TELOS

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INTRODUCTION

The massive state intervention into every crevice of civil society associated with the New Deal and its aftermath required, for its success, considerable social homogenization and de-individualization. Without it, the administrative apparatus could not process people into docile de-politicized consumers who readily accept bureaucratic authority as a condition of their social and psychological well-being. Although these phenomena were the subject of the famous Frankfurt School's 1936 study, many of the particular socio-psychological mechanisms involved remain unclear. In the opening essay on "Bureaucratization and the Family," Joel Kovel, drawing heavily on his own clinical experience, attempts to outline the process whereby the disintegration of the family creates problems of identity-formation which remain unsolved. This, in turn, results in a generation of psychologically crippled individuals whose effective functioning in modern society requires precisely the existence of that bureaucracy whose irresistible rationalizing thrust originally contributed to the disintegration of the traditional family and the substitution of experts and professionals to perform many of the functions previously carried out within that social unit. Thus, the process is self-validating—which explains, among other things, why modern administrative apparati remain necessary notwithstanding all of their obvious shortcoming and overall irrationality.

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In the same vein, Elizabeth and Stuart Ewen trace out some of the ways in which "Americanization" was successfully carried out through advertisement and other similar means. Aimed at heterogeneous ethnic groups whose cultural peculiarities allowed them to resist standard homogenizing efforts, this advertisement projected ideal models whose imitation accounts for the rapid assimilation of second and third generation immigrants. Compounded with the simultaneous process of family disintegration fostered by the administrative apparatus, this explains the unprecedented success in "Americanizing," i.e., standardizing, homogenizing, depoliticizing, and cretinizing, the multitude of ethnic communities in the American landscape of the 1950s and afterward.

Although somewhat older, Adorno's essay on "Administration and Culture" broaches the same theme—this time focusing specifically on what happens to culture in the process. Here Adorno prefigures a phenomenon which has become wide-spread recently and has been discussed in the pages of this journal under the heading of "artificial negativity." The process whereby administration destroys every remaining "hiding place" and, to the extent that it does this all too well, it must eventually reconstruct them, or even "plan the unplanned." It becomes an administrative task to challange administration so that it can continue on functioning effectively. Of course, in the early 1960s the crisis of the over-bureaucratized administrative apparatus had not yet reached the proportions it has in the past decade. Yet, Adorno's discussion clearly traces out some of the processes which eventually precipitated the crisis.

Continuing our critical re-examination of Marxism, James Miller outlines a series of criticisms which seem to warrant a reconsideration of some of Nietzsche's ideas. This theoretical path, which has also been undertaken by many sectors of the French Left, leads Miller to a further critique of post-Marxist efforts such as those of the French existentialists, Adorno and Habermas. Their relation to Nietzsche remains problematic. This is not a mere exercise in the history of ideas since a serious confrontation with Nietzsche raises crucial political questions concerning the nature of an emancipatory society—especially if the Marxian reconciliation and its totalitarian implications have already led to a re-thinking of the whole emancipatory project.

This problem of totalitarianism is also the subject of Evelyn Tschirhart's article "On Chinese Asexuality." The problem with the way sex is socially manipulated in that country tends to demystify a great deal of what has been said about the Chinese model as an alternative to the Soviet counterpart. The harsh penalties reported for alleged "sexual offenses," the retention of a Victorian outlook long after technological developments have made population control efforts totally independent of sexual asceticism, and the omnipresent and arbitrary heavy hand of the party are too reminiscent of the darkest days of Stalin's regime. Far from being the path to emancipation, the Chinese model appears more and more as a bad copy of the standard Stalinist version.

In attempting to better understand what Stalinism means and how it led to the phasing out of all types of innovative changes brought about by the Bolsheviks, Rainer Traub's article on "Lenin and Taylor" traces out the rise and fall of "scientific management" through a reconstruction of the history of Moscow's "Central Institute of Labor." Notwithstanding the miriad of problems involved in reconciling liberation with Taylorism, the fact that Stalinism could not even tolerate experimentation and research in that area illustrates the extent to which it failed to provide anything different from the worst possible variety of forced industrialization.

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Given the recent wave of interest in the work of Walter Benjamin, this issue includes another chapter from Sandor Radnoti's book on that subject. Since the book, for various political reasons, cannot be published in Hungary, we will attempt to serialize it in forthcoming issues. The present chapter on "Benjamin's Politics" indicates the extent to which Benjamin also was a victim of Western intellectuals' hopelessness in the 1930s. In spite of his brilliance, Benjamin came to accept far too many of the predominant myths of the time precisely at a time when many other intellectuals were moving in the opposite direction.

The *Notes* sections includes Laura Boella's critical evaluation of Agnes Heller's work as part of the efforts of the Hungarian Left during the past decade. Attempting to develop a Marxist perspective to contrapose to the official version, her work on Marx's theory of needs [now in English, but practically impossible to obtain in the U.S.] sought to locate a foundation for the New Left critique. Unfortunately, that analysis, on the one hand, ends up in a traditional Kantian ethics safeguarding the inviolability of individuality and human needs *as they manifest themselves*, while, on the other, in terms of the way needs are manipulated in the West—therefore making the whole analysis irrelevant there—the approach remains typically Eastern European. It presupposes an unsophisticated and oppressive bureaucracy restructuring needs in a situation in which individuals are still relatively uneffected by the more subtle manipulative mechanisms of the culture industry, the welfare state, and consumerism in general. At any rate, its Kantian outcome indicates to what an extent classical liberalism and its philosophical underpinnings remain revolutionary innovations in societies under bureaucratic centralist forms of government.

In order to provide an account of some of the theoretical and political problems presently being discussed, this issue of *Telos* includes three extensive conference reports by Beml, Cavalcanti, and Berman, dealing with recent conferences on Eurocommunism, Socialism in Latin America, and the Venice *Biennale*. Also enclosed is an exchange on "artificial negativity" which raises questions which need to be answered if this kind of analysis is to develop further.

In this issue we also publish a selection of recently translated letters between Luxemburg and her lover Jogiches, which reveals a different Luxemburg than the politician and theoretician she usually appears. The section closes with another series of impressions—"Notes from a Planning Office"—by a Yugoslav planner who, in order to avoid unnecessary flack, writes under the pseudonym of Hop Jan and sends us his contribution in a plain brown wrapper with no return address.

The review section opens with an extensive analysis of Elias' work. Such an analysis is needed since Elias is rapidly becoming the theoretical rallying point for those dissatisfied with critical theory and looking for a viable alternative. Unfortunately, as Buck-Morss readily shows, these expectations are not fulfilled and a close reading of *The Civilization Process* reveals a number of problems which make it a poor candidate to displace critical theory. The review section also contains an analysis of Racinaro's recent book seen as part of the theoretical offensive within the Italian Communist Party to overthrow the predominant Togliattian-Gramscian perspective, a discussion by Alt of working class history—followed by the author's reply—Harrison's devastating critique of Tar's ridiculous and pretentious book on the Frankfurt School, Herf's detailed analysis of Löwy's work on the young Lukács, Antonio's discussion of two typical *Annales* School contributions now in English, Kuper's interpretation of *Anti-Oedipus*, and Blume's examination of Rothenberg's *Notebooks*.

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RATIONALIZATION AND THE FAMILY

by Joel Kovel

In Kafka's *Trial*, K. succeeds in proving to the Priest that the Doorkeeper who keeps the man from approaching the Law is no more than a simpleton. The Priest, however, objects. No one has the right to pass judgment on the Doorkeeper, for he serves the Law; to doubt his dignity is to doubt the Law itself. K. fights back: "I don't agree with that point of view...for if one accepts it, one must accept as true everything the Doorkeeper says. But you yourself have sufficiently proved how impossible it is to do that." "No," said the Priest, "it is not necessary to accept everything as true, one must only accept it as necessary." "A melancholy conclusion," said K. "It turns lying into a universal principle."[1]

True enough...and melancholy enough. Kafka is describing the predicament of those trapped by rationalized, lucid madness—the world of modern administration. To the extent that his vision is true, i.e., to the degree that the administrative mode is totalized, people living in this mode are as insects caught in the web of a spider to whose power they cannot help but aspire. This is not an encouraging picture, nor is it the picture of man Marx had in mind. Yet, it contains a deep human truth, one which may tell us something about the failure of the left and of the radical consciousness in general in advanced capitalist societies.

The inertia of the masses cannot be comprehended on a purely objectivistic level. No matter how relentless may be the social structures that culminate in a net of economic domination, one is yet left with the question: why do some—perhaps most—people knuckle under, while others resist? In other words, there is no quantum of social coercion. Whatever is set up to exert such coercion—and this would include the entire output of the culture industry, the educational aparatus, etc.—has to act through an individual subjectivity that, multiplied without end, comprises the mass. It has to *mean* something to that subjectivity; and, depending on what it means and how the specific subject is constituted, coercion either produces compliance or resistance. Viewed from this end of the process, the "inertia of the masses" can be rephrased as the failure of a *historical* subject to develop from the *individual* subject. To study this failure, one must examine the historical emergence of that individual subject, in all its weakness and reproducibility.

1. Franz Kafka, *The Trial*, trans. Willa and Edwin Muir (New York, 1968), pp. 220-222.

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And one must study it in light of the notion of administration, for it is by this mode that history is delivered to the individual, much as medicine is administered to a patient.

What unites all the elements of social coercion in an historical totality is their formal subjugation to the administrative mode, their gathering by the tentacles of a universal bureaucracy. Ultimately, this inhuman process is made by and for humans. If the revolutionary spirit is gone, its elements have been seized and held hostage by administration. Adorno's phrase, "The totally administered society," arid and impersonal as it may appear, nevertheless strikes a chord of terror. There is something both desolate and diabolic about the idea. We know that this is the heart of the matter: a heart of heartlessness, an icy rationality that paralyzes the will and numbs the senses. What we are not able to comprehend is the point of historical mediation between a labyrinth with its endless chambers, their lurid green walls pasted over with yellowing memoranda, their flickering flourescent lights, stacks of forms and pockmarked bakelite counters—and the humans who line up quiescently behind them and succumb to its will.

For present purposes I shall use a set of congeneric terms, e.g., administrative mode, bureaucratic rationality, etc., to describe a peculiar way public life is delivered to persons within the terms of contemporary capitalist society. The mode is no discrete form, but a dialectical compound of an established reasonableness and fairness on the one hand, and a certain mysterious inexorability on the other. It is designed to be sensibly pleasant but never gratifying, to provide a rationalized type of stimulation and a notion of order. And, finally, it seems perfectly transparent and banal, yet invariably gives the impression of unseen forces at work. This is partly the result of a high degree of technological elaboration, and partly the function of the extreme degree of alienation and division of labor characteristic of bureaucratic rationalization. The notion is not confined to bureaucracies as such, but pervades mass media, health care, and other facets of contemporary life. The mode, in short, is superficiality of style with a deep hidden content. Although the bureaucratic mode serves the economic requirements of capital—notably by exerting some predictable control over the productivity of the work force and by regulating the consumption of commodities—there can be no doubt that it exerts a systematic cultural influence that transcends mere economistic considerations. Indeed, administration infiltrates every pore of personal existence. And by personal existence we mean life with other people, beginning with the family.

As Walter Benjamin[2] pointed out, one is never left in doubt that Kafka's fathers are right and have reason on their side—no matter how monstrous, filthy, seedy, and stupid they also happen to be. The capture of desire completes the triumph of administration. For after K's melancholy

2. Walter Benjamin, "Franz Kafka," in *Illuminations*, ed. Hannah Arendt (New York, 1969), pp. 111-141.

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conclusion, he wearies of disputation and paces alongside the Priest, fearful of becoming "utterly dependent" upon him. The priest tells him how to leave the cathedral—and now K panics."I can't find my way about in this darkness. . . don't you want anything more from me? . . . you let me go as if you cared nothing about me. . ." "I belong to the Court," replies the Priest. "So why should I want anything from you? The Court wants nothing from you. It receives you when you come and it dismisses you when you go."

In love, the weaker is the one who loves the more. Administration wants nothing from anybody; hence it remains the stronger so long as a glimmer of desire comes toward it from the human subject who is its object. And administration wants nothing because it is constituted by the negation of desire. Desire presupposes a subject. It is the vector between the subject and some lost portion of the object world—real or imagined. Bureaucracy, however, is created insofar as subjectivity is wrung out of social intercourse. It is what is left behind: "rationalization," if one takes an ahistorical view; administrative domination if one thinks dialectically.

As Heydebrand has recently argued,[3] bureaucratic organizations, far from being the "abstract march of functional rationality," always embody the fundamental contradictions of capitalist society even as they raise those contradictions to new historical levels. From this standpoint, bureaucratic rationalization always has one super-ordinate meaning, namely, to increase the productivity of labor. Consequently, it drags along with it all of the contradictory moments inherent in the notion of productivity and the labor process.

In order to turn labor into a commodity, the worker must be objectified so that his activity can be placed into a calculable set of relations out of which surplus value can be extracted. At the same time, some modicum of subjectivity must thrive in order for value to exist at all. In concrete terms, workers must retain enough of a mind so that they may sell labor-power on the market as well as exercise some degree of choice in the consumption of commodities. Without these two ends of the economic process, capital would cease to circulate. Consequently the existence, not to mention the expansion, of capital depends upon the combined maintanance of a ruthless objectification and the cultivation of a certain degree of subjectivity. But such a combination is inherently explosive. For, by permitting the coexistence of subjectivity and objectification, capital becomes vulnerable to the adventitious development of genuine rationality as well as transcendant desire. In other words, capital necessarily permits the germination of what, sufficiently developed, could destroy it. Nothing is more important for its survival than the thwarting of such a development. But this cannot be done automatically. People will not spontaneously accept the cultural terms of capitalist expansion; nor can anything so irrational be taught directly. The

3. Wolf Heydebrand, "Organizational Contradictions in Public Bureaucracies: Toward a Marxian Theory of Organizations," *The Sociological Quarterly* 18 (Winter 1977), pp. 83-107.

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terms must be mediated so that stunted forms of human development can be passed off as the apex of human nature. In this struggle, administration becomes capital's stoutest legion.

Bureaucratic rationalization may then be read as the more or less continuous attempt to manage the inter-relationship between the subjectivity and the objectification required by capital. It does so by mediating its peculiar brand of rationality—one that strips desire from subjectivity, as it "humanizes" objectification, i.e., tries to make it fair and equitable, while retaining a semblance of rational objectivity. Since the instruments of bureaucracy are constituted by the elimination of desire while the human subjects to whom they relate remain passionate, the conditions for bureaucratic domination are therefore automatically established. The question remains as to how these conditions become invested with desire, terror, and necessity.

In the immediate experience of life, the notion of necessity is rooted in the family—to be more exact, in those primitive intrafamilial images of self and others that congeal into the matrix of subjectivity. And since as Kafka held, everything must merely be accepted as necessary for bureaucratic domination to exist, the alignment of the matrix of family relations must be secured within the prevailing conception of necessity.

The notion of necessity described here is quite phenomenologically distinct from that allowed by ordinary consciousness and factored into political economy. The latter is experienced as an imperative stemming from the outside world; it is rooted in an appreciation of the self's relation to that outer world; and it is felt in a framework of linear, sequential time, no matter how brief the interval. The structure of such necessity is generally of an "if-then" nature. "If I wish to survive, then I had better step out of the way of that oncoming truck." Or, from the economic sphere: "If I wish to retain my unemployment benefits, then I had better see to it that I am paid under the table for that free-lance job." The logic of this form of necessity varies from reflex to calculation; it can be readily assimilated into the prevailing reality principle.

But this notion of necessity is not what Kafka's Priest had in mind; nor is it sufficient in itself to lock people into the order of things. There is another, more primary experience of necessity that does not arise from the outer world, although, significantly enough, it may be projected onto the outer world and be experienced as arising there. It rather emerges from a stratum of "deep" subjectivity—"deep" in the sense of being "thing-like," beneath verbalization, without "if-then" qualities, outside ordinary time sequence and essentially unconscious, although with a certain degree of determinable structure. The pressure of this stratum into consciousness—and hence its phenomenological surface—is experienced as a murky yet peremptory urging; and the structure of this urging is given by the archaic mental traces of original caretaking others as they had been experienced by the infant through his or her body. Since this quality of necessity is suffused with desire for an outer source of

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power, and since the model for such a power was once a parent, it may be said that the family supplies a trans-historical substructure for the possibilities of domination. One says *trans-historical* because the structure is an outcome of a universal human disposition: in this case, infantile helplessness and the need for attachment. To this extent, we are introducing "biological" considerations, although we are dealing with a piece of nature that confers no determinancy and, indeed, sees to it that the nucleus of the human psyche is imaginary.

The family, then, is no "base" for historical domination. History neither abolishes nor is based on the trans-historical but is a continual transformation of it. If it should turn out that transactions with the mother are responsible for the primary experience of necessity, this does not make mothers responsible for historical domination (although it might help account for the profound and decisive fear of women which enters into the history of patriarchal domination).[4] Similarly, though men in fact rule in patriarchal-dominative orders up to and including capitalism, this does not make fathers as such responsible for the woes of family life. A much more complex account is needed to comprehend the relations between the personal microsphere and the societal macrosphere[5] than has yet been forthcoming from radical thought. Certainly, Marxism continues to flounder for lack of such an articulation.

Marx recognized that the self is an "ensemble of social relations."[6] and that we construct our beings out of the ways we are with others, but he did not appreciate—and this became a particularly weak point in his system—that the self does not spring up all at once like Athena, but passes from an undifferentiated primordium through a number of intermediary stages, all of which are dragged along and play vital roles in later developments. The first apprehension of self is of the reflection made by the infant in the eyes and gestures of the primary caretaking parent—an object that, for historical as well as biological reasons, generally happens to coincide with the mother. Before there is a well-structured "I" who can position him or herself with respect to the outer world and so enter the realm of economic necessity, there is the proto-self composed of the initial products of differentiation from the primordium. We may regard these products as comprising an elementary contradiction between the nameless urging that stems from the activity of the infant's organism, and the named construction that stems from incorporating the other's recognition. The former is a matter of sensation, the latter of an internalized perception; the energy comes from within, the form from without; and though they do not go together in nature, it is the job of the nascent self to put them together in its own realm, that of the psyche. In

4. Cf. Dorothy Dinnerstein, *The Mermaid and the Minotaur* (New York, 1976).

5. John Fekete, "Administered Society and its Culture Industry: Politics and Rationality in Science Fiction," unpublished paper delivered at the St. Louis *Telos* Conference, February 1978.

6. Karl Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach," in *Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and History,* ed. and trans. Loyd D. Easton and Kurt H. Guddat, (Garden City, 1967), p. 402.

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this fashion the primary or narcissistic self arises, the self as other, the self in which the subject fuses itself from a thing-like element drawn from its own bodily urge and an elementary word, or name, that belongs to the other.[7] When this fundamental elaboration of the self begins, individuals are readied for historical participation; insofar as it is ever completed, they become full historical agents.[8]

We may study the primitive manifestations of this organization with the aid of psychoanalysis which, by withdrawing the object of inter-subjective dialogue from view, succeeds in decomposing the screen of ordinary language and in revealing the fundamental structures of subjectivity. Based upon these findings we can generalize that, for each human subject, there is a level beneath which the person can re-experience the empty unstructuredness of an original craving fused with the assignment of agency or structure to an unspecified other. Now this is a frightening and risky position, and in ordinary waking experience, tends to become sealed off—i.e., repressed—rather quickly. The mode of repression is itself a historically specific act which reflects the individual's internalization of the prevailing mode of social relations.[9] From a somewhat different angle, this means that repression achieves a synthetic unity between the most elementary properties of the self and the externally established system of domination: in this case, bureaucratic administration. Between these faces of the unity lie the intermediary structures of everyday life and their subjective correlates—more specifically, subjective registration of the family, which coincides, in the most general sense of that term, with the Oedipus complex. In other words, no individual can react to any social force without bringing in all the particulars of his or her individual history. No matter how ant-like the denizens of an administered society may essentially be, each ant moves according to a "physiology" which is given by personal history. Within any concrete historical situation, all these elements are involved, although the particular conjunction of historical forces may bring one or another feature to the fore.

A brief psychological digression my be in order here. One is accustomed in psychoanalysis to distinguish between two broad phases of infantile mental development, the preoedipal and the oedipal. The former generally coincides with the oral and anal stages of psychosexual development, and the latter, with the phallic and genital phases. However, the essential nature of preoedipal and oedipal phases does not reside in the sexual sphere as such, but rather in the orientation between the self and others in the world. In brief, preoedipal relations are *dyadic* in quality, while those of the oedipal period are *triangulated.* In the former, the self is related to another (generally

7. Cf. Joel Kovel, "Things and Words: Metapsychology and the Historical Point of View," *Psychoanalysis and Contemporary Thought,* I:1 (1978), pp. 21-88.

8. Lucien Sève developed this concept under the name "excentration sociale." Cf. "Psychanalyse et Materialisme Historique," in C. Clement, P. Bruno, L. Sève, *Pour une Critique Marxiste de la Theorie Psychanalytique* (Paris 1973).

9. Wilhelm Reich was the first to pursue this idea systematically. Cf. *Character Analysis* (New York, 1945).

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the mother) into whom it can be more or less fully absorbed. As a corollary to this, the subjective boundaries of the preoedipal self are blurred *vis à vis* the world and its own body.[10] By contrast, the oedipal child has achieved a reasonably clear distinction (subject to numerous lapses throughout life) in relation to the body. Further, the other becomes *others*: there is always a third (classically, father alongside mother)—and beyond this third, an endless elaboration of others in increasingly intricate patterns. It is for this reason that the Oedipus complex can be said to be the subjective registration of the family as well as the mediation between infantile life and social existence. However real the distinction between preoedipal and oedipal phases, of equal importance is their interpenetration: the more deeply one studies an individual, the more problematic becomes any discrete segregation of mental elements into one phase or the other. In particular, one becomes impressed with the tendency of what seems oedipal to dissolve into its preoedipal forerunners. It often seems as if real participation in the world of discrete individuals—i.e., civil society—is necessary to keep the individual from sliding backward into a narcissistic pool of merger with an undifferentiated other. In any case, people seem considerably more vulnerable to manipulation around this point than had previously been realized by psychoanalytic students of society, who had made the Oedipus complex the *alpha* and *omega* of psychosocial transactions. There is a sense in which they were right, since oedipal relations remain the point of intersection between the individual and the many discrete figures of society. However, once entry into subjectivity has been attained, a dialectic between oedipal and preoedipal takes over in which it often seems as if the more primitive layers are the decisive ones.

In other words, the Oedipus complex does not in itself account for the subjective mediation of domination, but is joined with, and indeed rests upon, a more fundamental preoedipal mental organization that has to do with the origins of the psyche itself out of object loss. It is this original function that supplies the universal—i.e., "biological" or trans-historical—quality to the situation; whereas the oedipal configuration is the inward reflection of the given historical state of the family and of relations of production in general. The Oedipal structures are no less critical for being yoked to more primitive preoedipal functions. But their importance is linked with that of history itself as well as with the previously outlined universal and trans-historical core of subjectivity. Viewed from the angle of history, the Oedipal structures are the shadow cast by the fathers who seized control of society at the dawn of historical time. Viewed from the angle of a transhistorical subjectivity, however, Oedipus, his forebears and his descendants, are all hedges against self-dissolution and merger. Combining the two views, we may say that historical domination has been supported and reinforced by what it negates, i.e., a return to certain anxieties attendant

10. For a good survey of early self-object differentiation, cf. Margaret S. Mahler, Fred Pine and Anni Bergman, *The Psychological Birth of the Human Infant* (New York, 1975).

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upon the primary condition of the self.

These considerations do not make the real position of mothers irrelevant, either as transmitters or victims of historical process. Aside from their position in the oedipal configuration (which is where children generally learn the key lessons about the role of the sexes in society), the actual behavior of the mother in the preoedipal phase plays an enormous role in the future development of the child. The seeds of resistance as well as acquiescence are sown in the first phase of life. Indeed it seems to me that the refusal of history, which is after all the fount of the revolutionary impulse, is instituted in the preoedipal—and presymbolic—experience of fusion with the mother. Being presymbolic, this experience belongs to the transhistorical, i.e., is removed from the historical system of significations. But the transhistorical is no more an absolute category than the historical. Beyond good and evil, it still only survives under specific historical circumstances, as babies only survive in a given family which shapes and is shaped by them.

It is not easy to pinpoint the central attitude of capitalist society, to say when it began, when it achieved hegemony, or whether it is still in a process of development. For present purposes let us agree to see it as a more or less ruthless universalization of an objectifying attitude. This, finally, is responsible for the mystique of productivity and economism since, by stripping the world of value, it leaves human activity nowhere to go than to work upon lifeless matter. What most critics of this development have overlooked, however, is its irrational core and mediations in everyday life. Despite appreciation of the irrationality of the attitude in its overall historical context, it is somehow assumed that objectification is itself a position rationally chosen and held. There is a confusion here between a transhistorical need to objectify, i.e., to realize needs and subjective wishes by transforming the external world, and the perversion of this function which occurs under capitalism and is specific to it.

In terms of the above discussion concerning the deeper structures of subjectivity, it may be possible to make some headway into the problem through a consideration of the history of the family under capitalism. Here one essential development stands out as characteristic of the entire era in its effects upon personal life: the relentless separation between so-called productive work and domestic life.

This is not the place, nor have I the qualifications, to develop the history of the bourgeois family in any detail. Let me state as a matter of definition that by the bourgeois family I mean a mode of familial existence specific to capitalist society as a whole, and imposed upon all who contribute to that society. There are important differences between the famlies of the working and the ruling classes; but all of them are stained with the mark of the totality.

The only point I wish to pursue here is the family's location within the central contradictions of capitalist society. It is perhaps not too sweeping a generalization to claim that the split between productive work and domestic

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life has cast a longer shadow across personal life than any other historical factor of the entire era.[11] The split has been necessary from the economic side as a means of developing the economic sphere and the primacy of production as such. It was the only way to develop a work force that could be inserted into a calculable system of wages and commodity relations. So long as production had been organized locally and in contact with the rest of personal life, no class hegemony could be established along the lines of economic domination. Once work had been broken from the hearth, however, it could be universalized, along with all its other cultural accoutrements: for example, social mobility, a technical attitude, etc. And once these factors existed at large, they could become the signifying elements for the rising bourgeoisie.

But the bourgeoisie did not pre-exist outside Western history like some nation of Goths hammering on the Roman gates. Rather, it created itself from within European society. Bourgeois self-generation drew on antecedent elements in Western culture; but its specific qualitative distinction did not arise until work had been split from the home. The character of the class—and of subsequent class struggles—became defined by the scission between work and domesticity. To put it slightly differently, it is not productivity as such, or objectification as such, that characterizes the bourgeoisie, except in a symptomatic way. The class has rather drawn its historical dynamic from the dialectic of two aspects of social existence, work and domesticity, that became severed in order that the bourgeoisie might arise.

Focusing for the time being on the domestic side, we can observe several remarkable and contradicting features. First of all, the bourgeois family was from the beginning a *decomposition* of older extended kinship systems that belonged to a precapitalist unity of work and domestic life. This decomposition began in feudal times and is by no means complete. In fact, if one recognizes capitalism's more or less systematic demolition of sustaining features of family life, for example, local rootedness, religious justification or economic necessity, an essential feature of bourgeois society has been to destroy the family as such. If one were to look only at the exigencies of the pure accumulation of capital, the family would be wiped out as an institution—except for those brute "biological" considerations having to do with the reproduction of the work force that Marx was able to describe in a purely economistic way within the framework of *Capital.*[12] Nor can the reality of this destruction be denied: look at any nursing home and see the outcome of family life for those who no longer have their role to play in the circulation of capital.

And yet the bourgeois age is the age of the family in a very real sense—not simply the family as a decayed fragment of metabolic breakdown, but the

11. Cf. E.P. Thompson: "The crime of the factory system was to inherit the worst features of the domestic system in a context which had none of the domestic compensations." *The Making of the English Working Class* (New York, 1963), p. 335.

12. Cf. Chapter X, "The Working Day," Vol. I, *Capital* (New York, 1967), pp. 231-302.

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family as centerpeice of the personal world, the family as location of a desire and intimacy that were not conceptualizable in precapitalist formations, the family that has been called "nuclear" in the two-fold sense of being the cellular module of social organization and the heart of human emotional life. This latter functional trend inherent in the bourgeois family is no sentimental trifle, nor is it reducible to economic terms—i.e., it cannot be explained simply as a manifestation of the need to stimulate commodity consumption or to develop a highly educated and differentiated work force. If these elements were economically reducible, the capitalist state would not have to worry about its legitimation function—i.e., it could collapse legitimation into accumulation. Instead, the state is beset with a neverending political struggle based upon the irreconcilable contradiction between those functions, a contradiction in which legitimation is always the weaker, yet never an erasable, element so far as the state is concerned. Hence, the political nature of the struggle.

The legitimation functions are real; they are grounded in bourgeois family existence and they represent the impression made by love on political economy. Splitting work from domestic life did far more than permit the development of a fantastic level of wealth, i.e., of objects of desire: it freed the family from the constraints of precapitalist domination and permitted it to undergo a structural development of its own. At the same time, it burdened this new institution—and, in particular, the women within it—with the unmet needs peculiar to the capitalist mode of work, with its systematic alienation. It should be noted that alienation, and not mere brutalization of work, is involved here; and that alienation does not involve a simple degradation of the work process but a more complex function that includes the promise of a higher level of development along with frustration and mystification. In other words, alienated individuals have been exposed to a certain degree of stimulation; they feel at some level the promise of entitlement of better things; and yet they are systematically cut off from any real agency in public or workplace existence. It is this individual who turns to home for the fulfillment of unmet—and historically expected—needs. Typically, this has consisted of the man attempting to reflect the domination experienced at the workplace onto the others at home, while at the same time seeking consolation from his wife. With both power and nurturance alienated away from the workplace, the family has to pick up the check at the cost of the woman's individuality. Eventually, the costs are passed all around, appearing at length as neurotic crippling and in character types suitably twisted to conform to capitalist society. There are several themes and innumerable variations, but the basic story remains the same: the conjunction of the historical and transhistorical under capitalism devolves through the family to produce a host of damaged individuals.

And so the bourgeois family is assailed with profound contradictions from the moment of its inception. Its prominence is a product more of these intense contradictory demands than of any supposed "nuclear" structure it is said to

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have. A close look at the experience of the bourgeois family would probably disclose that the solidity connoted by the term "nuclear" is at most a meta-stable resting point in the history of its development; and more likely, just another piece of propaganda. Whatever the duration of the family's stability, it is plain that the forces to which it is subjected would tear it apart if the state did not undertake substantial interventions to patch things up.

One of the casualties of this development deserves some attention: the role of the father, or of patriarchy in general. The classic bourgeois family is patriarchal and it was in such a context that Freud observed the configuration of the Oedipus complex. Yet, at least for the past two centuries, the patriarchal quality of the bourgeois family has been no more than an outer shell steadily hollowed out from within.[13] In this respect, bourgeois patriarchy is like a house nibbled away by termites: it looks fine for quite a while, but then collapses all of a sudden. The hegemony of capital, with its fluid objectification, sounds the knell of patriarchy, even though those who retain power appear for some time to be in the lineage of kings. Capital's ethos of calculating rationality, epitomized in the notion of administration, is antithetical to the spirit of myth in general, and to the Oedipal myth in particular. The arbitrary and capricious will of patriarchy, descended from Abraham and Isaac, yields to fairness, the fact-finding board, and peer review. When Louis XIV boasted that he was the state, he was already protesting too much: the mere fact of having to remind his audience of the identity signified that a defensive posture was about to be taken toward impersonal administrative forces. Since capital began to win, the real figure of the father has steadily receded. Kafka represents the last gasp of its hold over the imagination, a cry of longing for one who has passed through the door. And with Kafka, the father disappears from Western literature.

What then is the role of the Oedipus complex, and why does patriarchy persist? Is the Oedipus complex, as Freud suspected, ultimately a biological residium that makes its claim in the face of the historical whittling away of its objective base? Or is there a Lacanian *nom du père*[14] that persists in the structure of language and cognition itself? From extended observation of neurotic and psychotic people, it is clear that oedipal dynamics continue to play a compelling role in their inner mental life; and this role continues to determine a good measure of their active relation to the object world. However, as previously noted, oedipal dynamics cannot be regarded as the exclusive organizing principle of the deeper state of subjectivity. Indeed, with respect to the psyche, they are in a relation homologous to that between patriarchy and administration on the social level: the Oedipus complex being the outer (i.e., closer to consciousness) aspect concealing a more basic and decisive preoedipal organization.

Whether this represents a real historical shift from Freud's time has to remain somewhat speculative at present. Early psychoanalytic formulatons,

13. Christopher Lasch, *Haven in a Heartless World: The Family Besieged* (New York, 1977).
14. Jacques Lacan, *Ecrits,* trans. Glen Sheridan (New York, 1977), p. 67.

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as we know, were almost exclusively oedipal; and Freud himself seemed quite remarkably obtuse on the subject of mothers in general, and the preoedipal relations with mothers in particular.[15] Was this a reflection of that portion of psyche offered up to psychoanalytic investigation at that particular time? And was this a real historical variation or a superficial change? Or did it merely manifest the bias of the analysts, which is itself a historical phenomenon? The question is impossible to answer fully at present (since it begs as well the ever-present factor of the narrow class basis of psychoanalytic discourse).[16] However, whatever the precise contours of the shift in psychoanalytic interest from oedipal to preoedipal dynamics, it seems that a historical force has been at work; and that this force, in its broadest outlines, has had to do with the weakening of actual parental influence in a social order that has remained structured by patriarchy.[17] The early "oedipal" neurotics Freud studied were by and large people in rebellion against actual fathers who could no longer hold them in check; while today's "narcissistic" neurotics (who have added to and not replaced the former category) reflect a more general fragmentation of relations with both parents. And as for the bias of the analyst, this has always been a historical factor. It should be recalled for example, that the intense interest in the mother-infant bond did not simply emerge from intrinsically scientific deliberations, but followed the political fortunes of women. As Juliet Mitchell has observed,[18] it was only after World War II allowed great numbers of women access to the public sphere that psychoanalysis began to turn its eyes toward primary human relations.

Freud pointed out that instincts were urges to return to earlier states of things.[19] While this insight was meant in a strictly biological sense, it can only be fully appreciated with respect to the historical—transhistorical dialectic. What is "instinctual' is a manifestation of that which is transhistorical clinging to what is historically passing away. Given the persistence of patriarchial structures along with the waning of immediate paternal influence, children, from their transhistorical position (which includes somatic givens as well as nurturant familial bonds), conjure up the oedipal parents and relate intrapsychically to them. The instinctual structure stands in an inverse relation to the objective one; and an object is instituted in the mind after it has been lost in reality. Once established intrapsychically, instinctual structures propel the individual to re-find the object in reality. The installation of the Oedipus complex provides therefore the subjective conditions for the persistence of patriarchy in the face of its historical obsolescence. Preoedipal formations, by contrast, are less capable of objective

15. Philip Slater, *The Glory of Hera* (Boston, 1971).
16. Michael Schneider, *Neurosis and Civilization: A Marxist-Freudian Synthesis*, trans. M. Roloff (New York, 1975).
17. Alexander Mitscherlich, *Society without the Father*, trans. Eric Mosbacher (New York, 1973).
18. Juliet Mitchell, *Psychoanalysis and Feminism* (New York, 1974).
19. Sigmund Freud, *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (1920), Standard Edition, Vol. XVIII, pop. 1-65.

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restoration on a social scale, although they structure much of the psychology of love, including its subversiveness. This is because of their dyadic, self-dissolving and protosymbolic qualities.

The loss of real parental influence is associated with an oedipal configuration of fantasy that is intense but incapable of serving as a platform for more mature development. Indeed the individual becomes all too readily suffused with preoedipal fantasy and subject to experiences of personal disintegration. The oedipal fantasies which articulate with these strata of mind are not the classical "positive" ones of conquest but the "negative" Oedipus complex of passive yearning for authority.[20] A further propping up by reality is required; and this support both replaces the missing parental influence and articulates symbolically with the negative oedipal fantasies as well as deeper preoedipal ones. It is into this space that administration is inserted, ostensibly a rationalization of the objective disorder of the world, but no less a correlative of the most primitive and thinglike strata of the inner mental world. And it is the conjunction of extremes of rationalization and irrationality that lends administration its sense of mysterious inexorability. It is as though the shadow of love were cast by a most loathsome and heartless suitor.

The essential mode of relation between individuals and the bureaucracy is that of the self toward an undifferentiated other—i.e., it is a relation desired from early infancy, of the self with its primary caretaking object. The triangulation of the oedipal situation yields to the dyad of an original bond; and capital, in becoming post-oedipal, does so by marshalling that which, in the family, is preoedipal.

Such a development does not take place in a state of happiness. Immediate observation confirms this truth in a compelling way. In its essentials, family life in advanced capitalist society is psychotic. The combination of heightened needs for nurturance with the loss of a material human presence for delivering these needs leads to a situation where the basic tie between the generations is one of psychotic fusion. The essential relation is lack of distinction between the self and other. In an age when increasing individuality is the ruling trend, the child is seen less and less as an individual within the family. The parents are forced to expend huge amounts of emotional energy toward children; yet, lacking social autonomy themselves, they cannot let them go. Children from their side, feel craving but no structure: in order to preserve sanity, a premature and violent rupture with parents has to be made. The older generation is disparaged and jettisoned, ostensibly with contempt but actually out of fear; for when the parents are approached, ordinary logical relations are suspended and a panicky loss of self, accompanied by extreme hatred, is experienced. Rather than experience this actual state of affairs, a falsified subjectivity arises: the whole panoply of inauthentic personal attitudes that provide the raw material for

20. Sigmund Freud, "From the History of an Infantile Neurosis" (1918), Standard Edition, Vol. XVII, p. 6.

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psychotherapeutic trades.

The distance between generations, combined with a perpetual craving, creates so to speak, vacuoles within personal experience into which the organelles of administration can ever so neatly be inserted. Here at last is a certified source of rationality, not to be valued for itself but as a hedge against madness. The fact that the logic of administration is shadowed by the domination of labor and that it enters as the embodiment of objectification, might make it seem an unlikely candidate for meeting the intense human needs that arise from the crisis of the family. And indeed it is, if needs are taken in a progressive sense, i.e., as what people "really" need. But in the actual state of disordered subjectivity evoked by contemporary family life, the logic of administration, and the intrusions of the capitalist order in general, play into the given psychological state of affairs.

If the dialectical logic of the unconscious is kept in mind, then someone in the situation outlined above is clearly anything but ready for a full human relation. Indeed, their yearnings, intense as they may be, are primarily a source of anxiety, for they lead back to hatred and to the edge of dissolution. The false subject which represents a lifeline away from this edge demands a false object for its realization; and the instruments of capital, from school curricula and T.V. shows to the bureaucratic logic of corporations and state agencies, are thoroughly tooled to meeting such a need.

The administrative mode provides the objective template upon which the psychoanalytic notion of the *ego* is constructed. This notion, which is a good example of reification in contemporary discourse, depicts the ego as a quasi-independent mechanism capable of mediating—with the ambivalent aid of conscience, or superego—between the "animal" id within the self and external reality. As recent psychoanalytic critics have pointed out,[21] this idea of the ego is an anthropomorphic fiction that does little justice to the subtleties of mental life. However, although the notion of the ego is extensively reified as a theoretical object, it must be granted that this reification has a certain factual correspondence with personal life within bourgeois society, insofar as the conditions of social existence force upon individuals a profound split between inner and outer life and hence require the development—as a matter of psychological survival—of more or less

21. Cf. Merton Gill and Philip Holzman, eds. *Psychology vs. Metapsychology. Psychoanalytic Essays in Memory of George S. Klein. Psychological Issues.* Monograph No. 36 (New York, 1976). Also, William Grossman and Bennett Simon, "Anthropormorphism-Motive, Meaning and ausality in Psychoanalytic Theory," *The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child,* Vol. XXIV (1969), pp. 78-111. The thrust of these critiques is to eliminate biologistic and mechanistic features from psychoanalytic theory. Their hazard is an attenuation of the depth of psychoanalytic discourse; cf. my "Things and Words," *op.cit.* Ego Psychology has come to bear a heavy share of the reification which has crept into mainstream psychoanalysis. In a particularly effective critique of Heinz Hartmann, the main exponent of Ego Psychology since Freud, Roy Schafer pointed out that Hartmann's Ego, rather than the self-subsisting biological agency it was portrayed as being, was more like an endopsychic representation of the efficient Austrian bureaucracy in which Hartmann's father had been a high official. Cf. Roy Schafer, "An Overview of Heinz Hartmann's Contribution to Psychoanalysis." *International Journal of Psychoanalysis,* 51 (1970), pp. 425-447.

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alienated internal mental agencies. The ego certainly has a mental reality, but it exists as the internalized adaptation to the existing mode of administration. Since it is the imprint of an external social reality that goes it own way antithetical to human desire, the ego—insofar as it can be postulated as a "thing" within the perimeter of bourgeois relations—is perpetually stretched out to the breaking point between the realms whose mediation it attempts. In this state of crisis, the ego turns to external objects for succor and stabilization; and it is at this juncture that the external social order has seized control. Through the administration of culture, the state sees to it that objects of desire, muted by the pale certification of rationality, are dispensed, whether in the form of Muzak, sex-education curricula or professional football. The sign of all these phenomena is the presentation of some deep wish of desire conjugated with the mask of a perfect and ultimate control by an unseen other. A new order of necessity arises. This, then, becomes the fate of the striving for transcendence, which, in unofficial hands, could move toward the revolutionary transformation of society itself.

What we are describing amounts to a *conjugation* between emotional states and objective structures, between desire and instrumental rationality. Each is falsified according to the operation of distinct dynamisms—the dialectic of the family and the commodity, respectively—and each demands of the other respect for its own falsity. Therefore, the conjugation between them is a doubled falsification, the making of "lying into a universal principle." The only immediately common feature between the two realms is a sense of power and urgency, Kafka's notion of necessity, not experienced as the apprehension of real relations in the world of space and time but as the inchoate urge towards a distant and receding center of power. To the extent that such an urge has transhistorical qualities it is reflected in the universal human pull towards transcendence. What characterizes the age of capital, however, is the historicization of the desire for transcendance, its seizure and universalization within a host of material circumstances, from the watching of television to the waiting on line at the neighborhood bank or supermarket. People are not particularly fascinated by these phenomena. Indeed, what strikes one is the rather low level of libidinal investment characteristic of the conjugation between desire and rationality, compared with more immediate subjective attitudes towards, say, one's body or family members. The point is not that people *desire* the administrative mode. It is rather that administration protects them against the desires they cannot stand, while it serves out, in the form of diluted rationalizations, a hint of the desire and power lost to them.

Administrative rationality is nothing that anybody except a small segment of the managerial class is happy about. Indeed, its purpose is not to provide happiness but to offer a dialectical fusion of realisitc self-preservation combined with a defense against the deepest anxieties. Since these anxieties are generated by the perpetual crisis of the family, all administration has to do in order to secure a more or less permanently docile population is to keep this crisis going. This task it has undertaken with alacrity, having made the family a prime subject of state concern since the beginning of the century. By

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thus appearing to be helpful in the human sense, the state manages to destroy the roots of family life and personal autonomy while introducing an endless procession of ego supports in the form of the various helping professions and agencies.[22] The fact that certain individuals may benefit from this arrangement only serves to legitimate it on a large scale—and it is on this larger scale that the process of destruction and rehabilitation is carried out.

Thus, administrative rationality has become the great mediating mode between subjective and objective existence. Without creativity, spontaneity, or the capacity to make anybody happy, it becomes the primary gluing force of contemporary culture. As long as it works, there is a rough equivalence between the amount of subjective autonomy it demolishes and the ego supports it provides—and this suffices to keep a reasonably intact population of producers and consumers in line with the prevailing order of things. It is obvious, however, that this state of affairs can never provide more than brief periods of stability for a small segment of the population. And the weakest point is the family. Insofar as the family is so structured as to be unable to match the desires it inculcates with the objects with which it is provided, and insofar as administrative intrusions cannot but in the long run continue the crisis of the family, the present arrangement can be no more than an unstable equilibrium. The system is open to perturbations from any number of angles—from attendant economic shortages to outbursts of unmediable mass-psychological desires and anxieties. In this respect, it should be recognized that the disorders we may expect—the workings on a mass-level of that part of us called id—are the well-springs of resistance no less than acquiescence. The opportunity arises afresh with each child born into the family. For administration, which destroys the autonomy and intimacy that people have become acculturated to need, also continually creates conditions that its own spurious brand of rationalization cannot encompass. By eliminating or otherwise alienating the need for human labor, bureaucratic capitalism leads to an increase in unbound time. It attempts to administer this (mainly through education and the culture industry); but the attempt never succeeds—ultimately because the center of psychological gravity has shifted to more primitive mental levels. The ground forever erodes under the tread of administration. Watching children watch T.V., one knows they are being dulled, rendered passive, made to numbly accept an unseen administered order. . . but one also senses that the programming never really captures their minds. Some portion of fantasy always escapes, not at all necessarily for better things, but available for something unexpected.

What this will portend I leave to the soothsayers. There are only two considerations for the future I would like to mention in closing. One is the inadequacy of any purely personalistic or family therapy—at least as presently construed—as a way out of the crisis. Whatever individual reconciliation this

22. For a good survey of this kind of penetration into everyday life, cf. Peter Schrag, *Mind Control* (New York, 1978).

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may offer—and I am not disputing its merit on a personal level—it is plain from the above that no therapy as such can unlock the point of conjugation where the economic order and the state penetrates into personal life. The second consideration follows from the first. It is the necessity of developing a conscious Left strategy, more fully articulated than heretofore, in which the unity of personal and work life can be re-established. This may have to proceed on a concretely microsocial or cellular level for a considerable period of time—time during which an understanding of its generalization to the totality of society can be formulated. The functioning of this strategy is neither to bypass nor reconstruct the family. Neither can be done, for intimate family relations remain a transhistorical given that cannot be gotten around, while the notion of reconstruction implies that there once was an ideal family unit to which we must return: a fantasy, understandable in infantile terms, but foreign to a real historical understanding of that perpetually battered foundation of civilization. The job then is not to reclaim but to newly define love, work and the generation of culture free from the tentacles of the state.

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SOME IMPLICATIONS OF NIETZSCHE'S THOUGHT FOR MARXISM*

by James Miller

Max Weber once wrote that "one can measure the honesty of a contemporary scholar, and above all, of a contemporary philosopher, in his posture toward Nietzsche and Marx." At the risk of belaboring the obvious, I would like to use Weber's comment as an excuse for reassessing Nietzsche's implications for Marxism—for, despite the difficulty of condensing his thought into debatable propositions, Nietzsche at least gestures toward a set of problems that raise serious doubts about Marx's original theory. In raising such doubts in the present context, it is not my intention to renounce Marxism as "obsolete"—as if important ideas, like automobiles, enjoy a limited life span—nor is it my intention, on the other hand, to remedy any deficiencies of Marxism with the aid of "existentialism"—as if important ideas, like antique autos on the blink, ought to be patched up with spare parts and kept running, for how much longer and where nobody knows. Instead, I want to state in simple terms what I think matters about Nietzsche's thought for those of us still concerned with the fate of Marx's project. To this end, I will close by briefly criticizing how latter-day neo-Marxists—Theodor Adorno and Jürgen Habermas in particular—have tried to cope with the kinds of questions posed by Nietzsche. This is not to suggest that Nietzsche's own position is incontrovertible, or even that it constitutes a privileged or unique standpoint for launching the kind of critique attempted here. Nor do I see any obviously preferable alternatives to the theories—of Marx, Adorno and Habermas—here criticized. The production of a positive program out of this problematic I have left to others, better equipped for the task.

At the outset, three aspects of Marx's original theory need to be detailed. I

*This paper was originally delivered at the Antioch Telos Conference in Yellow Springs, Ohio, on May 27, 1977. At that time, it was criticized for its alleged "left irrationalism" (see the report in *Telos* 32, Summer 1977, p. 188). More helpfully, Bob D'Amico pointed out that my argument seemed merely to reiterate positions already taken in France by Foucault and others. At the time, I had paid little attention to this work. Since then, I have read some of the French discussion of Nietzsche, and find myself in sympathy with much of it: particularly with Deleuze's treatment of Nietzsche as an anti-Hegelian, Foucault's incisive discussion of Nietzsche as a historian, and Derrida's attack on Heidegger's reading of Nietzsche. I have nevertheless chosen to let my original essay stand essentially unchanged, if only as independent evidence of how Nietzsche's thought may assume significance for someone sifting through the debris of Marxism.

1. Quoted from a letter written "near the end" of Weber's life, by Arthur Mitzman, in *The Iron Cage* (New York, 1969), p. 182.

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have chosen these three aspects, not only because they are central to the theory, but also because Nietzsche, without ever specifically addressing Marx or Marxism, raises what I take to be quite serious doubts about the validity of Marx's own understanding. The three aspects are 1) the status of "critique" in Marx; 2) Marx's concept of human agency; and 3) his theory of history.

Beginning with Marx, a fundamental aim of critical theory was the harnessing of self-consciousness to an historically effective agency (originally, the proletariat). Through an "immanent critique" of ideology, it was thought possible to endow this agency with a specific valuative content and purpose. Such an "immanent critique" depended on the availability of guiding ideas concealed within the projudices of an era, ideas that could be demystified through criticism, and hence made of practical relevance to a movement for social change. By becoming "practical," such abstract ideas as freedom and equality might finally be realized historically. Behind this operation of critique, however, stood a fundamental assumption about the hidden coherence and unity of the world: as Marx himself put it in an early programmatic statement, "Reason has always existed, but not always in a rational form. The critic, therefore can start with any form of theoretical and practical consciousness and develop the true actuality out of the form *inherent* in existing actuality as its ought-to-be and goal."[2]

Although Marx discarded the idealist rhetoric surrounding this formulation, his understanding of what criticism can accomplish seems to have remained essentially unchanged throughout his life. At the outset, he criticized the liberal principles of the modern political state, confident that "as far as actual life is concerned, the *political state* especially contains in all its *modern* forms the demands of reason," even if these demands remain purely ideal. But political economy underwent a similar critique, which yielded, in the labor theory of value developed in *Capital*, a paradigm of freely creative human agency—a paradigm contravened by the development of cooperative production under capitalist domination. Once again, an idea immanent to the "modern form" of political economy—labor creating value as the foundation of economic law—was criticized to yield a criterion both for subsequent theorizing and for practice: cooperative production, if it was to accord with the immanent standard of labor as free agency, had to be subjected to the collective agency of the modern laboring class.

One precondition for the effectiveness of this kind of immanent critique should be stressed: the critic must assume that certain constellations of belief occupy a privileged position within an epoch. Thus Marx's confrontation with the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, in "On the Jewish Question," loses much of its force in a polity which does not recognize its principles in this declaration. Or, to take an example closer to home: in an age when the labor theory of value has been widely dismissed as erroneous,

2. Karl Marx and Friedrick Engels, *Collected Works* [hereafter CW] (New York, 1974), Vol. 3, p. 143 ("Letters from the Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher").

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Marx's critique of political economy does not carry the compelling power of forced recognition he may well have counted on among his readers. Similarly, to proclaim to a convention of American analytic philosophers that "the proletariat cannot be transcended without the actualization of philosophy" makes, literally, no sense. The Marxist notion of critique, in other words, covertly relies on the conviction that any epoch expressed itself in a limited number of fixed prejudices and leading ideologies, like Jacobin liberalism, classical political economy, and Hegel's philosophy. When an idea achieves sufficient circulation within a society, it can be assumed, once deciphered, as a foundation of progressive theory. As Marx put this point in *Capital*, "the secret of the expression of value, namely, that all kinds of labor are equal and equivalent, because, and so far as they are human labor in general, cannot be deciphered, until the notion of human equality has already acquired the fixity of a popular prejudice."[3]

The second aspect of Marx's theory meriting reconsideration concerns his understanding of historically effective human agency. In a word, this understanding is focused on the notion of *interest*. The proletariat, for example, is not simply a mute witness of historical events, nor is it the self-conscious architect of those events; rather, for Marx it is above all a materially interested participant, able to intervene and transform the direction and tempo of historical development, as impelled by more or less consciously articulated needs. Classes are like individuals in this respect: both pursue their material interests with some degree of foresight, calculation and hence rationality. It is precisely this aspect of behavior ruled by self- or class-interests which distinguishes it from merely passionate, or purely cerebral forms of social action; indeed, the rationality *and* abiding passion involved in the pursuit of material interests facilitate the predictability of social action, as both the classical political economists and Marx were so quick to appreciate.

Indeed, by extending the thesis of interest-governed behavior to classes, Marx was able to extend the thesis of predictability to the domain of historical development. It is not surprising, then, that the recognition of interest became a crucial moment in his materialist pedagogy. The ultimate imperative, gleaned through an immanent critique of the French materialists, was clear to Marx from the start: "if correctly understood interest is the principle of all morality, man's private interest must be made to coincide with the interest of humanity."[4] In *The Holy Family*, Marx quotes with evident approval several passages from Helvetius and Holbach, both of whom understood the importance for social change of recognizing one's material interest—unlike the left-Hegelians, who caricatured socialism as an idle fantasy.[5] "As, according to Helvétius, it is education, by which he means...not only education in the ordinary sense but the totality of the

3. Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. 1, trans. Moore and Aveling (Chicago, 1906), p. 69.
4. Marx and Engels, *CW*, Vol. 4, p. 131 (*The Holy Family*).
5. *Ibid.*, *CW*, Vol. 4, p. 133.

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individual's conditions of life, which forms man, if a reform is necessary to abolish the contradiction between particular interests and those of society, so, on the other hand, a transformation of consciousness is necessary to carry out such a reform." Marx himself anticipated that such an education of interests occurred to some extent spontaneously, under the compulsion of economic circumstance, and within the class struggle: "economic conditions had first transformed the mass of the people of the country into workers. The domination of capital had created for this mass a common situation, common interests. This mass is thus already a class as against capital, but not yet for itself. In the struggle, of which we have pointed out only a few phases, this mass becomes united, and constitutes itself as a class for itself. The interests it defends become class interests."[6] As Marx adds in *The Communist Manifesto*, the interests of the proletariat are also formed by the "elements of politics and general education" bequeathed by the bourgeoisie to the proletariat to enlist its aid in the bourgeois revolution; and as sections of the ruling class come to defend the interests of the proletariat, they supply the proletariat "with fresh elements of enlightenment and progress." With the help of able educators like Marx himself, the proletariat comes to understand its class interest in terms of the leading ideas of the epoch which it must actualize; ideas like democracy, equality, liberty. In coming to pursue its interests self-consciously, the proletariat discovers that its particular emancipation necessarily entails universal emancipation; for where all previous "movements" were of minorities, "in the interest of minorities," the proletarian movement "is the self-conscious, independent movement of the immense majority, in the interest of the immense majority."[7]

The third aspect of Marx's theory worth noting is his outlook on history. A passage from Georg Lukács' *Tactics and Ethics* succintly states, accurately in my view, the assumptions crucial for a Marxist understanding of history: "The first such thesis is: that the development of society is determined exclusively by forces present within that society.... The second: that the direction of this development can be clearly determined, even if it is not yet fully understood. The third: that this direction has been related in a certain, albeit still not fully understood fashion, to human objectives; such a relationship can be perceived and made conscious, and the process of making it conscious exerts a positive influence on the development itself. And finally, the fourth thesis: that the relationship in question is possible because, although the motive forces of society are independent of every *individual* human consciousness, or its will and its objectives, their existence is inconceivable except in the form of *human* consciousness, human will and human objectives."[8] The second and third theses should be especially noted:

6. Marx and Engels, *CW*, Vol. 6, p. 211 (*The Poverty of Philosophy*).

7. Marx and Engels, *CW*, Vol. 6, pp. 495, 493-4 (*Manifesto of the Communist Party*). An extended treatment of Marx's concept of interest appears in Chapter Four of my book, *History and Human Existence: From Marx to Merleau-Ponty* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, forthcoming in 1979).

8. Georg Lukács, *Political Writings 1919-1929*, trans. McColgan (London, 1972), p. 14.

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Marxism presumes that history has a "direction," which furthermore represents a "development." Marx's understanding of history tends to portray the unfolding of events in time as unitary and linear, with a teleological coherence.

Needless to say, the three aspects of Marx's thinking I have just detailed—his understanding of immanent critique, of interested human agency, and of history as unitary process of development—are all interrelated. The historical direction is gleaned through the process of critique and political action; and the motive forces of society independent of every *individual* consciousness mentioned by Lukács become intelligible precisely as class *interests*, rationally orienting the material pursuits of real individuals.

What does Nietzsche have to say about this nexus of ideas?

Nietzsche's starting point is the reflective individual.[9] With Nietzsche, subjectivity claims not just an epistemological priority—"the subject alone is demonstrable" (WP§569)[10]—but also the dignity of a moral duty: "We, however, *want to become those we are*—human beings who are new, unique, incomparable, who give themselves laws, who create themselves" (GS § 335). What conditions enable the creative individual to cultivate and express his genius? By what right, asks Nietzsche, can the free play of genius be confined? As we shall see, this consummation of individuation carries troubling implications for any social theory premissed, as Marx's is, on the "fixity" of an epoch's "leading" ideas, on the enlightened interest of human agency, and on the unitary coherence of historical development.

Nietzsche attacks this trio of assumptions from a variety of angles. In the first place, he argues that the most cherished objective ideals and norms—of Judeo-Christian ethics, of modern metaphysics, of liberalism and of socialism—*all* tend to be discredited under the impact of industrialization and the scientific method of systematic skepticism. Instead of a "fixity" of

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9. The starting point for a philosophical reading of Nietzsche remains the work of Martin Heidegger and Karl Jaspers. But the French have been more sensitive to the implications of Nietzsche for Marxism and Hegelianism. See Gilles Deleuze, *Nietzsche et la philosophie* (Paris, 1962), esp. pp. 9-11 ("Contre la dialectique"); Michel Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," in *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice*, ed. Bouchard (Ithaca, New York, 1977), pp. 139-164; and the comments on Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche scattered throughout Jacques Derrida's work, e.g., *Of Grammatology*, trans. Spivak (Baltimore, 1976), pp. 19-21. Most English Language scholarship tends either to avoid or to whitewash Nietzsche's politics; cf. Tracy Strong's provocative chapter on "Parables of the Shepherd and the Herd: Nietzsche and Politics," in his book *Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of Transfiguration* (Berkeley-Los Angeles, 1975), pp. 186-217. Unfortunately, Strong has got it into his head that Mao Tse-Tung is a plausible paradigm of Nietzschean politics in action. Most odd. Among other English-language treatments, I have found helpful Erich Heller's essays in *The Disinherited Mind* (New York, 1975); but see particularly Arthur Danto's subtle treatment in *Nietzsche as Philosopher* (New York, 1965)—a book that Jürgen Habermas cribbed many exegetical moves from.

10. Abbreviations for all Nietzsche references are as follows: BGE: *Beyond Good and Evil*; GS: *The Gay Science*; GM: *On the Genealogy of Morals*; WP: *The Will to Power*; (with sections numbered according to the edition first published by Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche); Z: *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. All quotes are taken from Walter Kaufmann's translations, and refer to sections (§).

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popular prejudices, Nietzsche portrays a potentially disorienting pluralism of objective norms, engendering everything from confusion or fanatic faith to a blasé and world-weary cynicism—hardly attitudes motivating an immanent critique. Indeed, since Nietzsche believed that the modern world lacked "leading" ideas, and since those ideas which did still retain some popular force (such as Christianity) were scarcely able to withstand skeptical inquiry, Nietzsche felt that "values" could not simply be criticized, but instead needed to be created anew. In the second place, Nietzsche, in disserting the conditions of being human, found, not the rational, freedom-loving, interest-oriented individual of classical liberal and idealist philosophy, but instead an anxious animal driven by intrinsically incoherent impulses, patterned and focused only after the model of artificial and essentially arbitrary objective norms—norms, as we have just seen, which Nietzsche believed increasingly forfeited their traditional force of self-evidence. Taking the subjective and objective aspects together—and this is the third point—Nietzsche dismissed any progressive theory of history as a pernicious delusion guaranteeing what precisely he believed to be in jeopardy. Indeed, Nietzsche foresaw for Europe, not perpetual development, but either brutal wars between societies with incommensurable codes of life, or a technical pacification of existence eliminating the need for any normative codes all.

Confronted with this prognosis, Nietzsche promulgated a series of "affirmative" doctrines. In the later works, his notions of the will to power, eternal recurrence, and the overman, as well as his hopes for an aristocratic rebirth of Europe, assume a central role in orienting his ways of thought. Yet Nietzsche's decisive importance for social theory derives not so much from his hopes for a "great politics," nor from his own positive ontology, which is biologically rooted in a highly ambiguous esteem for whatever enhances "life." Rather, Nietzsche's importance derives from his diagnosis of the culture and society he confronted. In what follows, then, I will focus narrowly on Nietzsche's reflection on his times, rather than on his psychology, his critique of morality, or his philosophy of temporality.

Nietzsche's basic assessment of his own age seems clear enough: around him he saw the traditional grounds for trust in life and the continuity of existence eroding. "Disintegration characterizes this time, and thus uncertainty: nothing stands firmly on its feet or on a hard faith in itself; one lives for tomorrow, as the day after tomorrow is dubious. Everything on our way is slippery and dangerous, and the ice that still supports us has become thin: all of us feel the warm, uncanny breath of the thawing wind; there we still walk, soon no one will be able to walk" (WP§57). The image of uncanny foreboding evoked here is indicative: while Nietaxche followed left-Hegelians like Feuerbach in placing the critique of religion at the center of his thinking, there was a crucial difference. Where Feuerbach's "materialist" inversion of Christianity claimed to yield insight into the essence of man—transcendence was disclosed as the secular telos of the entire species—Nietzsche's critique foreclosed the apparent necessity of *any* transcendence, or transcendent

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ideals, whatsoever, whether secular or divine. The case of religious faith itself showed that human beings quite willingly forfeited their subjective will-to-transcendence; while the disclosure of the Christian "God" as a humanly created fiction by no means entailed that any other transcendent ideal would necessarily take its place. Criticism of theology, in this context, does not distill any redemptive image of secular transcendence, as Feuerbach had hoped; rather, thoughtful observation reveals a "chaos" of "*very diverse* value judgements," none of them compelling, or essential any longer as "the basis, 'the condition of existence' " (WP§260). The critique of secular constellations of belief—metaphysics, liberalism, political economy—cannot yield any more comforting results, for the simple reason that Nietzsche considers it unthinkable that any one perspective or worldview could command universal allegiance: secular and various religious perspectives may be able to win a measure of popular credence, but no one worldview will prove able to justify its priority logically, as long as skepticism remains a viable human faculty. Rather than establishing trustworthy new goals for humanity, as both Marx and Feuerbach had anticipated, the critique of contemporary ideology merely uncovers new idols, such as Man, Society, and History, which Nietzsche regarded as so many different expressions for the "herd instinct" which inclines men to base their beliefs in a timid conformism rather than on independently argued reasons, or even on a passionately held inward faith.

Previously, societies, through their conventions, religions and traditional customs, had provided an objective pattern through which the individual became encultured, effectively oriented within the world. By throwing the individual back on his own resources, the erosion of confidence in external norms simultaneously exposed to doubt the internalized norms constituting psychic order. In the past, "to be alone, to experience things by oneself, neither to obey nor to rule, to be an individual—that was not a pleasure but a punishment; one was sentenced 'to individuality' " (GS§117). Individuation in any social context is a punishment most men would just as soon avoid. The realization, through the dissolution of credible objective norms, of a limitless individual "freedom" seems more frightening than liberating—in contradiction to the hopes held by proponents of universal enlightenment. Why this fear? Primarily because the solitary ego, despite the assurances of modern philosophy, offers no more substantial foundation than objective norms for the orientation of life. According to Nietzsche, the individual intrinsically embodies little more than a number of ceaselessly demanding drives and impulses.[11] The challenge, then—and this is one precondition for the development of genius in any age—the challenge is to govern this unruly subjective commonwealth, and to forge a unique psychic order without resorting to the discredited fictions of theologians, philosophers and politicians.

But most individuals would rather decline this particular challenge. Their ways of escaping it—of running away from the "prison" of individuality—are

11. See, e.g., WP s 481, 488, 492; BGE 19.

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manifold. One may blindly reaffirm old faiths, for example: and Nietzsche indeed charged that many modern worldviews have simply resurrected the "Christian moral hypothesis" in various disguises. Given his description of this hypothesis, its continuing attraction is scarcely surprising. Nietzsche summarized the Christian moral hypothesis in four propositions: first, that man has an "absolute value;" second, that man is perfectible, and that freedom is a real possibility for all; third, that man can acquire certain knowledge about the world and his condition in it; fourth, and finally, that man possesses an inherent dignity which no amount of evil or misfortune can detract from (WP§4). By supplying a rationale for existence as well as a paradigm of the "good" life, faith in such propositions protects "against despair and the leap into nothing" (WP§55). Mimesis is easier than innovation—and far less risky.

Nietzsche himself, by contrast, welcomed the chaotic vitality he saw in contemporary society, even if he doubted the capacity of most men to withstand the ambiguity and tension the perception of such normative pluralism entailed. Most men, he felt, went through life wearing blinders, oblivious to the perils and promise of their times. For hardy and creative spirits, however, the conflict between incommensurable forms of life could be invigorating, and help broaden one's outlook on life: Nietzsche highly esteemed those societies and individuals capable of encompassing the greatest concentration of conflicting energies. The collapse of traditional moral codes, and above all the decline of Judeo-Christian monotheism, created a situation of unprecedented possibilities at least for men unafraid of bold departures. Nietzsche himself speaks of a "new dawn," an "open sea" permitting "all the daring of the lover of knowledge" (GS§343). This is the context for Nietzsche's saying "God is dead." In place of the heliocentric imagery of the monotheistic tradition beginning with Plato, Nietzsche speaks of a "starry sky:" the "death of God," he writes in *The Gay Science*, is like "an eclipse of the sun whose like has probably never yet occurred on earth" (GS§343). Now that the sun of monotheism has set, however, the world can appear illuminated by a variety of constellations, many suns providing many perspectives, with no single standpoint privileged any longer. "As in the realm of stars the orbit of a planet is determined by two suns; as in certain cases of suns different colors shine near a single planet . . . —so we modern men are determined, thanks to the complicated mechanics of our 'starry sky,' by *different* moralities; our actions shine alternately in different colors, they are rarely univocal—and there are cases enough in which we perform actions of *many colors*" (BGE§215).

To be sure, Nietzsche fears that the "herd instinct" will resolve this colorful polyphany of values into one dull note common to all, and hence comfortable for each. All of Nietzsche's hopes and fears—and his neo-Platonic cosmic imagery—come into play in the great preface to *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, which expresses a central tension in his thought: "And thus spoke Zarathustra to the people: The time has come for man to set himself a goal. The time has

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come for man to plant the seed of his highest hope. His soil is still rich enough. But one day this soil will be poor and domesticated, and no tall tree will be able to grow in it. Alas, the time is coming when man will no longer shoot the arrow of his longing beyond man, and the string of his bow will have forgotten how to whir! I say unto you: one must still have chaos in oneself to be able to give birth to a dancing star. I say unto you: you still have chaos in yourselves. Alas, the time is coming when man will no longer give birth to a star. Alas, the time of the most despicable man is coming, he that is no longer able to despise himself. Behold, I show you the last man. 'What is love? What is creation? What is longing? What is a star?' thus asks the last man, and he blinks. The earth has become small, on it hops the last man, who makes everything small. His race is as ineradicable as the flea-beetle; the last man lives longest! "

Nietzsche's worst fear was the "last man." His highest hope was for a kind of individuated and secularized polytheism: or, to quote his prophet Zarathustra, "Precisely this is godlike that there are gods, but no God" (Z,III,§12). The ideal of transcendence is preserved in Nietzsche's thought, then, but only at the expense of "monotheism," or any theory of a privileged "Truth." As he suggests in *The Gay Science*, polytheism is a mythic formulation of the highest human goals. "For an individual to posit his own ideal and to derive from it his own law, joys and rights.... The wonderful art and gift of creating gods—polytheism—was the medium through which this impulse could discharge, purify, perfect and ennoble itself.... Above and outside, in some distant overworld, one was permitted to behold a *plurality of norms*.... It was here that the luxury of individuals was first permitted" (GS§143). Having formulated, in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, the ideal of a modern individualized neo-polytheism, however, Nietzsche immediately hastens to restrict its creation to those few noble souls who can form and follow their own laws. Most of the "rabble," on the other hand, must remain blinds servants of circumstance, bound to routine and unreflected conventions. At best, then, Nietzsche hopes for a "new nobility," appreciative of each other's heroic exploits, able to promulgate new polytheistic myths (such as Zarathustra), perhaps even able to rescue modern life from the aimless drift and nihilism that might otherwise result in an administered society anxious to confine or repress the creative instincts of genuinely gifted *individuals*. This, in condensed form, is Nietzsche's image of the political order appropriate to the philosopher-kings of the future—and Nietzsche emphatically asserts that "*genuine philosophers...are commanders and legislators*" (BGE§211).

Nietzsche's program for historical scholarship is more modest, although no less revealing, than his historical diagnosis. In *Beyond Good and Evil*, after dismissing any attempt to supply morals with a "rational foundation," Nietzsche commends a purely descriptive catalogue of the various moral systems and sentiments mankind has experienced: the "real problems of morality," he writes, "emerge only when we compare *many* moralities" (BGE§186). Moreover, while Nietzsche anticipates a "genealogical"

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interpretation of morals, he rejects any attempt to smuggle a teleological function or "purpose" into such an account, or, for that matter, to have such an account, through a dialectical sleight of hand, portray history as a unitary and logical development. His genealogical method seems more akin to André Breton's *hasard objectif* than to Hegel's cunning of reason; he marvels at fortuitous affinities and the free play of power, rather than claiming to decipher a hidden logical coherence. For the Nietzschean interpreter, "purposes and utilities are only *signs* that a will to power has become master of something less powerful and imposed upon it the character of a function; and the entire history of a 'thing,' an organ, a custom, can in this way be a continuous sign-chain of ever new interpretations and adaptations whose causes do not even have to be related to one another but, on the contrary, in some cases succeed and alternate with one another in a purely chance fashion" (GMII, §12).

This methodological point underlines the historical evaluation embodied in Zarathustra's parable of the Last Man. History for Nietzsche, far from having any direction at all—let alone a progressive sense—instead comprises an energy field where conflicting interpretations are perpetually in play, organizing themselves through mutual antagonism; only the momentary outcome of these conflicts determines the local sense of history, a provisional meaning that is never univocal, always revocable.

Moreover, Nietzsche's methodological commitment to multiple interpretations favors a dissolution of his own starting point, the individual subject, as a privileged standpoint. He is well aware that individuation is no primordial datum, but rather the product of an historical genealogy: "If we place ourselves at the end of this tremendous process, where the tree at last brings forth the fruit, where society and the morality of custom at last reveal *what* they have simply been the means to: then we discover that the ripest fruit is the *sovereign individual*, like only to himself, liberated again from custom, autonomous and supramoral" (GMII,§2). So Nietzsche's own insight into this historical result can by no means be taken as a timeless "philosophical anthropology."

With even less warrant can Nietzsche be cast aside as an apologist for a cult of the "authentic" ego, transparently present to itself. Relentlessly skeptical in his own self-reflection, he denounces the "transcendental ego" as a fiction and castigates the consolations of presuming an enduring personal identity. " 'Everything is subjective,' you say; but even this is interpretation. The 'subject' is not something given, it is something added and invented and projected beyond what there is.... The world is knowable; but it is *interpretable* otherwise, it has no meaning behind it, but countless meanings.— 'Perspectivism' " (WP§481).

A more direct assault on the value of universal enlightenment can scarcely be imagined. Not only is the "Truth" to be conveyed called into question; the human subject of enlightenment, deprived of any necessary claim to even a latent interest in rationality and freedom, and ascribed as the locus of

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conflicting drives and appetites, also becomes a questionable medium for receiving the kind of momentary truths Nietzsche himself so ardently pursues. If all the conceptual paraphenalia of our thinking, be it scientific, religious, or moral, is purely a product of convention and artifice—and Nietzsche in fact believes this to be so—doesn't the modern philosopher's search for truth lead, not necessarily to liberation, but to a perplexing ambiguity, a bewildering proliferation of perspectives, a paralyzing doubt, even a crippling skepticism about the value of life itself? As Nietzsche baldly states at the outset of *Beyond Good and Evil*, "suppose we want truth: *why not rather untruth'?*" (BGE§1). Nietzsche's answer to this rhetorical question is ambiguous, for while he describes his own thirst for truth as a last remnant of piety, he also is convinced that most human beings cannot tolerate the tension and uncertainty the modern truth seeker must endure. There is no doubt, however, about the main point: in contradiction with the program of universal enlightenment, Nietzsche proposes, with a typical rhetorical thrust, a "valuation of *not-knowing*, ...of simplification and falsification" (WP§492).

We are now in a better position to understand Nietzsche's attack on socialism. Although the "socialism" he dismisses is today fashionably ridiculed as "vulgar"—a theory of history blatantly espousing an evolutionary determinism—Nietzsche's comments, taken in the broader context of his philosophy, raise troublesome questions about certain assumptions central to Marx's original theory as well.

Marx, as we have seen, relied on an understanding of history and human agency that linked the pursuit of material interest with the ideal of human emancipation. Nietzsche, by contrast, portrays human beings as creatures driven, for the most part, by *fear*: of reasoning, of freedom, of truth, of novelty, of individuation, of the tensions created by a multi-faceted personality. Interest, one of the key faculties Marx believed operative in social action, Nietzsche dismissed as relatively unimportant: "man is an indifferent egoist; even the cleverest thinks his habits more important than his advantage" (WP§363). Most individuals, left to their own devices, crave security, order, certainty, the familiar, tried-and-true routine that seems to provide a steady foundation for life. Nor does discomfort and material distress necessarily dissolve such patterns of behavior: "In an age of disintegration...human beings have...drives and value standards that fight each other and rarely permit each other any rest. Such human beings of late cultures and refracted lights will on the average be weaker human beings: their most profound desire is that the war they *are* should come to an end. Happiness appears to them, in agreement with a tranquilizing...medicine and way of thought, pre-eminently as the happiness of resting, of not being disturbed" (BGE§200).

Nietzsche views with suspicion any theory of history as a purposive progression in large part because he suspects these theories of mollifying the fears of the craven. He accuses socialism of harboring "Christian value judgements," just as he derides Hegel for attempting to use history as a way of

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salvaging the "Christian moral hypothesis" (WP §1). The "Hegelian way out," chides Nietzsche, is to invest history with teleological significance: thus, for Hegel, God "is demonstrable, but as something in process of becoming, and we are part of it, as witness our impulse toward the idea (the hidden meaning of the historical movement)" (WP§253). Elsewhere, professing a "profound aversion to reposing once and for all in any one total view of the world" (WP§470), he assails the dialectical method for what I will call its synoptic imperative—the systematic attempt to approach divergent perspectives from a superior, 'totalizing' standpoint. The implications of such remarks for a Marxist philosophy of history seem clear: Is not the search for a univocal historical coherence itself symptomatic of a lingering lust for some "superhuman authority" that would resolve all doubts about the sense of life? A philosophy of history like Marx's appears merely as one more ideological avenue for escaping the perils and promise of the current age: "One wants to get around the will, the willing of a goal, the risk of positing a goal *for oneself*; one wants to rid oneself of the responsibility (one would accept fatalism)" (WP§20).

Because he fears that a pacified existence is what most men want, Nietzsche is doubly disturbed by the socialist credo of "progress." "Whoever examines the conscience of the European today will have to pull the same imperative out of a thousand moral folds and hideouts—the imperative of herd timidity: 'We want that some day there should be *nothing any more to be afraid of*! Some day—throughout Europe, the will and way to this day is now called 'progress' " (BGE§201). One of Nietzsche's most telling tirades against socialism in fact attacks its "economic optimism"—as if the mere development of productive forces insures a society populated by multi-faceted individuals eager to "hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticize after dinner. Once we possess that common economic management of the earth that will soon be inevitable," writes Nietzsche in a note from 1887, "mankind will be able to find its best meaning as a machine in the service of this economy—as a tremendous clockwork, composed of ever smaller, ever more subtly 'adapted' gears; as an ever-growing superfluity of all dominating and commanding elements; as a whole of tremendous force, whose individual factors represent *minimal forces, minimal values*" (WP§866). Along this path lies, not Marx's social individual—in any case, a contradiction in terms for Nietzsche—but Nietzsche's "Last Man," as ineradicable as a flea-beetle.

It should be clear by now just how radically Nietzsche's way of thought challenges the assumptions of Marx's original theory in the three areas I initially discussed—so radically indeed that the dialectical method itself is called into question. Disputing the value of "immanent critique," particularly in an era of cynical pluralism—one meaning of Europe's "nihilism"—Nietzsche proposes instead a ruthless "perspectivism," which skeptically clarifies divergent paths rather than dissipating differences in an idle dream of reconciliation (a questionable end in any case). Similarly, Nietzsche

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ridicules the assumption that human beings are generally self-interested, let alone animated, now or potentially, by an enlightened common interest; instead, he raises the possibility that the dissolution of any unifying moral focus for modern life has resulted in a generalized fear. Finally, Nietzsche rejects any teleological or progressive theory of history's "direction" as a reversion to theology. Taking Nietzsche's point seriously here would discredit any unitary narrative of history, or any sort of tiered approach to social history ("base" and "superstructure"), raising instead the prospect of unsynchronized multiple histories, interpretable from a variety of perspectives.

Needless to say, there are numerous difficulties in Nietzsche's thought. But one does not need to endorse his affirmations—the will to power, the eternal recurrence, the exaltation of life, the teaching of the overman, or "great politics" as a brutally agonistic rebirth of aristocracy—to be struct by the cogency of his diagnosis. Often through the sheer force and emphatic repetition of his imagery, Nietzsche has raised reasonable doubts about assumptions central to Marx's original theory. A series of uncomfortable questions now emerge.

For example, we have seen that Marx in *Capital* asserts that "equality" in the modern world has "achieved the fixity of a popular prejudice." But what if anti-Semitism achieves such "fixity"—what about the enterprise of immanent critique then? And what if "fixity" of any sort disappears in the flux of changing fashion? Is immanent critique really feasible in a situation where "all fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable projudices and opinions, are swept away," where "all new-formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify," where "all that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned?"[12]

Or, to take another line of questioning: If the latent monotheism of a reconciliatory dialectics, oriented around a univocal end of history, is discredited, how should our hopes for a society enhancing human freedom be justified? By recourse to the vividness of imagined alternatives? By the persuasiveness of better arguments? By unveiling a transcendental foundation for the concepts "truth," "good" and "equality" in the logic of the ordinary speech act?

Finally, if the synoptic imperatives of dialectic as a method—its claim to comprehend the "totality"—have been radically challenged, on what grounds should we prefer the perspective of a "critical theory" to the perspectives afforded by the stoical interpretive theories of Max Weber and Wittgenstein, both of whom counseled a meticulously "value-neutral" portrait of a human world torn asunder into incommensurable forms of life? If reconciliation is a chimera, why pursue it? Yet, if our modern world consists of competing forms of life, how can we justify our own unavoidable choice of basic (methodological and moral) perspectives?

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12. Marx and Engels, CW, Vol. 6, p. 487 (*Manifesto of the Communist Party*).

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In all of these areas, Nietzsche's thought opens up new paths for questioning that enable us to see familiar phenomena from new perspectives—even if what we see is not always reassuring. Above all, perhaps, Nietzsche summons *imagination*—the power to envision other forms of life—as a way of thinking of the highest dignity and the greatest risk. " 'Truth' is therefore not something there, that might be found or discovered—but something that must be created and that gives a name to a process, or rather to a will to overcome that has in itself no end—introducing truth, as a *processus in infinitum*, an active determining—not a becoming conscious of something that is in itself firm and determined" (WP§552).

Where does the Marxist encounter with Nietzsche's thought currently stand? Obviously, "orthodox" Marxists scarcely have the time or inclination to wade through what are presumed to be, at best, poetic paeans to irrationality. But a significant number of latter-day Western Marxist philosophers have confronted Nietzsche, whether directly or indirectly. Ironically, the group of neo-Marxists one might assume come closest to assimilating Nietzsche's insights—the French "existential Marxists" Sartre and Merleau-Ponty—seem to me to avoid the most unsettling aspects of his thought, largely by regressing to a univocal and unitary sense of History as the "Marxist moment" of their synthesis.[13]

The Frankfurt theorists present a more interesting problem. Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcuse and Habermas all read Nietzsche, and despite critical reservations, incorporated significant aspects of his psychology and understanding of morals into their own thinking.[14] Moreover, their unquestionable commitment to some form of Freudian analysis underlined the extent to which they had abandoned such orthodox Marxist presumptions as the "interested" agency of human beings. As Adorno put it, "the individual's rational economic behavior undoubtedly derives from something more than economic calculation and the profit motive.... *Fear* constitutes a more crucial subjective motive of objective rationality."[15]

Adorno here comes close to endorsing the Nietzschean claim that fear motivates the individual's commitment to stable codes of life and logical schemes of thought. While denouncing Nietzsche's tendency to fetishize the "authenticity" of individuals, Adorno elsewhere praises Nietzsche as a philosopher "whose reflection penetrated even the concept of truth."[16] Moreover, he tacitly endorses Nietzsche's notion that static norms are the product of domination, and the will to secure static cognitive outlooks.[17] On

13. See my *History and Human Existence* for an analysis of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty. Part of the chapter on Merleau-Ponty has appeared as "Merleau-Ponty's Marxism: Between Phenomenology and the Hegelian Absolute," *History and Theory*, Vol. XV, No. 2, 1976, pp. 109-32.

14. Cf. Martin Jay, *The Dialectical Imagination* (Boston, 1973), pp. 48-50.

15. Theodor Adorno, "Sociology and Psychology," *New Left Review*, 46, November-December, 1967, p. 71.

16. Theodor Adorno, *Minima Moralia*, trans. Jephcott (London, 1974), Sec. 99, p. 154.

17. Cf. Gillian Rose, "How is Critical Theory Possible? Theodor W. Adorno and Concept Formation in Sociology," *Political Studies*, Vol. XXIV, No. 1, March, 1976, p. 81.

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the other hand, when we turn to the questions of immanent critique and the understanding of history, the stand taken by the critical theory of Adorno seems considerably more ambiguous.

In a seminal essay like "Cultural Criticism and Society," Adorno underlines with astringent clarity the antinomies that threaten to undermine the critical enterprise. Rejecting a purely immanent critique of cultural works, he castigates as "naive" the idea "that unflinching immersion in the object will inevitably lead to truth by virtue of the logic of things.... Stubbornly immanent contemplation threatens to revert to idealism." Adorno even more unequivocally rejects the traditional Marxist method, which assumes a "transcendent" perspective on the social whole, an "Archimedean position above culture and the blindness of society, from which consciousness can bring the totality, no matter how massive, into flux." This appears to be a clearcut denial of the synoptic outlook on the social totality assumed by the "materialist" dialectic. Finally, Adorno admits that in any case "there are no more ideologies in the authentic sense of false consciousness," ideologies that might enable an immanent critique to confront professed ideals with a deficient reality in the name of a call to realize those ideals. Thus to bring the traditional concepts of liberal culture to account, "before a responsibility which it denies," is only "to confirm cultural pomposity. Neutralized and ready-made, traditional culture has become worthless today." This is one further reason why "the alternatives—either calling culture as a whole into question from outside under the general notion of ideology, or confronting it with the norms which it itself has crystallized—cannot be accepted by critical theory."[18]

But Adorno waffles on almost all of these points. Elsewhere, he asserts that immanent criticism is still a viable "concrete process of cognition," which finds a value in confronting "the thing with what it claims to be by itself according to its concept."[19] Moreover, there remains in Adorno's work an element of nostalgia as well as distrust for the "Archimedean position above...the blindness of society"—whether this be understood as the synoptic standpoint of the "materialist" viewing the "concrete totality" created by commodity exchange, or the synoptic dream of the apocalyptic Hegelian, anticipating the reconciled totality at the end of history. In a sense, Adorno's unwavering allegiance to the dialectical method confesses as much: for the whole point of dialectic, from one angle, is its methodic refusal to remain immersed in the perspectives immediately available to insight, and its insistence on surmounting any one-sided opposition of competing standpoints to attain an overview. And while the "synoptic imperative" of the dialectical method need not issue ultimately in a *terminus ad quem* such as Hegel's Absolute, the method itself, under the sway of the synoptic imperative, preserves this telos within itself, even if as a frustrated impulse. Thus the

18. Theodor Adorno, *Prisms*, trans. Weber (London, 1967), pp. 31, 33, 34.

19. Theodor Adorno, *Introduction to Emile Durkheim 'Sociology and Philosophy,'* in *Gesammelte Schriften*, Vol. 8 (Frankfurt, 1973), p. 259, quoted by Rose, *op. cit.*, p. 83.

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curious flavor of the sentence opening *Negative Dialectics*: "Philosophy, which once seemed obsolete, lives on because the moment to realize it was missed."[20] Of course, both Adorno and Marx, in the passage alluded to, have in mind *Hegelian* philosophy. But why should the dialectical philosophy emerge unscathed from the practical disappointments its "materialist" applications seem to have engendered? Was it not a dialectical chimera of the first order to ever believe that an historical agent could bring a meaningful unitary direction into the historical process? Why should the method remain untouched by the failure of reality to conform with the expectations generated by its concepts? Was the proletariat merely less interested in redeeming humanity, and more doltish than anyone expected? Or was Marx perhaps not so clever a critical theorist as Theodor Adorno?

Now Adorno might well defend his attachment to the dialectical method as one of the last ways in which the mind can actively sustain a field of tension and critical autonomy within an administered world that otherwise promises to reduce objects and thought to a pacified immediacy. "Dragged into the abyss by its object," the dialectical method remains true to thought, and the concept of its object, by refusing to take the plunge.

But Adorno goes further in his fidelity to the synoptic imperative of the dialectical method than this account would suggest. While in *Negative Dialectics* he defends dialectic as "the consistent sense of nonidentity," arguing that the method does not entail any one standpoint, he also places great emphasis on the falsity of relativism, which he conveniently equates either with Mannheim's sociology of knowledge, or a crude subjectivism, rather than the more challenging notion of an irreconcilable ethical pluralism articulated by both Nietzsche and Weber. Adorno's remarks are nonetheless telling. Surrounded by a few shabby rhetorical flourishes ("relativism, no matter how progressive its bearing, has at all times been linked with moments of reaction"), his argument is centered on the claim that relativism is a form of "bourgeois skepticism," discredited by the objectivity of social process. His language here is extremely revealing: "In fact, the law [sic] that governs the divergent perspectives is the structure of the social process as a preordained whole."[21] Thus, against relativism, Adorno brandishes the transcendent overview on the social totality apparently banished in "Cultural Criticism and Society." We have here a provisional synoptic standpoint, as stable as society is reified, embodied in the exchange relations themselves: a standpoint critical for establishing the superiority of critical theory to any relativistic sociology or philosophy.

In fact, Adorno preserves the synoptic imperative not only at the analytic level of insight into the given social whole, but also at the teleological level of an imageless utopia of the reconciled totality—the paradoxical promise of a salvation which cannot be depicted, but which nonetheless imbues criticism with a sense of denied possibilities, and a potential meaning of history.

20. Theodor Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, trans. Ashton (New York, 1973), p. 3.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 37.

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At this point, critical theory become what Nietzsche always suspected socialism to be, namely theology, albeit "negative" theology stripped of icons and imagery. And Adorno says as much in *Negative Dialectics*. After rejecting Marx's attack on idealist epistemology as too crude, Adorno turns to the proper role of the mind, and warns that "a consciousness interpolating images," involved in flights of imagination unhinged from any attempt to conceptualize the objective world, "would unwittingly reproduce idealism." Even worse, any such imaginatively interpolated body of ideas would smack of "subjective arbitrariness." Marx, recognizing the problem, prohibited "utopia" from being "positively pictured," a ban secularizing the "theological ban on images.... At its most materialistic, materialism comes to agree with theology. Its great desire would be the resurrection of the flesh."[22] This curiously ascetic avowal of a hedonistic redemption, as the imageless standpoint of ultimate reconciliation, accords fully with Adorno's last comments in *Minima Moralia*: "The only philosophy which can be responsibly practised in face of despair is the attempt to contemplate all things as they would present themselves from the standpoint of redemption.... Perspectives must be fashioned that displace and estrange the world, reveal it to be, with its rifts and crevices, as indigent and distorted as it will appear one day in the messianic light. To gain such perspectives...is the simplest of things,...but it is also the utterly impossible thing.... Even its own impossibility it must at last comprehend for the sake of the possible. But beside the demand thus placed on thought, the question of the reality or unreality of redemption itself hardly matters."[23]

The importance of even this "imageless" ultimate synopsis should not be underestimated. As Adorno wrote elsewhere, the understanding of possibilities preserved in the notion of reconciliation forms an essential aspect of the critical theory of society. "The concept and theory of society are legitimate only when...they merely hold in negative fashion to the basic possibility inherent in them...."[24] Orthodox sociology, by contrast, "simply treats society, *potentially the self-determining subject*, as if it were an object, and could be determined from outside."[25] A critical theory, preserving the utopian possibility of society as a self-determining subject, could express "the fact that such possibility is threatened with suffocation. Such awareness, without any preconceptions as to where it might lead, would be the *first condition* for an ultimate break in society's omnipotence."[26]

We can see, then, that even Theodor Adorno, for all of this claims to practice the dialectical method without a standpoint, and for all of his assertions that dialectics is the "consistent sense of nonidentity," succumbs

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22. *Ibid.*, p. 207.
23. Adorno, *Minima Moralia*, Sec. 153, p. 247.
24. Theodor Adorno, "Society," trans. Jameson, *Salmagundi*, Nos. 10-11, 1969-70, p. 153.
25. Theodor Adorno, "Introduction," in Adorno, et. al., *The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology*, trans. Adey and Frisby (London, 1976), p. 33 (emphasis added).
26. Adorno, "Society," p. 153 (emphasis added).

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ultimately to the synoptic imperative inherent in the method: even for Adorno, the dialectical "sense of nonidentity contains identity. . .the pledge that there should be no contradiction, no antagonism."[27] Concealed as the "first condition" of the critical theorist's enterprise is what Lucien Goldmann aptly called "the hidden God," covertly providing a sense of redemptive direction for the critique which denounces the reification of the administered society. Thus, while Adorno discards Marx's original notion of interest-governed human agency, and maintains the concept of immanent critique only with some ambivalence, he nevertheless retains, through his fidelity to the dialectical dream of a "togetherness in diversity,"[28] a key element in the Marxist understanding of history, however much petrification he ascribes to our melancholy current state of affairs. It is precisely here—in the conceptual interpenetration of history and dialectical reason—that the critical theory of Adorno, like the "existential Marxism" of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, proves vulnerable to a Nietzschean critique.

Interestingly enough, Adorno's most important successor, is fully aware of these problems: for it does not seem coincidental that Jürgen Habermas chooses to close *Knowledge and Human Interests*, his latter-day defense of critical theory, with a discussion of Nietzsche's philosophy; nor does it seem coincidental that Habermas abandons the primacy of history and dialectical method. In its place, Habermas has laboriously constructed en elaborate form of "transcendental anthropology," in an attempt to secure a new foundation for a critical theory oriented around the possibilities for human emancipation. Habermas pursues his attempt to provide new grounds for critical theory in *Knowledge and Human Interests* by analyzing a special "interest in emancipation" that governs critique. This interest, which is to be distinguished from the interest in control guiding natural scientific inquiry, and the interest in understanding guiding interpretation in the cultural sciences, springs from a basic anthropological posture rather than a constellation of historical concepts and forces: in the contemporary situation, where the traditional notion of immanent critique faces difficulty, "the reflection that the new ideology calls for must penetrate beyond the level of particular historical class interests to disclose the fundamental interests of mankind as such, engaged in the process of self-constitution."[29] Not only in critical Marxism, but also in psychoanalysis, Habermas claims to uncover a

27. Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, p. 149.

28. *Ibid.*, p. 150. "Togetherness in diversity" is surely Hegel's dream as well—whether as the re-collection of History, in the finale to the *Phenomenology*, or as a non-antagonistic division of labor in the *Philosophy of Right*. Adorno, like the left-Hegelians, can only consistently accuse Hegel of prematurely thinking that the concept has been actualized in the object. Hegel's dialectics, on the other hand, avoids the vulgar identity-thinking characteristic of positivism, which believes concepts always render reality without remainder. Of course, if one abandon's Hegel's and Adorno's conceptual realism, in favor of the conventionalist nominalism favored (apparently) by Marx, and certainly by Nietzsche and Wittgenstein, the whole enterprise of negative dialectics acquires a distinct aroma of unreality. For Marx's nominalism, see Marx and Engels, *CW*, Vol. 4, pp. 57-61, 127-8 (*The Holy Family*).

29. Jürgen Habermas, *Toward a Rational Society*, trans. Shapiro (Boston, 1970), p. 113.

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primordial urge to self-reflection, undertaken in the hopes of liberation from misunderstanding, delusion and domination.

Now it is obvious that Nietzsche's perspectivism, *if* valid (which cannot be taken for granted), would jeopardize Habermas' position. In the first place, as we have seen, Nietzsche disputed the necessity of any connection between interest, agency and insight: he portrays human beings as, by and large, creatures of habit rather than interest, whether self-, class-, or cognitive-interest. More importantly, however, his notion of polytheism, of a perpetual strife among incommensurable standpoints, imperils the basic schema of *Knowledge and Human Interests*: rather than three basic arenas of inquiry, characterized by three different animating interests, his thought envisions the possibility of a *multitude* of types of inquiry, even if Nietzsche himself ends up in a kind of reductionism, by evaluating each perspective by its "utility" for "life."

Yet, despite the inadequacies of Nietzsche's biological reductionism, which he accurately notes, Habermas' own critique miscarries. He claims, for example, that "Nietzsche would never have arrived at perspectivism if from the very beginning he had not rejected epistemology as possible."[30] Yet, as we have seen, Nietzsche arrives at his doctrine of perspectivism for a variety of reasons, not the least of which was his understanding of the times he lived in. His era had witnessed not only the disintegration of metaphysics and religion under the impact of positive science, as Habermas notes, but also the rise, in consequence, of al pluralism of norms. The late nineteenth century—and our era, as well—can be viewed as an age of competing worldviews; and Nietzsche's perspectivism springs far more fundamentally from this observation than any *a priori* rejection of epistemology.

Habermas also charges that Nietzsche denies "the status of *knowledge* to the critical recollection of self-generated illusion that has become independent and opposed to the subject—that is, to the self-reflection of false consciousness."[31] In other words, he alleges that Nietzsche does not believe that the criticism of "illusions" necessarily enhances our understanding of the world. This is indeed true. To quote the passage from *The Will to Power* which Habermas cites in this connection: "The destruction of illusion does not produce truth, but only one more piece of ignorance, an extension of our 'empty space,' an increase of our 'desert' " (WP§603). All Habermas can find in this passage is a denial of knowledge to the results of critique.

But Nietzsche's sarcastic jibe at the cheerful skepticism of the most empty headed enthusiasts of enlightenment should be contrasted with the other passages we have remarked, where he welcomes the results of criticism as creating an "open sea" for "knowledge" (GS§343). Taken in *this* context, Nietzsche, far from denying the emancipatory potential of dispelling illusions, is quite appropriately evoking, through the image of "empty space,"

30. Jürgen Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests*, trans. Shapiro (Boston, 1971), p. 298.

31. *Ibid.*, p. 299.

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at least three interesting ideas. First, that criticism sometimes does not aim at actualizing the unrealized potential expressed in its object's concept, but instead merely discards it entirely; thus scientology, say, is not something most of us would consider a fit object for immanent critique, although our dismissal of it might prove quite disorienting for the believer in scientology. Second, that immanent criticism tied to the concept of its object cannot be presumed to generate new knowledge by the mere fact that criticism has occurred; thus Feuerbach's attack on Christianity might be said to have destroyed one fiction to create another, of man's species essence (this was Marx's view). Here it needs to be stressed that Nietzsche's perspectivism denies, *not* the possibility of truth and knowledge, but rather their immutability: construing life, including intellectual life, as an unceasing battle of competing interpretations, Nietzsche is only skeptical that the most recent result of this battle should be regarded as either assured "knowledge," or as genuine "progress." (It can be added that interpretation for Nietzsche moves in an unbreakable circle, an ebb and flow characterized by ephemeral victories in the power struggle between various perspectives, whereas interpretation for Habermas, as for Marx, forms one moment in an essentially linear progressive development, which markes the emancipatory formation-process of the human species.) Third, and finally, Nietzsche's sentence suggests that skeptical reflection may come into conflict with custom, and dissolve the traditional foundation it often professes to rationalize: thus the impulse to remedy the inequities and "failed promise" of a blind custom may end, not by an enhancement of human freedom, but by the dissolution of the traditional beliefs and practices previous generations had assumed as the groundwork of their meaningful agency. This again is an obvious point—the truth, if you will, of the conservative argument in modern social thought—but Habermas finds it easier to dismiss Nietzsche's disturbing doubts by labeling them a "denial of reflection."

Yet, as Habermas' own choice of Nietzsche to end *Knowledge and Human Interests* suggests, Max Weber's observation remains as true today as when first written: one *can* measure the honesty of a contemporary philosopher in their posture toward Nietzsche and Marx. And if the rejoinders of critical theory to Nietzsche's thinking are not always convincing, they do at least attest to Nietzsche's continuing challenge for any social theory interested in the fate of human freedom.

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AMERICANIZATION AND CONSUMPTION*

by Stuart and Elizabeth Ewen

The scene opens: a pair of hands appears, interlocking pieces of a three-dimensional, wooden, "Chinese" puzzle. As the puzzle takes form, a softly modulated man's voice explains that most "industrial problems" or "business problems" are actually "communications problems."

Businessmen and industrialists, take note! An effective, well-designed, integrated system of *communicating* is the key to a smoothly running operation.

At last the disembodied hands have completed their task. The puzzle is solved. Behold! It has formed the *logo* of the American Telephone and Telegraph Company, the largest corporation on earth.

Now, the screen goes black, and a white-lettered message crosses it, proclaiming: *"The system is the solution."* Like stars on the firmament.

Perhaps you recognize this ad, a recent segment from NBC's "Evening News." The ad is a quintessential example of the consciousness industries' projected image; a corporate expression of total administration as a positive ideal, an absolute. The basic premise of the ad is that in a corporate industrial world, it is the agencies of communication which provide the mechanism for social order. Posing in the guise of a universal, the consciousness industry provides a language, a system of belief, a way of inculcating and effecting "common understanding," all of which remind us that we are, after all, but components in a modern world. It is a modern world defined by the retail (individualized) consumption of goods and services; a world in which social relations are disciplined by the exchange of money; a world in which it increasingly *makes sense* that if there are solutions to be had, they can be bought.

Yet before accepting the trans-historic universality of such a system, we would benefit from a glance at the history of such a vision of the world; evaluating the role that emerging consciousness industries have played in the development of the vision. Another ad, this one *not* aimed at a corporate industrial audience, creates a different prism. This ad took the form of a flyer. It was circulated and posted in Italy's *mezzogiorno* (southern tier) at the turn of this century. Its audience was a decimated peasantry; plagued by

*This article derives from work which will eventually appear in a book, tentatively entitled: *In the Shadow of the Image: Fantasies of Freedom in Capitalist America.*

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taxes and rents, historically wounded by the increasing domination of the more industrial north, no longer able to survive on its traditional lands. The ad was one of countless circulars, reaching into the most isolated regions, which invited its viewers to come to America. This ad in particular, distributed by woolen manufacturers' agents from Lawrence, Massachusetts, showed a "picture of a mill on one side of the street and a bank on the other—and workers trooping from one to the other with bags of money under their arms."[1] This ad, and others, linking "ancient utopian motives" to an as yet unknown future in industrial America, was part of an initiation into the terms of *modernity*.[2]

Unlike the ad from AT&T, which assumes a viewership well schooled in the logic of the metropolis, the second ad—wooing people from one world into another—offers the metropolis as an unknown, albeit an unknown which promises to alleviate the hardships of immediate experience. It is only fitting that one's first contact with the core of the industrial market, should come in the form of an advertisement, an artifact exemplary of an industrialized, consumer society. This ad, and the broad ensemble of industrial artifacts to which it belonged, was one of the early glimmers of a distant society which was, at that very moment, defining itself with a vengeance, as *a world beyond nature*. Of particular interest to an audience historically bound to the land, the world which beckoned was one without a peasantry.

To clarify this, though the United States had (and still has) an agricultural working class, it was (is) a class which was largely assembled as integral to a cash-crop economy. From its beginnings, America had built much of its economic vitality on the foundation of a capitalist agriculture. Slavery, standing at the heart of the development of a capitalist world market, was a decidedly capitalist labor system. It is no irony that the New York Stock Exchange stands today at a site originally haunted by slave traders and their pirate cohort.[3] Designed for the forced production of a cash crop, the slave labor system was one which bound people to owners, not to land. In many ways more akin to a factory proletariat than a peasantry, slaves embodied transportable and exchangeable labor; they had in fact been transported to the production site, the plantation. There, production was characterized by extreme labor intensity; people were mobilized by systems of discipline and observation which stand closer to the patterns of the industrial factory than to those of the feudatory lands of Europe.

Similarly, the rise of great portions of the United States as a grain belt, a "bread basket" for the world, by the end of the 19th century, was not the result of an initiative by small, independent, "Yankee" farmers. Rather, it was the result of a governmentally enforced integration of large-scale

1. Elizabeth Gurley Flynn. *The Rebel Girl.* New York, 1955, p. 134.

2. Grazia Dore. "Some Social and Historical Aspects of Italian Emigration to America." Originally in *Journal of Social History* (Winter 1968); as reprinted in Francesco Cordasco and Eugene Bucchioni. *The Italians: Social Backgrounds of an American Group.* Clifton, 1974, p. 20.

3. See Matthew Josephson, *The Robber Barons.* New York, 1956, p. 16.

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capitalist agriculture with highly industrialized networks of transportation (railroads, which were given vast farmlands on both sides of the tracks) and communications (telegraphy, and its facility for high-speed, and—by about 1870—worldwide exchange; the stock ticker, for example.)[4] The American environment to which many Europeans came in the years girdling the turn of the twentieth century, even in its agriculture, was at sharp variance from their own historical experience, and the social forms that had carried it.

While the America of the European circulars offered itself as a land of promise, we cannot assume that people responded to that offer with a sense of total and willful abandonment of the "old culture." Though millions responded to the lure of *money* in America, we cannot derive from that that people were anxiously embracing a world view which ranked *false estate* (money, abstract value) above *real estate* (land, tangible use value).

Indeed, many saw money as something to be saved and consolidated so as to replenish and revitalize their connection to a customary means to survival. The underlying assumption here, was the uneducated notion that all money behaves like capital. Many saw migration to America as but a temporary foray; one which would allow for a prosperous return to an old and familiar way of life. Within the United States there were some similar tendencies. Herbert Gutman tells us of an advertisement distributed among Black Alabamans during a Kansas coal strike of 1896-1897: "WANTED! COLORED coal-miners for Weir City, Kan., district, the paradise for colored people...Special train will leave Birmingham the 13th. Transportation advanced. Get ready and go to the land of promise."[5] Though historically denied any claim to the land, industrial wages held a utopian promise to many freedmen. It was thought that wages would provide the wherewithall by which former slaves could return south and establish, for the first time, a sovereignty on the land.

This is an important phenomenon, common to people who, over a lifetime, are caught in the dynamics of an unequally developed world.[6] It is a phenomenon which continues currently, for example, among the one-seventh of the working population of Europe composed of migratory laborers. Many of these people enter the industrial centers of Europe with the hope that a return home will be a prosperous one. In Europe, where the return home is

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4. Slavery as a capitalist labor system is a theme developed by George Rawick in *From Sundown to Sunup*. Westport, 1972. This is one of the only books on the subject of slavery to address this issue frontally. Also, William Eric Perkins, in a discussion we had last spring, helped to shed light on this subject. Regarding the question of the capitalist roots of American agriculture, William Appleman Williams has most clearly perceived and addressed the connection. His *Roots of the Modern American Empire: A Study of the Growth and Shaping of Social Consciousness in a Marketplace Society* is an important contribution. Lawrence Goodwyn's *Democratic Promise: The Populist Moment in America*. New York, 1976, also provides important insights into the rise of American capitalist agriculture and the radical response.

5. Herbert Gutman. *Work, Culture and Society in Industrializing America*. New York, 1977, pp. 174-175.

6. See John Berger and Jean Mohr. *A Seventh Man: Migrant Workers in Europe*. New York, 1975, for a vivid portrayal of current conditions among Europe's migratory workers.

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systematically enforced, it is a return which is instead characterized by impoverishment and extreme alienation, an alienation rooted in the unclouded recognition of oneself as a movable and malleable object in the design of others.[7]

Returning to the United States, around the turn of the century, this sense of alienation is one widely expressed by those who made the venture to America. Initially interpreted as a vehicle for replenishing the old way of life, money wages and the practice of selling time, were soon revealed as a new structure of domination. There was a quickly perceived difference between *money* and *capital.* While capital was something which, like land (an abstract parody of land?) *could* generate more value for capitalists, the money wages that working people landed in America were something to be spent, used up. Among people for whom consumption had been anathema, consumption was being proferred as necessary definition of citizenship.

In an historical etymology of the word "consumer," Raymond Williams makes this point particularly clear.[8] After indicating a (Fr.) root word which connotes "to take up completely, devour, waste, spend," Williams notes that in "almost all its early English uses, *consume* had an unfavorable sense; it meant to destroy, to use up, to waste, to exhaust. This sense," he continues, "is still present in 'consumed by fire' and in the popular description of pulmonary phthisis as *consumption.* Early uses of *consumer,* from C16, had the same general sense of destruction or waste." Needless to say, it is in those regions where exchange had left most senses of natural propriety behind, that the term consumer began to attain a neutral, and eventually a self-congratulatory meaning. (As in: "I am a member of the consumer movement!") In a context where value is derived from the land, or from the direct appropriation of nature, *consumption* is suicide. It is to *use up* that which must be maintained and replenished in order to survive. For the non-industrial people who came to populate industrial America, the wage-system represented an intrinsic violation of a basic assumption, customarily derived from a sensuous proximity to nature. Hence, the common compulsion among early immigrants to *save,* to appropriate money *as if it were land.*[9]

The disruption of a sensuous proximity to nature is an event of no small concern. Yet Capitalism and Marxism alike, with modernistic zeal, have

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7. *Ibid.*

8. Raymond Williams. *Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society.* New York, 1976, pp. 68-70.

9. This attempt to transform wages into a form of capital-land continues today among the vast number of Chinese immigrants who have come to New York's Chinatown in recent years. Thus, in a relatively emiserated population, we see a compulsive tendency toward "savings," and the flourishing of the banking business in that area. This tendency is well presented in Downtown Community Television Center's excellent documentary, "Chinatown" (WNET). *The Daily News* (New York, January 29, 1978), reports on this proclivity toward saving, among New York's recent immigrants from Nationalist China. According to the *News,* this proclivity for savings has made for a boom business among bankers; numerous large New York City banks have recently opened branch offices to absorb thses savings.

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tended toward what Raymond Williams has recently called "a triumphalist version of 'man's conquest of nature'." Such a shared perception, Williams adds, is best understood within the context of "a whole period of bourgeois thought." He continues: "Indeed, it became an almost inevitable generalization from the extraordinary achievements in material transformation of the industrial revolution and of advances in the physical sciences. . . . Human beings have, by associated labor, moved in thousands of ways out of passive dependence on their environment, and out of mere adaptive marginality at its edges. The reshaping, remaking and innovative transformation of the pre-human material world is absolutely significant, historically. But of course *this can only be described as the 'conquest of nature' if the initial terms of a separated 'man' and 'nature' are taken for granted.*"[10]

Within the context of industrial America, this separation has been axiomatic to the predominant ideology of development. In the society to which immigrants came, waste and exhaustion were key to the germination of new, industrial markets. In the cases of those folk making steerage to Gotham, the consumption of their traditional relationship to nature, the destruction of skills by which that relationship was carried on, and the exhaustion of the social forms of customary life, were primary projects of American mass industrialism, forged as it was in the early years of this century. Repeated calls for the "Americanization" of immigrants came from many decisive sectors. Edgar Furniss, a Yale University social scientist of the period, expressed an American conviction that was widely held among people in business, in politics, in social bureaucracies, as well as among an increasingly kept profession of academics. "Americanization," he implored, "is the paramount need, not only for the immigrant, but for the very existence of the Republic. Unless the millions of immigrants present and future are made an integral part of the population, understanding our institutions, sharing the standards and ideals of the democracy, the Nation itself is imperiled."[11] Clearly, although the call for "Americanization" was couched in the terms of 18th century nationalism, it was not an invite for immigrants to join the ruling Yankee-Calvinist brotherhood. Rather, the "American nation" that was being raised as a social standard was a nation in the process of being formed, being standardized. It was a nation which not only beckoned to the newly arrived from southern and eastern Europe, but also to an increasingly large, increasingly dispossessed domestic population. "Americanization" was not a process of naturalization, as it is usually represented, but rather of de-naturalization. It was a process by which a cultural transvaluation was to be enacted; that process by which a peasantry or people involved in petty commodity production, are encouraged and or coerced into equating consumption with survival.

10. Raymond Williams. "Problems of Materialism." *New Left Review.* Number 109, May-June 1978, p. 8.

11. Edgar D. Furniss. *Labor Problems.* Boston, 1925, p. 176.

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The first stage of Americanization, an integration into the wage system of labor, created great fissures and, ultimately, gaps in people's comprehension of the material world in which they lived their lives. Money was an abstract and symbolic system of value which was necessary to life, yet which seemingly operated by an autonomous and lifeless physics. It rendered much of the way in which non-industrial peoples understood themselves, and the reproduction of their daily lives, useless. The money system itself was a widely disseminated *mass medium* which ripped the structure of peoples' *needs* from their customary roots, and by necessity transplanted these needs in a soil nourished by the "rationality" of corporate industry and the retail marketplace. Robert Park, the Chicago School sociologist, was one of the most ardent chroniclers of this transplanting, although himself a vocal champion of Americanization. In an enthusiastic, typically "Progressive" discussion of the transformative powers of money, Park described what must have been, in the subjectivity of immigrant peoples, a wrenching experience: "Money is the cardinal device by which values have become rationalized and sentiments have been replaced by interests. It is just because we feel no personal and no sentimental attitude toward our money, such as we do toward, for example, our home, that money becomes a valuable means of exchange. We will be interested in acquiring a certain amount of money in order to achieve a certain purpose, but provided that purpose may be achieved in any other way we are likely to be just as well satisfied. It is only the miser who becomes sentimental about money...."[12]

Like most developments forged in the heat of the historical dialectic, the purge of the "sentiments" by "rationality" contained crucial and emancipatory possibilities. The rationality of social production and the wage system, had incorporated an assault on the traditional power of the patriarchy, heralding the possibility and growing demand for the emancipation and equalization of women. So, too, had it exercised a force against the traditional primacy of religion, and fealty to religious hierarchy. It should be mentioned here, briefly, that the money economy and industrialism raised up the historically elusive possibility of material sufficiency, under the ideological banner of "abundance."[13] So too would its mechanical rationality be increasingly articulated with an appeal to historically denied spheres of aesthetics. To this we shall return momentarily.

But what Robert Park celebrated as the erradication of sentiment, meant—for people entering the metropolis—that they were experiencing a social fabric torn like the clothing of a grieving Jewish widow. The bonds of family and traditional community, bonds—despite their contradictions—born of a sensuous proximity to nature, became jeapordied in a world whose self-proclaimed destiny was the transcendence of nature itself.

12. Robert E. Park. "The City: Suggestions for the Investigation of Human Behavior in the Urban Environment." Robert E. Park, Ernest W. Burgess, and Roderick D. McKenzie. *The City*. Chicago, 1925, pp. 16-17.

13. For a further discussion of this development and its internalization in American advertising, see Stuart Ewen, *Captains of Consciousness: Advertising and the Social Roots of the Consumer Culture*. New York, 1976.

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The second phase of Americanization, the ideological consumerization of a newly industrialized people, came largely as a response to the social crisis explicit within the first. We must assume that something about the truncation of traditional cultural understandings and the decimation of customary bonds which resulted, made people particularly vulnerable and yielding to the ideological lure of modern consumerism.[14] It is no accident that what we understand to be *mass culture*; a social landscape marked by consumer industries, consciousness industries, and mass media, develops at this nodal point where a formerly rural, or otherwise non-industrial people were being transformed into a permanent, mass industrial population.

Clearly, part of the origin of *mass culture* (advertising, mass media, mass proliferation of images) lay in the capitalist necessity to generate ever expanding markets. At the same time, however, we must recognize that the creation of these markets necessitated an abolition of the social memories which militated against consumption. The new markets, by necessity, had to present a world view in which *nature* was not merely separated from humankind, but was portrayed as inhospitable and-or a hopeless anachronism; totally overcome by an industrial force and imagination which proclaimed for itself, the right and power of creation. The mechanism through which this took place was, ironically, based in the spread of misery and discontent engendered by the historic experience of industrial capitalism itself.

Amidst the social crisis of industrialization, the hitherto denied realms of leisure, beauty and pleasure, became a decisive ideological overlay of a consumerist culture. An aesthetic ideal, formerly the province of an aristocracy, was universalized as the promise which would be met in exchange for a consumerized understanding of survival. Simon Patten, one of the most important and outspoken apostles of industrial consumerism, argued that the leap from "scarcity" to "abundance" demanded the coercive denial of nature and the embrace of artiface: "...it is the reduction of old pleasures that forces the consumer to resort to new pleasures to make up for the loss of old ones."[15]

Patten anticipated Walter Benjamin by more than thirty years when he indicated that it was the mechanical reproduction of images which would be the decisive hook of the new order, bringing what he termed "the beautiful within the reach of all." Postulating the transformative capacity of such images, Patten, by the 1890s, had already perceived the inherent power of mass advertising. "So cheap are many kinds of pictures," he noted, "that they are largely distributed as means of advertisement. Everywhere the homes of the poorest people are full of beautiful objects, many of which have no cost; and when their taste is improved by contact with these objects, others more

14. Joel Kovel's work on the subjective dimensions of the process under consideration brought this point to our attention.

15. Simon Patten. *The Consumption of Wealth*. New York, 1892, p. 51.

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suited to the new condition can be obtained at a slight increase in cost."[16]

According to Patten, as the consumption of mass produced objects was encouraged by imagery, the ultimate logic of consumption—very much in the terms outlined by Raymond Williams—would take over. Continual waste would be internalized and canonized as a social good. In Patten's words: "...the standard of life is determined, not so much by what a man has to enjoy, as by the rapidity with which he tires of the pleasure. To have a high standard means to enjoy a pleasure intensely and to tire of it quickly."[17] In Patten we are witness to the ways in which the demands of the market begin to map out a national identity, a new way of life. While Patten's enthusiasm for this development betrays an obvious ecological blindspot, his insight into the process of Americanization is undeniable. Realizing that industrial capitalism has mediated, apparently severed, people's relationship to nature (even their own), he located the modern *telos* of domination. Implicitly, and unwittingly, Simon Patten provided a sketch of the anti-social premise of the Americanization process. He anticipated the way in which the mass production and distribution of industrial imagery would become an increasingly decisive component of the material environment. The aesthetic realm, ultimately the reified reclamation of a pre-civilized *nature* (the insatiable urge for immediate, inconsequential gratification), would become the aphrodisiac by which a submission to corporate advances could be achieved.[18] Such an aesthetic, in Patten's own terms, presumed to pacify human initiative. The source of creative power would be the object world, invested with subjective power. History itself would become a succession of technological and commodity forms; forms propelled by the demands of the market economy. "The new basis of civilization," as Patten called it, was one in which the human subject was expelled from history; progress was to be measured by the extent to which social life, social relations, became what has been termed, a "mirror of production." The ancient utopian dream of a "world turned upside down," would come to pass. What Patten neglected to foresee was that it would be a nightmare, a celebration of impotency.

By the 1920s, the development of American consciousness industries, particularly advertising, had begun to materialize as a result of the same social decisions by which mass industrialism was being developed. The priorities by which a population was being mobilized and privatized as wage earners, gave rise—of necessity—to a new capitalist cosmos. It was here that industrial-bureaucratic rationality was fused with the aesthetic sphere. The realm of possibility was being explored, but only within the confines of industrial agencies predicated on denial. This unlikely fusion was one

16. *Ibid.*, p. 34.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 51.
18. The sexual metaphor is still entirely appropriate in this regard. Only recently we came across an "Advertising" column in the *New York Times* (January 24, 1978), which explained that within the advertising industry, "well-known" personalities who have not yet leased their names for product advertising, are referred to as "virgins."

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sculpted by consciousness industries, working overtime to place a social democratic imprint upon capitalist social relations themselves. There was no room for even a *loyal* opposition.

One can readily observe, as an ongoing premise of consumer advertising, an outlook which links a criticism of modern industrial life to solutions predicated on a utopian vision of that modernity. Predictably, the solutions proferred by advertising circumvent any reliance on a sensuous appropriation of nature *or* of self *or* of social collectivity. The pleasures of the marketplace, like the labor process from which they emanate, are individuated, couched in a vision of a social world made up of anonymous and or hostile strangers. We can see the apex of this development in the supposed sexual liberations of the consumer universe. While appealing to wishes historically denied, the increased sexualization of corporate imagery is permeated by the logic of consumption. The ongoing display of diverse sexual images betrays the insatiability of the market more than it does the expansion of sensual gratification. The pornotopian charade of the consciousness industries links the sensual self with imperatives of the market. The "constant rapidity" with which we are encouraged to tire of consumable objects is generalized as a paradigm for existence; more particularly for sex. It is socialized, in part, as an insatiable need for new and different love objects. The separation from nature is exacted amidst a decimation of reliable social bonds. Within such a framework, sexuality among strangers becomes the logical ideal. An unwillingness to accept the aesthetic challenge of the ever changing novelty, leaves one with but the barest bones of the industrial as a tempo for survival: life becomes "going through the motions."

Through the process of Americanization, we arrive once again at the totalitarian assertion that "the system is the solution." It is an assertion which presupposes two decisive historical developments: first, that human self-activity has been eradicated and-or subsumed under the all-pervasive activity of the industrial order; second, that technological determinism has incontestably arrived as the motor force of history. Within such a perception, experienced history becomes but a passive viewing of the contingencies of the commodity market; the corporate order becomes the only continuous cultural premise.

This vision has the greatest appeal within a context where consumerism and the apparent transcendence of nature has been the experience of generations. The United States, founded on the basis of a capitalist agriculture, has traditionally articulated a national identity in terms of the domination of nature. The fetish of practicality and inventiveness, indicates the historic primacy of a *false estate* over a *real estate*. At the same time, however, our analysis of this process demands an international perspective. Understood within the framework of a world capitalist market, the culture of Americanization betrays the particularity of its roots.

While the artifacts of Americanization have been widely exported, in those

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areas where populations are not integrated into a consumerist mode, the universal of terror far outweighs the universal of the consumer culture. In recent history, it has been these areas which have been the weakest links in the capitalist market. It is here, as in the case of Vietnam, that the power of resistance has been most decisive. Imperialism assumes unequal development. A consumer culture, while its impulse is to project its own universality, is at the same time dearly dependent upon its lack of universality. Among people whose oppression is located in senuous proximity to nature, the culture of Americanization and consumption, though imported and disseminated by local ruling cliques, can have little transformative appeal.[19]

Within advanced industrial regions, where consumptionism has been installed, Americanization has enjoyed a well-calculated success. Yet, we cannot afford to assume that the politics of resistance is eclipsed; only that its terms have been altered. Within the industrialized regions, two important imperatives must be embodied by a politics of resistance. First, as the social bonds of customary life have been destroyed, it becomes crucial to establish new, more egalitarian bonds within the context of political activity. The individualization of modern life must not be canonized as we envision the future. Vanguardism will only reinforce the social passivity of consumerism. Substituting correct line for correct breath. Second, as industrial society has utilized the aesthetic sphere to fill the social vacuum left in the wake of its conquest, political struggle must claim the aesthetic realm as its own. Within the context of an Americanized culture, a politics predicated on denial and self-sacrifice suggests only the emptiness and anomie that people fear, lurking close under the imagery of consumerism. Rather, it is crucial that we cultivate a political vision which liberates aesthetics from its confinement in the colonized space-time constructions of consumerist possibility. Ours is to deepen and expand the realm of aesthetics, not swipe it away.

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19. Ariel Dorfman, co-author with Armand Mattelart, of *How to Read Donald Duck.* Bagnolet, 1975, spoke in New York recently. Commenting on the rise of cultural forms of resistance within Chile today, he emphasized that there had been a general failure, on the part of the "Donald Duck" culture, to mobilize the major part of the Chilean population, despite its religious celebration and importation by the ruling junta.

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ON CHINESE ASEXUALITY*

by Evelyne Tschirhart

The Sex of Angels.

Some friends who recently returned from China have told us of a new phenomenon in certain parts of Peking. For protection against additional tremors during the earthquakes, temporary covers were erected on the sidewalks with whatever material was available. However, a month later these temporary structures were still standing and seem to have become permanent fixtures. Tremendous ingenuity was shown in simply locating construction materials for these "second homes"—they were acquired illegitimately or on the black market. Even individualism was encouraged as these supposedly temporary shelters were crudely decorated. And if there is no rush to demolish the shacks, it is because, our friends tell us, among other things, they frequently serve as locations for a *rendez-vous*. They then add with a sigh of nostalgia: "Scandalous Peking!"

It is not hard to imagine the advantages a "private room" offers residents of dormitories and those living in tiny apartments frequently shared with family and even neighbors. Of course, there are always the parks, when they are not closed year after year for "strategic reasons." But in the summer, when the foliage slightly cools the suffocating air, it is advisable not to linger too long in the evening for fear of running into the patrolling civil guard. There is even a rumor circulating around Peking that the old Summer Palace has become a place of debauchery and prostitution!

One no longer knows what to think of Chinese asexuality. Nevertheless, the Maoists, friendship committees, and researchers of all types and persuasions are nearly unanimous on this question: "The Chinese are not interested in that!" We, too, for the benefit of those wallowing under capitalistic oppression, have in the past been anxious at press conferences to project images of an evolving Chinese paradise. Not content with the official account, we found it necessary to search the dialectic, to refine our concepts, in order to indubitably present in the originality of its realization the superiority of socialism. Indeed, the success of Claudie Broyelle's work, *La Moitié du Ciel*, whose readers extended far beyond the Maoist fringe, reveals an atavistic desire to place our future in the hands of a benevolent power.

From a "friendship" trip that I made to China in August of 1967, I can still

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recall the simple answers of smiling factory and commune leaders who patiently dodged our difficult questions: the young Chinese, totally occupied as they were in participating in the great Cultural Revolution, had no thoughts of love; birth control was going very well—although there was some resistance among peasants who, as everyone knows, lag behind the rest of the population. And even while we listened piously to this perfumed socialist morality, tens and tens of thousands of Chinese were out cultivating the land for the first time and giving free reign in the cities and countryside to their revolutionary creativity. Only much later did we learn—with blame given to Lin Piao—that the birth rate had shot up during these historic years.

If at the time the responses of our Chinese comrades made at least the most critical among us ill at ease, there was always someone—the advanced element—to remind us that China was constructing socialism and that requires some sacrifices. When in the course of evening walks we would come upon couples embracing tightly or holding hands, we felt unconsciously reassured by these discrete manifestations of eroticism. On returning home and unpacking our suitcase of certified propaganda, we could say, "I've even encountered amourous Chinese." Socialism was thus given a human face quieting those malevolent tongues who spoke of sexual repression.

However, it is no longer necessary to travel to China to understand that in the domain of sexuality (as in others) socialism offers wornout models and hardly flowering perspectives. Interestingly, China's public morality is equally embraced by our bourgeois elites and Maoists (not to mention the priests). That a single party has complete rule of the sexuality of 900 million Chinese in matters of abstinence, late marriage, and heterosexuality, is in itself a totalitarian phenomenon which ought to have struck us right between the eyes. We have not lost our sight; it merely took us two years of Chinese everyday life to see what was so obvious 13,000 km. away! Given our lack of vision, the periscope of Marxist-Leninist thought scanned for us the panorama of history with a synthesizing view which grasped the essential and ignored the facts and details regarding imperfections in the development of socialism. By a strange sleight of hand, what is considered a vice in capitalistic societies passes for a virtue in the socialist state. Similarly, while all reform in bourgeois systems is an illusion or trick, the maintenance of bourgeois or feudal institutions in a socialist system looses its reactionary character so as to guard the colors of the revolution.

An example of this manicheism can be seen in *La Moitié du Ciel* concerning the question of "free unions" whose institutionalization certain feminists demand. By arguing that "free unions" would not effectively liberate women if not accompanied by provisions to protect them and their children, Claudie comes to justify late marriage as practiced in China and asks us to believe that "despite a misleading appearance," it "approaches a free union." Unless it is simply a matter of faith, this logic is completely beyond us! Yet obligatory abstinence before marriage still remains a disturbing point: an abstinence which cannot be justified by demographic

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considerations since contraceptive methods are available. Happily, Proletarian Love arrives just in time to straighten things out. In order to understand what stuff this love between two mature people of opposite sex is made of, we may refer to the opera *La Fille aux Cheveux Blancs*, revised and corrected by Chiang Chin: "A love born of a common hate of the oppressors cannot freely expand so long as any oppressor, foreign or national, still exercise power. This conception of love, closely linked to socialist reality, is diametrically opposed to the idealistic and bourgeois conception. In it there is nothing of magic nor of captivity as in the love of Hsi Eul and Ta Tchouen; there is no 'magnetic attraction' or love at first sight, but rather a single past of suffering, a single hate, and a single desire for struggle. They love one another because they have the same hate of the old society and same determination to create another."[1] In periods of calm, Proletarian Love radiates a warm altruism to the profit of all: parents, friends, neighbors, etc. (not to mention Chairman Mao and the party, which Claudie unhappily fails to note). "We do not ask simply that a couple care for one another, but that above all they be dedicated to the people and maintain warm relations with their comrades."[2] As for sexuality, in this "debate on sexuality" it is at a level of bare subsistence.

In *La Moitié du Ciel*, the author deplores (without too much further insistence) the absence of discussion on this question all the while stressing that such a debate "would have no reason to become central." She hints that this insufficiency is the result of a backward mentality among some revolutionary cadres; yet this is to hide the forest behind the trees since it is the party line which takes the place of debate on all questions regarding sexuality.

Another way of approaching sexuality in China is to pretend that what appears to us repressive is not so for the Chinese, still underdeveloped and subsisting on a daily bowl of rice. Or it is an aspect of civilization, or a feudal survival, and not part of the nature of the present regime. Such reasoning recalls the old debate on individual liberties. In an interview granted to *Nouvel Observateur* in June of 1977,[3] Julia Kristeva responded as follows when asked if the climate of sexual repression and China's puritan atmosphere bothered her: "It bothers me but I am not Chinese. Your question would make sense if we lived in an Hegelian History (History with a capital H) and if all problems were more or less identical everywhere under the sun. In China the history of communism has been a history of the liberation of women, even if this emancipation was also a recovery of female labor power. For a woman who has had bound feet and who has just left feudalism—thus, for four hundred million women—communism is an indubitable affirmation. I think we must enter into Chinese history and not

1. Claudie Broyelle, *La Moitié du Ciel*, p. 264.
2. *Ibid.*
3. *Nouvel Obsevateur:* Le document de la semaine, "Julia Kristeva: A quoi servent les intellectuels?" 20 juin 1977.

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pose our questions on sexual or individual liberty. Chinese society does not necessarily operate with these notions." Elementary, my dear Watson! Are you Chinese? No? Niether am I. We must not confuse our meridians... Thank God, thanks to the Party, women no longer have bound feet. True, bound feet would hardly aid productivity in the factory or fields. However, to reduce the problem of the emancipation of women to the elimination of a revolting feudal practice is just a little simplistic. At any rate, a victorious capitalism would have ended this mutilation. As for our silly and absurd questions on sexual repression and individual liberty, we are cautioned to inquire with tact and discretion, for "Chinese society does not necessarily operate with these notions." But clarifications are in order, especially on the meaning of the word "society." Is "society" the Party which dictates and imposes its "socialist" morality on the masses who endure it?

It is interesting to note how clear Kristeva is about the positive side: "The history of the Chinese Communist Party is the history of emancipation," and how reserved she becomes when speaking of repression. Note that when it concerns the negative, the Communist Party modestly disappears into Chinese history, a history we are invited to penetrate. Indeed, one never knows enough, and the past does clarify the present, particularly when it has been continually falsified, erased, and cancelled. But who will dare to question the present?

Pasqualini recounts in his *Prisonnier de Mao* how homosexuals were executed and how offenses to the moral order were punished: "In China moral offenses are not treated lightly. In Socialist countries in general, but more so in China, deviations from the norm are not appreciated nor considered tolerable. The reasoning is simple: those who do not conduct themselves normally must be punished for the purification of society. After the revolution, male opera singers were prosecuted because they embodied feminity. Sodomy and rape can be punished by death. Women receive sentences of five years for extra-marital and pre-marital affairs. A married man who seduces a married woman gets ten years. A married man who seduces a single woman will receive an unspecified yet heavy sentence—the woman gets a light sentence. Lesbianism has always been rare in China, but homosexuality, formerly quite extensive, is henceforth no longer tolerated. I have read articles of homosexual rape in Western prisons In China the guilty are shot in a field."[4] This is not a tale of the Tang dynasty but of Chinese socialism! And when *Le Monde* reports in its news columns (very little indeed) recent executions for sexual offenses, it is precisely such repressive power which we question and not History, be it Hegelian or not.

One would love a clarification of these "notions" which do not attract us but are currently effective in Chinese society. Notions, it is worth recalling, that were in force in Nazi Germany and Mussolini's Italy. And if it is necessary to render unto Caesar what is Caesar's, we give to the Chinese Communist

4. J. Pasqualini, *Prisonnier de Mao* (Gallimard, 1974).

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Party and its leaders the responsibility for Chinese repression, that repression which Kristeva (and we shall not reproach her) would judge intolerable for herself.

Perhaps it would be best to cease fantasizing about China and listen to the Chinese even if what they have to say isn't pleasant. For example, to Yu Xue, a former Red Guard who escaped China by boat and in a essay, *La entalité Sociale à l'Ere de Mao*, tries to remind us that the Chinese are not zombies: "When we speak about China, it is necessary to begin with a sincere and truthful understanding of its people. In order to know China, it is necessary first of all to understand the people who live there, how they live their lives, how they think and experience things. The Chinese are human beings and it is necessary to understand them as such. I insist on this point (although it may appear obvious) because many commentators on China see the Chinese as 'research objects' corresponding to the reflections of their fantasies. 'The Chinese system,' they say 'isn't it grand?' Of course there is no freedom of speech, of thought, or of literary expression, but the Chinese have no need of such things! Thus, for these observers, the Chinese are very unusual beings, 'human tools' designed specially to produce, make, or construct this or that. Or else they take them for 'super-men.' In short, the Chinese can be anything at all, but not the human beings they resemble. This attitude is nothing less than an insult to the Chinese. I spent my entire youth in China and I know the life of workers and farmers. They have needs, hopes, and desires as do all other farmers and workers throughout the world, and this is so despite the political pressures of the current regime."

Slices of Life.

Living in a universe where double language and double thought reigns, one quickly learns to decode the dull language used in conversations of more than two people. Cynicism, silence or a smile become the important elements of communication. Slices of life then appear which are not at all rosy.

Elderly Chen has waited ten years for his wife, who works more than 10,000 km. from the capital, to be transferred to the same school. He takes care of their son while she watches their daughter. Again and again, he has asked that their separation be ended, but the two are not yet together. While he exercises patience, there are more urgent problems to attend to...

Chang's wife is a doctor, who for many years has worked throughout the provinces to aid workers who have been sent to work on important field projects. She could live in Peking, but since the Cultural Revolution, she has gotten it into her head to enter the Party. She must show herself worthy. In the meantime, Chang waits...

Hong and Li work together in the same organization. They are young and single, and both had been recommended for a few months course with the Army. However, gossip of a sexual relationship reached the authorities. Li will now depart alone for the Army. As for Hong, she will be given an assignment hundreds of kilometers from her friend.

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Lin works for a publisher. She has suffered from an emotional depression for two or three years and is treated for migraines and stomach ulcers. Lin knows very well the cause of her suffering: she doesn't get along with her husband. However, she is told that her nervous illness is the result of not reforming her ideology. There is no question of divorce without a valid—that is to say, political—reason. Perhaps, if her husband murders her with a hachet, as happened to another employee, she will be accorded a divorce posthumously. In waiting, she must be content with her life.

Ting was beaten to a pulp by her husband. For a year she unsuccessfully sought a divorce. However, her husband, who had deserted her many times, was considered a good fellow by his superiors. The authorities had attempted in vain to bring Ting to her senses. This poor woman continued to regularly disturb the neighborhood with her cries and lamentations without anyone ever coming to her aid. Party cadres, who had never lost an occasion to incite the masses to vigilance in the event of a suspicious attitude within the university walls, remained deaf during these episodes. They slept quietly with their ears covered, while neighbors and colleagues commented on Ting's fate, some remarking that she really must like it.

"In China," Y Xue writes, "the totalitarian state-power, with the aid of its propaganda organs, has so strangled expression and the exchange of affection, that the population (in particular the young) cannot satisfy their emotional or sexual needs except in fear and 'criminal' acts." Here is an example of a young teacher Chen Ping which perfectly illustrates this situation.

Two young teachers worked in the same village and fell in love. Realizing what had happened, they felt guilty and decided to avoid one another. But their work brought them together everyday. One day when alone they exchanged a kiss making them immensely guilty. They decided to discuss their feelings and finally admitted that they longed for one another and that it was not a crime. They embraced once again. Meanwhile, the young man, who wished to enter the civilian-guard, asked the young girl to keep their meetings a secret. They commenced to meet regularly in the evenings (in the country one doesn't need a room). Unfortunately, returning from one of these evening meetings, the young girl fell into a dry pit breaking her legs. Even though the pain was intense and she could hear workmen returning, she dared not call for help for fear that their secret would be discovered. At daybreak her moans finally attracted attention. She was removed from the pit and transported to the hospital where under questioning and in a comatose state she admitted to the relationship. Her young accomplice was immediately brought forward, publicly criticized, and transferred to another village. His military career was ended before it began. The moral of the story is what the young girl discovered for herself: to fall in love is a bad thing. The proof is that it must be hidden.

As overwhelming as these examples are of sexual and emotional control, for most people it fails to indicate a twisted morality. The Party cannot

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nationalize sexuality, but it can channel it through all sorts of pressures; infractions can even be tolerated since they are also an appearance of corruption among the people.

Dissuade, observe and punish.

Such are athe policies of Chinese sexual politics. As we have seen, it imposes late marriage, prohibits sexual relations outside of marriage, and punishes offenders—in short imposes a norm. Toward this end, it must direct energies (of workmen, peasants, students, and even soldiers) into work and study for the construction of socialism. Regarding students, a professor explained, "There does exist social pressure which can be justified from a demographic point of view. On the other hand, we advise the young that they must work and if they marry too soon it may be detrimental to their studies. Before the Cultural Revolution, this problem was discussed and opinions were divided. Now the young are different. They conform because the social pressure is much greater. But we misunderstand them."

Besides, everything is organized so that students have as little time as possible for themselves. Overworked with assignments, political meetings and groups, they are left few moments of freedom so their thinking doesn't go wrong: the sale of birth control pills to young girls and to women whose husbands are away for long periods is discouraged; a "fallen woman" is to be given a quick corrective "in order to provide a lesson;" and finally pleasure itself is discouraged because, as Orwell has already explained in *1984*, it is subversive: "It was not merely that the sex instinct created a world of its own which was outside the Party's control and which therefore had to be destroyed if possible. What was more important was that sexual privation induced hysteria, which was desirable because it could be transformed into war fever and leader worship. . . . The sex impulse was dangerous to the Party, and the party had turned it to account."[5]

How is it possible not to see hysteria in the relentlessness of Red Guards, during the wildest moments of the Lin Piao terror, cutting the hair of young girls and ruthlessly pursuing those in tight slacks, not to mention the demented cult of Mao, Supreme Being? How can anyone fail to see hysteria in the obscene caricatures of the Band of Four, particularly those of Chiang Ching (as had happened on other occasions to the wives of Liu Shao-chi and Lin Piao), whose misogynist character is so striking? Anyone driven to ecstasy by the absence of public pornography in China ought to question themselves just a little on the secret impulses revealed in the graphics of Mme. Mao's bountiful low-cut dresses and emphasized buttocks. But certainly the Party will not be scandalized when this represents the triumph of its line.

Party and hypocrisy.

Having defined its morality for the masses, the Party also has the power to

5. Orwell, *1984*, p. 134 (English edition).

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transgress it. As with a petty parish priest: do what I say but not what I do. Of course, prudence implies a little discretion, but as everyone knows, the higher ones' position in the hierarchy the greater the tolerance. Sexual privileges can be made part of a bureaucratic position. Nevertheless, if you are not yet highly placed in the ranks, deviations in this domain can be punished. Chang, for example, was a brilliant student in his third year with the English Department. A soldier and a member of the Party, he was known by all for his spirit "of daring to think and daring to act." He was an enthusiastic student of Mao's thought and diligent in English. However, just at the end of his studies, this promising future was spoiled. Being attracted to a student in his class, he proposed that she sleep with him. This proposal was met with an indignant refusal, but like all communists, not being able to stand defeat, he reiterated his proposition painting for her an unknown paradise. In effect, if she gave herself to him, he would help in seeing that her candidacy for the Party was accepted. This student, not taking the bait, revealed the secret plot. Chang was returned to his province, but not before the removal of his prized uniform and red-starred cap.

It would be a mistake to believe that all young Chinese women follow the example of Chang's student. For most young trainees, giving into the desires of the head of a brigade or a popular commune is frequently their only way of returning home or obtaining the severely rationed food coupons.

On the other hand, if cases of rape are numerous (and we cannot see how it could be otherwise in such a climate of repression), rape can also be an alibi for a young girl who, initially consenting, finds it necessary to save her reputation. (In China, as elsewhere, a woman is judged more severely by public opinion than a man, and the majority of men loathe to marry a woman who is not a virgin).

In *Après Mao, les Managers*, Pierre Pean reports the following scandal which occurred in Sian, capital of Shansi: "In Sian, the workers of an electrical equipment factory defended a young worker sentenced in the summer of 1975—unjustly in their eyes—to 20 years in prison for rape. They described the entire affair on wall posters on center city buildings, and in particular on the sides of the Tower of Tambour, a monument to the Ming era. The posters state that in autumn of 1973, Wang, a young worker at the factory and a young woman named Mao X (to avoid precise identification) were caught having sex when they were to have been at a criticism meeting against Lin Piao and Confucius. According to the posters, because the couple had been together for some time, the affair should have been handled within the factory by a criticism of their 'bourgeois conduct.' But the brother of Mao X struck the 'guilty' young man. According to all the posters, the father of the young girl turned to his contacts in the police to have the young man incarcerated. Eighteen months later, the trial was held. After 'consultation with the masses,' Wang was sentenced to 20 years in prison. Although 'raped,' the young Mao X found herself given three years of 'labor reform.' On the posters—put up for the benefit of the provincial authorities—the workers

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accused the police of never consulting the 'popular masses,' namely themselves, the fellow workers of Wang."[6]

"Profoundly changing human character"

Finally, it is not only regarding sexuality that the Chinese citizen is repressed, but in all aspects of his individuality. The Party, unifier of thought, wishes to expropriate the people's morality, sensibility, and values (without always completely succeeding), in order to install the absolute authority of its Norm. Of course, there are still conservative and reactionary values in the population. Paradoxically, however, these are not always the ones the Party combats (or, if it does so, it is only in the context of pitting one faction against another). Take the case of the Womens' Federation. As a syndicate (hardly by accident) it remained dysfunctional during the entire period of the Cultural Revolution, and it was only in 1974 (with the Party's green flag) that it resumed its activities. During this period, the criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius was in full swing. Not wishing to remain silent, some activists within the federations wrote articles about Confusianism and other male chauvinist ideas corrupting their lives. But this did not last long since those who launched this campaign only wished to eliminate Chou En-lai and not to criticize male chauvinism. The women were left out in the cold.

Besides, the role of the Women's Federation is not revolutionary. Rather, its usual activity is to study Marxism-Leninism and the thought of Mao, not to mention assigning the most deserving children to day-care openings and disciplining errant couples.

In 1974, the Women's Federation of Peking met for the first time since the Cultural Revolution. One day, I asked my female colleagues if our Institute had sent delegates to participate in the work of the Congress. There was an initial tense silence and questioning looks. Yes, someone had certainly been sent. "Oh," I said, relieved, "then you met in preparatory sessions and chose a comrade?" Again a heavy silence. No, no one knew who had been designated by the Party to represent the women of the Institute. But they assured me that it must have been a woman.

On March 8th, the traditional Women's Day in China, some of my colleagues, who knew I was interested in the question, invited me to attend a meeting on the theme, "Women Criticizing Confucius." Before a packed house, students and professors followed one another to the rostrum to read some standard lines they had drafted for the meeting. If you heard one you heard them all. Since the Liberation, women were equal to men thanks to Chairman Mao and the Communist Party of China. During the Pilin-Pikong, all women had made a considerable step forward on the road to emancipation, and we were all exhorted to work with even greater dedication and enthusiasm in the study of Marxism-Leninism and the thought of Chairman Mao. Of course, problems remain (although negligible since they

6. Pierre Pean, *Après Mao, les Managers*, pp. 69-70.

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weren't mentioned), but we have not yet attained communism. Of course, that explains everything! A little later, I learned that the women of the Institute were dissatisfied with their inadequate day care program. To this the authorities turned a deaf ear.

It is easy to understand that under these conditions a feminist movement in China cannot possibly develop. Such a movement would mean that women in China must take their problems into their own hands, discuss their specific concerns, and struggle together so that their demands are met. In sum, this would mean that they create a minimum of democracy! The only specifically female conditions now recognized are menstruation, pregnancy, and nursing. This leads the editors of *Quebec-Chine*, in a special issue dedicated to Chinese women, to write with admiration concerning this recognition and the available facilities: "Women (in China) are now free to control their bodies. They are free to participate in the transformation of their country and through that, to play a revolutionary role without renouncing the joys of maternity if they wish both." Such are the benefits of socialism for as everyone knows, in capitalist countries, women do not have control over their lives, nor over childbirth and nursing. As for the freedom to give one's body solely for procreation and labor in the construction of socialism, what woman would relish this? The Women's Federation is only an instrument of the Party to control women and, under the cover of progressivism and emancipation (previously women lived under the yoke of the feudal family), to dissolve the family not in the progressive sense but only as it provides a resistance to totalitarian state-power: "Human sentiments are thus suppressed in Chinese society. Emotional relations between parents, friends, and the two sexes are necessary for the existence of a human being. But the social system of Chinese communism oppresses emotional relations which are thought immoral and bourgeois. The only emotional connection which is recognized as legitimate is that between an individual and the state. I do not think this is an invention of Mao, because every dictator knows how to employ these same methods. Deprived of other emotional attachments, the individual becomes more and more dependent and admiring of his great, supreme leader."[7]

At the beginning of our visit to China, we were a little disappointed to discover the "petit-bourgeois' life style of our Chinese colleagues. We had heard so much of the revolutionizing of human relations in China, that we were waiting to see tangible signs of a communal society in the making. But there was nothing of this. Professors stayed home on Sundays to do the wash, and those who lived at the Institute and who were thus next door neighbors intermingled very little and entertained rarely. When we questioned them about this, the answer was unanimous: there wasn't any need to establish friendships since everyone met at work and during political events. And then, genuine communal living implies a certain candor, an exchange of ideas, and

7. Yu Xue, "La Mentalité en Chine à l'Ere de Mao," revue *Fleuve Jaune*. See also the film by Ettore Scola, *Une Journée Particulière*.

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finally a broaching of political subjects. But many at the Institute had been burned during the Cultural Revolution and some had even been betrayed by their best friends. Old personal histories had been exposed one Grand Day to the severe damage of those concerned. And then the future is never certain; your neighbor could be a rightist, and having exchanged this or that suggestion with him, you would be compromised. It is better to live quietly isolated from one another.

When I asked one professor if he had any friends he made this cynical reply: "Friends? Why? There is no need for friends in our society. What could they possibly be but a waste of time? During the day, we work for the construction of socialism. In the evening it is necessary to prepare dinner and look after the children. Generally we go to bed early to stay in good health. The Party asks us to keep good living habits."

Another generally accepted image is that the Chinese are a happy, smiling, and relaxed people. We found the situation quite the opposite, witnessing on many occasions (at bus stops, for example, where the buses are so jammed that there is a risk of getting caught in the vehicle's closing doors) the extreme tension and nervousness of the people. The appearance of calm on their faces—traditionally feelings are hidden—is contradicted by numerous tics and body spasms, or by the excessive consumption of tobacco by many men, or by numerous symptoms of nervous illness, such as stomach disorders, or migraines, which are suffered by many and not just intellectuals.

Daily, the Chinese live under the pressure of a constant denial of their impulses and desires. In order to survive it is necessary either to integrate oneself completely into the system and thus to become more or less an accomplice, or to resist, which is obviously extremely dangerous, if not mad. We know that a concealed, subterranean resistance exists. But it seems that, given the actual state of affairs, passive resistance reamins the only way to maintain a minimum of sanity. As one teacher said, "I love political meetings because there at least I can think about anything at all or sleep...."

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BENJAMIN'S POLITICS*

by Sandor Radnoti

Benjamin began to turn increasingly to Marxism from 1924 on. What this means is that the democratic revolutionary transformation of the bourgeois world became a decisive element of his philosophical perspective, and that he turned to Marx and the Marxists for theoretical support. In a sense, the turn did not benefit his work: he was never again able to achieve the coherence of his early writings, and a new heterogeneity and uncertainty entered his research. It could be said, following Adorno's unstated position implicit in his critical letters, that Benjamin's later works are not up to the philosophical level of *The Origin of German Tragedy*. Does this mean that Benjamin went wrong and that his friend, Gerschom Scholem, was right to state (as a warning in his letters, categorically in his recollections) that he was forcing an alien language on himself, translating his secular theology into Marxism, and losing rather than gaining from Marxist methodology?

Such a conclusion is as unacceptable as the view that, after his turn, Benjamin cannot be considered a philosopher.[1] Unless philosophy is identified with "professional" philosophy—in which case, except for a few passages, Benjamin was never a philosopher—such an objection is groundless. Benjamin was facing two alternatives: to choose a path of literary scholarship and sensitive criticism, free of ideology, or, in a way characteristic of philosophy, to make his theory practical. There is no trace of objective, scientific reflections to prepare the turn. Indeed, a certain degree of subjectivism accompanies the process of transition and Bloch refers, not

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*Translated by John Fekete. This is Chapter III of an unpublished book, titled in Hungarian *Krédo és Rezignáció*.

1. Hannah Arendt raised this possibility in her essay on Benjamin. Cf. *Benjamin-Brecht; Zwei Essays* (Piper, 1971), pp. 17ff. Hildegard Brenner embraces this notion and stresses the historical as against the philosophical character of Benjamin's work. Cf. "Die Lesbarkeit der Bilder—Skizzen zum Passagenentwurf," in *Alternative* (April-June 1968), p. 49. The *sole* common ground between the two interpretations is in the sharply critical assessment of the Frankfurt School's picture of Benjamin. But Adorno's student Tiedemann also differentiates a "sociology of art" phase and a philosophy of history phase in Benjamin's second period. Cf. *Benjamin: Der Falneur*, introduction by Tiedemann (Neue Rundschau, 1967), p. 550. Adorno himself correctly characterizes Benjamin's philosophical nature as follows: "his philosophical power extended to non-philosophical objects as well, to manifestly blind, intentionaless materials. One might say as an approximation that the less the object which he discussed belonged among the so-called official subjects of philosophy, the more illuminating he showed himself philosophically." In *Ueber Walter Benjamin* (Suhrkamp, 1968).

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without justice, to Benjamin's surrealism in *One-Way Street*.[2] After the early sonnets and the carefully crafted translations, it is during this period that Benjamin's genre, the "illumination," takes shape in the landscapes and snapshots of cities, in after-images and autobiography. The scientific and necessary character of his chosen perspective dawns on him only later. The *necessity* of the collapse of capitalism contributes not to his initial choice, but to sustaining it.

The philosophical problem which unfolded simultaneously with the writing of *The Origin of German Tragedy* is the antithesis of contemplation and action. In *The Origin of German Tragedy*, totality could be rescued only through sacrificing all action. Yet, this produced an unsatisfactory explanation of the world, not because it is impossible to conceive and to present the world as the history of decadence, but for moral reasons. Collecting images of such a world into monads—and a special emphasis falls on *collecting* which, next to experimenting, is the clearest example of contemplative activity—striving for a beautiful representation of hopelessness, inevitably conceals a frivolous substitute satisfaction. Benjamin's monadology preserves the Leibnizian character of pre-stabilization and, as in Leibniz, ultimately an interconnectedness of *facts* that cannot be further analyzed. Although the monad, as a methodological principle, is retained in the theory of dialectical images even after the turn, and remains, as Benjamin has stressed, one of the many continuities between the two periods, Rolf Tiedemann is right in his assessment that Benjamin's critique of the internal private totality of the bourgeois world is in many respects also a critique of the monad typology developed in *The Origin of German Tragedy*.[3]

The ethical bases of Benjamin's turn to Marxism are symbolized in the two encounters that initiated the chain reaction: Lacisz Aszja, a Bolshevik woman, and Lukács's *History and Class Consciousness*. Both are examples of political action. To understand Lukács' great impact, we have to bear in mind the points of contact between the two men's thinking.[4] Benjamin writes from Capri in his September 16, 1924 letter to Scholem: "The reason why Lukács' book took hold of me is that, starting from political considerations, Lukács arrives (at least in part if not as extensively as I had first supposed) at epistemological propositions which appear enormously kindred and

2. *Erbschaft dieser Zeit* (Suhrkamp, 1962), pp. 367ff.

3. Cf. *Studien zur Philosophie Benjamins* (Europaische Verlagsanstalt, 1965), p. 45. Tiedemann demonstrates here the facticity that remains in Benjamin's conception of the ideal. (This student of Adorno is so loyal to that dubious tradition of the Frankfurt School that he does not even mention the theoretical foundation of his critique: Lukács's study of reification.) The final conclusion of Tiedemann's just critique, that the monad in *The Origin of German Tragedy* is an epistemological category of philosophy of history (*ibid.*, p. 44), is unjustified. I have analyzed Benjamin's study elsewhere and shown its character as philosophy of history. See my "The Early Aesthetics of Walter Benjamin," *International Journal of Sociology*, III:1 (Spring 1977). When we talk about Benjamin's new period, it is not a question of the birth of the philosophy of history, but of its turn.

4. See my "Bloch and Lukács: Two Radical Critics in a 'God-Forsaken World'," in *Telos* 25 (Fall 1975), pp. 155-164.

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confirmative to me. On the terrain of communism, the 'theory and praxis' problem is posed in such a way that, in spite of their obvious disparities, any definitive insight into theory is bound up with praxis. In any case, it is evident to me that this position in Lukács is in no way a bourgeois demagogic platitude but has a really solid philosophical kernel. As I am not presently in a position to fulfill this solid precondition, I am therefore also postponing the material portion—but just postponing it. As soon as possible, I plan to study Lukács' book, and I would be disappointed if the debate with Hegel's concept of the dialectic and with his inferences failed to manifest the grounds of my nihilism with regard to Communism. All this does not alter the fact that, since I have been here, I see the political praxis of Communism (*not as a theoretical problem but primarily as an obligatory behavior*) in a different light than ever before."[5]

If we consider the elementary speed with which six years earlier Lukacs himself changed within days into an active revolutionary, then Benjamin is just marking time. Nine months later, he indicates that he is expediting his investigation of Marxist politics and is joining the Communist Party,[6] but in his important letter a year later (May 26, 1926), he is still just turning over in his mind the possibilities of his new stand. It is here that he formulates the postulate for leaving the sphere of pure theory. There are only two ways: religious or political. Indeed, the two are ultimately identical. "I am talking about an identity which manifests itself, paradoxically, in the transformation of one into the other (in either direction), with the essential condition that the attitude governing action must, in its own self-understanding, be sufficiently relentless and radical. Our task is not one of deciding for all time, but rather one of deciding in every moment. But *we must make our decision.* These realms may and, obviously, do have other identities than those which exist within the framework of practical change, but these other identities lead those like ourselves who want to look for them here and now far astray. If one day I were to join the Communist Party (which again depends only on a final push from chance) my own disposition would be always to act radically, never consistently, in all the most important things. How possible it may be to remain in the party must simply be determined experimentally, and what is interesting and questionable is not so much yes or no as how long? As far as certain incontrovertible ideas are concerned (such as materialist metaphysics or even, in my view, the inappropriate materialist conception of history), in a serious case such weapons can be used just as well in the interests of Communism as against it. If it is true, as you write, that I have fallen in 'behind certain fundamentals'. . . , then 'behind' means first and foremost that anyone in our generation who experiences and understands the current historical moment as struggle, and for whom this is not just a cliché, cannot hold back from studying and practicing that mechanism through which

5. Letter to Scholem, in *Briefe* I (Suhrkamp, 1966), p. 355 (emphasis added).
6. Letter to Scholem at the end of May 1925. *Ibid.*, p. 382.

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things and relations and masses affect each other.... In my view, anarchist methods are unserviceable and Communist 'goals' are meaningless and non-existent. But the value of Communist action is not reduced an iota, since that action is the corrective for the goals and since meaningful *political* goals do not exist."[7]

The goal of a monograph about Benjamin should clarify precisely every step of the transition.[8] For our purpose, only a few decisive moments are relevant. Benjamin increasingly appropriates the materialist conception of history, with particular respect for a very problematic side of it: the relation between base and superstructure. He never joins the Party, but he never publicly criticizes it. In a declaration of faith in 1931, he describes himself not as a representative of dialectical materialism as dogma, but as a researcher who finds the materialist attitude more fruitful than the idealist.[9] Politics, which appears for the first time in Benjamin's thinking in 1924, is important not as politics, but as the adequate form of morally and philosophically decisive action. The peculiarity originates in the period when he begins his turn to Marxism. It would be a mistake to assimilate the previous long citation (detailing his resignation with regard to political goals) either to a tragic anarchist morality or to a Bernsteinian social democratic ethic. It simply represents a sharp reaction to the liquidation of Europe's revolutionary possibilities. The question is: why does Benjamin's engagement come so late, and if there is no longer a revolutionary alternative, then why politics?

It is really odd, in the light of his later course, that Benjamin keeps himself completely apart from the political events around 1920. He keeps a distance from which he simply does not acknowledge the vast changes in the world, even though Germany, his homeland, either in theory or in practice, plays out virtually all its historical possibilities, from social democratic collapse in 1914 through the short-lived alternative of soviet government in 1918, the tragic experiment of the small revolutionary avant-garde, Spartacus, and the Bavarian soviet republic to the liberal solution of the social-democratic-bourgeois compromise. The World War puts an end to the hopes Benjamin placed in an intellectual movement aimed at reforming the schools, which he later called "a heroic experiment to change the attitudes of men without touching their relations."[10] His friend, Heinle, commits suicide, and his teacher, Wyneken, suddenly turns into the possessed prophet of the war.[11] In addition to these diappointments, the fact that he is a Jew significantly

7. Letter to Scholem. *Ibid.*, pp. 425ff.

8. I only know one study that deals with this in detail. See Helmut Salzinger, "Walter Benjamin—Theologe der Revolution," in *Kritik und Interpretation der kritischen Theorie* (TWA Reprint Edition, 1970), pp. 269ff.

9. Letter to Max Rychner, March 7, 1931. *Brief II*, pp. 522ff.

10. *Berliner Chronik* (Suhrkamp, 1970), p. 39. The recently published manuscript, "Childhood in Berlin," is a draft of the autobiographical work titled "Around the Turn of the Century," but the former contains far more political references and concrete autobiographical details than the latter.

11. *Ibid.*, pp. 36ff. The letter breaking with Wyneken dates from March 9, 1915. See *Briefe* I, pp. 120ff.

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contributes in a double sense to his reticence. A few lines from a letter written in 1923 casts this light on the passive side of his behavior: "In the most horrible moments of a people's history, only those who belong to it have the right to speak..., those in a position to say not only *mea res agitur*, but also *propriam rem ago*. The Jew certainly cannot speak."[12] The active side of his position: from 1915 onward he is engaged in emigrating to Palestine, and this plan only dies gradually around 1930. As with the possibility of freely choosing one's behavior, Jewry is also annihilated in a sentence written to Scholem: "Apart from you, I have never gotten to know living Jewry in any form at all."[13] Because of the character of Benjamin's development, the need to confront revolutionary action awakened in him at the time when Europe was growing quiet.

What is paradoxical is the shift toward political action precisely when every kind of political action seemed increasingly unlikely to bring about a future that would radically alter the bourgeois world. It is not that the grand political movements—the workers' movements— ceased to exist. Rather, movements with a mass base slowly fell silent about the ultimate aim of overthrowing bourgeois society or, on the contrary, while vocally proclaiming that aim in reality came to fight only for particular interests. The Soviet Union itself came to consider the preservation of the status quo as its political interest, even though its birth for the European Left had symbolized the possibility of transcending the bourgeois world. For this reason, political action appears in Benjamin's first, tentative approach as divorced from its objective possibility, i.e., explicitly as a need flowing from philosophy and moral conduct and as the analogue of religious action. The political *sphere* itself—and here this category, which refers to separated existence, already signals that politics in this sense is only a part of the bourgeois world—never occupied Benjamin. Both before and after his turn to Marxism, he grasped past, present, and future through the destiny of culture.

All the more interesting then, is his only (but brilliant) political analysis. Date: 1931. "All indications are that the masses of the unemployed are electing national socialist delegates. Up to this point, the communists have failed to connect up with this mass and hence with the possibility of revolutionary action. Because of the fantastic mass of the reserve army, the representation of the interests of labor becomes in every concrete sense a reformist task, and presumably the communists would not be able to represent them any differently from the social democrats. Everyone who still works belongs, by virtue of that fact alone, to the labor aristocracy, while a gigantic welfare stratum (naturally of microscopic format) is coming into being: an idle petty-bourgeoisie whose life consists of chance and inactivity and whose days are enacted with the same philistine precision as those of the

12. Letter to Florens Christian Rang, November 18, 1923. See *Briefe I*, p. 310.

13. Letter of April 25, 1930. *Briefe* II, p. 512. The task of Benjamin's philology is to assess the impact of Jewish philosophy and mysticism on Benjamin. In this connection, Martin Buber's impact also needs to be clarified.

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modest players at the baths."[14]

In these few lines, Benjamin points out one of the most important foundations of fascism and emphasizes the previous general conclusion concerning political movements oriented to particular interests. His analysis lacks theoretical direction because he does not raise one very concrete question: if the communist movement were to orient itself to the interest of the unemployed—overlooking a difficulty that cannot be discussed here, i.e., that the Party is an unsuitable organizational form for a mass movement of unemployed being transformed into petty-bourgeois—then how could that be linked up with the diametrically opposed interest of labor? In principle, of course, one may reply that such linking up is not at all necessary. Considering the question as a theoretical model out of its historical context, today (when in the advanced capitalist countries the whole of labor—and not primarily because of the unemployed—has become, from the standpoint of its interests, a labor aristocracy in the classical sense, or at least may become that without shaking the foundations of the system) such replies have indeed been produced. In the same way, the new recognition that modern capitalism is able to integrate *all* strata *on the basis of their own interests* has made it possible today to uncover the theoretical problem behind the question: i.e., that interest—as exclusive motive force—does not lead out of bourgeois society.[15]

But when it organizes or re-organizes social contacts and arrangements, the separated political sphere, a child of this society, invokes precisely this interest—or its negative correlative, the anxiety about interests. Marx pointed out that the abstraction of politics is a modern phenomenon. He writes that political arrangements developed only where "the private spheres achieve autonomous existence."[16] The *calculable behavior* of separated private individuals (which is the precondition for the separation and functioning of politics) is based on the rationality of interest. There is no need to show that the *natural law* of bourgeois society is at work here: it is enough to realize the decisive place of 'human nature' in the whole spectrum of bourgeois philosophy or, to stay with Benjamin's material, the role of the villain in baroque theater as he calculates this nature. The fact that Machiavelli adduces arguments in favor of the eternal nature of interest-oriented man and simultaneously creates the science of politics says enough. The rationality of this science is always and of necessity completed by irrational moments; people's political reactions can never be totally calculated and even in the guise of interest they transcend interest. Already with Machiavelli, fortune, circumstances, and changing times are such necessarily irrational categories supplementing rationality. This is especially true of the basis of the description, i.e., human nature itself. We may come to know how it

14. Letter to Scholem, October 3, 1931. *Briefe* II, p. 537.

15. The critique of interest from this viewpoint was originated by Agnes Heller. See "Towards a Marxist Theory of Value," translated by Andrew Arato in *Kinesis*, V:1 (Fall 1972), pp. 3-76.

16. See *The Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*.

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functions, but of the reason why it functions just so, all we can say it: it is just so.[17] The antinomy of bourgeois society demonstrates from yet another side that both the separation of the political and its very existence as a separated sphere are possible *only* in a world governed by interest. The only reason that a separated politics could have come into being with Machiavelli is that he was not after changing the world: he was after rational arrangements within possibilities that were given and presumed unchangeable.[18]

All politics are based on power and interest structures and bring such structures into existence. Yet, politics embodies certain moments, e.g., movement, action, community, and publicity which may be subordinated to the previously-mentioned structures but their total subordination is not necessary and they may hope to gradually put an end to that subordination. In any case, this possibility, as well as the illusion of this possibility, have played a great role in the formation of the paradoxical situation where politics was to become the abstract universality of bourgeois society precisely when the termination of bourgeois society appeared in political form.[19]

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17. "...one of whom succeeds in his designs and the other not, and in the same way two men succeed equally by different methods, one being cautious, the other impetuous, which arises only from the nature of the times, which does or does not conform to their method of procedure. From this it results, as I have said, that two men, acting differently, attain the same effect, and of two others acting in the same way, one attains his goal and not the other. On this depend also the changes in prosperity, for if it happens that time and circumstances are favorable to one who acts with caution and prudence he will be successful, but if time and circumstances change he will be ruined, because he does not change his mode of procedure. No man is found so prudent as to be able to adapt himself to this, either because he cannot deviate from that to which his nature disposes him, or else because having always prospered by walking in one path, he cannot persuade himself that it is well to leave it, and therefore the cautious man, when it is time to act suddenly, does not know how to do so and is constantly ruined; for if one could change one's nature with time and circumstances, fortune would never change." Niccolo Machiavelli, *The Prince*, translated by Luigi Ricci, rev. E.R.P. Vincent (London, 1935), pp. 112-113. On the development of the political sphere, see Agnes Heller, *A reneszansz ember* (Akademiai, 1967), pp. 267ff; and Jürgen Habermas, "Die klassische Lehre von der Politik in ihrem Verhältnis zur Sozialphilosophie," in *Theorie und Praxis* (Luchterhand, 1967), pp. 13ff.

18. From this standpoint, the counterpart of *The Prince* is Thomas More's *Utopia*. Only the first book of *Utopia*—the critical part of this work— is of a political character. Thomas More shows the interest motives of the given, inhuman and unacceptable world. The second book of *Utopia*, however, is *not* a political work, in two senses. First, in the Utopian island community, where interest is no longer a factor of life and the aim of life is "the improvement of their minds," there is no separated politics. Second, there is no political mediation through which England could turn into Utopia. However much More may stand at the outset of bourgeois development, and however much need there was for revolutions to launch the unfettered functioning of bourgeois economy, More's simple conclusion has outlived every internal change in the bourgeois world. There is no transition between the two books of his work. Without a transition—and, of course, the political moment would form an element of this—even the possibility of the annihilation and transcendence of the bourgeois world is lost. But this possibility is equally lost if the transformation is imagined or effected purely in the political sphere. Purely political revolutions aiming at the annihilation of the bourgeois world may be carried out, yet the power and interest structures, the antinomies, and the alienation of that world will still be reproduced. Cf. More's *Utopia* in *Famous Utopias of the Renaissance*, ed. Frederic R. White (New York, 1955), p. 53.

19. Eighteenth-century England, which began the purely political organization of bourgeois society, to a certain extent represents an exception. Here, a really clear-sighted and cynical political and economic thought and philosophy developed which, in the name of complete

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From a separation between private or particular interests and the ideological common interest, and between bourgeois society and the political state, it does not yet follow *ipso facto* that the ideological expression of common interest should be politics. At first, it was religion or the authority of the monarchy, later the law and the nation have had a permanent, distinct role. For a long time, politics did not have a comparably general ideological function and homogenizing role. Obviously, the science of politics both understood and articulated the secret of the system of atomized interests. This is why, except in England, Machiavelli has been met for more than three hundred years with silence, passionate attack, and misinterpretation.

With the formation and organization of the proletariat, politics as ideology emerged from its role in the background, bearing the dangerous threat that all political struggles carried out consistently from the standpoint of proletarian class interest will be directed against the economic foundations will mean, at the same time, the transcendence of the bourgeois world. With this *political* radicalism, and with its correlative, the liberal, bourgeois-democratic ideal of the common interest continuously being effected from the unimpeded collision of particular interests, politics (naturally, within national boundaries) becomes the universal ideological medium of bourgeois society. It is impossible here to draw the historical portrait of these tendencies: it is enough to indicate that in the course of the political emancipation of the proletariat, its ideology became attached to its radical ultimate object, while its existence was linked to the political possibilities of liberal-democratic ideology. The proletariat has played a decisive role in the development of modern capitalism *in both respects*. Bernstein truly expressed the secret of social democracy when he declared null and void the ultimate object and identified the movement as the socialism of interest-oriented man. The revolutionary wave that followed the World War and 1917 constituted "a metaphysical event" (Gramsci) because those small groups which, under the leadership of Luxemburg, Lenin, Pannekoek and others, had been working on the critique of reformism and on the construction of a revolutionary alternative, suddenly acquired world-historical significance.

The concept of politics includes its *immediate* success, its result. For the European intelligentsia, the big argument for *political* engagement and action was the existence and the results of a politics which was not integrated into the status quo as a *single* particular interest and which did not—as did European social democracy in 1914—subordinate its particular interest to the

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rationalization, refused to acknowledge any spiritual generality above society and which identified private and common interest within the economy and wealth. The counter-reaction, characteristically, consists of the interchange of common interest and private interest and of the roles of citoyen and bourgeois, the defense of bourgeois society, and the rejection of the state. (According to Fielding's and Hogarth's conviction, what stands opposed to the private individual's socially profitable activity is the activity of politicians serving their own profit.) Thus, 18th-century England is the source of *another* concept of politics: politics as total absence of principle, as corruption, as 'great sinfulness.' Cf. my notes on this problem: "Walpole-ok es Jonathan Wild-ok," in *Filologiai Közlöny* (1969), pp. 19ff.

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'general interest' of bourgeois society. From this viewpoint, Lukács' lightning turn in 1918 symbolizes the situation of the radicalizing intelligentsia. At least equally symbolic, however, is what Bloch writes in the 1923 version of his *Utopia*: "The war ended, the revolution began, and the doors opened with it. But very soon these doors closed again."[20] For present purposes, we may pass over the otherwise extraordinarily important and instructive internal political debates within the radical movement(s) during the period of the open doors: i.e., about the leading role of councils or of the party, about the function of parliament and the trade unions, about the relation between a spontaneous mass movement and a revolutionary elite, etc. The fact is that polemics and antitheses are developed from a common ground in two standpoints.

The first is an inference that may appear tautological: that the movement *exists*. This is the most important. Certain questions that within a few years will again become decisive—all of them connected with the non-existence of the movement and new possibilities for it—are self-evident during this brief period. For the moment, from the standpoint of historical comprehension, we may bracket whether ultimately this movement tended to, or had the capacity to, destroy the bourgeois world. Its participants experienced it as though it did, because in the context of the general crisis of post-war Europe the radical and utopian character of this movement could be realized temporarily and ~~indeed played a significant~~ part in the (finally not revolutionary) transformation of the world. This same question can in no way be indifferent for us with a view to contemporary ideological orientation. If we bind our perspective today to the conceptions worked out in that period, or to one or the other of the practices that materialized then—as was frequent in the radical experiments of the 1960s—then we are essentially condemning ourselves to a futile wait for the restoration of the conditions of that time, including a general social and economic crisis and the existence of masses who neither *can* nor want to integrate into what exists.

This *second* standpoint, added to the standpoint that the movement *exists*, consists of a conviction of the necessity of the collapse of capitalism. Armed with empirical support by the world situation in the aftermath of World War I, this conviction in turn supported the radicalism of the movement. This postulate of necessity, developed by Lūxemburg, is unquestionably in the background even of the great ideological totalization and political philosophy of the epoch, Lukács' *History and Class Consciousness*. The book, in whose writings (spanning over the years 1919-1922) the growing internal problems of the movement can be followed step by step, does not occupy itself in detail with this question. Yet, although he made the deepest impact in defetishizing the natural laws of the bourgeois world and in revealing the antinomy that the proletariat, the subject of revolution, "as the product of capitalism, must necessarily be subject to the modes of existence of its creator,"[21] Lukács too

20. *Geist der Utopie* (Cassirer, 1923), p. 3.
21. "Class Consciousness" in *History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics*,

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clings to the necessity of socio-economic collapse.

Of course, at the center of Lukács' theory is the proposition that the downfall of capitalism can be followed by the transcendence of capitalism only through the action of the proletariat. Otherwise, the fall is a relapse into barbarism. "For the blind power of the forces at work will only advance 'automatically' to their goal of self-annihilation as long as that goal is not within reach. When the moment of transition to the 'realm of freedom' arrives this will become apparent just because the blind forces really will hurtle blindly toward the abyss, and only the conscious will of the proletariat will be able to save mankind from the impending catastrophe. In other words, when the final economic crisis of capitalism develops, *the fate of the revolution, (and with it the fate of mankind) will depend on the ideological maturity of the proletariat, i.e., on its class consciousness.*"[22]

How deep was the impact of *History and Class Consciousness* on Benjamin is demonstrated by the following passage from *One-Way Street*, his 1928 book of aphorisms or, as Adorno says, his collection of allegories.[23] "The conception of class struggle may lead one astray. It is not a question of a test of strength where the decisive element is who wins and who loses, or of a struggle where the winner prospers and the loser suffers. Thinking like that is a way of romantically touching up the facts. After all, whether the bourgeoisie wins or loses in the fight, it is condemned to fall owing to internal contradictions that become fatal for it in the course of development. The question, simply, is whether it is ruined by itself or through the agency of the proletariat. The life or death of a 3,000 year cultural evolution hangs on this question. History knows nothing about the bad infinity contained in the image of the two eternally struggling fighters. The real politician counts only on limited time. And if the destruction of the bourgeoisie fails to occur in a virtually calculable moment of economic and technical development (signalled by inflation and chemical warfare), then everything is lost. The burning fuse must be cut before the spark can ignite the dynamite."[24]

There is no need to discuss here the fact that the momentary character of the point of change is of fundamental significance in Benjamin, whereas it is not the most decisive element in Lukács' conception. The two trains of thought are identical in content. It is just that a fine alteration in tone replaces with a desperate necessity that optimism which Lukács had built upon both necessity *and* a radical movement: if the fall of the bourgeoisie is

translated by Rodney Livingstone (London, 1971), p. 76.

22. *Ibid.*, p. 70. The relation between the problem raised in *History and Class Consciousness* —namely, the alternative character of history—and the Hegelian philosophy of history typical of the book is yet to be revealed. In any case, here and there, even in the same study, we find the following kinds of mythic-pathetic ideas: "But the proletariat cannot abdicate its mission. The only question at issue is how much it has to suffer before it achieves ideological maturity, before it acquires a true understanding of its class situation and a true class consciousness." *Ibid.*, p. 76. And in his study of Rosa Luxemburg, he writes of "optimism" and "the theoretical certainty of the coming social revolution." Cf. "The Marxism of Rosa Luxemburg," *ibid.*, p. 37.

23. "Benjamins Einbahnstrasse" in *Ueber Walter Benjamin*, p. 55.

24. "Einbahnstrasse," in *Schriften* I (Suhrkamp, 1955), pp. 544f.

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not the victory of the proletariat, then all is lost. As the movement declines with the particularization of political aims and the growth of factional fights, the emphasis inevitably shifts from movement to necessity. The 1929 world-wide economic crisis is a satire on the 1920: what had displayed its positive side from 1917 to the first few years of the 1920s in the form of the anti-capitalist revolutionary movement, now makes its appearance negatively, for only a brief period and for the last time, as the possibility—perhaps scientifically necessary, after all—of the collapse of capitalism.

Still, this accounts for the fact that Benjamin's belated engagement has a political character, notwithstanding all the internal problems of politics. As already indicated, laying the theoretical foundations of a political practice is not at issue here, but rather the unresolved philosophical question of action, in response to which politics was indeed the only theoretical and ethical answer that he could find. He may have been several years late with this discovery, yet it was still the product of the post-WWI revolutionary wave. "The power of its existence"—as we know—could have penetrated not just a few years but several decades after the loss of its historical foundations. Yet, being a few years late was just enough so that what had been able to appear for a moment as a dialectical unity in the light of a living movement and the hopes linked with it, had become the antinomy of newly severed parts.

If Lukács had demonstrated that, "having failed to discover the identical subject-object in history,"[25] Hegelian philosophy is driven into the arms of mythology,then with the passing of time, the numerous unities of *History and Class Consciousness* may have themselves appeared increasingly mythological to the reader: e.g., his category of the identical subject-object the proletariat, or the ascribed class consciousness, or the party. In fact, one of the most important documents of that time, Joseph Ravai's review, already draws attention to this—affirmatively—and emphasizes that conceptual mythology is necessary and should be acknowledged and made explicit![26]

As the previously quoted letters indicate, Benjamin formulates his rapproachement entirely in antinomies: Not as a theoretical problem, but as obligatory conduct. It was essentially the bolshevization of an orthodox Kantian. It was not as an aim, but rather as act. For the party, its sole possible (*given*) terrain is not the immediate repository of class consciousness, as in the latter studies of Lukács' book, but simply practical action. Finally, the suspicions he nurtures about the Hegelianism of Lukács' book harmonize completely with the Kantian character of the identification of religion and politics within praxis. Clearly, Benjamin's turn is the demand of practical reason separated from pure reason. It is obvious that the antinomies expressed in the letters are untenable. (And, characteristically, the first

25. "Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat," *History and Class Consciousness*, p. 147.

26. "Rezension von 'Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein'." *Archiv für die Geschichte des Sozialismus und der Arbeiterbewegung* (1925), p. 236.

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ideological 'cancellation' of this untenableness consisted of the acceptance of 'necessity.')

In fact, such antinomies would be untenable for anyone who has not settled in to live in an unchangeable world. And from this point of view, Benjamin is not a Kantian from that point on. Consequently, the fact that Benjamin did not make his dualism permanent when he joined the party is not merely private vacillation but is endowed with philosophical significance. He did not make it permanent but neither did he put an end to it. This wavering is characteristic of his entire later work: *after all,* the identification of religion and politics at the deepest levels indirectly expresses skepticism about the possibility of realizing political goals; and, by contrast in place of Kantian moral practice and through political practice, the need to redeem and change the world deny the permanence of the current state of affairs.

If, notwithstanding politics' internal problems, in the end politics was the sole possible key to Benjamin's turn, this key presupposes another one: religion. It allows Benjamin to respond to the previously-mentioned desperate supplication from *One-Way Street* with an answer forged from faith and hope, and it provides a meaning fuller than and complementary to politics which reconstitutes all of life. In *History and Class Consciousness,* Lukács deals with the "petty-bourgeois, free-thinking impeachment" of revolutionary Marxism as a religious faith. He writes: "What they call faith, and seek to deprecate by adding the epithet 'religious,' is nothing more nor less than the certainty that capitalism is doomed and that—ultimately—the proletariat will be victorious. There can be no "material" guarantee of this certitude. It can be guaranteed methodologically—by the dialectical method.... The so-called religious faith is nothing more than the certitude that, regardless of all temporary defeats and setbacks, the historical process will come to fruition *in our deeds and through our deeds.*"[27]

This, however, is not some *so-called* religious faith; it really is religious faith, or at least turns into that in every *momentary* relapse whose momentary character can only be established from an extra-historical viewpoint. Here we see that dilemma in the conception of *History and Class Consciousness* which can no longer be explained by reference to the existing movement nor can it be embedded in an historical perspective whereby it can be claimed that it only arises as a problem when there is no longer a movement. This train of thought presupposes that even at the ebb-tide of revolution or when the movement does not exist, the measure of everything is the existing movement in the form that it has come to be known and experienced. To characterize the ebb-tide of revolution as the turning point is treacherous. The natural analogy imports a kind of necessity which does not exist in history: the ebb-tide of revolution presupposes an ensuing revolutionary wave. In other words, what is again at issue here is the dual fixation of political ideology and the movement's general ideology on the existence of the movement and on the

27. "The Marxism of Rosa Luxemburg," *op.cit.,* p. 43.

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necessity of the downfall of capitalism.

This, however has certain consequences for the future—for the collapse of the movement—which cannot be dealt with by replacing ideological critique with historical understanding. (Such an interpretation is unjustified even from a purely historical viewpoint, since the movement was never homogeneous, and a collapse was possible at every moment of its history.) The existing movement, as the prevailing measure, offers two possibilities. One may characterize the prevailing 'movement' in terms of its existence, i.e., one may identify that subject which transcends the bourgeois world with a *real* historical force which, at least ideologically, preserves the movement's heritage. Alternatively, one may radically separate is and ought, and incorporate into the critique of what exists the non-existence of those forces which transcend it.

The first possibility is Lukács, and that in *History and Class Consciousness* he took the decisive steps in this direction by dispensing with mediations, ascribed class consciousness, and later the corresponding theory of the party. Of course, this refers to real alternative attitudes, and not to the ideological mystification of opportunism. Lukács' starting point is that the only field of real action is the party. Benjamin reached the same conclusion. In Lukács' view, however, the possibility of staying in the party cannot and need not be a matter of experimentation as Benjamin thought. Need not be, because in spite of every possible empirical problem, the party remains the ontological bearer of the 'real' consciousness of the proletariat. Cannot be, because for Lukacs, there is no alternative to action: a break with the party entails reverting to an isolated private scholar and to that crisis from which only his practical choice provided the way out. This prognosis was not inaccurate: Benjamin, for example, was always isolated. (Of course, Lukács' great sacrifices, precisely because they were sacrifices within philosophy and not simply destructive of philosophy, never proved sufficient to put an end to his isolation *within* the Party.)

Inside or outside the Party? Both possibilities reproduce the old question of ethics or religion which I tried to introduce through the early theoretical opposition between Bloch and Lukács.[28] Lukács' decision, which included the elimination of ethics on the theoretical level, was deeply ethical. According to his earlier revolutionary moral philosophy, the greatness of his sacrifice testifies to his morality. From another viewpoint, the elimination of ethics means the identity of party and ethics.[29] The other side of the antinomy is the religious faith in the party, which was much more general: recall Gramsci's splendid thoughts about Marxism turning into religion, "popular belief."[30] The dualist conception more or less reveals what is concealed in myth in both versions of the party myth. The separation of is and

28. See my "Bloch and Lukács," *op.cit.*
29. "The Marxism of Rosa Luxemburg," *op.cit.*, p. 42.
30. "The Study of Philosophy" in *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, ed. and trans. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (London, 1971).

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ought means a critical theory of what is. The ought, by contrast, is either filled with religious elements, or else it is preserved within a solitary ethos as no longer realizable values. The path of the Frankfurt School leads in this second direction. Benjamin, popular opinion to the contrary, does not belong with them.

If Salzinger calls Benjamin the theologian of revolution,[31] naturally this is much more appropriate to the Ernst Bloch of the *Utopia* and the *Münzer* book. Indeed, the expression itself originates with Bloch who, as is well known, called Thomas Münzer the theologian of revolution.[32] Benjamin *did not* lay the theoretical foundations for a revolutionary activism; unlike Lukács and Bloch, he did not develop theory of revolution. Nonetheless, in a different sense than Salzinger, we can accept this designation. As we saw, revolution became a philosophical need and a necessity of life for Benjamin. As in Bloch, secularized theology, is connected with the advent and consummation of revolution. Why the advent of revolution could fulfill religious needs is clear from the above. As far as the consummation is concerned, mankind's great religious transformations are always before Bloch's and Benjamin's eyes. Changes in existence were not merely 'reflected' in these religious transformations: they were identical with that aspect of non-alienated ideology which is oriented to man's *entire* life. In their view, religion provided an example for the expansion of political revolution: for changing the function of revolution. Political revolution is *only* an indispensable precondition or a starting point for Benjamin.[33]

Up to this point, as far as the essence of the matter is concerned, his position is very similar to Bloch's. They meet at a crossroads. While Bloch shifts from the standpoint of theological utopia in the direction of the ontologization of utopia, Benjamin accepts Bloch's political conclusions as the analogue for religious action. This second ideological encounter occurs after the *Utopia* book and in close connection with it, during the late 1920s. Its documents include that deep impression which Bloch's critique of *History and Class Consciousness* makes on Benjamin, Bloch's recollection of a half year of 'symbiosis' between them in Paris 1926, and finally, Bloch's

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31. *Op.cit.*, pp. 269ff. Salzinger transforms Benjamin into a theoretical forerunner of today's radical movements even more than Marcuse. His argument is very dubious. He writes: "Today there can no longer be any doubt that the later Benjamin was a communist." *Ibid.*, p. 275. He dismisses all possible counter-arguments by claiming that Benjamin's reservations and his decision to remain outside the party constitute a criticism of the communist movement of the day. My main objection to Salzinger is that he tries to find in the 1920s and 1930s a *direct* ideological inspiration for today's radical experiments.

32. *Thomas Münzer als Theologe der Revolution* (Aufbau, 1960).

33. In his letter to Scholem of April 17, 1931, he emphasizes that he has no illusions about the party. "But I would be short-sighted if I considered this circumstance to be unalterable. Of course, the precondition for such change is no smaller thing than the German Bolshevik revolution. Not that a victorious party would even in the smallest measure review its standpoint concerning my current affairs, but it would make it possible for me to write differently. This means the following: I am determined to carry out my business under all conditions, but my business is not the same under all conditions." *Briefe* II, p. 530.

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acknowledging critique of *One-way Street* in 1928.[34]

Pre-revolutionary philosophy, however, cannot be sustained, and two things distinguish Benjamin from Bloch: the non-utopian character of his philosophy, and the religious solution as the *refuge* of reality. The fact that his philosophy is not utopian does not mean that there is no place in it for utopia. After all, messianism proves that there is a future. "The soothsayers who found out from time what it had in store certainly did not experience time as either homogeneous or empty. Anyone who keeps this in mind will perhaps get an idea of how past times were experienced in remembrance—namely, in just the same way. We know that the Jews were prohibited from investigating the future. Yet, the Torah and the prayers instruct them in remembrance. This stripped the future of its magic, to which all those who turn to the soothsayers for enlightenment succumb. This does not imply, however, that for the Jews the future turned into homogeneous, empty time. For every second of time was the strait gate through which the Messiah might enter."[35] In the same great work, his *Theses on Philosophy and History*, Benjamin says: "Like every generation that preceded us, we have been endowed with a *weak* Messianic power, a power to which the past has a claim. That claim cannot be settled cheaply."[36] Such weak Messianic power speaks from Benjamin's works more resigned than Bloch's sharp and forceful voice.

Benjamin's cautious Messianic solution made it possible for him to keep the passage-ways between his theory and communism from collapsing. His Messianism is cautious, and hence the straight gate through which the Messiah enters is not erected in the present. Only by so doing can he remain a philosopher. After the 1930s, the human and artistic documents of communist Messianism may still exist with ever growing internal problems, but not its philosophy. There is a single political reason why Benjamin did and was able to preserve his passage-ways; precisely because in the end he did not join the Party. Thus, from time to time, he could be regarded as a valuable ally and could publish in communist journals until the war. It is obvious that such a relation was not without the usual difficulties. (Thus, for example, an article appeared in Moscow in 1938 in *Internationale Literatur* simply declaring that Benjamin was a follower of Heidegger.)[37]

Benjamin kept up his various connections in his own fashion. It is evident from the editorial refinements which Horkheimer performed on Benjamin's *Reproduction* essay before its publication that his standpoint was not in agreement with the Frankfurt School. The whole first chapter fell victim to

34. See *Briefe I*, p. 350; *Ueber Walter Benjamin*, p. 16; Bloch, "Review Form in der Philosophie," in *Erbschaft dieser Zeit*, pp. 368ff. It is not at all impossible, though Adorno mentions it skeptically, that at one time Bloch and Benjamin planned to work out a common theory of Messianism. *Ueber Walter Benjamin*, p. 13. (The conception of a "system of theoretical Messianism" comes up in the first draft of *Geist der Utopie*. See Bloch, *Gesamtausgabe*, Band 16 [Suhrkamp, 1971], p. 337.)

35. Benjamin, "Theses on the Philosophy of History," No. XVIII.B., in *Illuminations*, ed. Hannah Arendt, trans. Harry Zohn (New York, 1968), p. 266.

36. *Ibid.*, No. 11, p. 256.

37. Benjamin mentions this in his letter to Gretel Adorno, July 20, 1938. *Briefe* II, p. 771.

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this refinement; fascism was everywhere replaced with the category of totalitarianism, etc.[38] And yet, it is precisely in "The Author as Producer" that he undertakes to work out in relation to a specific question what was to be an explicitly communist standpoint. The last sentence of his study also casts light on the historical reasons that led him to this extreme in his overall conception. "Mankind's self-alienation has reached such a degree that it can experience its own destruction as an aesthetic pleasure of the first order. This is the situation of politics which fascism is rendering aesthetic. Communism responds by politicizing art."[39]

What was the attraction of communism for the European intelligentsia in the 1930s? That the attraction remained—though diminished as compared to the early 1920s—is indisputable: one needs only think of such credible documents as Paul Nizan's novel, *The Conspiracy*. The book articulates the most important attraction: that voluntary integration which moves masses of men and which emerges as an alternative for the left-wing intelligentsia that has been external to all movements. Within that integration, the sacrifice to party discipline is experienced as liberation from the 'freedom' of bourgeois isolation. "The socialists hold meetings to discuss politics and elections. Then it's over: none of this determines their breathing, their private lives, their friendships, or their views about death or the future. They are citizens. Not human beings. The communist may be clumsy, groping about, falling down, but his ambition is to be a whole man.... It is true, of course, that at times I thought to myself: the party is wrong, its standpoint is incorrect. I even said so aloud. They replied that I was mistaken; and it may be that I was right. But should I fight against *myself* in the name of freedom of criticism? I have always considered loyalty more important than winning the day, even if the cost is breaking with my political stand of the day. Because we are not living for occasional little truths, but for a complete, all-embracing relationship with other human beings..."[40]

"We are the Party. You and I and you and we—all of us.... We may err and you may be right, Do not break away from us!' says Brecht in *The Measures Taken*.[41] For a long time whatever cast doubt on this identity was put off, set aside, *bracketed*. Brecht's words in Svedenborg, July 1938, recorded by Benjamin, are typical: "Should the suspicion prove correct one day, then it will become necessary to fight the regime, and publicly. But, unfortunately or God be praised, whichever you prefer, the suspicion is at present not yet a certainty."[42] In spite of his personal precautions and reservations, Brecht is the one who, through his works and ideology, best

38. See Helga Gallas, "Wie es zu den Eingriffen in Benjamins Texte kam oder über die Herstellbarkeit von Einverständnis," *Alternative* (April-June 1968), pp. 76ff.
39. "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction," *Illuminations*, p. 244.
40. Paul Nizan, *Az összeesküvés* (*The Conspiracy*) (Europa, 1966), pp. 169f.
41. "The Measures Taken," in *The Jewish Wife and other Short Plays*, trans. Eric Bentley (New York, 1965), pp. 100-101.
42. "Conversations with Brecht," in *Understanding Brecht*, trans. Anna Bostock (London, 1973), pp. 117-118.

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expresses the communism of the 1930s. Since Brecht is one of the most important relations in Benjamin's life, both as an intellectual and as a friend, it makes sense to write of him in connection with Benjamin's political position.

At any rate, the 1930s cannot be sharply separated from the 1920s, not because they preserved or guaranteed the values of the heroic period, but because a critic of the 1930s can already discover in the heroic period all those antinomies which gradually revealed their unresovable features. Two qualifications must be attached to the statement that Brecht represents the communism of the 1930s. It was not official communist politics, but rather the subjective relation suited to communism and, of course, not only that. First of all, his art is more than a mirror, and his masterpieces are much richer than this question. Nevertheless, next to the theater (as a movement that creates a public) the following were the most important *problems of form* for this great poet: 1. that he had no confidence in the possibility of the unity and integrity of human life within the bourgeois world, and 2. that he considered the absence of these a necessity for the revolutionary transformation of this world. "You are yourselves no longer.... One and all of you are nameless and motherless, blank pages on which the revolution writes its instructions." "What baseness would you not commit to root out baseness?"[43]

While the first problem, that of the total, closed alienation of the bourgeois world, raises the question of where the revolutionizing subject that will transcend that world is to come from, the second problem raises the question of how the bourgeois world might be transcended with instruments which, at every point, even in the results they effect, are the most characteristic instruments of this world. Brecht's answer to all these questions, partly in some of his works and in his ideological writings, also remains within antinomies typical of the bourgeois world. We have a rather precise self-characterization of Brecht's thought: "My love for light flows from my rather obscure thinking. I have become a little doctrinaire because I had urgent need of direction. My thoughts get easily confused, I acknowledge this calmly; confusion calms me. If I think something through, I immediately start to oppose it, and suddenly I call everything into doubt anxiously, whereas just before I was childishly happy that at least I saw something with some certainty, or so I made myself believe against the measure of my modest

43. "The Measures Taken," *op.cit.*, pp. 81-82 and 96. In the present context, we can only cite the most obvious and most straightforward manifestation of the problem. An intensive analysis of the form of Brecht's works would discover these questions in Brecht and the answers he gave to them on various levels of generality and abstraction. What is more, it is just *The Good Soul of Setzuan* which reveals one of the secrets of Brecht's work, i.e., that the appeal to the most elementary feelings is fully *connected* with the absence of human integrity and the whole man. Brecht, by the way, identified human integrity with the quality of unalterability. He writes: As long as the star of his destiny is concealed in King Lear's bosom, as long as we regard him as unchangeable..." "On Experimental Theatre," in *Brecht on Theatre*, ed. and trans. John Willett (New York, 1964), pp. 130ff.

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needs. Such sentences as the proof of the pudding is in the eating or life is the form of existence of protein, are extraordinarily reassuring to me, until I get confused once again."[44]

Brecht is speaking not only about himself, but also about the insatiable desire of the 1930s communist generation for some *tangible certainty*. That ambivalence which characterized the revolutionary avant-garde prior to World War I, and which persisted, more dimly, in the 1920s, is sharpest with Brecht: the ambivalence of the movement and of scientific certainty. There is no doubt that Brecht is the true offspring of the communism of the 1920s.[45] But he is not part of a real movement: he is seeking it. This produces hyperrationalist solutions: the necessity which has only to be recognized in order that we may change the world. The *movement* in the theater, as both a change in the function of theater and also a conception of reception as scientific cognition, exemplify this dualism. Every reader of Brecht's theoretical writings knows how rigidly Brecht maintained the simply but increasingly questionable truths of the immediately revolutionizing nature of interests and property relations, of the unified class, and of *the* "worker." At several points, faith in these basic rational laws changes over into explicit self-deception. The emphatic ending to *The Measures Taken* shows this just as clearly as the 1943 letter to Thomas Mann which seeks information about the existence of any significant anti-Hitler forces within Germany.[46] Adorno's paradox about Brecht's inverted religion is not unfair,[47] just as it would not be unfair to any other communist of the 1930s who sought his movement and had faith in its existence.

A whole milieu came into existence around the myth of identity, one form of which, the identity between revolutionary and party, found its most sincere and most pathetic expression in the previously-mentioned figure in Nizan's work. Benjamin, whose position was grounded in a non-dialectical Messianic hope shot through with resignation, was profoundly attracted to Brecht's gaunt figure and myth of reason with which he drove away resignation, as well as to Brecht's hidden, practically messianic conception. Contact between them follows, and certain rational patterns are built into Benjamin's thinking, although of course it is superficial to explain this simply as Brecht's unadulterated impact.[48] In any case, after their meeting in 1920,[49] from the viewpoint of the attraction of communism, Brecht filled a similar function in Benjamin's life and thought as the person of Lacisz Aszia and Lukács' book

44. "Notes on Literary Work," in *Irodalomrol és müvészetrol* (Kossuth, 1970), p. 307.
45. That he was a friend and student of Korsch is well known. The likely effect of *History and Class Consciousness* is raised by Ferenc Fehér, "Még egyszer Brecht es Lukács viszonyarol —legendak nélkül" ("Once more on the relation between Brecht and Lukács, Free of the Legends"), *Uj Iras* (July 1969), pp. 89ff.
46. *On Literature and Art*, pp. 355ff.
47. On Brecht's "inverted theology," see Benjamin's literary remains in the archives at Potsdam. (Folder 29, Sheet 39). Cited by Rosemarie Heise, "Verwort," *Das Paris des Second Empire bei Baudelaire* (Aufbau, 1970), p. 18.
48. See Gershom Scholem, *Walter Benjamin* (Neue Rundschau, 1965), p. 14.
49 See *Briefe* II, p. 494.

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had jointly done earlier. "The Author as Producer" is the work which displays the closest collaboration. Here, for the first and last time, Benjamin takes a position in literary debates that were essentially internal to the Party. Moreover, he takes a position unmistakeably opposed to Lukács' views, though without ever mentioning Lukács' name.[50]

Those reservations which ultimately marked out a different path for Benjamin from communism were likewise not completely independent of Brecht. Benjamin himself, in view of fascism, bracketed and postponed the critique of the communist politics of the 1930s. Whenever the subject comes up in his letters or journals, the communist Brecht is always called upon to relay this intimate criticism. In one of his letters, he holds with Brecht that Soviet policy on culture and nationalities is catastrophic from all the viewpoints for which they were fighting, and in the journal of his conversations with Brecht he immortalizes numerous particularly sharp Brechtian judgments—while manifestly in agreement with them.[51]

Recollection, as the road on which the future reveals itself: this was the last thought Benjamin put to paper, and it accurately circumscribes his activity following his turn to Marxism. The parallels between history and the histories of individuals have not ceased to exist; it is simultaneously a question of both historical and biographical recollection. The ground on which the two are interlinked, however, is no longer allegorical analogy but rather the historical testimony of the experiences and of the great changes in the experiences of both individuals and masses.

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50. "The Author as Producer," in *Understanding Brecht*, pp. 85-103. The Lukács article against which Benjamin is evidently polemicizing is "Tendenz oder Parteilichkeit," which appeared in 1932 in *Linkskurve*.

51. Cf. *Brief* II, pp. 771ff. For the conversations with Brecht, see "Conversations with Brecht," *op.cit.* This extraordinarily interesting journal is one of the most important documents of Brecht's *sub rosa* political views.

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LENIN AND TAYLOR: THE FATE OF "SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT" IN THE (EARLY) SOVIET UNION*

by Rainer Traub

Prior to the October Revolution, the socialist parties of Europe opposed Taylorism as the most modern and ruthless form of capitalist exploitation. In 1913 and 1914, Lenin devoted two articles to this "scientific method of extortion of sweat," which carried the "enslavement of humankind to the machine" to an extreme. "As a result of this method three times more labor is squeezed out of the worker in the same nine to ten hour workday; all the worker's strength is unmercifully roused, everybit of nervous and muscle energy is drained from the slave laborer at three times the speed.... Advances in the spheres of technology and science in capitalist society are but advances in the art of extortion of sweat."[1] Lenin's assessment of Taylorism after the revolution is already contained in embryonic form in his remark that: in addition to its central goal (the intensification of the labor process), Taylorism furthers the "rational, logical distribution of labor within the factory" and the elimination of "superfluous motion."[2] He was later to revise his earlier assessment of Taylorism in one essential point.

1. *Authoritarian Centralization, Reintroduction of Piece Work and the Civil War.*

Until the beginning of March 1918, Lenin also was swept along by the elemental revolutionary action of the masses. In speeches and articles he repeatedly emphasized the "creative energy" and spontaneity of the proletariat as the decisive source and most important impetus of the revolution. "Socialism will not be created by decrees from above. Fiscal-bureaucratic automation is alien to its spirit. A living, creative socialism is the work of the masses themselves."[3] Faced with the alarming economic situation, however, he began in mid-March 1918, to favor a far-reaching change of course. Why? "Due to the mobilization for the war effort, the backward and agrarian Russian economy was already in a state of

*Originally published in *Kursbuch*, No. 43 (1976). Translated by Judy Joseph.

1. Lenin, *Works* (LW), Vol. 18 (Moscow, 1972), pp. 594-595.
2. LW, Vol. 20 (Moscow, 1972), p. 152.
3. LW, Vol. 26 (Moscow, 1972), p. 288.

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rapid disintegration at the time of the October Revolution. The rate of industrial decline doubled after the revolution. If the output of large industry had amounted to 3/4 of the pre-war level in 1917, by 1918 it had fallen to 1/3. The ferocity of the class struggle and the revolutionary politization of the workers, on the one hand, and rampant starvation, on the other, had reduced productivity to a minimum, with a concomitant slackening of discipline. The results of the elemental outburst of revolutionary spontaneity on the part of the masses in the first months following the revolution were contradictory in nature. On the one hand, the proletariat had smashed the bastions of the ruling class, had unceremoniously driven away the factory owners and taken operations into their own hands. On the other hand, this unplanned and anarchistic syndicalist socialization of production had greatly accelerated economic collapse. For the most part the anarcho-syndicalists works committees had no sense of the overall exigencies of the revolution; they were concerned instead with the gains of their own factory and thus contributed to the dissolution of regional and supraregional economic units. When urgent appeals from the state and trade unions for voluntary proletarian discipline had borne little fruit, rigid centralization of the political and economic decision-making authority seemed the most expedient means of halting the advanced state of economic disintegration. The authoritarian turn in the revolution was in the making."

In place of the spontaneity of the masses, Lenin demanded rigid discipline. In place of the frequently disorganized factory management in the hands of economically, technically and organizationally inexperienced, revolutionary workers, he called for the establishment of efficient centralized management, with personal responsibility resting on the factory manager. Systematic control became his "magic formula."

Lenin's new concept of organization was influenced by the model of the German war economy, whose centralization and efficiency greatly impressed him. The lesson to be learned from the Germans was "the principle of discipline, organization, and harmonious cooperation based upon the most modern mechanized industry, the most rigid system audibility and control."[4] He felt it crucially important to increase productivity, as well as to intensify the labor process. Discipline needed strengthening and labor management needed improvement. These objectives led him to revise his pre-revolutionary assessment of Taylorism: "Piece-work and those elements, which are progressive in Taylorism. . .must become part of the daily routine; they must be employed and tested. In comparison with workers in advanced industrial nations, the Russian is a poor worker. Nor could it be any different in the face of such remnants of serfdom. The Soviet Union must set its people the task of learning to work. The most sophisticated achievement of capitalism in this regard, the Taylor system combines—as do all advances of capitalism—the refined bestiality of bourgeois exploitation with a series of the most valuable

4. LW, Vol. 27 (Moscow, 1972), p. 163.

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achievements in its analysis of mechanical motion during the work process, in the elimination of superfluous and awkward motion, in the development of the most accurate methods of work and in the introduction of the best systems of audibility and control. etc."

Taylorism was to be systematically tested and evaluated.[5] Lenin still strongly rejected the so-called negative side of Taylorism: the intensification of the process of labor at the expense of the health and well-being of the worker. He believed, however, that the "positive" side, namely increased productivity, accomplished through improved labor organization, could be extracted from the capitalist system of Taylorism and employed in a socialist manner. In conversation with an Old Bolshevik he expressed this idea. "Now that the workers, and no longer the bourgeoisie, hold power, we cannot reject Taylorism wholesale. Instead, we must remove its bourgeois trappings with the help of scientific research and practical experience and examine it carefully for those elements which could facilitate the work process and offer some relief to the worker by transferring the hard physical labor to the machine. Only in this way can we reach the state where the worker only had to adjust the heavy machinery; consequently, general productivity in the factory can be increased."[6] Lenin's post-revolutionary position is representative of the "official" Soviet line to the present day. The practical fate of "scientific management," however, was fraught with much more serious contradictions and conflicts than this apparent theoretical continuity would seem to suggest.

Both the Seventh Party Congress of the Bolsheviks in March 1918, and the Fourth All-Russian Council Congress, held shortly thereafter, called for increased activity and discipline on the part of the workers to be achieved, if necessary, through draconian measures. The Central Council of Trade Unions finally assumed responsibility for this unpopular change in labor policy with its decree of April 3. After serious conflicts, the trade unions, with the support of the government, *finally* had prevailed against the syndicalist works committees centrifugal tendencies. Given the "economic disintegration" and the threatened "obliteration of the proletariat," they considered their major task to maintain and increase the level of production. "Productivity norms" were to be established for each worker. The decision was made to reintroduce, although 'unwillingly,' the piece-work, which had been abolished after the revolution. It was hoped that this would "increase productivity."[7]

Beyond that, the Council of Trade Unions ordered that the Taylor system and the principles of "scientific management" be introduced, adding that an increase in productivity would not result in the "exhaustion of the worker."[8]

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5. *Op. Cit.*, p. 259.
6. Cited in Uwe Brügmann, *Die russischen Gewerkschaften in Revolution und Bürgerkrieg 1917-1919* (Räteverlag, 1973), p. 233.
7. E.H. Carr, *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-23*, Vol. 2 (Harmondsworth, 1966), p. 115.
8. Carr, *op.cit.*; Brügmann, *op.cit.*, pp. 225ff.

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The sponsors of these actions saw them throughout as "emergency measures," not as specific socialist labor policy. Still, opposition forces from within the unions and party as well as the non-Bolshevist left parties protested violently against these provisions. Not only the rigid discipline, ordered "for the sake of the state," but more importantly the antiegalitarian implications of the piece-work system were found unacceptable. These would inevitably lead to dissension within the working class and the "petit bourgeois pursuit of the Kopeke."[9] Rjazanov, the chairman of the Petrograd Central Council of Trade Unions warned that, with the current food shortage, the piece-work system would lead to the workers' physical exhaustion and premature death. Nevertheless, a majority of the Trade Union councils voted in favor of the introduction of piece-work. "Fear of economic collapse was stronger than the socialist ideal."[10]

Subsequently, the level of production was significantly raised, but at a high price: over-exertion and deterioration of the workers' health were inevitable given the food shortages that were commonplace Civil War occurences after the summer of 1918. On the other hand, it is difficult to imagine how the Red Army, several million strong, could otherwise have been outfitted to win ultimate victory in the Civil War.

By the end of the Civil War, industrial production had sunk almost to nothing. In 1920 factory productivity amounted on an average to 27% of the pre-war output. Since the Soviet Union could not count on foreign aid, it had to provide for itself. Once again, increased productivity and improved labor organization were declared to be among the most important priorities.

The difficult historical task of improving labor organization in this semi-Asiatic society became a central topic of the discussion following the final defeat of the large land owners and capitalists. Not only had the objective conditions of production, the factories, been destroyed, but the "personal" conditions of production were also inadequate for meeting an accelerated rate of industrialization. The mass of illiterate peasants, formally released from serfdom only six decades before, had come to live in accordance with the rhythm of nature in its daily working life, which had evolved over centuries. The peasant toiled during the spring planting season and the harvest and spent the winter dozing before the fire with alcohol as his only distraction. The use of a watch, not to mention industrial discipline, were unknown to the Muzhik. The laziness, tardiness and unreliability of the Russian had become proverbial in both Russian and West European literature. This applied to the peasants as well as to the majority of the working class, which was composed of newly trained workers, who still bore the stamp of peasant customs.

And yet these same workers had fought in the revolution and, together with the peasants, had defended it against the superior enemy forces in a difficult

9. Brügmann, *op. cit.*, pp. 234-35; Carr, *op. cit.*, pp. 116-17.
10. Brügmann, *op. cit.*, p. 225.

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struggle. Kautsky offered an explanation for this contradiction in his article, "The American and Russian Worker," written in the wake of the Revolution of 1905: "While the American worker has already internalized industrial discipline and has accustomed himself to the rhythm set by the machine, and therefore, is highly effective and productive, he has forfeited much of his vitality, his capacity for spontaneous activity, for revolutionary enthusiasm and solidarity. His life is characterized by egotism, the pursuit of the dollar and his individual hopes for upward mobility. The Russian proletarian, on the other hand, having just turned his back on his village, having rebelled against the autocracy and barbarism of Czarism, combines exactly those virtues which his American colleague has lost to the machine. The iron discipline of the machine is alien to the Russian worker. In return, the spontaneous freshness and intensity of his emotions enables him to be carried along by grandiose rhetoric and even to become temporarily a part of the avant-garde of the International Workers' Movement. What was the greatest strength of the Russian workers movement, both before and during the revolution, was to prove to be its very weakness when, after the revolution, industrialization was to be accomplished as rapidly as possible."

2. *The "Russian Taylor" and the "Central Institute of Labor."*

The man, who sought to organize the campaign against the "attachment of the Russian people to the village, to hibernation," who sought to inoculate "Russia with the bacillus of work," was Alexej Kapitonovic Gastev, the "bard of Taylorism," as he was called by his opponents. Born in 1882, the son of a teacher, and by profession a locksmith, he joined the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party in 1901. After the party split, he joined the Bolshevik faction and was hunted several times for revolutionary activity. He lived for several years in French exile, during which he held several jobs, including one at Renault.

In May, 1917, he was elected to the Central Council of the Petrograd Works; in the same year he became First Secretary of the All-Russian Metal Workers Union. In 1920, Gastev was the driving force behind the founding of the "Central Institute of Labor" in Moscow. Until 1938 he remained the director of the Institute, which had been established to research and propagate the principle of "scientific management." The Stalinist purges, which decimated all the social sciences, also eliminated the Institute as well as its directors in 1940. Little is known of Gastev's end. The newest edition of the "Large Soviet Encyclopedia," which was reverently spread the cloak of silence over the purges only mentions 1941 as his year of death. Another source claims he was shot.[11]

In order to understand Gastev's character, his impact and his fantastic goals, one must recall the social atmosphere in the Soviet Union at the

11. Jean-Marie Chanvier, "U.R.S.S.: L'Ere du 'Management' ou les nouvelles Formes d'Organisation du Travail," *Les Temps Modernes*, Aug.-Sept. 1975, p. 205. Chanvier erroneously gives 1937 as the year of death.

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beginning of the 1920s. Despite material want, the pitiful situation of the working class and the undermining of proletarian democracy, the early 1920s were the most creative years in Soviet history. In the cultural and scientific spheres, an atmosphere of almost unlimited freedom, diversity and experimentation prevailed. The younger generation, in particular, undertook the task of creating a new world with great enthusiasm. One giant step was to suffice to bring Russia out of its almost medieval, absolutist past into a socialist future. An enthusiasm for technology and industry animated the entire country. The greatest hopes were nourished for technical development and the factory, with America as the model of the most advanced industrial nation.

The success of the revolution, it was confidently hoped, would be guaranteed by a union of the economic achievements of "Americanism" and the political achievements of the October Revolution. Messianic power was attributed to the machine, which was glorified as the true revolutionary subject. After 1917, a new type of literature, whose roots reached back far before the revolution, sprang up: proletarian factory poetry. The proletarian writers joined together to form the "Proletkult," a mass cultural organization, which also demanded independence from the party. By the end of 1920, it numbered nearly half a million, predominantly proletarian, members, almost as many members as the Bolshevik Party itself. The leading member of the "Proletkult" and one of the favorite proletarian writers was none other than Gastev. Gastev praises the fusion of man and machine in his poem, "We Grow Out of Iron:" "I grow iron arms and shoulders—I coalesce with the iron form." In his article, "On the Tendencies of Proletarian Culture," he writes unambiguously: "...the machine controls living persons. Machines are no longer the objects of control, but rather its subject."[12]

Young people reacted most favorably to Gastev's numerous speeches, in which he campaigned for his idea of a Taylorist revolution for Russia. And yet, he had many critics, such as Lunacharski, then the people's commissar of education, who reproached him for machine idolatry. As a result, the program and methodolgy of the Institute of Labor, headed by Gastev, came under attack. The Institute had been founded in August, 1920, by decree of the Central Council of Trade Unions. A year later, the Council of Labor and Defence "in acknowledgement of the initiatives of the All-Russian Central Council of Trade Unions...declared it the central institution in the Republic in the development, demonstration and propagation of the principle of scientific management. It would, furthermore, coordinate the activities of all other institutions in the Republic which were engaged in labor research."[13]

The document, signed by Lenin, proves that the Soviet government supported all initiatives to eliminate disorganization in the sphere of production. At the same time the document demonstrates that Lenin could

12. Cf. *Proletarische Kulturrevolution in Sowjetrussland (1917-21). Dokumente des "Proletkult,"* ed. by R. Lorenz (Munich, 1969), pp. 60, 87.

13. Lenin, *Ueber wissenschaftliche Arbeitsorganisation* (Berlin, 1971), p. 113.

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not have been sufficiently acquainted with Gastev's theory. Lenin's own conception of scientific management corresponded more with that of Gastev's critics. In fact, shortly before his death, he recommended that the writings of Gastev's two major critics, Ermanski and Kerzencev, be used as textbooks.

Although Gastev respected Taylor as the founder of a new historical period, in contrast to Taylor, "scientific management" meant much more to him than a rational theory of production and organization. He conceived of it as a comprehensive life principle of elemental, almost mystical force. He also gave his new "science" the new task of "social engineering." "We must teach the human masses by impregnating them with a special instinct to take control of their surroundings. Scientific management does not belong only in the factory."[14] An analysis of the two fundamental motions used in the labor process, the stroke and the thrust, forms the foundation of this science of labor. "One cannot demand that a person learn a trade, but one must demand unconditionally that each citizen completely master the two fundamental aspects of the work process—the stroke and the thrust." Gastev's abstruse conclusion that all aspects of life should be mechanized served to strengthen the arguments of his opponents. Patiently, as if he were speaking to children, he repeatedly stated that the mechanization of humans was not unnatural but rather a totally organic process: "Many find it repugnant that we want to deal with human beings as with a screw, a nut, a machine. But we must undertake this as fearlessly as we accept the growth of trees and the expansion of the railway network."

To fulfill this program, the Central Institute of Labor championed new training methods based on drilling. Chiseling, for example, was taught with the following drill: "The worker is brought into a laboratory workplace. He assumes a certain posture, in which his feet are placed in a set position. A special apparatus is used which helps him hold this position. He exercises first his fingers, hands, elbows, and arms, and finally his whole body." This creates, in Gastev's words, the "biomechanics of the stroke." Finally, the worker is urged to make regular striking motions, while paced by a metronom (10, 15, 60 strokes perminute). In this way, he "learns to make regular movements, and is thus trained to work at an automatic pace." Gastev believed that such conditioned and directed muscle control could prove infinitely useful.

The most immediate practical significance of this primitive drilling method was that it promised to shorten radically the training period for apprentices, from three years to three months. Gastev pointed with pride to the fact that even in the United States, the fatherland of Taylorism, a rational training program of this kind was unknown in vocational schools. A *Pravda* report from December, 1922, describing a training session conducted by the Institute, presents a ghostly picture of collective drilling. In absolute silence, interrupted only by the commands of instructors, a group of apprentices

14. Cited in Franciska Baumgarten, *Arbeitswissenschaft und Psychotechnik in Russland* (Munich and Berlin, 1924), p. 14. What follows is based primarily on this book.

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performs rhythmic thrusts and strokes at a steady speed, with periodic pauses. Nevertheless, the reporter's claim that the "apprentices" performed enthusiastically is convincing.

The Institute also undertook more positive activities including the propagation of rational labor management. To this end, the Institute distributed hundreds of thousands of copies of Gastev's brochure "How Work Should Be Performed" (Moscow, 1922) in pamphlet form. Sixteen elementary ground rules for every type of work were listed: e.g., No unnecessary objects should be left lying around the workplace, work should be performed at a steady pace, workers should not become "heated" in case of breakdowns. In pursuing propagandistic activities of this kind on the perimeter of science, the Institute contributed greatly to the development of urgently needed principles of modern industrial discipline, endurance and management. On Lenin's initiative, as Gastev later remembered, the pamphlet was hung in the reception room of the Kremlin. And, indeed, such elementary writings, meant for enlightenment and propaganda did not arouse fierce opposition. This criticism was reserved for Gastev's fanatical devotion to Taylor and his drilling methods, which were denounced as typical of the capitalist system.

3. *Taylorism or Scientific Management?*

The First All-Russian Congress for Initiatives in Scientific Management saw the first clash between Taylorists and anti-Taylor forces. This conference, held from January 20 to 27, 1921, had been convened on Trotsky's initiative. While some speakers celebrated Taylorism as a truly "ingenious" idea and called for its organic union with socialism, others disputed its scientific character and countered it with a conception of scientific management which they considered genuinely "scientific." The most well-known representative of this group was the labor researcher, Ermanski. In his book, *The Taylor System*, published first in 1918, reissued in expanded form in 1922 by the state publishing house, and recommended by Lenin as the required "textbook for all trade union schools and secondary schools,"[15] he argued that Taylorism was unscientific. Rather its methods for intensifying the process of labor made amockery of all knowledge in the field of industrial psychology. A truly scientific method of management should not be oriented toward the maximum, but rather optimum. The decisive factor was not, as in the case of Taylor, the purely quantitative result of performance, but the qualitative relation of expended energy to the result. Thus, their relation in actual production must be as small as possible, so that an optimal result can be obtained with the smallest possible expenditure of energy.[16] Holding to the tenets of Marx, he distinguished between an intensified process of labor and increased productivity. A genuinely scientific method of management would raise the level of production by increasing productivity. The immoderate

15. Lenin, *Ueber wissenschaftliche Arbeitsorganisation, op.cit.*, p. 18.

16. Cf. J. Ermanski, *Wissenschaftliche Betriebsorganisation und Taylorsystem* (Berlin, 1925); *Theorie und Praxis der Rationalisierung* (Vienna, Berlin, 1928).

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intensification of the work process advocated by Taylor actually hinders an increase in productivity, for it absorbs the entire strength of the worker and thwarts the rational and effective management of the objective conditions of production.

The Conference accepted a compromise resolution. It was conceded that Taylor had contributed to the development of "scientific management;" however, his system contained, "unscientific aspects," namely, the ruthless intensification of the labor process. Consequently, "Taylorism" could not be identified with "scientific management."[17] Still, this resolution failed to settle the dispute concerning the exact definition of "scientific management" which reached its highpoint in 1924.

The forces opposing Gastev's goal of "mechanizing" labor sought to develop their own form of scientific management, which would allow the proletariat as the "subject in the work process," to attain maximum productivity under optimal working conditions. The leader of this group was Platon Michailovic Kerzenciv, one of the most well'rounded of the Bolshevik intellectuals, and a leading figure in the "Proletkult." In the early twenties he directed the Moscow Institute for Scientific Management in the Transportation Sector. The polemics between the two groups intensified to such an extent that in March 1924, the Second All-Russian Conference on Scientific Management attempted once again to reconcile the differences between the Taylorists and their opponents. Express support was given the Central Institute of Labor while at the same time it was conceded that it had not developed a "complete system of management."[18] This ostensible compromise could not hide the fact that the Gastev school had in actuality prevailed. In contrast to the "fruitless discussions" of the opposition,[19] its work had produced tangible, economic results, in the opinion of the party leadership and works leaders.

Such "successes" were attained, however, in an increasingly ruthless manner, at the expense of the total suppression of worker initiatives and with an alarming neglect of workers' safety. The forced "productivity campaign," waged in 1924 and 1925, (productivity amounted to only 30 to 40% of the 1913 level) led to a rapid rise in the number of accidents (a rise of about 50%). The resultant increase in the level of production was achieved predominantly be increasing the intensity of the work process. The piece work, considered the best means of stimulating production, also was introduced on a widespread basis. In 1923, 45.7% of the workers were paid by piece-work; in 1924, 51.4%; in 1925, 60.1%; and in 1926, 61.3%.[20] These essentially capitalist methods of production obeyed a fatal logic in as much as they were not only based upon, but also furthered the suppression of, proletarian democracy and worker initiatives in production. In contrast to an

17. *Die Wissenschaftliche Organisation der Arbeit, Produktion und Leitung. Sammelband von Dokumenten* (Moscow, 1969), p. 125 (in Russian).

18. *Ibid.*, p. 126; Carr, *op. cit.*

19. Cited in J. Strassburger, "Wissenschaftliche Arbeitsorganisation in der DDR," *Deutschland-Archiv* (June 1975), p. 621.

20. Carr, *op. cit.*, p. 419.

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increase in productivity achieved by technical advances (which is possible only with the aid of the workers' creative imagination) the intensification of the work process, can only be accomplished to the detriment of those directly involved in the production process.

Although workers' resistance to such methods resulted in increasingly frequent strikes, by 1925 the conflict over the methods of socialist development finally was resolved with the defeat of the "left opposition" at the Fourteenth Bolshevik Party Congress in December, 1925. Since a natural affinity existed between the party's left opposition and the opposition of the anti-Taylorists, the defeat of the one had direct consequences for the other. A spokesperson for the opposition, speaking at the Congress, called the relations of labor in industry more state-capitalist than socialist, and mentioned the preponderant use of the piece-work as an illustration of this point. Union leader Andreev responded that, even if the piece-work was an "old capitalist institution," it had to be retained for the time being, "owing to our poor technical outfitting."[21] Any praise for the piece-work as the ideal socialist form of payment seemed inconceivable at this time, even to the Stalinist Central Committee. Only with the achievement of the dictatorship over the proletariat in the 1930s was this taboo broken.

4. *The Rise, Fall and Rehabilitation of Scientific Management in the Soviet Union.*

Although, practically speaking, the Central Institute of Labor was the most active group in the development of scientific management, there were other groups within the Soviet Union which also joined in this endeavor. As early as 1921 there were some twenty institutions concerned with scientific management, and during the twenties a network of twenty-eight Labor Institutes had been created, which spanned the Soviet Union from Kiev to Eastern Siberia. Almost a half a million persons, specialists as well as workers, participated in their research and experiments. Late in 1923 a central Council for Scientific management, with Gastev as its vice-president, was formed by the Commissariat for the Economy. Between 1921 and 1927 more than twenty journals were published in the field.[22] All aspects of labor science, from rationalization, to professional selection, to worker safety, were examined. Moreover, the findings of Western research in this area were studied intensively and leading Soviet researchers, such as I.N. Spielrein, who emphasized the necessity of combining measures for workers' safety with an improved method of labor management.

The impressive growth of the movement in the early USSR cannot hide the fact that the practical application of research findings remained very limited, apart from the work of the Central Institute of Labor. Only a fraction of the fundamental problems facing Soviet industry in the twenties could have been solved through scientific management: the high rate of unemployment, the

21. Carr, *op.cit.*, pp. 428-429.
22. Cf. Chanvier, *op.cit.*, p. 205, and *Die wissenschaftliche Organisation..., op.cit.*

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chronic lack of qualified workers and totally out-dated and insufficient machinery, considerably limited the scientific management principles. The elimination of workers' rights in the factory formed a further barrier to the universal employment of the system of scientific management as a means of increasing productivity. For this reason, one can rightfully claim that the proponents of scientific management in the twenties fell victim to a "speculative-pluralistic loss of touch with reality."[23] Since Soviet technology was greatly dependent on capitalist nations, management procedures in Soviet factories hardly differed from those in the factories of the United States of Western Europe, especially following the phase of forced industrialization. labor researchers were given the task of attending to workers' safety and providing for their hygenic and cultural needs. The achievements of the Soviet Union in this sphere greatly impressed Western industrial sociologists, such as Georges Friedmann.[24] A few years later the Stalinist purges brought this epoch to an abrupt end. The labor institutes were closed, the labor experts were deported or shot and their names were erased from the public's memory. The barbaric methods of "stachanovism" and forced labor were incompatible with any form of "scientific" management.

The 1960s saw the beginnings of efforts to rehabilitate scientific management. In recent years, numerous monographs on industrial management have appeared. In connection with the "scientific-technological revolution," the principle of scientific management is to be expanded into a comprehensive system of social management, in which the "exact" sciences such as cybernetics and information theory, are expected to make major contributions. Those works dealing with the history of scientific management avoid any mention and all discussion of the controversy which once surrounded it, e.g., that between Gastev and Kerzencev. Thus, the impression is created of a harmonious and uninterrupted development of this theory disrupted only by personality conflicts. Only a few isolated attempts have been made to study the social emancipation fo the worker as the "subject of the work process."[25] The essence of this new interest in scientific management is technocratic in nature. To that extent, Gastev is rightfully named as its precursor. Whenever the discussion turns to adapting the "progressive elements" in bourgeois organization and management theory, Lenin's statements on the subject are religously cited. In his influential book which appeared in 1970, Gvisiani, Kosygin's son-in-law, stated that it is not wise to take a "nihilistic" position on present U.S. management practices. "The wheat must be carefully separated from the chaff, i.e., the capitalist, exploitative content from the positive aspects."

23. Angelika Ebbinghaus, "Taylor in Russland," *Autonomie* No. 1, October 1975, p. 14.

24. Cf. G. Friedmann, *Problèmes: du Machinisme en U.R.S.S. et dans les Pays Capitalistes* (Paris, 1934); by the same author, *De la Sainte Russie à l'U.R.S.S.* (Paris, 1938).

25. E.g., V.J. Elmeev, *Der Kommunismus und die Entwicklung des Menschen als einer gesellschaftlichen Produktivkraft* (Moscow, 1964) (in Russian). Elmeev presents the revocation of state functions in the free association of workers as the decisive task of industrial management.

26. D.M. Gvisiani, *Organisation und Leitung. Soziologische Analyse der bürgerlichen Theorien* (Moscow, 1970), p. 10 (in Russian).

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CULTURE AND ADMINISTRATION

by Theodor W. Adorno[1]

Whoever speaks of culture speaks about administration as well, whether this is his intention or not. The combination of so many things lacking a common denominator—such as philosophy and religion, science and art, forms of conduct and mores—and finally the inclusion of the objective spirit of an age in the single word "culture" betrays from the outset the administrative view, the task of which, looking down from on high, is to assemble, distribute, evaluate and organize. The word culture itself, in its specific use, is scarcely older than Kant and its beloved adversary, civilization, did not establish itself—at least in Germany—until the nineteenth century; it was then elevated to the level of a slogan by Spengler. In any case, the present-day proximity of the concepts "culture" and "administration" is easily detected within the practices of language, which in radio broadcasting attach the title "The Cultural Word" to a province where everything possible is encountered, insofar as it corresponds to a more or less precise idea of niveau and cultivation—in contrast to the sphere of entertainment—that province of administration, in other words, which is reserved for a spirit which is not spirit at all, but rather a service to listeners, devoted to light music along with its literary and dramatic pendants.

At the same time, however—according to German concepts—culture is opposed to administration. Culture would like to be higher and more pure, something untouchable which cannot be tailored according to any tactical or technical considerations. In educated language, this line of thought makes reference to the autonomy of culture. Popular opinion even takes pleasure in associating the concept of personality with it. Culture is viewed as the manifestation of pure humanity without regard for its functional relationships within society. In spite of its self-righteous assonance, the word culture cannot be avoided; this proves to what a degree the category, correctly criticized hundreds of times, is both fitting for and dedicated to the world as it is—namely, to the administrated world. Nonetheless, no half-way sensitive person can overcome the discomfort conditioned by his consciousness of a culture which is indeed administrated. As Eduard Steuermann once formulated it, the more that is done for culture, the worse it fares.[2] This

1. "Kultur und Verwaltung" was first delivered as a lecture and published in *Vorträge, gehalten anlässlich der Hessischen Hochschulwochen für staatswissenschaftliche Fortbildung*, Vol. 28 (Bad Homburg, 1960). It appeared in *Merkur*, Vol. 14 No. 2 (February, 1960), pp. 101-121; this text is the basis of this translation. It has since been reprinted in *Soziologica* II (1962). Translated by Wes Blomster; notes are by the translator.

2. Steuermann (1892-1964) was among the outstanding pianists of the twentieth century and the major pianistic interpretor and spokesman for Arnold Schoenberg and his school. Steuermann came to the United States in 1936; he taught at the Philadelphia Conservatory and at the Juilliard School. Upon Steuermann's death, Adorno wrote his "Nachruf auf einen Pianisten" ("Eulogy for a Pianist"), included in *Impromptus* (Frankfurt, 1968).

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paradox could be developed as follows: culture suffers damage when it is planned and administrated; when it is left to itself, however, everything cultural threatens not only to lose its possibility of effect, but its very existence as well. It is neither possible to accept uncritically the concept of culture, long permeated by ideas of departmentalization, nor to continue to shake one's head conservatively about what is being done to culture in the age of integral organization.

The aversion towards the words culture and administration—an aversion by no means free of barbarism and overshadowed by the urge to release the safety catch on a revolver—must not conceal that a certain truth is involved in it. This makes possible the treatment of culture as something of a unity, as for example the heads of cultural departments of cities are wont to do when they unite in the hands of an expert a series of objects which for the moment actually do have something in common. This common factor stands in contrast to everything which serves the reproduction of material life, the literal self-preservation of the human being in general, and the needs of his mere existence. Everyone knows that these boundaries cannot be clearly fixed. From the beginning it has been argued whether the spheres of justice and politics are to be included in culture; they are, at any rate, not to be found in the cultural departments organized by administration. It is further difficult to deny that due to the total tendencies at work in the present, many facets traditionally alloted to culture come to resemble material production more and more: the natural sciences far into the highest reaches of theoretical discipline—"philosophic" according to older ways of thinking, in a manner hardly expected from the traditional perspective of culture—determine to an ever-greater degree the down-to-earth fate of man. The progress of these sciences is, in turn, directly dependent upon the forces of material life, i.e., of economics. This is the situation before which man stands today and which is so discomforting to him. The point is missed, however, if this situation is merely discussed to death by concentrating upon supposedly transitional phenomena. The current inclination to deny embarrassing contradictions in this matter by means of conceptual distinctions and manipulations—a type of vulgarized epistomology—must be resisted. For the moment the simple fact must be recognized that that which is specifically cultural is that which is removed from the naked necessity of life.

This, however, does not offer dispensation from the consideration of the meaning of administration, for this is no longer merely a national or communal institution existing in clear separation from the free play of social forces. The tendency of every institution towards expansion—both quantitatively and qualitatively—was designated as immanent by Max Weber in *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization* (Part III, Chapter VI).[3] Weber did this in keeping with the formally definitional method of his late

3. *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* (Tübingen, 1922). The English translation by A.M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons was published in Glencoe, Illinois, in 1947. Page references here are to the German edition.

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work. In Weber's view, bureaucracies, following their own law, are destined to expand. In the recent past the Nazi SS offers the most horrid example in support of this thesis. Weber finds the foundation for his thesis in the technical superiority of the organizational type of administration in contrast to traditionalist organization: "The decisive reason for the advance of bureaucratic organization has always been its purely technical superiority over every other form of organization. A fully-developed bureaucratic mechanism stands in the same relationship to other forms as does the machine to the non-mechanical types of production of goods. Precision, speed, clarity, documentary ability, continuity, discretion, unity, rigid subordination, reduction of friction and of material and personal expenses are unique to bureaucratic organization. In the case of monocratic administration, these factors are intensified to the optimum through schooled individual officials in contrast to colleague-like older forms which are either honorary or extra-official" (p. 600f). It is precisely the example of the SS, however, which shows to what degree the formal concept of rationality, imputed by Weber and restricted to an end-means relationship, impedes judgement on the rationality of means. In Weber's own theory of rationality, there is a suspicion of the imprint of administrated thought. The mechanism through which independence is established by organizations would have to be defined more specifically than was done by Weber or even in the formal sociology of Simmel, who simply contrasted phenomena of social ossification with life as a metaphysical actuality. Organizations of convenience in an antagonistic society must necessarily pursue particular ends; they do this at the expense of the interests of other groups. Therefore, obduracy and reification necessarily result. If such organizations continued to occupy a subordinate position within which they were totally open and honest towards their membership and its direct desires, they would be incapable of any action. The more firmly integrated they are, the greater is their prospect for asserting themselves in relation to others. The advantage of totalitarian "monolithic" nations over liberalist nations in power politics which can be internationally observed today is also applicable to the structure of organizations of small format. Their external effectivity is a function of their inner homogeneity, which in turn is dependent upon the so-called totality gaining primacy over individual interests, so that the organization *qua* organization takes the place of such interests. An organization is forced into independence by self-preservation; at the same time this establishment of independence leads to alienation from its purposes and from the people of whom it is composed. Finally—in order to be able to pursue its goals appropriately—it enters into a contradiction with them.

It is difficult to accept the immanent tendency of administration towards expansion and the establishment of independence as a simple form of control as the explanation for the transition from administrative apparatuses in the older sense of the word into those of the administrated world, along with their entry into regions not previously subject to administration. Responsibility for

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this might lie in the extension of conditions of exchange throughout the entirety of life in the face of increasing monopolization. Thinking in equivalents is in itself a form of production insofar as it produces the commensurability of all objects along with their subsumibility under abstract rules. Qualitative differences between spheres as well as those within each individual sphere are reduced and therewith the resistance against administration is lessened. At the same time, growing concentration brings about units of such scope that traditionalist—in any way "irrational" methods—are no longer of any help. Economically, risk increases along with the size of the unit and this calls for planning—at least planning of the type demanded up to now by the type in control, defined by Max Weber as the "monocratic" type. However, the immoderate size even of those institutions not concerned about profit—such as education and radio—furthers the practices of administration through the demand for organizational gradation. These practices are strengthened by technological development; in the case of radio, for example, that which is to be communicated is concentrated to the extreme and disseminated as far as possible. Max Weber was still in a position to restrict his thought essentially to administration in the narrow sense, i.e., to bureaucratic hierarchies. He made note—in agreement with Robert Michels—of analogous tendencies only in political parties and, of course, in the sector of education and instruction as well. Meanwhile, this tendency has left all this far behind and achieved total development; this it has done by no means only in economic monopolies. The increase in the quantity of administrative apparatus has brought about a new quality. Mechanisms conceived according to a liberalistic model are no longer roofed over or interpenetrated by administration; they have rather assumed the upper hand towards spheres of freedom to such a degree that the latter appear only to be tolerated. Precisely this was anticipated in the era of pre-fascism by Karl Mannheim.

Even culture is not taboo to this tendency. Within the economic sector, Weber asks whether the understanding of the administrators for the objective problems which they have to solve is equal to the powers which they wield. This is so because precise factual knowledge in their field is a matter of immediate economic existence: "errors in official statistics bring no direct consequences for the guilty official; errors in the calculation of a capitalistic concern result in losses to the firm, indeed, perhaps even in the loss of its existence" (*Ibid.*, p. 673). However, the question regarding the competence of bureaucracies, formulated by Weber in regard to economics, has in the meantime magnified in scope to the same degree as has administration itself within society. This question becomes critical in the cultural sphere. Weber touches upon what is coming in a parenthetical remark without realizing the significance of his observation, made over forty years ago during the conception of his great work.Within the highly-specialized context of the educational-sociological annotation to this chapter on bureaucracy he mentions that the possession of educational patents increasingly represses

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talent—or "charisma," for the spiritual cost of educational patents is always slight and does not particularly decrease with mass production (p. 676). According to this thought, that irrational mission which is not to be planned progressively withdraws from the spirit itself, while this remains a mission for which the spirit is uniquely suited according to traditional views. In an excourse, Weber underscores this view: "Behind all pronouncements of the present day on the bases of education is to be found at some decisive point that struggle of the "specialist" type against old "cultured humanity," a struggle which penetrated into all the most intimate questions of culture and which is conditioned by the irrevocable expansion of the control of all public and private relations through bureaucraticization and the steadily-increasing significance of specialized knowledge" (p. 677). Weber's opposition to "specialized humanity" expressed here is of the type common in late-liberal society since Ibsen's *Hedda Gabler*. Inseparable from this, however, is the obligatory increase of administrative control in regions in which administration is without objective competence. Specialists must exercise authority in fields in which they cannot be professionally qualified, while their particular aptitude in abstractly-technical matters of administration is needed in order that the organization continue to function.

The dialectic of culture and administration nowhere expresses the sacrosanct irrationality of culture so clearly as in the continually growing alienation of administration from culture—both in terms of its objective categories and its personal composition. (And culture, of course, seems most thoroughly irrational to those who have had the smallest experience of it.) For that which is administrated, administration is an external affair by which it is subsumed rather than comprehended. This is precisely the essence of administrated rationality itself, which does nothing but order and cover over. In the chapter on amphiboly in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant—in opposition to Leibniz—denied rationality the ability of cognition of "the interior of things." Aporia prevails between the absolute purpose of the cultural and the absolute rationality of administration, which is nothing but the rationality of scientific ratio. What is called cultural with good reason must recollectively assimilate whatever has been left along the way in the process of the progressive control of nature, reflected in increasing rationality and ever more rational forms of control. Culture is the perennial claim of the particular over the general, as long as the latter remains unreconciled to the former. At least, this was envisioned in the distinction between the nomothetic and the idiographic—problematic as this distinction might be—made in the Southwest German School towards which Max Weber was philosophically inclined. However, administation necessarily represents—without subjective guilt and without individual will—the general against this particular. The twisted feeling of irreconcilability in the relation of culture and administration is characteristic of this situation. It bears witness to the continuing antagonistic character of a world which is growing ever more unified. The demand made by administration upon culture is essentially

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heteronomous: culture—no matter what form it takes—is to be measured by norms not inherent to it and which have nothing to do with the quality of the object, but rather with some type of abstract standards imposed from without, while at the same time the administrative instance—according to its own prescriptions and nature—must for the most part refuse to become involved in questions of immanent quality which regard the truth of the thing itself or its objective bases in general. Such expansion of administrative competence into a region, the idea of which contradicts every kind of average generality inherent to the concept of administrative norms, is itself irrational, alien to the immanent ratio of the object—e.g., to the quality of a work of art—and a matter of coincidence as far as culture is concerned. The self-consciousness of this antinomy and the consequences thereof are the first demands which would have to be made upon an administrative praxis which is mature and enlightened in the Kantian sense.

At an early point—beginning around the middle of the nineteenth century—culture began to resist this rationality of purpose. During the age of Symbolism and Art nouveau, artists such as Oscar Wilde provocatively called culture useless. In bourgeois society, however, a terribly complex relation prevails between the useful and the useless, a situation which is by no means new today. The usefulness of the useful is itself by no means beyond doubt and the useless occupies the place of that which can no longer be distorted by profit. Much which is classified as useful goods goes beyond the directly biological reproduction of life. This reproduction itself is in no sense a great beyond of history, but rather is dependent upon that which is looked upon as culture. If human beings of the industrial era were to spend the days of their existence under those conditions which characterized the vegetative life of the Stone Age, they would no doubt perish. Critical Theory, in its view of society, has expressed this in the hypothesis that reproduction of the labor force corresponds to the cultural state historically achieved by any given age; this is not necessarily a static natural category. It is not necessary to be a follower of the American economist Veblen, back to whom technocracy dates and who tendentiously viewed all goods not drastically necessary as the expression of control, status and ostentation; he further designated all of culture as that looked upon in the slovenly jargon of the administrated world as "show." it is not possible, however, to be blind to the fact that the useful—that which is of advantage to man in all previous history—is nothing immediate, existing for its own sake, but rather that within the total system which has its eye directed towards profit. The useful per se has been relegated to a secondary position, where it is produced by the machinery of the system as well. There is hardly another point to which the consciousness of society is so allergic as it is to this one. Precisely because the usefulness of the useful is so dubious a matter, it is doubly important that this apparatus demonstrate its usefulness through its function solely for the sake of the consumer. For this reason the line of demarcation between the useful and the useless is drawn so strictly in ideology. The enthronement of culture as an entity unto itself, independent

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of all material conditions—indeed, as something which makes these conditions matters of total indifference—is a fitting correlation of the faith in the pure usefulness of the useful. Culture is looked upon as thoroughly useless and for that reason as something beyond the planning and administrative methods of material production; this results in a much sharper definition of the profile upon which the claim to validity of both the useful and the useless is based. One factor of actuality has manifested itself within this ideology: the separation of culture from the material processes of life and—finally—the social hiatus between physical and intellectual work. The heritage of this situation is to be observed in the antinomy of culture and administration. The scent of philistinism which clings to administration is of the same type—and not only philologically—as the odium attached to low, useful, and—in the final analysis—physical labor by antiquity. The rigid opposition of culture and administration in thought, the product of a social and spiritual situation which attempts at the same time to force the two together, has nonetheless always been a questionable matter. In art history it is well known that wherever the artifacts of the past manifest the demand for collective labor—and this extends deep into the individual production of significant architects, sculptors and painters—administration spoke with a decisive voice. For that reason even in the past administration by no means lived in happy harmony with those who today unhesitatingly call themselves the creators of culture—a romantic desire fondly projected backward into history. The church and later the regents of the Italian city states, followed by the princes of absolutism, represented administrative instances from the perspective of their relation to the sphere of culture. Their relation to cultural production was probably far more substantial than that between present-day administration and administrated culture. The undisputed dominance of religion reduced the contrast between culture and practical life; the powerful lords of that day — often enough, to be sure, condottieri — were probably closer to culture than many of the administrative specialists of a society marked by the radical division of labor. This, however, made their control of culture all the more immediate and rigorous, for it was unchecked by any regulations or rational rules of procedure. The relation of the immanent truth of cultural configurations to that which has today been given the dubious name of "commission" was at that time, at any rate, hardly less odious than today. Great artists even of a type which seems by and large to have agreed with the objectively valid spirit of their time—such as Bach—lived in permanent conflict with their administrations. Less is known about such conflicts during the high Middle Ages only because at that time they were pre-decided in favor of the administrative power simply as a matter of principle. In relation to this power, demands which have achieved full consciousness of themselves only in the modern concept of individualism scarcely had a chance.

Despite all this there has been an essential change in the relation between culture and organized power. Culture—as that which goes beyond the system

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of self-preservation of the species—involves an irrevocably critical impulse towards the status quo and all institutions thereof. This is by no means merely a tendency embodied in many cultural structures, but rather a protest against integration which always violently opposes that which is qualitatively different; in a certain sense this criticism is directed against the idea of levelling unification itself. The fact that anything at all thrives which is different and which is not to be turned into cash illuminates the prevailing praxis in all its dubiousness. It is not only through its manifest practical intentions, but rather through its mere existence—indeed, precisely through its impractical nature—that art manifests a polemic, secretly practical character. This, however, cannot be reconciled through the insertion of culture as a category—"cultural activities"—into the totality of prevailing practice as has been done under current conditions with total smoothness. At one time the line of demarcation between reality and culture was neither so sharp nor so deep as it now is. Works of art did not, for example, reflect upon their own autonomy and upon the formal law unique to each of them; rather they had their place within given contexts, within which they fulfilled a function, no matter how immediate it was. They did not yet assert their existence as works of art to the degree which was later to seem almost a matter of course; it was precisely this factor from which the fullness and comprehensiveness of their success—indeed their very artistic power—benefited. Paul Valéry enlarged upon this topic without falling victim to the balsam-like cliché regarding the human being for whom all things supposedly exist; the human being has become fashionable only since he became fungible. If one reads Vasari's biographies of the painters, one is astonished to note the stress which he places upon the ability of the painters of the Renaissance to imitate nature—i.e., to create portraits of great similarity to their models—as something particularly worthy of praise. Since the invention of photography, this ability—not easily separated from practical purposes in painting—has become a matter of increasing indifference—an attitude which extends to older painting as well. But even Valéry suspected that such painting owed its aesthetic authenticity to the fact that it had not yet taken an oath to a chemically pure concept of the aesthetic, implying that, in the final analysis, art might exist as art only where it no longer expressed any ambition as art. This attitude involved the full awareness on the part of art that its previous innocence was not to be reestablished through an imagined communal will.

At any rate, the concept of culture has been neutralized to a great extent through its emancipation from the actual processes of life experienced with the rise of the bourgeoisie and the Enlightenment. The opposition of culture to the status quo has been deadened to a large degree. Hegel's late and resigned theory which reserves the concept of absolute spirit—in contrast to his views in the *Phenomenology*—only for cultural spheres in the narrower sense is the first and up until now still the most significant theoretical imprint of this state of affairs. The process of neutralization—the transformation of

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culture into something independent and external, removed from any possible relation to praxis—makes it possible to integrate it into the organization from which it untiringly cleanses itself; furthermore, this is accomplished neither with contradiction nor with danger. Today manifestations of extreme artistry can be fostered, produced and presented by official institutions; indeed, art is dependent upon such support if it is to be produced at all and to find its way to an audience. Yet, at the same time, art denounces everything institutional and official. This gives some evidence of the neutralization of culture and of the irreconcilability with administration of that which has been neutralized. Through the sacrifice of its possible relation to praxis, the cultural concept itself becomes an instance of organization; that which is so provokingly useless in culture is transformed into tolerated negativity or even into something negatively useful—into a lubricant for the system, into something which exists for something else, into untruth, or into goods of the culture industry calculated for the consumer. All this is registered today in the uncomfortable relation between culture and administration.

Nothing escapes the attention of the attention of radically socialized society,[4] which further effects the culture of which it seizes control. This can be illustrated in simple fashion. Sometime ago a small publication appeared—a pamphlet—apparently written for the needs of those who undertake cultural trips through Europe—of whatever use such a brochure might possibly be. It offered a concise catalogue of artistic festivals during this particular summer and the autumn as well. The reason for such a scheme is obvious: it permits the cultural traveler to divide this time and to seek out that which he thinks will be of interest to him—in short, he can plan his trip according to the same principle which lies behind the organization of these festivals: they are all embraced and controlled by a single comprehensive organization. Inherent in the idea of the festival, however,—and of the artistic festival as well, no matter how secularized and weakened it might be—is the claim to something unique, to the emphatic event which is not fungible. Festivals are to be celebrated as they come; they are not to be organized only from the perspective of avoiding overlapping. Administrative reason which takes control of them and rationalizes them banishes festivity from them. This results in an intensification into the grotesque which cannot escape the notice of the more sensitive nerves present at these so-called cultural offerings—even at those of the avant garde. In an effort to preserve a feeling of contrast to contemporary streamlining, culture is still permitted to drive about in a type of gypsy wagon; the gypsy wagons, however, roll about secretly in a monstrous hall, a fact which they themselves do not notice.

This might well explain to no small degree the loss of inner tension which is to be observed today at various points even in progressive cultural productions—to say nothing of the less progressive efforts. Whatever raises from within itself a claim to being autonomous, critical and antithetical—while at the same time never being able to assert this claim with

4. Original: "die radikal vergesellschaftete Gesellschaft."

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total legitimacy—must necessarily come to naught; this is particularly true when its impulses are integrated into something heteronomous to them, which has been worked out previously from above—that is to say, when it is granted the space in which to draw breath immediately by that power against which it rebels. At the same time, this is not a result of the easily-criticized excesses of managerism gone wild. In the administrated world managers are used as scapegoats almost as frequently as are the bureaucrats; the assignment of objective guilt relationships to people is itself a product of prevailing ideology. Paradox developments are unavoidable. The total social and economic tendency consumes the material basis of traditional culture, either liberal or individualistic in style. The appeal to the creators of culture to withdraw from the process of administration and keep distant from it has a hollow ring. Not only would this deprive them of the possibility of earning a living, but also of every effect, every contact between work of art and society, something which the work of greatest integrity cannot do without, if it is not to perish. Those who praise the purity of their withdrawal from organization—those quiet voices in the nation—arouse the suspicion that they are provincial and petit bourgeois reactionaries. The popular argument that the material basis for the productive spirit—and this always has meant the non-conforming spirit—has always been precarious and that this spirit has preserved its power in defiant self-assertion is threadbare. The fact that an undesirable condition is nothing which has set in just today is no reason for perpetuating it if this condition is no longer necessary; that better things will make their way by virtue of their own power is nothing but an edifying ginger-bread slogan. "Much is lost in the night." From time to time coincidental discoveries—such as that of Georg Büchner by Karl Emil Franzos—give an idea of the senseless destruction which has taken place in the history of mankind, even in the sphere of spiritual production. Furthermore, there has been a qualitative change in this region. There no longer are any hiding places—not even in Europe which in this respect, as in so many others, involuntarily imitates America; there is no longer dignity in poverty—not even any longer the possibility of modestly surviving the winter for a person who loses his position in the administrated world. It is sufficient to call to mind an existence such as that of Paul Verlaine at the end of the nineteenth century: the lift of the fallen alcoholic who, even when he was down and out, found friendly and understanding doctors in Paris hospitals who supported him in the midst of the most extreme of extreme situations. Anything similar would be unthinkable today. Not that there is any lack of such doctors or of friendly people in general—in a certain sense the administrated world has witnessed in many areas an increase in humanitarianism from the perspective of concern on the part of everyone for everyone. It is just that such doctors—with an eye towards their administrations—would probably no longer have the right to give shelter to the vagabond genius, to honor him and to protect him from humiliation. Instead, he would become the object of public welfare, attended and fed and treated with great care, to be sure, but

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torn from his way of life and therewith presumably from the possibility of expressing that which he had once felt to be the purpose of his life in the world—no matter how dubious the attitude towards the production of the definitively degraded and rejected Verlaine was. The concept of socially useful work cannot be separated from the process of integral socialization; it would necessarily also be held up to the person whose usefulness can be defined only in terms of the negation of this process and salvation would hardly turn out to be a blessing to the man saved today.

To become aware of such situations, it is by no means necessary to concentrate upon that customarily defined following the second war by the fatally neutralizing word "border situation"—"Grenz-situation"—although it is clear that such situations—extreme situations—are in themselves inseparable from the substantiality of everything cultural down to the present day: in this region the concept of "the average" has no place. The changes in the basic social stratum of culture, which is the matter of central concern here, extend into more harmless regions. In Vienna of the 1920s within the Schoenberg circle the strength of tradition among the anti-traditionalists—both in terms of art and of general personal conduct—was surprising. The spirit which attracted people to this circle was decidedly artistic, selective and sensitive; it bore within itself the markings of discriminatory competence and a sense of history. These artists—prepared for the dissolution of established ideas and norms—existed with a certain naivété and matter-of-factness within Austrian society, which remained half-closed and half-feudal even after the fall of the monarchy. It is precisely to this society that they owe that sensuous culture and impatient subtlety which brought them into conflict with Viennese conformism. The boldness of artistic renewal joined hands with proud negligence. In spite of all irony and skepticism, numerous categories of a still firmly integrated social and spiritual order were accepted. These categories provided a not inconsiderable prerequisite for the insubordinate tenderness of this generation. It was necessary, as it were, to be satiatiated with tradition in order really to be able to negate it and to be able to turn the unique vital force of tradition against ossification and self-satisfaction. It is only where that which was is still strong enough to form the forces within the subject and at the same time to oppose them that the production of that which has not yet been seems possible. Constructivism and green houses can be conceived only under conditions of warmth and within psychologically protected dwellings—and this is not to be understood only in literal terms.

However, the equalization of the tensions felt today between culture and its objective conditions threatens culture with spiritual death by freezing. In its relation to reality there is a dialectic of non-simultaneity. Only where the development towards the administrated world and social modernity had not yet asserted itself so successfully—in France and Austria, for example—did the aesthetically modern—the avant garde—thrive. When reality, however, dwells upon the current standard, a tendentious levelling of consciousness takes place. The more easily consciousness adjusts to integral reality, the more

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it is discouraged from going beyond that which is there once and for all.

Naturally, by no means all cultural spheres are subject to this dialectic of non-simultaneity; many of them are actually in need of the newest administrative standards. This is true of the whole community of natural sciences which probably both absorb and also produce the strongest productive forces today. They could not do justice to their present-day assignments in any other way than through the aid in planning offered by administration; the rationality of the sciences is itself similar to that of administration. The same situation exists wherever team work, collective effort, and wide-range investigation are necessary, such as in empirical social research. This field has not only modeled its own training after the example of administrative categories; without administration, it would sink into chaos—above all, into that which is coincidentally particular and irresponsible. Even art could not possibly oppose all this en bloc. A field such as architecture, which—by virtue of its foundation in practical needs—is today better off than the autonomous artistic genres, was never conceivable without administration. The film, above all, because of the scope of costs which can be met only through investment, is dependent upon a type of planning analogous to that of public administration. In the film, to be sure, the contradiction between inescapably calculating and the truth of matters is defined with horrifying clarity: the foolishness of the film is not so much the product of individual failure as of this contradiction. Its principle is the planning intention which includes the cinema-goer in its calculation; this results in the lack of harmony.

Administration, however, is not simply imposed upon the supposedly productive human being from without. It multiplies within this person himself. That a particular situation in time brings forth those subjects intended for it is to be taken very literally. Nor are those who produce culture secure before the "increasingly organic composition of mankind." (Cf. Adorno, *Minima Moralia*, p. 442.)[5] Their security terminates in the situation in which their own participation in the administrative apparatus spreads out before them in opposition to spontaneity in much the same way in which it manifests itself within material production. Whoever possesses a flair for such tendencies can expect to encounter disguised administrative categories even in the most advanced avant garde artistic products—indeed, even in the most finely-nuanced emotions of the individual, in his voice and gestures. Attention must be directed toward aesthetic tendencies in the direction of integral construction; this can be verified at many junctures. Such tendencies envision a type of planning from above, the analogy of which to administration is not to be ignored. Such structures might well be totally predetermined. According to Max Weber's thesis, administration, by its very nature, by and large excludes individual arbitrariness in favor of an objectively regulated process; in the same manner the individual action of the

5. Adorno quotes from "Novissimum Organum," Section 147 of *Minima Moralia* (Frankfurt, 1951).

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idea in art of this type is frowned upon. At the same time, the applied methods of procedures are not arbitrarily thought out—and this is what gives the phenomenon its weight—, but rather developed with an immanently artistic consequence. These methods can be traced back very far into history. (Cf. Adorno, *Klangfiguren*, p. 95.)[6] But it is precisely art which gives total voice to the seemingly individual and coincidental which is now to be the subject of total aesthetic prohibition and which in turn must pay the price for progressive integration presenting a totally different situation than that found in actual administration. Within certain boundaries, administration—through rational ordering processes—actually prevents negative coincidence, blind control over others, nepotism and favoritism. Ever since Aristotle's *Politics*, it has been well-known that the shadow of injustice falls upon the just rational law within the order of reality so that the rationality of administrative acts stands in need of that corrective which Aristotle included as "equity." The work of art is limited by this residue to the same degree. To the work of art clings an impulse of that which is ordered and produced from without—secretly of that subjectivism which is indeed anathema. Today the field of tension within all advanced art is actually defined by the poles of radical construction and equally radical resistance against it; often both factors merge. Furthermore, it is from this perspective that tachism is to be understood.[7] The negation of the concept of the cultural is itself under preparation. The major factor therein is the dismissal of such concepts as autonomy, spontaneity, and criticism: autonomy, because the subject, rather than making conscious decisions, both has and wishes to subjugate itself to whatever has been preordained. The reason for this is that the spirit, which according to traditional cultural concepts should be its own law-giver, at every instant now experiences its own impotence in relation to the overwhelming demands of mere being. Spontaneity diminishes because total planning takes precedence over the individual impulse, predetermining this impulse in turn, reducing it to the level of illusion, and no longer tolerating that play of forces which was expected to give rise to a free totality. And finally, criticism is dying out because the critical spirit is as disturbing as sand in a machine to that smoothly-running operation which is becoming more and more the model of the cultural. This critical spirit now seems antiquated, irresponsible and unworthy, much like "arm chair" thinking. The relationship between generations has been reversed ludicrously; youth seeks its validation in the principle of reality while the older generation digresses into the intelligible world. The National Socialists, who anticipated all this in brutal fashion—thereby unmasking it paradistically—were in

6. Reference is made to "Zur Vorgeschichte der Reihenkomposition" ("On the Pre-History of Serial Composition"), in *Klangfiguren* (Berlin and Frankfurt, 1959).

7. Tachism is a technique of painting which emerged after the second war. The designation is derived from the French word *tache*—spot, blob or stain. Painters employing this technique throw paint upon the canvas in spots or blobs; they emphasize automatism and spontaneity and deny any intention of producing conscious formal configurations. Jackson Pollock is a major exponent of this technique.

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relation to the category of the critical precisely the heralds of a coming development; this was manifested in their replacement of criticism with their own observations upon art, which in actuality offered only information on factual matters. This same tendency is to be noted in the increasing suppression of the critical spirit today; a journal of the avant garde proudly displays the sub-title "Information."

In many sectors the accounts have not yet been balanced; this is particularly true of those regions isolated or distant from the most powerful social tendencies, although they hardly benefit from their isolation. In official culture, on the other hand, the accounts balance all the more perfectly. UNESCO poets actually come into being who are, for example, capable of enthusiasm because the humane blossoms in the midst of inhuman situations; in the name of a humanitarianism which steers clear of any controversial issue, they inscribe the international slogans of high administration with their very hearts' blood. Nothing need be said about the infantile trash to which the authorities of government and party obligate artists. No one would be astonished if in the West projects were financed involving research on generally valid, absolute values, conducted, however, with the underdeveloped countries in the back of the mind. There is no lack of obliging intellectuals ready to cast suspicions upon the critical spirit of true intellectuals through an affirmation of life borrowed from want-ad marriage offers. This official picture of humanism is completed by accusing everything truly human and in no way official of inhumanity. For criticism takes from man his meagre spiritual possessions, removing the veil which he himself looks upon as benevolent. The anger aroused in him by the unveiled image is diverted to those who tear this veil, in keeping with the hypothesis of Helvetius that truth never damages anyone except him who utters it. My by no means new observation (cf. *Minima Moralia*, p. 395ff.)[8] that even that which deviates is by no means secure from standardization has recently been misused to discredit the polemic application of the concept of conformism—as if the fact that there is a second-rate conformism, preceeded at least by an act of resistance, somehow makes more palatable that first spineless conformism, that swimming along with the current and simultaneous adjustment to stronger batallions. In truth—to borrow a word from Heinrich Regius—one attacks the word conformism, because one is in total agreement with the process defined by it.[9]

A further particularly clear phenomenon to which the label of the Muses is attached has its place in administrated culture; this is the attempt—effective in terms of mass psychology—to save the spontaneity which is threatened by administration or—as they refer to it in those circles—through "correct understanding:" every attempt of pedagogy to lay claim to the spiritual is an expression of this desire. The visible result is regression, blind complacency on

8. Reference is made to "Piperdruck," Section 132 of Adorno's book.

9. Max Horkheimer published under the pseydonym "Heinrich Regius" in the 1930s; this made possible the circulation of his work in Germany following his own exile from the country.

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the part of the subject encouraged to be spontaneous. It is no accident that the jargon of authenticity is spoken everywhere in these spheres, the language of which Karl Korn has offered such penetrant examples in his recent book on language in the administrated world.[10] Particularly outstanding in this regard is the chapter on pretense. This jargon is not identical with the administrative language of older vintage, as it can be encountered still today in old filing cabinets haunted by the tone of its touchingly subaltern notes. The old administrative language—dust-covered and antiquated—bears significant witness to the relative separation of administration and culture, whereby—against its will—it pays homage to culture. The jargon of authenticity, however, united the heterogenous under one roof. Linguistic components from an individual sphere—from theological tradition, existential philosophy, the youth movement, the military or from Expressionism—are institutionally absorbed and then—to a certain extent—returned to the private sphere, placed back in the possession of the individual person, who can then speak with ease, freedom and joy about mission and encounter, about authentic pronouncement and concern, as though he himself were pleased. In truth, he is only putting on airs, as though each individual were his own announcer on FM radio. If, for example, a letter contains the phrase "in approximately," the reader can assume that a few lines later the writer of the letter will announce his intention of approaching the person addressed in the near future. The personal contact stipulated in this way is nothing but the mask of an administrative process which draws the person thus addressed into its function: humanity which can be turned on and off should inspire the person addressed to unpaid achievements.

Nonetheless, what is demonstrated by such models is to be attributed to administration, in regard to which one might console oneself by means of a philosophically disreputable concept of inwardness or with pure culture which is guaranteed genuine. Those who use such words are the first to attack everything unregimented in a rage. In truth, culture itself is expected to pay the bill. Even when culture is viewed as something removed from reality, it is in no way isolated from reality, but rather involved instructions for actual realization, no matter how distant and mediated this might be. If culture is totally deprived of this impulse, it becomes invalid. Within culture administration only repeats the offenses committed by culture itself in that it ever degraded itself to an element of representation, to a field of activity, and, finally, to a sector of mass action, of propaganda and of tourism. If culture is defined as the de-barbarization of man, elevating him beyond the state of simple nature, without actually perpetuating this state through violent suppression, then culture is a total failure. It has not been able to take root in man as long as he has lacked the prerequisites for an existence marked by human dignity. It is no coincidence that he is still capable of barbarous outbursts because of suppressed rancor about his fate, about his deeply-felt

10. *Sprache in der verwalteten Welt*, second edition (Olten and Freiburg in Breisgau, 1959).

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lack of freedom. The fact that he welcomes the trash of the culture industry with outstretched arms—half aware that it is trash—is another aspect of the same state of affairs, the seeming harmlessness of which is probably restricted to the surface. Culture long ago evolved into its own contradiction, the congealed content of educational priviledge; for that reason it now takes its place within the material production process as an administrated supplement to it.

Furthermore, whoever resists being convinced that it is necessary to bring on something ominously positive immediately is not going to be content to step aside shaking his head once he has taken stock of all these difficulties, simply because the objective possibility of anything better is blocked. The radicalism which promises itself everything by virtue of total change is abstract; for even within the changed totality the problems of the individual obstinately return again. Such radicalism looses ground as soon as its idea volatilizes into a chimera, dispensing every further effort toward improvement. Within itself, it then becomes an agent to sabotage something better. Excessive demand is a sublime form of sabotage. On the other hand, it is not to be overlooked that in the question regarding what is to be done here and now, a type of total social subject is imagined, a community of *hommes de bonne volonté* who need only take their places around a gigantic round table in order to bring order into this chaos of failure. But the difficulties of the cultural, for which the commonplace concept of crisis is no longer in any way sufficient, are so deeply rooted that individual good will is severely restricted. There is no point in imagining a unanimous will where objective and subjective antagonism provokes disaster. Finally, the threat experienced by the spirit in the fact of rationalization is an indication that the irrationality of the entire situation continues unchanged and that every particular rationalization benefits this irrationality in that it strengthens the pressures of a blind and unreconciled generality upon the particular.

The antinomy of planning and culture results in the dialectical idea of absorbing that which is spontaneous and not planned into planning, of creative space for these factors and of a strengthening of their possibilities. This idea does not dispense with the basis of social justice. The possibility of decentralization, particularly in view of the state of the forces of technical production as they now approach Utopian dimensions, is favorable to it. Planning of the non-planned within a specific sector—that of education—was emphatically advocated by Helmut Becker; there are other fields which offer analogous situations.[11]

In spite of this seeming plausibility, however, the feeling of untruth cannot be overcome totally: namely, the feeling that the non-planned is degraded to a costume of itself and, consequently, that the freedom involved becomes a

11. Helmut Becker (born 1913) is Director of Educational Research at the Max Planck Society in Berlin and Professor of Sociology at the Berlin Free University; he has been involved extensively in educational projects of the Aspen Institute fo Humanistic Studies. He is the son of Carl Heinrich Becker, who in 1921 and from 1925 to 1930 was German Minister for Cultural Affairs.

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fiction. One need only compare the synthetic artists quarter of New York, Greenwich Village, with the Parisian rive gauche of pre-Hitler days. In the New York district license continues to exist as an officially tolerated institution; for this reason it has become what the Americans call "phoney." Furthermore, in the tendency to reserve for artists a particular life style—a tendency which dominated the entire nineteenth century—and to permit them to give form to that which is repulsive to the bourgeois society from which they live has concealed the deception exploited perhaps for the first time by Murger's bohème novel.[12]

Planning of the non-planned would have to establish at the outset the degree to which it is compatible with the specific content of the non-planned, i.e., to what degree planning from this perspective is "rational." Beyond this lies the question regarding the impersonal "one"—the person, that is, who represents the instance which makes decisions on the greatest difficulties. In the beginning nothing more can be demanded than a cultural policy, thought out within itself and aware of these difficulties—a policy which does not conceive of the concept of culture as a reified fixed configuration of values, but rather a policy which absorbs critical considerations in order to develop them further. Such a cultural policy would not misunderstand itself as god-willed; it would not blindly endorse faith in culture, blind to its entanglement with the social totality—and for that very reason truely entangled—it would find a parallel in the negative naivété involved in accepting administration as faith: i.e., whoever receives an office from god, receives ratio from him as well. Administration which wishes to do its part must renounce itself; it needs the ignominious figure of the expert. No city administration, for example, can decide from which painter it should buy paintings, unless it can rely upon people who have a serious, objective and progressive understanding of painting. In establishing the necessity of the expert, one immediately exposes himself again to every imaginable reproach—to the notorious accusation, for example, that the judgement of an expert remains a judgement for experts and as such ignores the community from which—according to popular phraseology—public institutions receive their mandate, or that the expert—necessarily an administrator himself—makes his decision from on high, thus extinguishing spontaneity; furthermore, his authority is not always secure and, among other things, it is a difficult matter to distinguish him from the apparatchik. Although one might be willing to concede the correctness of some of the aspects mentioned here, distrust toward the argument of the man on the street that culture does after all have something to contribute to the life of man will remain: the state of consciousness according to which one is to orient himself from the perspective of this argumentation is in truth the very state of consciousness which would have to be overcome by any culture sufficient to its own concept. All too much pleasure is found in attacks upon exposed modern art, coupled

12. Henri Murger (1822-1861) published *Scénes de la vie de bohème* in 1847; Puccini's popular opera is based on this work.

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with attacks against administrations which supposedly wasted the pennies of the tax-payer on experiments which the latter viewed either with indifference or rejection. This argumentation is of an illusory democracy; an off-shoot of that totalitarian technique tries to gain life through the exploitation of plebicite forms of democracy. What such voices of the popular soul hate most is anything of free spirit; they sympathize with stale reaction. While the total social constitution formally guarantees equal rights, it nonetheless continues to conserve the educational privilege, granting the possibility of differentiated and progressive spiritual experience to only a few. The platitude the progress of spiritual things—particularly of art—proceeds in the beginning against the will of the majority, makes it possible for the mortal enemies of all progress to entrench themselves behind those who—without any guilt of their own, to be sure—are excluded from the vital expression of their own concern. A cultural policy which has rid itself of social naivété must see through this complex without fear of the mass of majorities. Through cultural policy alone it is hardly possible to eradicate the contradiction between democratic order and the actual consciousness of those who are kept in a continuing state of minority by social conditions. But democracy through representation, to which even the experts in the administration of cultural matters owe their legitimation, nonetheless permits a certain balance; it makes possible the hindrance of maneuvers which serve barbarism through the corruption of the idea of objective quality by means of callous appeal to the common will. Walter Benjamin's thought on critics whose task it is to uphold the interest of the public against the public itself can be applied to cultural policy as well. To serve this purpose is the duty of the expert. The longing for individuals who might work beyond the realm of expertise usually characterizes only regression or the desire for technicians of communication, with whom—simply because they are lacking any real understanding of matters—one can get along better and who dwell all the more conformingly within their own policy. There is no pure immediacy of culture: wherever it permits itself to be consumed arbitrarily by a public as consumer goods, it manipulates people. The subject becomes the subject of culture only through the mediation of objective discipline; the advocate thereof—in the administrated world, at any rate—is the expert. To be sure, it might be possible to find experts whose authority really is founded upon the authority of the thing itself, rather than in the power of suggestion or personal prestige. It would take an expert to decide who the experts are—and this leads into a vicious circle. The relation between administration and expert is not only a matter of necessity, but it is a virtue as well. It opens a perspective for the protection of cultural matters from the realm of control by the market, which today unhesitatingly mutilates culture. The spirit in its autonomous form is no less alienated from the manipulated and by now firmly-fixed needs of consumers than it is from administration. The authoritarian establishment of the independence of the latter allows it—through the cooptation of those to whom these matters are not alien—to make certain corrections in the dictates

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of these needs. This would scarcely be possible if the sphere of culture were left totally at the mercy of the mechanics of supply and demand—to say nothing of the power of direct command by totalitarian rulers. The most questionable aspect of the administrated world—this very independence of the executive instances—conceals the potential of something better; the institutions are strengthened to such a degree that they—even if they and their function is transparent to themselves—are able to break through the principle of merely existing for something else—of adjustment to the deceptive wishes of a plebicite. These wishes, were they to be fulfilled, would irrevocably repress everything cultural by bringing it forth from its presumed state of isolation. If the administrated world is to be understood as one from which all hiding places are fast disappearing, it should still be possible for this world to compensate for this and—by virtue of the powers of men of insight—to create centers of freedom as they are eradicated by the blind and unconscious process of mere social selection. That irrationality expressed in the independence of administration in its relation to society is the refuge of the inhibited development of culture itself. It is only through deviation from prevalent rationality that culture displays its ratio. Such hopes, however, are rooted in a state of consciousness on the part of administrators which is by no means simply to be taken for granted: it would depend upon their critical independence from the power and the spirit of a consumer society identical with the administrated world itself.

All the suggestions heard thus far would amount to ideas with broken wings, were it not for a bit of false logic encountered in them. One adjusts all too readily to the prevailing conviction that the categories of culture and administration must simply be accepted as that into which they actually have developed to a large degree in historical terms: as static blocks which discretely oppose each other—as mere actualities. In so doing one remains under the spell of that reification, the criticism of which is inherent in all the more cogent reflections upon culture and administration. No matter how reified both categories are in reality, neither is totally reified; both refer back to living subjects—just as does the most adventurous cybernetic machine. Therefore, the spontaneous consciousness, not yet totally in the grips of reification, is still in a position to alter the function of the institution within which this consciousness expresses itself. For the present, within liberal-democratic order, the individual still has sufficient freedom within the institution and with its help to make a modest contribution to its correction. Whoever makes critically and unflinchingly conscious use of the means of administration and its institutions is still in a position to realize something which would be different from merely administrated culture. The minimal differences from the ever-constant which are open to him define for him—no matter how hopelessly—the difference concerning the totality; it is, however, in the difference itself—in divergence—that hope is concentrated.

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NOTES AND COMMENTARY:

RADICALISM AND NEEDS IN HELLER*

By Laura Boella

Heller's general theoretical approach is characterized primarily by an explicit value commitment and by an effort to reassert the centrality of the concept of history. Defying both official orthodoxy and neo-positivistic tendencies in contemporary thought, she structures her research according to the ideal of emancipation. Against any metaphysical and relativistic historicism or a "science" of history, she vindicates a notion of history as "constructed" from the viewpoint of the needs of a new humanity. The tension between this theoretical approach and empirical facts corresponding to it give rise to an antiempiricist conception of science and a notion of praxis intrinsically bound to the conscious direction of its agents.

From the early 1960s Heller's studies—ranging from the problem of value and needs to the project of a social anthropology—show a remarkable coherence and originality in seeking a re-conceptualization of the notion of subject inherited from the philosophy of praxis, and especially from the early Lukács. The tension permeating a book such as *History and Class Consciousness*, between the ideal-typical conception of the revolutionary class and its empirical manifestation—the result of ignoring questions of everyday life, psychology, politics and ideology rather than of an analytical elaboration of the connections between the proletariat's everyday consciousness and its class consciousness—is questioned in terms of the present need to develop valid criteria for praxis, i.e., predictions materialistically based on the transition to socialism.

Heller is well aware of the dilemma confronting the social sciences today: although providing logical rigor, the high degree of abstraction of its general laws makes them empirically insignificant while the wealth of the informative contents deprives them of any predictive power applicable to social praxis. Heller's strategy does not deal with capital's self-movement fully and exclusively on the methodological level, thus losing sight of the needs and the viewpoint of praxis. Rather, she places theory in a constitutive relation with the subject in his materiality, changeability, and in a historically determined relation with the surrounding world.[1]

The notion of need has become crucial at a time when Marxist theory has had to confront the crisis of its own legitimation. It is a notion which holds together theory and practice, fact and value, social objectification and the individual dimension. From an ideological element variously present in 18th and 19th century economic theories, it has become part of an intensely anti-economistic perspective, i.e., a perspective antithetical to today's dominant economism ascribing primacy to "productive forces." From the level of behavior, experiences, desires and aspirations permeating the whole social fabric but sharply separated from any political consideration, it now seems to have become an indispensable foundation for a reconstruction of politics in contraposition to the aspirations of bureaucratized Left parties.

Heller's study on needs became theoretically and politically significant with the new wave of interest in Lukács' early book within the context of youth protest movements

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*Translated by Vicky Totah.

1. Cf. Agnes Heller, "Towards a Marxist Theory of Value," translated by Andrew Arato, in *Kinesis*, V:1 (Fall 1972). This theme is discussed again in her *The Theory of Needs in Marx* (London, 1976); and in *Instinto e Aggressività* (Milan, 1978), pp. 86-92.

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in Western countries—especially after 1968.[2] A dissident intellectual in a socialist country and Lukács' student, Heller stressed the prominence of the subjective function and its redefinition within present social conditions. In that context, Heller suggested rereading the young Marx and the *Grundrisse* in order to clarify the theoretical relation between subjectivity and radical needs, not only to emphasize the urgency of the problem but also to investigate Marx's discrepancies, ambiguities, and various diverse solutions.[3]

After the publication of Heller's book on needs in 1974, the discussion concerning needs has developed in a misleading way. A double image of Heller as a theoretician of "radical needs" has been created in the "market" of leftist ideologies. The theme of needs has been reduced to that of immediate "desire," thus leading to ideologies of irrationality and pure negativity, and to the myth of simplicity and immediacy. Desire, which is always individual and often remains on subjective and pre-political levels, has been confused with needs which can be both individual and collective, and express an actual demand in terms of activity and objectification.[4] But the major divergence in the evaluation of Heller's work can be found between those who read her theory within the context of a "realized socialism," reducing it to a philosophical legitimation of post-Stalinist revisionism, and those who idealistically identify her with spontaneism and the immediate activities of radical movements—especially youth groups—to the point of inventing a theory of so-called "new extremism."[5]

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2. Cf. Furio Cerutti, *et al., Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein Heute. Eine Diskussion und Dokumentation* (Amsterdam, 1971). The critique of Lukács' notion of class consciousness is carried out, especially by Negt and Krahl, in terms of the lack of the "non-identical" moment, the social and material substratum of the individual life-histories of family organization and collective processes of learning, i.e., the overlooking of needs, yearnings and individuals' material requirements. The theme of needs had already been investigated by the Italian journal *Aut Aut* in the 1960s, from the perspective of Paci's Husserlian phenomenology in connection with the problem of the foundation of the sciences and the discovery of the primacy of precategorical levels. Cf. Enzo Paci, *Function of the Sciences and the Meaning of Man*, translated by Paul Piccone and James E. Hansen (Evanston, Ill., 1972). This gave rise to a series of philosophical investigations not only in phenomenology, but also in the works of Hegel and Sartre, and in political economy where, through needs, a possible relation was seen between the subject and economic behavior. Cf. Enzo Paci, "Due Temi Fenomenologici," in *Aut Aut*, 116 (1970), pp. 7-37. In 1971 a debate concerning needs takes place in the same journal (nos. 123-124, 126 and 128) between Paci, Tomassini, Rovatti, Veca, Fornari and Comolli. In 1973, *Aut Aut* 134 contained Paci's "Bisogni, Paradossi e Trasformazione del Mondo," Tomassini's "Bisogno e Valore d'Uso in Marx," and Vigorelli's "La Nozione del Bisogno da Hegel a Marx." Two different analyses on needs take shape: on the one hand, Paci's attempt to locate it philosophically by relating it to the concept of scarcity, and on the other hand, the search for its implications in the young Marx and in the *Grundrisse*. Cf. Vigorelli, "Bisogno e *Rareté*: Sartre tra l'Ideologia e la Critica," in *Aut Aut*, 136-137 (1973). As the problem seemed to lead increasingly to history and politics, the journal addressed itself to the issues raised by followers of the Frankfurt School such as Hans-Jürgen Krahl, who, even though he criticized the political outcome of the school, emphasized its emancipatory themes, and especially those of needs. Through Krahl, the relation between needs and organization became crucial and there began a critical reconsideration of the Leninist model of organization.

3. Cf. Pier Aldo Rovatti, Roberta Tomassini and Amadeo Vigorelli, *Bisogni e Teoria Marxista* (Milan, 1976). For a general evaluation, see Antonio Negri, Amadeo Vigorelli and Pier Aldo Rovatti, "Discussione sul 'Politico' e i Bisogni" in *Aut Aut*, 155-156 (1976).

4. Cf. D'Alessandro, "Bisogni e Movimento Reale," in *Ombre Rosse*, 14 (1976), and *Bisogni, Crisi della Militanza, Organizzazione Proletaria* (Rome, 1977); G. Jervis, "Quali Bisogni? Alcune Note," and Paola, "Il Bisogno del Comunismo," both in *Ombre Rosse*, 17 (1976).

5. The clearest examples of these conflicting evaluations are found in Di Pada's "Marx, Heller e i Nostri Bisogni," in *Ombre Rosse*, 9-10 (1975), and Minopoli's "A Proposito del Nuovo

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Above and beyond this level of discussion, the real theoretical and practical significance of Heller's work understood as the program of a "revolution in everyday life" is as the most organic effort to provide a theoretical answer to the crisis of "realized socialism" and, more generally, of the Third International model of revolution and development. Confronted by the contemplative and subtly anti-communist form taken on by the "crisis of Marxism" with the French "Nouveaux Philosophes" or with the more sophisticated self-critical and methodological reflection of philosophers such as Colletti and Althusser, Heller's position turns out to be an energetic return to the specificity of the dialectic of social groups and of the behavior of the antagonistic subjects. It amounts to a critical and anti-dogmatic use of Marxism: an anti-fetishistic effort to contrapose a precise program of anti-bureaucratic critique to the solidity and positive realism of economic processes and of static and reified socio-political institutions. Thus, it has reactivated the sense of alternatives in social development, and of socialism as a choice and utopian projections which animate concrete social praxis.[6] The presence and the creation of "radical needs" determines the transformation of the masses' everyday life, a real democratization, and the choice of an alternative model of values with regard to the predominant acquisitive logic in both contemporary capitalism and socialism. "Particular" individuals of class society, aiming toward the level of generic human social objectifications and against the alienation of which they are themselves a product, give rise to a qualitatively higher type of subjectivity characterized by "radical needs" that transcend the structural framework of the class society because of the kind of satisfaction and fulfillment they seek.

Heller has been reproached for her distinction between "existential" needs and "qualitative" ("properly human") ones. Allegedly, the latter do not have anything to do with the proletariat's real material needs but express an aristocratic conception of the working class' economic struggles as "backward" and "integrated," and contraposes to them the "qualitative" struggles of students, intellectuals, and women.[7] By so reducing her to a vulgarized Marcuse, what has been overlooked is that Heller's work is closely connected with those movements for democratic and economic reforms that peaked in countries such as Hungary and Czechoslovakia at the end of the 1960s,[8] and with the spread of a new anti-capitalist consciousness in the student movements and in a large part of the working population of Western Europe after 1968. When Heller discusses the student and youth movements (e.g., the German Commune movement of

Estremismo: Autonomia, Bisogni e Individualismo Radicale," in *Critica Marxista*, 2 (1977). The sensationalist press (such as *L'Espresso*) has gone so far as to associate Heller with Krahl and Sohn-Rethel. Di Paola thinks he has found in Heller's book a "revisionist" theory of the law of value and a hidden apology for revisionist "productivism." On the contrary, Minopoli sees in Heller the conceptual origin of that dangerous tendency to interpret the phenomena of youth revolt in terms of value and needs, which is seen as the cultural matrix of the authors of the "new extremism." On the same level, but with a more complex theoretical discussion, see LaGrassa, *Valore e Formazione Sociale* (Rome, 1975), pp. 138-154, who considers the viewpoint of needs "idealist" and "subjectivist." For a preliminary evaluation of the Italian debates concerning Heller's book, see Agnes Heller, "Replica sui Bisogni e la Vita Quotidiana," *Aut Aut*, 159-160 (1977).

6. Cf. Amadeo Vigorelli, "Critica del Socialismo Burocratico e Teoria della Vita Quotidiana nella Scuola di Lukács," in *Aut Aut*, 157-158 (1977).

7. Cf. D'Alessandro, "Bisogni e Movimento Reale," *op.cit.*, and Di Paola, "Marx, la Heller e i Nostri Bisogni," *op.cit.*, and Heller, "Replica sui Bisogni e la Vita Quotidiana," *op.cit.*, pp. 13-14.

8. The sociological writings of Hegedüs and Markus dealing with the period of economic reform in Hungary (1968-1972) are crucial to Heller's analyses.

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1968) she has in mind a qualitative change engulfing all potential subjects participating in a transformation of the existing state of affairs. Thus, Heller's claim, once she indicates that the historical and universal function carried out by the proletariat (at least in Europe) transformed the working class itself as it was transforming society, has very broad implications. The exclusion of the proletariat from the state in the 19th century has allowed a modification of the structure of the bourgeois state into a bourgeois democracy. The rights of freedom, organization and universal suffrage have been conquered by the working class through trade-union and party struggles that have guaranteed the right of representation within civil society and occasionally within the bourgeois state. Both trade-union and parties are the main agencies of transformation of the type of capitalism described by Marx into modern capitalism. Today it is no longer true that the proletariat has nothing to lose but its chains. Labor struggles within bourgeois society have created the premises for human emancipation. Precisely because of this, however, radical needs are not to be found solely within the proletariat. A movement emerges that does not exclude, but rather includes, the working class (but at a level that transcends its particular interests as a class objectively defined by its position in the productive process), with women (working women and women in general), oppressed in a society dominated by men, with youth (workers and non-workers) expressing their need for community, and with the working class and all those who want to participate in determining their own destiny, expressing the need for self-management.

Here the critique of the notion of "working" subject as the only relevant figure on the level of social praxis emerges in its full meaning. The distinction between "existential" needs and "properly human" needs vigorously challenges the ideology of socialism as "liberation from needs," as a guarantee of the survival and material reproduction of the working individual. The need for food, sexual needs, needs for social contact and cooperation and needs for activity are not "natural" needs since they emerge as concrete needs only in a determinate social context.

Nevertheless, when they become the exclusive goal of the proletariat's everyday struggle, they are nothing but the emblem of "the damned lack of needs" of the working class reduced by capitalism to a beastly level of the satisfaction of existential needs only. That is why, in terms of these typical needs of the reproduction of the "working" individual, there cannot be any "progress" other than the extension to increasingly broader social strata of "alienated needs," i.e., needs for money, power and possession.

In fact, once the youth and student movements develop a new figure of subject "rich in needs" and no longer characterized by economic poverty, Heller's theory appears as the opposite of a classification and a selection of needs. What becomes important is the dialectic between struggles which, notwithstanding radical passwords, aim essentially at a new codification of the position of the subject in the productive process, and struggles which seek the whole overthrow of the system of the division of labor and consequently to liberate everyone's faculty to dispose of the social wealth collectively produced.[9]

This is a dialectic that has crucial historical and political implications. Historically,

9. In this context, the distinction of the category of property into "possession" and "appropriation" (enjoyment, use, disposition) is fundamental. Cf. Agnes Heller and Ferenc Feher, "Forms of Equality," in *Telos* 32 (Summer 1977), pp. 6-26. For a discussion of these themes see the review of Heller's *The Theory of Need in Marx* (London 1976) by Jean Cohen, in *Telos* 33 (Fall 1977), pp. 170-184.

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the "political revolution" (which Heller identifies with the French Revolution) generates a movement which, having as its final aim the conquest of political power, leaves unchanged the structure of needs typical of bourgeois society. This actually entails the maintenance of the dichotomy between *bourgeois* and *citoyen*: if "natural" existence in capitalist society takes the *bourgeois* form—that of a single private person who fights for his own interests—those who decide to participate actively in political struggles must leave the everyday life of others, in addition to their own, out of consideration. Thus, during this kind of revolution, the masses are mobilized only on an emotive level, without affecting the alienation developed by capitalism: this is the main reason for the rapid regression of mass movements after the conquest of power. On the other hand, the vanguard of the political revolutionary movement (the elite of the *citoyens*) can keep its power only by consciously renouncing the satisfaction of at least part of its needs. It is this asceticism that generates the heroic aura surrounding revolutionary leaders. Once the political situation becomes stable, this asceticism (which has left unchanged the system of needs developed in the capitalist period by postponing satisfaction from the present to the future) easily turns into one of the quantitative and alienated needs predominant in bourgeois society: the need for power.

The historical destiny of a purely political revolution is to pursue a foolish design of transformation of everyday life and of the masses' system of needs. While the latter rapidly regress to the alienation of bourgeois private life, the heroic leaders become bureaucrats who administer power. Thus, socialism as it has been "realized" in countries following the Bolshevik model of revolution has "retranslated" capitalism's ethical dilemma between *bourgeois* and *citoyen*: between private individuals pursuing their own interests and abstract morality of self-sacrifice. Not by accident does Feher, in outlining the most complete and pregnant picture of East European society hitherto available, define it as an anti-capitalist social formation, as a socialist experiment that has nevertheless produced a new kind of alienation. A situation characterized by the passivity of the masses (resulting from the persistence of the division between manual and intellectual labor) and by the theoretical and practical leadership of radical intellectuals (tied to the Jacobin idea of an elitist hyper-rational dictatorship denying sensuous living people and their needs) has produced "political" societies in which state and civil society are no longer separate, as in capitalism, but are under the state's tutelage and control. Consequently, the legitimation of the ruling elite derives from its being the repository and guarantor of the "public welfare": the embodiment of an abstract idea of a homogeneous society in which people's empirical being is considered a liability and must be radically "removed" along with the contradictions and the conflicts it generates. Thus, the "dictatorship over needs" is the primacy of politics understood as the hypostatization of what is "public," "collective," or the "principles" on the concrete subjectivity of the masses. Subordinated in all the aspects of his life to the demands of the plan, the individual sees his needs dealt with only in terms of his laboring activity defined in an authoritarian way in conformity with the demands of production. Every power of decision concerning the productive process and his private life is taken away from him and he has little opportunity to change his position within the social division of work.[10]

Thus, political problems result in the triumph of the bureaucratic apparatus and of instrumental rationality: in the creation of an authoritarian society concerned with

10. Ferenc Feher, "The Dictatorship over Needs," *Telos* 35 (Spring 1978), pp. 31-42.

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productivistic aims different from those of capitalism only in that they receive a greater ideological emphasis and are better manipulated. It is in this sense that, with the "total social revolution," the social dimension becomes more crucial than the political one which, however, remains a necessary condition in terms of a global and irreversible restructuring of the alienated way of life of capitalism.

"Radicalism" refers to the ability to transcend the forms of preconstituted life in capitalist and socialist societies. Often, this "transcendence" is not actual in the sense that it does not coincide with the immediacy of the subjects' behavior, although it does not imply a reality in which the subjects are not "conscious." In fact, radical needs are inherent in Marx's "enormous awareness,"[11] which, like Lukács' "ascribed" class consciousness, does not coincide with the working class' empirical consciousness, i.e., with the awareness of misery and poverty in the strict sense, but represents the "simple awareness of estrangement" which generates the proletariat's need to overturn in a revolutionary way the estranged social relations of production.[12] It is departing from this point that the problem arises as to the forms and way through which capitalist society actually produces this "enormous awareness." And it is here that the theory of needs develops in a way completely different from that of Lukács who, identifying in an Hegelian way both subject and object with the mythical figure of the organization, ended up reintroducing in Marxism the bad determinism guaranteed by the party of the automatic transition from the positivism of immediate interests to the radicalism of communist needs.

First of all, Heller rejects the category of "social need," which she considers to be based on the fetishized category of interest. This category of "social needs," in fact, turns out to be a general system of needs to which the individual must subordinate his own personal needs as soon as he is "acquainted" by "educators" with the "truth" and "universality" of "social needs," as contraposed to individual ones. Actually, "social needs" are not the "true" needs of individual persons. They are nothing but the needs of privileged or ruling groups of the working class, or of a society disguised by the halo of "general validity." The movement's leaders, the representatives of "social needs," are the ones who decide which ones are the "true" and "right" needs of the mass, and thus institute altogether fetishized and authoritarian criteria for "recognizing" or "not recognizing" needs.

To pose the problem of the legitimation of the critique of "false" needs in terms of "true" ones means to elaborate the theme of transition from need as "lack" to need as "project" (to use Sartre's terms): from the stage of the immediacy of the awareness of the lack of community, of love and of a "rich" life, to the awareness of the forms of satisfaction and activities toward those needs. This is where one finds the most crucial themes related to the theory of needs: the relation with values, the regulating function of ideas, the distinction between radical and non-radical needs—a series of themes that have come to be defined in terms of a search for a criterion of rationality around which to organize the project of the revolution of forms of life.[13]

Heller rejects the idealistic procedure of "ascribing" specific needs to groups or persons who allegedly are not aware of them. On this level, even the claim that the real needs of the present society are alienated and manipulated risks becoming a tool for

11. Karl Marx, *Grundrisse*, translated by Martin Nicolaus (London, 1973), p. 463.

12. According to Heller, in Marx's times this "enormous awareness" did not exist. Thus, it has had to be constructed.

13. This reveals once again the absurdity of accusing Heller of being a representative of a new "irrationalism." This problem is further studied in a forthcoming article dealing with "True and False Needs."

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discriminating between "real" and "imaginary" needs, in the hands of a theoretician-judge who puts himself outside or above the world as a respository of correct consciousness. Heller criticizes the thesis of a total fetishization of capitalism as developed, for example, in *History and Class Consciousness*, derived from the totalization of the market's self-regulating function and from the instrumental rationality typical of the capitalist epoch. On the contrary, following Polanyi, Heller claims that it is a matter of a "negative utopia" never fully realized by the bourgeoisie.[14] Thus, all existing needs are conscious and therefore real: since they are felt that way they deserve recognition and satisfaction. The discriminating element is not the relation between needs and consciousness but the Kantian ethical principle of not treating others as means, but always as ends. In fact, they are needs which, once recognized, would prevent the recognition and the satisfaction of all needs: they are the quantitative and alienated needs of possession, domination, and ambition which were already discussed by Kant as antithetical to the value of man as an end in himself.

On the other hand, even the existence or the creation of social objectifications and institutions within which needs can be satisfied must never be transformed into a pretension of direction and, eventually, a modification of the system of needs. In the latter case there would be a brutal manipulation, a "dictatorship of needs" or the more subtle one of the liberal-democratic systems in which there are no life-alternatives or alternative institutions. Even the democratic channeling of "lacks" into determinate "projects," i.e., the delegation of social and political choices to a system of institutions, remains a form of power over needs, although it is preferable to planning. Thus, the plurality, diversity and specificity of needs are guaranteed by the self-determination of individuals, and in particular by the existence of alternatives to existing institutions and objectifications. In this respect, for Heller the problem of the awareness of needs and of possible and desirable options for a way of life bound with a determined system of needs is solved in terms of a pluralism, nourished primarily by minority groups where the leading rule of a system of needs acts largely as one possibility among others to transform existing needs as mere "lack" into "projects" of consciously felt needs.

In Heller's most recent writings, the process through which the possibility of recognizing and satisfying all needs is identified coincides with the abolition of a society based on relations of subordination and hierarchy, thus presupposing the need to treat other people as means. Consequently, the function of the transformation of ways of life, of the options expressed in relation to the systems of needs and of criticism (acceptable only when it is personal and does not end in coercive measures) is to set up a democracy in which all people can participate in social decisions, power is decentralized, and the prevailing end of social coexistence is an individual and communitarian *Bildung*.

The suggestion of a sort of "social interaction" free from domination and the explicit reference to Habermas' and Apel's philosophy,[15] are related to Heller's conviction that radical theory does express the needs emerging from real radical

14. Cf. Feher and Heller, "Forms of Equality," *op.cit.*, p. 7n., where Polanyi's *The Great Transformation* (Boston, 1967) is cited. Actually, Lukács did not discriminate among needs, but he sharply contraposed needs and consciousness. Presupposing, in an Hegelian way, the system of needs as identical to bourgeois society, ascribed consciousness for him could have no relation with needs which defined the "place" occupied by the proletariat in the context of social totality. Thus, in the "jump" toward a radically different society, needs would not have played any role.

15. Cf. Jürgen Habermas, "Vorbereitende Bemerkungen zu einer Theorie der kommunikativen Kompetenz," in Habermas-Luhmann, *Theorie der Gesellschaft oder Sozialtechnologie?* (Frankfurt, 1971); and Otto Apel, *Transformation der Philosophie* (Frankfurt, 1973).

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movements but is not exhausted in this function. In her last book, philosophy is related with ideas of value close to radical needs, i.e., they refer to the working class' real struggles, but they derive their legitimation from a utopia that transcends practice and anticipates it in the name of the regulating idea of humanity.[16] These themes are yet to be fully developed, but have already given rise to some objections related to the Enlightenment rationality and its universal values, with which Heller undertakes an ethical detour to the claims of the plurality and diversity of needs, whose radicality would no longer be free to expand into the specificity and variety of radical movements, but would have to be contained within the context of a harmonious and pedagogical criterion of rationality based on the consensus of a freely operating *Oeffentlichkeit*.[17]

Heller is not afraid to acknowledge the "Enlightenment" function of her philosophy, while she rejects a reading of it as a "curse of being an Eastern European philosopher," i.e., as a reflex of the conditions of Hungarian society that would justify a traditional figure of intellectuals as "servants of humanity,"[18] an idea already eclipsed in advanced capitalist societies. Actually, Heller makes it very clear that radical needs are not yet mass needs, but they emerge in determined places and situations whence they set in motion their propulsive strength to transcend the existing state of affairs. The criterion of rationality based on the Kantian value of man as an end in himself—which, primarily in the interpretations of the Italian Communist Party's intellectuals,[19] seemed to legitimate a hierarchy and therefore a selection among needs in terms of their relation to a party's political project—has instead an undeniable alternative and critical function with regard to the instrumental rationality which emerges on the Italian Left in theories of politics as the ability of making decisions and efficiency in action.[20]

The very distance between needs and politics (which seems unbridgeable from the viewpoint of instrumental rationality and which, in the present situation where the economic crisis seems to restrict needs to a material level, legitimates ideologies of austerity seeking to discipline needs) changes character as soon as we look at a situation whereby, on a mass level, rationality no longer consists in producing "wealth," but in producing "activities" free of oppression. The phenomenon of marginal labor, in its contradictory aspect functional to the resolution of the present crisis of capital, hides a type of activity that does not fit into the established schemes of production. The traditional foundation of economics and politics, first of all the concept of class, is thus challenged by the new forms of socialization of individuals, forms that are no longer abstractions, but developments of a concrete subjectivity typified by the constant and daily reappropriation by women and youth of their own material existence in relation to capital. The research unfolding with the theory on needs can now focus on an everyday struggle which, e.g., in Italy (but in different forms also in France and Germany and even in Eastern industrialized countries such as

16. Agnes Heller, *Philosophie des linken Radikalismus. Bekenntnis zur Philosophie* (Hamburg, 1978).

17. Cf. Pier Aldo Rovatti, "Il Percorso Impuro dei Bisogni," introduction to Agnes Heller, *Instinto e Aggressività, op.cit.*, pp. 10-12; and Amadeo Vigorelli, "Filosofia e Socialismo in Agnes Heller," introduction to Agnes Heller, *La Teoria, la Prassi e i Bisogni* (Rome, 1978), pp. 20-21.

18. Cf. Mihaly Vajda, "Il Funzionario dell'Umanità," *Aut Aut* 145-146 (1974).

19. Cf. Adornato, "Filosofia e Politica in Agnes Heller," in *Critica Marxista* 2-3 (1976).

20. This position, correctly designated with the label "the autonomy of the political," is held, within the Italian Communist Party, by intellectuals such as Tronti, Asor Rosa, and Cacciari.

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East Germany and Hungary) sees subjects choosing autonomous life styles against totalizing organizations and the myth of exemplary action. It is precisely the polarization between this reality and a theory of history oriented toward the future and toward the value of human wealth that constitutes the specificity of Heller's activity in present-day Marxism. For Heller, to emancipate the theory from the ties of a dogmatic thought frozen by formulas into a "doctrine" means to work out a thought finally free to test and assert its own autonomy and its own ability to raise questions, criticize and demystify. Compared to the sophisticated methodological self-reflections of Western Marxist culture,[21] this attitude is in a sense naive. Yet it is politically explosive. One need only look at the central role assigned to the critique of ideology understood not only as unmasking of false consciousness but as the locating of real problems underlying false solutions and false facts adduced even by Leftist ideology. On the other hand, the reactivation of the critical and problematic function of philosophy against its prescribing and generalizing use has the precise meaning of rediscovering its materialistic foundation in view of fulfilling alternatives and of providing an answer to the questions that it raises for the forces fighting for a different social order. While it clearly outlines the space for concrete class conflicts, philosophy does not restrict itself, but finds a confidence in itself that it may have lost elsewhere.

21. Heller has herself pointed this out in regard to Kosik. Cf. her essay "On the New Adventures of the Dialectic," *Telos* 31 (Spring 1977), pp. 123-142.

MARKETING EUROCOMMUNISM: A CONFERENCE REPORT

By Maxy Beml

Traditionally, radical political projects used to come across the Atlantic for their last experiments well after their fortunes had been exhausted in the old continent. Throughout the 19th century, scores of Utopian dreams faded away in the interminable spaces of the American Midwest. But things have changed. Nowadays the opposite is the case. Given the present configuration of world powers, new ideas have to come to the United States *before* they can even consider a successful career: it is essential to at least neutralize the *interventionist* sectors of the American establishment. The Italian Communist Party has learned this important lesson all too well. This explains the growing stream of Party functionaries coming to "lecture" to American universities at a level that can be described, at best, as intellectually embarrassing. The function of these lectures is by no means purely academic: it is to sell projected policies to the powers that be so as to gain their indispensable blessing.

Consequently, conferences such as the one on "Eurocommunism: The European Context and the American Response" held in Rochester, N.Y., October 19-21, tend to be political successes and intellectual flops. The party line, Americanized to the lowest possible common denominator, is beamed in at the smoothest wavelength available so that it can pierce the thickest bureaucratic skull while at the same time infuriating the most tolerant academicians. Considering the political irrelevance of American

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intellectuals, this is no great loss. Furthermore, if a meaningful understanding of the problem is needed, one can always consult *Rinascita, Critica Marxista* and some of the other extremely sophisticated publications where these issues are articulated in all of their subtleties. Thus, it is not surprising that the only original contribution of this particular conference has been an updating of the latest jokes circulating in the Italian Parliament. Problematic political questions were avoided with the finesse of experienced toreadors—the only difference being the rapidly fading color of the traditional red *muleta*. Yet, the event was not uninteresting, in spite of the organizers' efforts to commodify the conference and cretinize the haphazardly chosen academic audience.

Although it was not acknowledged by everyone that Eurocommunism did exist, it was immediately obvious that, if it did, it had to be essentially an Italian Communist Party matter generalized to France and Spain primarily for strategic purposes. Thus, there were panels on both the French and the Spanish situations, but they were relatively insignificant: theoretical and political fluff whose primary role was to provide appropriate fillers. Elleinstein did present a well-done science-fiction account of the French Communist Party and several locals tried to make a case for Spain. As in any well-planned boxing match, these preliminary light-weight presentations were meant to prepare the audience for the main event: Segre's, Lombardo-Radice's, and Salvadori's lectures. And this is fully justified. One need only recall the genesis of Eurocommunism: the first policy statements were made by Berlinguer and Carillo on the occasion of the re-emergence into Spanish public life of the Spanish Communist party; exactly the same positions were jointly endorsed by Berlinguer and Marchais in November of the same year; and finally all three reiterated support for what by then had been labelled Eurocommunism in March 1977.

The main policy statement concerning Eurocommunism was made by Sergio Segre, a member of the Central Committee of the Italian Communist Party, and otherwise a king-pin in determining the party's foreign posture. Needless to say, his account was mainstream party-line. Beginning with a reassurance that Eurocommunism does not seek to become a new Communist International, he immediately rooted it in the tradition of Italian Communism from Gramsci and Togliatti to the present. The main tenet of this tradition has always been the democratic overcoming of capitalism and of its restrictions on freedoms and full human development: "The prospect for a socialist society today arises from the present state of affairs and is premised on the conviction that socialism can only be built with the development and full implementation of democracy. Underlying this is the recognition of the value of the individual and collective freedoms and their guarantee, the principles of the secular nature of the state and its democratic organization, the plurality of political parties in a system of free discourse, trade-unions' autonomy, religious freedom, freedom of speech, culture, art and science."

Clearly the main point was to differentiate the Eurocommunist model from the Soviet one. The *leit-motif* throughout was "autonomy" and "democracy" understood in continuity with the progressive bourgeois tradition of freedoms. Eurocommunism, if anything, was presented as the most significant stabilizing force in Western Europe. This logically entails the party's main foreign policy positions: acceptance of NATO (after initial opposition) since its disruption today would severely destabilize existing power relations; support for African unification and independence; emphasis on a Middle East peace settlement that takes into account the Palestinians' rights and future; anti-racism; long-range economic unification of Europe's developed North

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and underdeveloped South; and Third World development.

The message to the U.S. State Department—whose representatives were in the audience, along with Russian "observers"—was that there is nothing to fear from a Communist participation in a governmental coalition since the Italian Party is totally independent of the Soviets and is primarily a democratic, stabilizing force in Western Europe. The other side of this coin, however, is that the Italian Communist Party no longer has a qualitative alternative to the present socio-economic system and that, at best, they only seek significant *quantitative* changes in the foreseeable future. The rejection of the Soviet model, however, does not mean the rehabilitation of the long-since discredited Northern European social-democratic model, although it does entail reverting to its traditional policies. The only significant difference is that in the case of Eurocommunism, what is most important is the development of increasingly broader political spaces where the possibility of an emancipatory alternative can be systematically elaborated. This should not be too upsetting to American monopoly capital whose primary concern today is with a stable and economically sound Europe hegemonized by the American culture industry, economically dependent on advanced American technology, and functioning within the framework of multinational corporations' ongoing international rationalization of economic relations.

None of these issues, however, were discussed at length, nor was it ever hinted that, when all is said and done, notwithstanding all of its shortcomings, the Eurocommunist strategy represents the only hope for the creation of a political free space where a now non-existent *qualitative* alternative to the late capitalist model can be developed. The Madison Avenue approach of the Communist representatives, the relatively off-the-wall character of the even more irrelevant than usual academic audience, and the banality of the political message all contributed to form a ludicrous organizational structure fully appropriate to the location: a community college in Rochester, N.Y.—a city that could have been easily substituted for Cleveland in Woody Allen's famous joke that hell was somewhat like living in that city. Thus, one should not have been surprised by the inanity of Roy Willis' opening question: why have the central committees of the French and Italian Communist Parties chosen to send representatives to Rochester rather than Kiev? As already indicated, these representatives had one mission and one mission only: that of finding still another American forum to legitimate Eurocommunism. Thus, Segre came off no better than a pink version of Melvin Laird on "Meet the Press"; too much of a political pro to simply say "no comment," he proceeded to fog the air with vacuous reaffirmations of his party's commitment to confront the present Italian crisis with a policy based on political democracy, pluralism and the protection of civil liberties. As if this were not enough, he reached into his well-tailored pocket for what was to be a public relations trump card but which emerged as a joker: the United States, he claimed, provided a model for it *alone* of all the capitalist nations had preserved democracy within the context of the Great Depression.

Jean Elleinstein was no more impressive, though he did demonstrate the considerable ideological dexterity that one would expect of a sincere intellectual who had remained within the French Communist Party for the last 30 years, somehow preserving a measure of self-respect or at least surviving within a party led until recently by loyal Stalinists like Duclos, Thorez and Kanapa, and now directed by the heroic Georges Marchais, who fought well against fascism as a volunteer worker in Nazi Germany, rising later through the party apparatus as a hit man. Introduced somewhat misleadingly as a formative influence within the Party and upon Marchais

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(who has publicly ridiculed him), Elleinstein repeated the dissident views which he had been forced to publish in France outside official party organs: the Party's failure to undertake a systematic analysis of the contradictions peculiar to advanced capitalist society, making this the basis for necessary programmatic revisions (until recently, the French Communist Party still advanced the orthodox emiseration thesis, despite the obvious fact that French workers were already thoroughly enmeshed in consumerism); the Party's failure to democratize itself internally so that policy would not be laid down by executive *diktat* but would rather emerge from unrestricted discussion generated from the base.

At Rochester, Elleinstein went perhaps further than his public position expressed in France. As opposed to Lenin, Bernstein was correct in stressing the relative flexibility and adaptability of capitalism. As opposed to Lenin, Kautsky and Luxemburg were correct in stressing the fundamental importance of democracy and attacking vanguardism: "political democracy, in spite of what Lenin thought, has universal and permanent value." Sensing, no doubt, that such positions if logically extended would place him out of the party, Elleinstein then backtracked and danced an impressive pirouette: one should not scrap Lenin but "relativize" him; one should not form a dissident faction within the party or break from it but submit to a revitalized form of democratic centralism, "a disputable and unhappy formulation but one which is nevertheless historically grounded." Thus Elleinstein refused to come to grips with the central question regarding the French Communist Party: how could a Party which is essentially authoritarian in structure be at the same time an emancipatory agent?

Most dubious of all, however, was Elleinstein's crass historicism. Not content with such reductionist-relativist nonsense as suggesting that Kautsky was correct for the West while Lenin was correct for Russia (what happened to the "universal and permanent value of democracy"?), Elleinstein went on to counterpose dialectical materialism to historical materialism, Marxist philosophy to Marxist historiography, suggesting that perhaps the former terms were essentially theological and therefore inappropriate to the "political age" (whatever that means). Elleinstein would thus bracket out from Marxism the very prospect of transcendence without which emancipation, or the leap from quantity to quality, would be impossible.

The most satisfactory paper, though not unhampered by a formalism of its own, was presented by Massimo Salvadori. He and his colleague at the University of Torino, Norberto Bobbio, both socialists, have levelled the most articulate critique at the Italian Communist Party, questioning, among other things, how an austerity policy can ever lead to social transformation. Salvadori suggested that the Eurocommunist position was fundamentally contradictory: on the one hand, Eurocommunists have adopted typically social-democratic principles and means; on the other, they seek to differentiate themselves from social democrats by preserving a Leninist legacy and claiming that their goal is not the *management* of capitalism, the fate of all social-democratic parties who have participated in government, but rather the *transformation* of capitalism. Salvadori began by tracing the original difference between communists and social democrats to the Lenin-Kautsky dispute over the "dictatorship of the proletariat." Eurocommunists, despite the continuity they claim, have fundamentally broken with Leninism by subscribing to the following social-democratic principles: (a) The Eurocommunist parties no longer pursue the objective of the dictatorship of the proletariat, but in fact renounce the very prospect of dictatorship; (b) they no longer seek to 'shatter' the existing state, but rather to 'democratize' it. They no longer counterpose 'bourgeois democracy' to 'proletarian

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democracy,' but instead regard 'socialist democracy' as a broadening of political democracy achieved by democratic means, renouncing the prospect of turning class struggle into civil war; (c) The Communist Party no longer is conceived of as a party that represents *in nuce* an 'anti-state' ready to become the 'proletarian state'; (d) The Communist Party presents itself as a force that submits its project to the test of elections in a 'pluralistic' system.

Salvadori then argued that Eurocommunists have not only rejected the objective of a dictatorship of the proletariat, but also the socio-economic prerequisites of that dictatorship: (a) the general expropriation of all key sectors of the economic system; (b) the seizure by armed workers of and the ousting of owners from the productive sectors (except for forms of petty property); (c) transfer of direct control over production to state organs and, secondarily, to various types of cooperative organs. The Eurocommunist parties instead reject the methods of revolutionary violence in regard to the whole 'methodology' of the transition to socialism. Not only do they no longer espouse the project of 'shattering' the existing state, but they actually mean to use the state machine in order to achieve the decisive objective of public control over the principal means of production and exchange, in line with a process of gradual socialization and via democratic planning. Salvadori also distinguished Eurocommunism from the earlier 'popular front' strategy in that this was a temporary expedient which never renounced the final end of a dictatorship of the proletariat nor rejected the Soviet Union as a universal or appropriate model to emulate. Eurocommunists, in contrast, explicitly reject the Soviet model both for its general faults as well as for its inappropriateness to the specific political development of Western Europe.

Thus, while Eurocommunists make the claim that, unlike social democrats, they seek to liquidate capitalism, they have programmatically relinquished all the essential Leninist means to do so. According to Salvadori, they "have offered no concrete indication whatsoever of the means for attaining this objective and have elaborated no project for social management which might go beyond the Soviet or social-democratic paths."

Why then the need for Eurocommunists to stress their 'methodological continuity' with Leninism? Salvadori suggested two reasons. First, they must legitimate the "Eurocommunist line" to their own rank-and-file who have been educated until quite recently "to regard social democracy as a 'submission' *par excellence* and Leninism as the root of every revolutionary position." Second, rejection of Leninism would entail placing democratic centralism and the internal structure of the party in question, a move that might have great costs and provide few benefits in terms of maintaining organizational coherence and effectiveness, especially when the party is aiming at broader social and political alliances.

Papers presented by the many European specialists who manned most of the panels were largely uninteresting and failed to go beyond the current literature. The sole exception was Peter Lange's analysis of the Italian Communist Party's "historic compromise" strategy. Whereas it is commonly held that this strategy was a simple and direct response to the fall of Allende in Chile (that is, the improbability of a democratically elected socialist government remaining in power with a majority and no broad alliances extending beyond the working class), Lange argued that the *compromesso storico* was primarily a response to the deepening Italian domestic crisis. In fact, Lange alluded to a piling-up or concatenation of three distinct crises which, taken together, amount to a general systemic crisis: a crisis of governance that began

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in 1968, a crisis of legitimation which began in 1970, and a crisis of accumulation which began in 1973.

Born in this generalized systemic crisis and respondent to it, the *compromesso storico* had the following objectives: (1) to ensure that the working class would not become progressively isolated, as might be the case if threatened middle-class strata withdrew their support for democracy backing conservative or reactionary alternatives; (2) to foreclose the possibility of a right-wing coalition being formed within the dominant Christian Democratic party; (3) to conserve and strengthen democratic politics as the only means through which socialist transformation might be possible.

According to Lange, the pursuit of these objectives entailed calling upon the working class to adjust its own interests to the common good and national interest, sacrificing its own immediate corporate demands so that alliances could be formed with other strata, while at the same time ensuring that sufficient resources would be available for reformist-transformative programs aimed at combatting such problems as general unemployment and social disaggregation. Such adjustment of working class demands and participation of the Italian Communist Party within the governing coalition, however, was also contingent on the readiness of the Christian Democrats and their *fiancheggiatori* (supporting interests) to agree to institutional reforms regarding such issues as sectoral planning, investment policy, etc.

Lange then argued that the strategy of the Italian Communist Party was therefore fundamentally different from both classical social democracy and Leninism in so far as these perceived the interest of the working class as being somehow external to the crisis of the capitalist economy and bourgeois democratic institutions. Social democrats would say that this crisis was objectively determined and therefore required no direct and conscious political action on their part that could or would fundamentally alter the situation. Leninists would say that the crisis was external to the working class, which had no stake in existing institutions; however, unlike social democrats, Leninists would call upon the working class to seize upon the crisis opportunity to smash existing institutions. In contrast to both, the Italian Communist Party locates the interests of the working class *within* the crisis, seeking to actively and self-consciously transform the capitalist economy and bourgeois-democratic institutions from within. Interesting as Lange's presentation was, he expressed no judgment as to the viability of the Communist strategy, nor did he indicate precisely how and to what extent this strategy could facilitate a leap from quantity to quality. Could one, that is, simply presume that qualitative change may naturally or automatically result from the mere extension of quantitative reforms?

Finally, something must be said with regard to the unfortunate manner in which the Eurocommunism conference was conceived and organized. The whole affair had a flavor that was not even bourgeois, but distinctively petty bourgeois. A ludicrous formalism, exclusivity and tight-fisted *grippe-sou* ambiance assaulted one's senses. Eurocommunism, to judge from its packaging by the conference organizers, was nothing but another conventional commodity, like a Eurailpass or a Eurodollar. Guests stayed at designated Eurocommunist motels and were transported to and fro by a chartered and so-identified Eurocommunism Shuttle-Bus. Though the auditorium in which the conference was held was always half-empty, one was required to pay $30 for admittance. Eurocommunist badges, thus purchased, had to be worn at all times; before each panel a check was made of everyone in the audience. Those having no badge were ejected. Even students at Monroe Community College, which co-sponsored

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the conference, were required to pay a $15 fee. Those attending the conference from outside the Rochester area were expected to preregister. No sooner did people arrive than they were confronted by a battery of four secretaries busily processing registrants at a large table and fumbling through card files. When someone was curtly asked whether he was registered, he responded, "We just got here." Not lifting her eyes from the card file of pre-registrants, the secretary shot back, "How do you spell that?"

Harmless left-cultists who quietly attempted to distribute a flyer "denouncing" Eurocommunism were quickly chased away by what appeared to be a saloon bouncer moonlighting during the afternoon, clearly unimpressed by their arguments concerning free speech. Suits and ties were *de rigueur*, except for John Cammett, who masqueraded as a truck driver the first night, but who subsequently was content to sport a worker's cap as a complement to his three-piece suit. Small wonder John Lukacs quipped in an otherwise fatuous presentation that his reactionary, pseudo-victorian heart rejoiced to see that behind the spectre of Eurocommunism lay only an unresurrected and rather petty-bourgeois world.

THE SOCIALIST INTERNATIONAL GOES TO LATIN AMERICA

By Pedro Cavalcanti

A conference on "Democratization in the Iberian Peninsula and in Latin America," sponsored by the Socialist International and organized by the Portuguese Socialist Party, was held in Lisbon, from Sept. 29 to Oct. 3, 1978. It was attended almost exclusively by political leaders of 33 countries from Europe and Latin America—including some well-known world figures. This conference represents the best organized effort so far by the Socialist International to confront the problems of Latin America and broaden its world-wide influence. The relevance of the subject can be seen by the presence of Willy Brandt, president of the Socialist International, Carlsomm, its general secretary, and leaders of national Socialist parties such as Mario Soares, Felipe Gonzales and Bettino Craxi. Mitterrand could not make it since he had to be present in Paris to deal with a vote of confidence in the French Parliament. The same happened to Palme, who had just presided over a congress of his own party. Both parties, however, as well as other Western European social democrat and socialist parties, sent high-ranking representatives.

In order to grasp the full relevance of the conference, it is necessary to locate it in a changing framework of international relations. One of the most striking features of the present situation is the continuing decline of Russian political influence due, among other things, to the growing realization of the general obsolescence and undesirability of the Soviet model. Although the Soviet Union remains an important world power, after "Kissinger's era," it has ceased to be "the other partner" to be consulted by the United States on every important international question. The recent Middle East talks point this out very clearly. While on the one hand, the Soviet Union remains very important for the Third World, its opportunistic *Realpolitik* exemplified by its recent shifting of support from Eritrea to Ethiopia, i.e., abandoning what the Russians

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themselves considered a genuine national liberation struggle, has considerably diminished Russia's influence in Africa, in the same way that the invasion of Czechoslovakia ten years ago put an end to the dreams of Leninist expansion in Europe.

But it is not just a matter of the Russian model losing its charm. Socialist foreign aid has also turned out to be seen as inappropriate, inefficient, and unable to deal with the needs of Third World countries. The technological gap between socialist and capitalist countries continues to grow and Third World nations are becoming increasingly aware of this fact. This explains, among other things, why Third World non-capitalist countries are becoming more willing to deal with transnational corporations, hoping that they will be able to control these modern monsters and prevent them from taking over.

China's bid to replace the Soviet Union as the Marxist-Leninist leader championing the cause of exploited countries has also fallen short. Embroiled in its own economic problems and having weathered a major political crisis—the so-called cultural revolution—China finds itself too handicapped to come to the aid of other nations. Furthermore, the struggle resulting in the defeat of the "gang of four" has tended to dampen the enthusiasm of Mao's visionary followers. After all, their idol was married to "the whore of Shanghai"—which makes one wonder whether Kua-feng would have been called the fag of Peking, had the other side won.

Cuba tried to replace China and it succeeded in Angola, where the presence of Cuban soldiers prevented the MPLA's defeat. But its involvement in the "Eritrean affair," at the side of the Soviet Union, has also tarnished the image of purity Castro sought to project. At any rate, in Latin America, the pro-Cuba groups of the 1960s are today almost non-existent. Their attempt to transpose the Cuban model resulting in the overthrow of Batista failed and they were subsequently annihilated.

While the socialist side is becoming embroiled in new sets of seemingly unresolvable contradictions, American foreign policy has also undergone significant changes from the Kissinger period to Carter's human rights offensive. Those who believe the human rights policy to be merely a moralist policy overlook the barrage of criticisms hurled at Kissinger's Metternichian world-view even before Carter's appearance on the political scene. One need only consult Brzezinski's article in *Foreign Policy* (Summer 1976), where U.S. foreign policy is described as "covert, manipulative and deceptive in style." In introducing a chapter bearing the revealing title of "Capitalism in one Country," Brzezinski denounced American foreign policy for being "committed to a largely static view of the world, based on a traditional balance of power, seeking accommodation among the major powers on the basis of spheres of influence, and more generally oriented toward preserving the status quo than reforming it."

Thus, the architects of today's American foreign policy have a very clear strategy to broaden American influence and economic interests. They know the weakness of the contemporary socialism and understand that new socialist nations need know-how and appreciate economic investments for their development. The U.S. economy can provide that. Monopoly capital may maintain unaltered imperialist relations of domination without necessarily requiring the services of the Navy and the Marines to keep "law and order" abroad. Imperialism does not need to put down its victims and can operate by creating dependence on advanced technology. As such, it would seem not to be imperialism but simply developed capitalism practicing normal trade. This is why, when questioned about American relations with "a Marxist country such as Angola" (*sic*), Andrew Young could reply that: "We do not care whether it is Marxist or

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not. The important thing is that it trades with us." The present ideology of protecting American world influence thrives on the free trade between advanced capitalist countries selling high technology commodities at monopoly prices, and relatively backward countries paying with natural resources or low-technology commodities selling at competitive prices.

The human rights policy becomes viable at this point and is successfully altering the U.S. imperialist world image. Of course, it has a high degree of incoherence as can be seen in the case of the U.S. continued support of the shah of Iran. Yet, present American foreign policy aims at a world full of liberal-democratic regimes operating within a capitalist framework. That, of course, means intensified American economic hegemony and the growing isolation of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. In short, it would reinforce the identification of dictatorship solely with socialism! Thus, "America in a hostile world" (the title of Brzezinski's article) would create a much more favorable international climate through a flexible U.S. foreign policy best enhancing American interests. The goal is to protect capitalism and that need not necessarily mean to support military and fascist dictatorships. In fact, in the long run these regimes are counterproductive to the cause of capitalism which theoretically remains committed to liberalism.

On the other hand, the human rights policy does not mean full democratic development. The supporters of this policy, mostly connected with the Trilateral Commission, see the expansion of democracy as it is now advocated primarily in Southern Europe, as a real danger for the future of capitalism. Their report, published under the title of *The Crisis of Democracy,* advocates capitalism cracking down whenever people seek to fully implement democratic ideals. As Huntington put it, they are worried about "democratic distempers" and "excesses of democracy" (his words).

The capitalist side, however, is by no means internally homogeneous, and within this configuration American interests today are facing heavy competition from Japanese and Western European forces. The Socialist International enters the world scene representing precisely these latter interests. Thus, it is not a struggle between enemies, but a competition among political allies—although this competition is definitely getting rougher.

Furthermore, the Socialist International represents many social forces that see expansion in the Third World as strengthening the cause of socialism as they understand it. The expansion of the Socialist International in Europe, as a result of the defeat of dictatorships in the Iberian Peninsula, has already triggered some changes within that organization. In a way, these new parties are responsible for the Socialist International shift away from its somewhat nordic environment.

Lastly, and most importantly, along with ideals, there are obviously many economic interests involved in the expansion of the Socialist International in the Third World. It means better opportunities for the expansion of Western European economies and stronger guarantees for their investments. An example of how much is at stake is the "deal of the century," i.e., the 10 billion dollar contract between West Germany and the Brazilian military for bringing nuclear power to the largest and most powerful country in Latin America. It is a typical case where American interests were plainly defeated and, in terms of how the question was ideologically posed, the U.S. could not prevent "the spread of nuclear power."

The following will attempt to indicate the importance of the Socialist International's present effort to move into Latin America. Although the conference

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was closed to the public in order to encourage frank and open debate, politically the results were highly positive. One need only examine the conclusions of the conference, published under the title "The Declaration of Lisbon," to realize what it entails. Nine pages long and listing fourteen points, this declaration expresses support for the Latin American people "in its struggle to establish regimes of freedom, social justice and democracy." In addition, the participants also expressed support for "independent economic development...against imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism and fascism."

Point 4 deals with electoral processes in Latin America. It points out that most of them are "simply electoral farces" and that dictatorships had to be forced to hold them by national and international pressures. A positive note here is struck by the Domincan events of last May. It was emphasized in the conference that such hopeful examples warrant increasing international solidarity. Point 5 stresses the positive role of the progressive former British colonies such as Jamaica and Guiana in their integration in the Latin American continent. Here the Declaration emphasizes the meaning of the conference which, for the first time, has brought together representatives of "European democratic socialism with well-known representatives of political forces which, for decades, struggle in Latin America for the cause of freedom, democracy and social progress." The presence of leaders such as Brizola from Brazil, Rodrigues from Chile, Pena Gomes from the Dominican Republic, the poet Cardenal from Nicaragua, and Odube, the ex-president of Costa Rica, is an indication of its relevance.

Point 7 deals with the importance of the consolidation of domestic institutions in the Iberian Peninsula for Latin America because of traditional links between these countries and their ex-colonies.

Point 8 is probably the most relevant part of the whole document. It is the longest one and deals with economic questions from viewpoints very close to the interests of Third World countries. One of its conclusions endorses such things as the right of Latin American countries to dispose of their resources freely and their right to regulate movements of capital and technology. This, "in the last analysis, means the rejection of intereference by other governments as well as by multinational enterprises, conglomerates and international agencies in the internal affairs of other countries." Also significant is that the north-south dialogue was not dealt with only in terms of relations among states, since most of them do not represent the people they oppress, but was broadened to involve other social forces such as democratic trade unions.

The next point provides "a most decisive and unconditional support for the struggle of the people of Nicaragua against Somoza's dictatorship." It recommends the withdrawal of political or diplomatic supports for Somoza, the elimination of any form of cooperation that can be considered as approval of such regimes, and appeals for campaigns of solidarity in favor of the liberation of the people of Nicaragua. This same section also condemns the fraud in the Bolivian elections, where a military coup prevented the normal electoral victory of Hernan Siles Suazo—who attended the conference—from beginning his term as the new president.

Point 11 condemns the arms race in Latin America and emphasizes the responsibility of countries that have encouraged such a race.

Point 12 indicates the extent of the commitment to Latin American democracy by the parties belonging to the Socialist International. It prefigures some involvement that, at this point, remains to be seen. What is probably the most relevant statement reads as follows: "The present critical situation in Latin America requires a closer

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cooperation among democratic socialist parties and other democratic parties with the forces operating in the continent. This cooperation must not only take the form of moral support, but it must also mean concrete and coordinated measures on the part of all of our parties and, specifically, those in power, in order to establish an efficient collaboration against the reactionary national forces and imperialist efforts. With such a purpose in mind, the leaders assembled in Lisbon will remain in permanent and fraternal contact, establishing bilateral as well as multilateral relations at different levels." The last point outlines the goal for the future: "the realization of true democracy in all dimensions: political, social, cultural and economic." The Declaration of Lisbon ends with a plea for solidarity from European and American parties and governments, and asks them to recognize their obligation to contribute to the struggle for a genuine democratization in the Latin American continent.

Apart from these *public* statements, what are the chances for these projects in Latin America? First of all, these efforts are likely to become very relevant for the future history of the continent and the world. The Socialist International has decided to move out of its European shell and Latin America is definitely the best suited continent to do so, as compared to Asia and Africa. This is due to the nature of Latin American colonization, the kind of societies it has created, and the recent memory of colonial domination in Asia and Africa, which was different. In short, Latin American countries are culturally more "Westernized" than African and Asian nations. In addition, socialist ideals remain very attractive for people living under capitalist dictatorships—especially since today this type of socialism also means democracy.

Latin America also has a relatively high level of urbanization. Historically, in the rare moments of liberal democracy, political life has reached only the literate urban masses and primarily petty-bourgeois sectors of the population: usually those groups open to the appeal of democratic socialism or social democracy (obviously two different things). Politically, the absence of radical parties of the European variety will facilitate the recruiting of lay masses unimpeded by competition. These types of socialist parties in most cases will not face Christian-Democrat opposition and, considering the Catholic Church's position in Latin America, can lead to the absorption of broad Catholic masses attracted to an open and democratic socialist party. Last but not least, the Socialist International can take advantage of the vacuum left by the Communist parties which, in more than half a century, have never sunk roots into their specific societies. Furthermore, parties belonging to the Socialist International will not compete directly with them since their Marxist-Leninist orientation leads them away from democratic socialism. In fact, Latin American Communist parties are still very close to the Russians, and "Eurocommunist" ideas remain foreign to them.

All of this, however, should not leave the impression that what is in store is an easy road for democratic socialist or social-democratic parties in Latin America. One of the major problems is the historical absence of similar organization with followers among peasants or workers. Even among middle-class groups their influence remains minimal.

Historically, conservative national and international interests in Latin America have popularized an image of socialism provided by regimes where Communist parties hold political power, i.e., Stalinism. The control of the mass media by these forces has made it difficult to rebuff their propaganda.

In some countries, the Socialist International will also face traditional political

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parties controlling large sectors of the population—especially in the backward countryside. Groups seeking to join in the struggle for this type of socialism will probably be confronted with the small but still influential opposition of official Communist parties. These parties may not appreciate much competition from the left. The same goes for extreme leftist groups, which, as the Chilean example shows, can become very bothersome. Furthermore, so-called external enemies are very much *inside* Latin America. Powerful world economic and political forces tend to accept solutions *à la Soares*, but they prefer alternatives in the case of a fall of the dictatorships *they now support*. Thus, as in the Portuguese situation, Soares has become their enemy.

In spite of being a Catholic continent, the Christian-Democratic parties are unlikely to succeed in Latin America. European Christian-Democrats are conservatives, when not openly reactionary, as can be seen in Germany with Strauss' leadership. That runs counter to the progressive positions of the Latin America Church—especially in terms of its positions on socio-economic structures. The chances of traditional Communist parties becoming more influential are also small. It is unlikely that these Communist parties can enter an era of democratic socialism, gradually abandoning orthodox Marxism-Leninism. Yet, a possible success of democratic socialist parties may force them to go in this direction. Thus, internationally, the Socialist International will face a kind of "virgin" continent in terms of the ideals it advocates, with almost no competition.

These are some of the factors that may enhance or inhibit what may be a turning point in Latin American history: the appearance of parties advocating the ideals of democratic socialism with international support. If these parties succeed, it will be an event of major proportions resulting in a change in the balance of forces in the continent.

The absence of parties sharing democratic or social-democratic goals is no accident in Latin American history. The colonialist attitude has historically penetrated European socialism, as typified by Bernstein's claim that "the rights of peoples with superior civilization to exercise their command over peoples of inferior civilization." How could political movements in a dominated continent ally themselves with forces that paternalize their oppression, the very reason for our struggle? In this sense, the Socialist International has a lot to overcome. Today, it is a very flexible organization: primarily a forum where political parties sharing common goals join to uphold *liberal democratic values* in politics.

Broadly speaking, parties belonging to the Socialist International can be divided into social-democrats and democratic socialists. The former accept the Welfare State as their goal, while the latter see social-democracy as a stage toward the establishment of a democratic socialism. Considering present social structures, in Latin America the chances today of social-democracy are more meager than in Europe. State intervention is already a wide-spread phenomenon in Latin America, including regimes with military dictatorship. Thus, social democratic goals are not new and are unfortunately identified with many of the oppressors in Latin America. Democratic socialism seems to have a better chance than social-democracy in Latin America. But only future internal struggles within these parties will decide the issue. This may surprise the Socialist International and may have interesting repercussions within its traditional European components.

In an international context characterized by the growing irrelevance of the Marxist-Leninist alternative, the Socialist International enters the scene as the politically and

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ideologically streamlined arm of a resurgent European capitalism seeking to checkmate its American cousin in a political situation in which European capitalism remains economically inferior. Its success, however, may also open the way for emancipatory democratic and socialist alternatives.

BEAUTY IN THE AGE OF POLLUTION: ART AND NATURE AT THE BIENNALE 1978

By Russell Berman

Traditional aesthetic theory described the relationship between art and nature as one of imitation and illusion. The work of art found its model in the external world and reproduced it. Even the process of transfiguration, i.e., the presentation of the real object as beautiful within the work, was defended as a legitimate reflection of the immanent truth behind the merely superficial empirical appearance. Thus, an artistic process of formal transformation, characteristic of the work of the staunchest nineteenth century realists themselves, was explained by theory in terms of reproduction; the image in the work of art allegedly corresponded to the essence of the objective world. The corollary to the call for imitation was the defense of illusion. The work of art should disguise its own artificial character and appear as nature. Neither should the seams and stitches of the technical process, the artisanry of art, be seen by the recipient nor should any tendentious axe be audibly ground. Just as the work of art was to present nature, it was to present itself as nature. Theory thus demanded the eclipse of the specifically artistic character of art.

Only painstakingly historical investigations will be able to determine the effect and function of these theoretical imperatives. One suspects, however, that the emphasis on imitation and illusion, at least on the part of innovative artists and their proponents, often provided an alibi for formal progress. The French impressionists, for example, defended their leap forward toward abstraction in terms of what the eye truly perceived. Similarly the German naturalists rejected the theatrical conventions of their day in the name of a more perfect imitation of nature and thereby anticipated dramatic developments which would concern playwrights half a century later; Brecht's epic theater and Beckett's speechlessness are both foreshadowed in Gerhart Hauptmann's social dramas.[1] Neither Hauptmann nor his allies, such as the critic Otto Brahm, managed to construct a developed theory of modern drama. They argued instead in terms of the imitation of contemporary reality and criticized the established stage for its entrapment in a web of formal rules. Yet, it was historically precisely the new theater which, for all its attacks on anachronistic conventions, was the agent of formal innovation.

In the case of the naturalists, the evocation of the theory of the imitation of nature provided a shelter for the development of new dramatic techniques. It would, on the other hand, not be difficult to find examples of situations where the same arguments have been used against aesthetic progress, i.e., where the ideal reproduction of a healthy totality has been played out against an allegedly decadent and obscure

1. Cf. Theodor W. Adorno, *Aesthetische Theorie* (Frankfurt, 1974), p. 369 and Peter Szondi, *Theorie des modernen Dramas* (Frankfurt, 1977), pp. 83-86.

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formalism. In both cases, however, the call for an imitation of nature has tended to assume an apologetic character; art which apparently could not be defended on its own terms was justified as a mirror, a reflection, manifestation of the objective world. The anti-artistic thrust of this theoretical tradition is evident already in the call for illusion. The artist, who should be omniscient in his reproduction of nature, should himself be invisible. The archimedian point, from which he perceives the world, is simultaneously his exile, for he should leave no trace of himself in his work, which must apear as nature. The theory of imitation and illusion, whatever its role may have been in specific historical debates, denies the nature of the artist and of art itself. Reflection excludes self-reflection, and the producer is bannished from his product. Illusion in the work of art is the corollary to the illusion of the artist as an autonomous individual, independent of the world confronting him.

This is the point at which the 1978 Biennale in Venice began: "From Nature to Art, from Art to Nature." In recent years, this international art exhibition has treated themes with all the earmarks of burning issues: Eastern European dissidents and Latin American conditions. An exhibit centered on the relationship between art and nature seems at first glance to be curiously old-fashioned. Even its organizers, Jean Christophe Amman, Achille Bonito Oliva, Antonio Del Guerico and Filiberto Menna have remarked that it appears to "a garment cut to fill an art of other times and then adapted to modern art."[2] On the one hand, the interest in what seems to be a scholastic question of aesthetic theory might be interpreted as a withdrawal from concerns of greater political and social relevance. On the other, the reference to a traditional aesthetic problem hardly seems the most direct path to a comprehension of contemporary art which, at least since the birth of the modern avant garde early in this century, has rejected the classical formula of an imitation of nature. Nevertheless, a closer examination of the Biennale's offerings and the theoretical enterprise which led to the selection reveals a profoundly critical motive. The title itself already suggests the distance from the theories of imitation and illusion. Nature and art are not conceived as mutually exclusive; art is not a mirror external to the nature it reflects. Instead, the exhibit is concerned with the space between two conceptual poles: the nature of art and the artificiality of nature. Neither does the artist lay claim to an omniscience capable of reproducing an objective totality within the aesthetic structure nor is the specificity of his position and the artistic process excluded from the work. The problem of art and nature is not presented as one of imitation but is redefined as "the interaction between a subject (with all its memories and hopes, understandings and desires) and an object (that appears in terms ever more removed from the traditional concept of 'nature')."[3] Modern art is understood to be very much interested in those experiences usually located in a dimension which common sense labels "external reality;" precisely the traditional dichotomy of external and internal experience is critically reexamined by the exhibit. The recognition of the specificity of aesthetic language implies a critique of correspondence theory which, postulating a one-to-one relationship between the categories of consciousness and objective reality, reduced the former to the latter. This stance is the main target of modern art as interpreted by the Biennale: "Before reflecting the world, the artist is led to thinking about himself, to an examination of his capacity and of his methods. The passage from mind to reality is not assured *a priori* on ontological grounds, and neither is that

2. *La Biennale di Venezia. Section of Visual Arts and Architecture. General Catalogue* (Venice, 1978), p. 11.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 11.

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from the language of art to the natural universe."[4] The problem of the modern artist becomes a metaphor for the critique of traditional objectivism. The concern with the artist's self and his activity corresponds to the recognition of the ideological character of abstract individualism, while the investigation of the environment evokes the individual's entanglement in a world which he does not confront as a sovereign manipulator. Politics, consequently, loses its traditional character as a set of external issues in a clearly limited realm. Instead it straddles the obsolete demarcation between the internal and external world, spreading out into ecology and penetrating into psychology and everyday experience. As Adorno understood, advanced aesthetics and advanced politics tend to converge,[5] and the criticism implicit in the most modern work of art is exponentially more explosive than the clear messages of the most solemn social realism.

In order to provide a "critical rereading of modern art from the point of view of the relationship it has with the environment,"[6] the organizers of the Biennale have developed a central exhibit divided into six stages each of which includes works of art related to certain thematic issues. We will return below to an examination of some of the more interesting contributions. The six stages themselves, however, as subcategories of the overall critique of illusionism, are indicative of the theoretical concerns which inspired the exhibition. The first is entitled "Great Abstraction Great Realism" and traces two only apparently antagonistic tendencies which initiated the aesthetic opposition to correspondence theory. The traditional notion of imitation was undermined both by rigorously abstract art with its self-referential structures as well as by extreme forms of representation which, isolating familiar objects, endowed them with a new autonomy. Juxtaposing the fully abstract with hyperrealism, the exhibit echoes insights articulated more than half a century ago by Kandinsky in his essay "concerning the question of form" (1912); the elimination of "intrusive beauty,"[7] i.e., formalism, in radical realism and the elimination of heterogeneous contents from abstract art would lead to the same result, which, as suggested by the exhibitors, can be identified as the rejection of the imitation of nature as the central principle of art. The work of art does not reproduce; instead it investigates its own nature in abstract works, while eroding the security of complacent perception in truly strenuous realism.

The second stage, entitled "Window Interior" includes works by surrealists and contemporary artists who seemingly accept the Renaissance notion of a painting as a window opening onto a scene but who have, following Breton, raised the question of the quality of the landscape outside the window: "*savoir sur quoi elle donne.*" The humanist perspective of a clear separation between subject and object, the anthropocentrism of a self-assured status is rejected. The scenes beyond the window are not a passive nature waiting to be discovered and exploited by the sovereign, faustian viewer. Instead, one finds in the earlier works, from the classical generation of surrealism (Dali, Ernst, Magritte) an investigation of a fantastic and savage interiority, while the younger generation (for example, Giuseppe Romangnoni and Leonardo Cremonini) seem to radicalize the critique of the traditional perspective by fully jettisoning the dichotomy of internal and external and offering images of a reality which has assumed an oneiric character and thereby seems to defy familiar, apparently logical categories (*vide* Robert Matta's satire of the Chilean junta as well as

4. *Ibid.*, p. 11.
5. Adorno, *Aesthetische Theorie*, pp. 160, 368.
6. *General Catalogue*, p. 11.
7. Max Bill (ed.), *Kandinsky. Essays Ueber Kunst und Künstler* (Stuttgart, 1955), p. 26.

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Cremonini's beach scene, where a clearly portrayed death-like leisure dissolves into acryllic shapelessness). In 1928 Breton proposed a retreat into an inner model in the face of an increasingly suspect external world.[8] In newer productions this alternative has apparently ceased to function.[9]

The "Urban Iconosphere," the third stage, is devoted to the investigation of the second nature of the contemporary environment. The artist is hopelessly tied up in this matrix and therefore cannot simply step outside of it in order to provide a lucidly rational reproduction. The works collected here do not merely share a unifying theme regarding the modern world and city life. On the contrary, the common project is the development of new communicative forms demanded by the exigencies of contemporary society. Images cease to be primarily logical and representative, as in nineteenth century realism, and take on an associative and emotive character. The artist responds to the decline, described by Habermas, of a public of individuals participating in rational discourse by developing new, historically adequate methods. For example, in James Rosenquist's "F-111," a work to which we will return, the sheer size (2800x300 cm) dwarfs the recipient and robs him of the illusion of sovereignty, which a painting with a similar theme (militarism and everyday life) but more domesticated dimensions might provide.

In the fourth stage, "Visual Convention," the perceptual process is investigated and the traditional assumptions underlying the contemplative stance toward the work of art[10] are criticized. Seeing is itself robbed of its transparency and becomes visible as a concrete activity: "Perception, that is, not as a means but as an act-visual process that in its turn, is considered as an act in itself."[11] What appears to be an epigonic Renaissance portrait takes on an enigmatic character when the viewer examines its title, "Young Man looking at Lorenzo Lotto" by Giulio Paolini. The mysteriously smiling face and the peering eyes become disturbingly obstrusive once the visual process is underscored. That the portrait itself is looking straight ahead at the absent Lotto estranges the viewer's own ability to see, which tended to assume a particularly conservative character in the context of the work's otherwise all too conventional technique. Contemplative autonomy disappears, and the nature of the reception of art emerges as a theme from the work itself.

Examples both of minimal and conceptual art are presented in the fifth stage, the "Entropy of Art." Works underscoring their own closed, autonomous, fully self-referential character tend to collapse on themselves and become simple systems. The harmony which traditional art achieved by integrating heterogeneous elements of the imitated nature is reached here by a self-evident limitation of the aesthetic product. Radically excluding extraneous elements, these pieces represent the extreme case of autonomous works. Their counterparts are collected in the sixth stage, "Nature Anti-Nature" in which nature, be it optimistically or pessimistically, is rediscovered as a force and a theme. Modern art, without illusionist dictates, confronts nature and grapples with it, even literally as in the documentation of Christo's

8. André Breton, *Le Surréalisme et la Peinture* (Paris, 1965), p. 4.

9. Thus Adorno in 1944: "Modern man wishes to sleep close to the floor, like an animal—decreed a German magazine before Hitler with prophetic masochism, and, by doing away with the bed, it abolished the threshhold between wakefulness and dreaming. Those who are up all night are always available and ready, without resistance, for everything, simultaneously alert and unconscious." *Minima Moralia* (Frankfurt, 1978), p. 40.

10. Cf. Walter Benjamin, *Das Kunstwerk im Zeitalter seiner technischen Reproduzierbarkeit* (Frankfurt, 1968), pp. 18-19, 21-23.

11. *General Catalogue*, p. 36.

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"Wrapped Coast, One Million Square Feet, Little By, Australia." Nine miles south of Sydney, the artist had covered a section of the coast one mile long and 150-400 feet wide, with eighty-four foot cliffs on the north and a sandy beach on the south, with an erosion control mesh composed of a synthetic fiber used in agriculture and thirty-five miles of polypropylene rope. The coast remained wrapped for ten weeks in 1969. A similarly direct integration of nature in the work of art was presented by Gino de Dominicis' "Time, error, space, etc." (1969-1970). A human skeleton has been placed on the ground. On its feet are roller skates, and in its left hand is a metal leash leading to a dog's skeleton. A straight brass pole, about seven feet high, pierces the ground like a lightning bolt just beside the extended right hand. A modern memento mori, the piece alludes to the tradition of sixteenth and seventeenth century paintings in which the vanities of this world are overshadowed by the imminence of death. Yet Dominicis rejects the representational aspects of the older works; he offers no luscious fruit, no sparkling wine. Death is not seen from afar, as an anticipated end, but has already penetrated the work as itself; the skeleton is authentic. The religious transcendence which earlier works may have promised is absent here, for the catastrophe has already taken place. What survives, what remains intact, what seems to have a claim to life after death are the monuments of this culture unscathed by time: the leash and the roller skates.

The classification of the various works into the six stages was not unproblematic. Some pieces could have easily been grouped in other categories. Similarly, given the underlying unity of the critical project—a re-examination of modern art in terms of a critique of correspondence theory and its epistemology—the borderlines between the stages were fluid. Nevertheless the wealth of the exhibit was reflected in its ability to develop tendentially different prespectives on the central theme. No single formula was presented but rather a panoply of arguments and questions. These can be best demonstrated by taking an analytic look at some of the individual works which lay closest to the central themes.

Traditional notions of the imitation of nature, rooted in the model of an autonomous subject confronting a transparently comprehensible objective world, occluded the specificity of the medium of expression. It was the achievement of abstraction to point to the nature of painting itself; thus, Kandinsky argued that the most extreme abstraction turned into realism, and consequently he preferred to call abstract art concrete.[12] This dialectic emerges from the works of Martin Barré, appropriately displayed in the section of "Great Abstraction." The medium of the work is its content; the material, ink on canvas, is the subject of the investigation. In a study, such as "61.T.18" (1961) the implicit limits and conventions are discovered by transcending them. Simple lines continue across two juxtaposed canvases, and, due to the work's simplicity, the complexity of the tradition of surface becomes apparent. Instead of mirroring reality, the artist disassembles the mirror itself in order to examine its properties. No doubt a work such as this, nearly two decades old, anticipated the more contemporary webbed canvases of a François Rouan. Two later pieces by Barré push the analysis of the medium further and, paradoxically, the rigor of their simplicity turns into elaborate allegories of the critique of illusionism. In "67.F.12." (1967) five arrows, whose ends dissolve, are arranged on the otherwise naked canvas. The artist does not offer the illusion of speed but instead, by criticizing the convention which traditionally suggested motion, he calls into question the hybris

12. Max Bill (ed.), *Kandinsky*, p. 215.

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of uncritical notions of progress. The undermining of the illusion of motion corresponds to a dissatisfaction with a world-view naively derived from Renaissance laws of motion. Rejecting the artistic convention, the work of art criticizes the optimism which continues to identify the scientistic perspective as the agent of enlightenment even after the catastrophes of the twentieth century; fleeting arrows point straight to nuclear power plants. Yet, at the same time, the form criticism assumes—the arrows dissolve in mid-canvas—can be understood as a utopian anticipation, a reconciliation of antagonism. This argument is expended in Barré's "72-73B" (1972-73), even though the characteristic simplicity is retained. A canvas, 160x148 cm, is partially divided into regular geometric patterns produced by fine, clear lines suggestive of the best tradition of perspective painting. These are the lines which once designed sixteenth century city squares and the gardens of absolutist palaces, the lines which charted the routes for European expansion and the trajectories of new war machines. Superimposed on this web of precisely drawn quadrangles, a series of course gray stripes stands in primitive contrast to those best laid plans. An enigmatic tension results from the contradiction between the two layers; while the stripes hardly represent an alternative composition, they suggest a thorough rejection of the initial pattern. They are the bold lines of dissatisfaction drawn through a rejected diagram in order to cross it out. As the agents of negation, their existence is not independent, not primordial. They are inextricably tied to the project they reject. Barré's critique of tradition can thus not be identified with the ever present primitivist vogues of pretentiously naive painters, the Carlos Castenadas and other charlatans who rant against civilization in the name of an allegedly immediately accessible nature or essence. Barré does not construct a sentimental opposition to rationality by claiming to leap back *ad fontes*. Instead, opposition is a concrete negation of the structure of domination, a dissatisfaction after the fact which lays no claim to an absolute priority. Nature is not introduced as the exotic beast which bad romantics like to rent from nearby zoos. Instead nature is the nature of the material itself, asserting itself against convention, which historically had occluded its own character.

A project which similarly demands recognition of the concreteness of the material and provocatively rejects the traditional illusionist call for meaning, is evident in Carla Accardi's "Great Gray" (1960). Pure color in rhythmic arrangement asserts its organic character. On a dark gray background a lighter structure marked by white shapes becomes a volatile mass, with the force of "Guernica" yet lacking any direct historical reference. The artistic material, with no other pretentions, becomes nature and life: a mythical gray beast without mythology. Advocates of realism would decry this abstraction as alienation; goals and means are allegedly reversed where materiality assumes an organic character. Yet, precisely due to the rigor of the work's negativity, the total exclusion of heterogeneous elements, the reversal is itself reversed. Uncompromising autonomy becomes an anticipatory emblem of non-administered existence. Simultaneously, however, the refusal to reduce the material to a lifeless object participates on another level in the critique of alienation. Nature ceases to be the passive victim of a force unconscious of its own origin. The traditional call for the predominance of spirit, meaning and forming within the work of art turns out, despite its complacent self-satisfaction, itself to be a variety of alienation. Unable to recognize the autonomy of nature, it cannot recognize its own nature and erodes its own independence at the moment it deems itself most free. Accardi's presentation of the dynamic between the material as material and, on the other hand, its hidden and

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rediscovered nature thematizes this dialectic. Nature ceases to be simply what is locked in parks and banished beyond the suburbs; it becomes the consciousness of concrete existence.

The works of Antonio Trotta also investigate the dynamics of the relation between art and nature. Yet, here not only is the nature of the material within the work of art underscored; the process of reception is also called into question by returning to a device which characterized early phases of illusionist art only to be later rejected when the character of illusion, its subjective, artistic quality, was suppressed: trompe l'oeil. Each of the two pieces "Artifice 1" and "Artifice 2" (1977) is a marble slate on which a classical human figure—again a reference to the good old days of imitation and realism—is etched with the tools of a sculptor in its hand. It is busy chiseling itself out of the raw marble at the bottom of the piece. By underscoring the relation of the realist image both to its own material and to the artistic process, the artist rediscovers art as nature. No doubt the pieces can be comprehended as parodies on Michelangelo's dictum that the shape is waiting to be discovered in the unhewn stone. Whatever value that recognition may have had in the Renaissance, it took on an ideological character in infinite epigonic repetitions. Classicist academic art propounded a humanism which occluded the specifically human by reducing nature to an object of domination. Trotta, on the contrary, shows the figure emancipating itself; the autonomy of the material is asserted and the sovereign security of the artist—the claim to the archimedian point—is negated.

Trotta goes even further with a similar theme in his piece "Embroidering Itself" (1974). The eye is fooled because what appears from the distance to be an ink drawing turns out to be embroidery on silk. Furthermore, as in the artifice pieces, the technique is also the content. A woman, with the hair and dress of the late nineteenth century, is sitting in front of a wooden frame on which is stretched a cloth. She is apparently embroidering, and, again, the artist has succeeded in transcending illusionism in order to call attention to the material of the work, i.e., to the nature of art. Yet, the added dimension of trompe l'oeil casts light on the visual process itself. The purpose of the trick is neither to demonstrate the artist's perfection of technique nor to engrandize the work. Instead, just as materiality within the work becomes a theme, the materiality outside the work, the concreteness of the recipient, is underscored. Like Paolini, who, in his "Young Man looking at Lorenzo Lotto," points to the viewer as the counterpart of the work, Trotta does not let the viewer assume an impregnable position vis-à-vis the work. "Embroidering itself," without any blatant social or political references, points beyond itself to its environment. The exclusion of heterogeneous elements in the autonomous work turns into transcendence. The radical attention to concrete nature within the work of art leads to the discovery of concrete materiality outside its limits.

One recalls traditional portraits in which proud figures posed in rooms draped with luxurious cloths, while in the background a window opened on a landscape which, were it peaceful or adventurous, seemed to wait for the conquering hand. Despite its ideological character, that perspective provided an adequate expression of bourgeois optimism from the days of Renaissance humanism until the era of liberal capitalism. No matter how manipulative the anticipated activity may have in fact been, it was also the legitimate agent of civilization. Ater the social organization which nurtured those individuals and made that praxis possible fell victim to its own internal dynamic, the surrealists inverted the traditional perspective and ventured into a fantastic interiority. Yet, even there, the security of the traditional dichotomy of internal and external was

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not rejected. Only a later generation (or, in the case of Robert Matta, a later phase) would investigate a world which overtook the worst dreams, without pretending that the interiority of dreams, itself manipulated, could provide an escape. Matta's piece displayed at the Biennale is characteristic: "Los Distacagodos" (1975).[13] It is a critique of militarism in general and the Chilean junta in particular. Cartoon-like military figures cover the large canvas, crawling like pigs, flying like birds, marching in goose-step. The ineluctable motion forward contrasts with the caricatured shapes, each of which is a joke. Formal composition and external reference combine to treat a world where a rigid division between realism and abstraction cannot do justice to exponential horror. Again Kandinsky's hypothesis of the convergence of the two tendencies reasserts itself. A classical realistic treatment of the topic would fail, precisely because the topic represents a situation in which the optimism inherent in realism has ceased to be germane.[14] Matta's rejection of the illusionist perspective is homologous to a rejection of false political hopes. Thus, despite his obviously critical stance, he renounces any falsely heroic gesture of resistance. In constrast with the overwhelming military force which gives the painting its propulsive force, the caricatures themselves seem embarassingly helpless. This is true even in the details; the soldiers who fly through the air have curved arms which seem to flap humorously with the greatest of ease. One has the sense of immense disproportion: name-calling helps little against B-52's. Were Matta to have remained at the level of mere caricature, the work would have been a product of pathetic exile. Yet, the juxtaposition of the two moments—force and caricature, might and helplessness—preserves the legitimacy of criticism by acknowledging its own limits. Works that make fun of fascism all too often become ideology by minimizing the seriousness of the situation.[15] Matta however succeeds by simultaneously turning the humor against himself; casting light on the ideological moment in the work of art, he overcomes it—*Aufhebung* as maintaining and surpassing.

While Matta incorporates an external political event into the work of art, he is simultaneously concerned with interiority, or better, he demonstrates how libidinal forces, ignored by illusionism (or at least by its theorists) and still located by the surrealists within the psychic realm, have seized control of external surroundings.[16] Man becomes the animals which previously only haunted his dreams. Phylogeny is reversed, and what the hybris of civilization derided as the law of the jungle reveals itself to be the law of society. A Lautrec or a Grosz caricatured humanity; Matta presents, on the contrary, humanity as a viciously natural beast. Here too, however, the artist is not satisfied with a cheap derogatory metaphor. The analysis is more complex because the apparent natural savagery of the individual figures is organized within the mechanical, military rhythm of the total composition. Nature is released only in order to manipulate it all the more effectively. "Los Destacagodos" thus is more than an attack on Pinochet; as an allegory of the relation between desublimated nature and the continuation of repression it describes contemporary mechanisms of

13. Breton, *Le Surréalisme*, pp. 189ff.

14. Cf. Adorno's critique of the classicism of Rolf Hochhuth in *Noten zur Literatur* (Frankfurt, 1974), pp. 591-598.

15. *Ibid.*, pp. 603-604. A useful stocktaking of the problem of aesthetic treatments of fascism has recently appeared: Elmar Buck, "Götterdämmerung allüberall. Der gewöhnliche und der interessant gemachte Faschismus. Immer wieder Schwierigkeiten beim Bewältigen des Unbewältigten." in Nicolas Born, Jürgen Manthey and Delf Schmidt (ed.), *Der neue Irrationalismus* (Reinbek bei Hamburg, 1978), pp. 179-208.

16. Breton, *Le Surréalisme*, p. 192.

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domination. Within the military machine, the individual figures are both agressors and themselves victims, animals run over on the highways of political exigency. Where they have most successfully externalized their own inner nature, they are most integrated into a totalitarian structure; the illusion of autonomy corresponds to an objective loss of subjectivity.

In the works of Leonardo Cremonini, for example his "Sun Screens" (1967-68), the silent autonomy of the aesthetic structure explodes into radical criticism. Where consumerism and ecology break the limits of traditional political programs, a realistic appraisal of the situation makes the necessity for a surrealistic critique obvious. Reasonable moderation will inevitably fall short of the goal. The picture is of a beach scene with figures lying on seats, the rectangular forms of which dominate the composition and even emancipate themselves from their role as content and float off as abstract form into the day-glo sky. To the right, powerful metal posts with brutally sharpened ends hold up a roof and in the distance, the sea, reduced to a miniscule blue line dissolves into the oily mud of the shore. The chemical quality of the artistic medium tendentially loses its representational role and becomes identical with the polluted environment: a fresh sea breeze in the age of oil spills. The predominant bright colors indicate the necessity for a happy summer vacation proclaimed by every cigarette advertisement, yet their clarity contrasts with subtle slips into the grotesque. The sun-bathers lie about rigidly with expressionless faces in a silent world. Their joyless passivity is Cremonini's critique of consumerism. Even when they appear to engage in activity, e.g., when the children play leap frog, their movements are broken into still frames which are integrated into the overriding geometric order. This world is itself the theme of the work; hot metal and plate glass entrap the vacationers in passivity: the rigor mortis of consumerism, accepted freely because it masks itself as pleasure. As in Matta's painting, repressive desublimation is the strategy of domination. Yet, while Matta's direct reference is to an immediately political event, Cremonini manages to thematize problems traditionally excluded from realistic politics; the nature which consumerism destroys is as artificial as the needs it manipulates.

After Matta and Cremonini, a third variation of artistic treatment of political topics is offered by James Rosenquist's "F-111" (1965). The enormous length of the painting undermines the traditional relation of the viewer to the work. This formal innovation cannot be separated from the content, the interpenetration of militarism and everyday American life in the mid-sixties. In front of Georg Grosz's famous "Pillars of Society," the caricature of the reactionary forces in Weimar Germany, the recipient was endowed with a false sense of power; the size of the enemies derided by the artist was not overwhelming. The stance of the viewer seemed adequate to offer meaningful opposition, which in 1933 turned out to be tragic self-deception. If "F-111," by its inherent criticism, does not fully exclude the possibility of resistance, it makes clear that the resistance will first have to grow; a total vision of the painting is not immediately available to the individual viewer, who is forced to walk up and down its thirty-one odd yards. The seriousness of the situation is however not only its dimensions. "F-111" is not a mammoth figure of the sort one finds overlooking war memorials. The icons of everyday life are organized in a collage-like manner and merged with the symbols of war and destruction. On a background of an all too familiar canned spaghetti glow the sleak silver wings of the pentagon's best. A mushroom cloud explodes into an umbrella with sanguine rainbow colors, while the smiling face of an innocent young girl, with white ribbon bows in her blond hair,

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appears beneath a glass bulb which simultaneously resembles a hair dryer and a pilot's helmet. Above it rises the nose of the plane. "U.S. Airforce" is printed across the middle of the work, next to a Firestone tire. Beside these images of the military-industrial complex, one finds happy little colored light bulbs, a sponge cake and small triangular flags on which are inscribed the key words of the text of the snap-crackle-and-pop breakfast: "Food Energy," Vitamin-B," "Riboflavin," "Protein," Iron," and "Niacin." In the background, Fourth of July fireworks explode, the ostensible link between manipulated popular culture and militarism. Rosenquist does not need to incorporate any blatantly critical material—a Vietnamese scene for example—in order to enhance the work's negative force. The juxtaposition of the plane and the nuclear explosion with naive happiness is disturbing enough. The relation is more complex than simple montage. The two moments are not only parts of the same system; they produce each other. The exigencies of the military organize everyday life, while naive obliviousness is the prerequisite to the continuity of an unchallenged politics which culminates in the F-111. Urban nature, with all the artificiality of body-building breakfast foods, leads to the nuclear destruction of nature: canned spaghetti as the anticipation of catastrophe.

Aside from the works collected in the six stations of the central pavilion, the Biennale also included a variety of contributions from twenty-seven participating nations. While these works were not designed to fit into the specific scheme of the critical project of the main exhibit, they all treated the general topic of the relation between art and nature. Some of these were of special interest due to the dimensions they added to the analyses already discussed above. In particular, works in the Spanish, Israeli and Austrian pavilions seemed less concerned with a rediscovery of the nature of art than with very different attempts to use artistic means in order to examine nature. Thus, the ecological crisis was the theme of two important pieces in the Spanish exhibit. Given, on the one hand, the crisis of objectivist illusionism and, on the other, the increasingly rapid destruction of the natural environment, one alternative open to the critical artist is to return to an earlier art form which concerned itself directly with the relation between man and nature: landscaping and gardening. Yet, the vocabulary of this genre, which once readily proclaimed the domination of nature in the geometric gardens of absolutist palaces, must be adopted to a new historical situation in which both the legitimacy of this domination and the autonomy of the dominator himself have become questionable. This is the problem posed by Nacho Criado in his work "Intersection," a landscape in front of the Spanish pavilion. Facing the entrance, one finds four gravel steps leading down into a pit filled with rocks and broken glass. A steep set of ladder-like steps seem to lead back up and into the exhibit, yet it turns out to be shakier than it appeared. Most visitors chose therefore to walk around the work and stay on a safe brick path along the building. Meanwhile sagging wooden planks stretch out to the right and left through a garden strewn with shattered mirrors and glass. Mirrors are also mounted on trees, surrounded and even penetrated by arrows; the viewer rediscovers himself as the victim of an anonymous attack—a modern St. Anthony—in a hostile environment. This silent hostility is heightened by the presence, at the edge of the landscape, of a tall wooden frame which resembles the external structure of a guillotine. In it is mounted a large bow. If the garden as an art form traditionally expressed man's domination over a domesticated nature, Criado's "Intersection" turns the tables without resorting to any romantic sentimentalization of nature. The source of the hostility is not nature itself which remains rigorously anonymous. It is rather the

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products of civilization, man's own work, which turn back on themselves and redirect their vigorous violence against the subject himself. While the viewer is clearly forced into the role of the victim—in the pit, in the garden filled with glass splinters, and in the mirrors—it is only a matter of time until the enigmatic identity of the culprit becomes clear. The intersection is civilization's crossing itself. Thus, Criado is not satisfied with a merely sensationalist treatment of the ecological crisis which would stop once adequately frightening colors had been found to paint the impending doom. Instead, he analyzes the source of the crisis and, preserving a sense of urgency in the thematization of hostility, he underscores that the crisis of nature is the work of culture. It is important to note that Criado's analysis is not performed by pointing a finger directly or by assuming an objectivist perspective in front of which the world would stretch out in its totality, like the gardens of Versailles. Criado rejects this absolutist posture. The force of his critique, on the contrary, is rooted in rigorous negation and the exclusion of elements heterogeneous to the inner dynamic of the work. The culprit is nowhere named, and not until the viewer manages to grasp the structure of the work and to understand its own internal motive can he follow it beyond its ostensible borders into the realm of protest and criticism.

A similar dynamic is evident in a work displayed within the pavilion, Pilar Palomer's "Sacrifices." Eighteen chestnut tree trunks, trimmed and stripped, have been arranged in a pile in the center of a room. On the walls hang photopraphs of the trees *in natura*, each, however, already bearing a sign that marked it for destruction. The implements, with which the trees were chopped down and transformed into the trunks in the work of art, are also on display. The sacrificial character of the work is by no means restricted to the arrangement of the trunks, somehow suggestive of a mysteriously religious pyre. On the contrary, the very senselessness of the arrangement, the silence of the photographs and the disinterested anonymity of the implements describe the contours of a process apparently robbed of any meaning. As in Criado's piece, the culprit is at least superficially absent; Palomer does not harangue. At most one senses a quiet weeping, yet even this sentimentality is repressed by the naked rigor of the work. The mystery lies in the character of the sacrifice, which oscillates between the two poles of its double nature. That the process traced by the evidence and the corpses had no meaning gives the label of sacrifice an ironic quality; one can only ask bitterly, "What for?" That senselessness, however, transcends the specificity of the work and becomes a critique of the purely instrumental as well. Palomer presents a description of a radically technical approach to the world, but she robs it of any colorful plastic coating. At the same time, the sacrifice refers not only to the real act and its social implications but also to the work of art itself. In its radical autonomy, its apparent purposelessness, it does not ossify as a monument. On the contrary, it becomes an offering, a magic gesture, i.e., the antinomy of the technical instrumentality, also inherent in the work. The center, however, is not this contradiction. Autonomy becomes critical when it ceases to speak; hence the anonymity of the culprit. Thus, it evokes a dialogue and initiates a response. The more senseless the sacrifice, the more certain the answer to the silent prayer, the fulfillment of the wish which must be kept secret for it to become true.

In the Israeli pavilion, Menashe Kadishman merges an allusion to the older pastoral genre, which portrayed innumerable shepards and shepardesses in sweetly lyrical landscapes, with Duchamps' principle of ready-mades. In his work "Sheep" (1978), he moves from art to nature-as-art by constructing a pen within and without the pavilion, in which a flock of live sheep graze. All remnants of what Kandinsky attacked as

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"intrusive beauty," the false artistic gesture which rapidly degenerates into euphemism, have been excluded. In place of illusion, activity in nature, the biological behavior of the animals, is declared to be art. This extreme concreteness, this refusal to subsume the material to any transcendent perspective, reveals new aspects of the artistic process. Amnon Barzel has commented that, "the transmission from one material to another is abolished to a degree where the material becomes the theme itself...this is an art which points at and delimits a situation of nature; a demonstrative rather than a descriptive art."[17] The distance necessary to description, which is rooted in the illusionist ideology of the artistic subject's independence from nature, is displaced by the concrete act. Metaphor is rejected, and the work of art becomes reality, just as reality has become art. What is problematic, however, is that Kadishman's work itself risks becoming an illusion precisely at the moment it rejects illusionism. By immediately presenting nature as art, it implies the ideological possibility of a direct leap back to nature. As a shock, an act of estrangement from moribund conventions, it no doubt includes a critical moment. Yet, the means with which this effect is achieved is itself regressive. The hasty retreat to natural beauty is all too often a ploy of civilization; Kadishman's lyricism is his weakness because it ignores the distance between man and nature, a distance which has become second nature.

The Austrian exhibit was devoted to an extensive collection of works by Arnulf Rainer. Rainer is known above all for his technique of painting over photographs of human faces and bodies. Nature and art collide on the canvas. Art becomes an analytic tool to examine the language expressed by the nature trapped in the photograph. The inner nature, hidden beneath the surface, is exposed by the artistic process. In a profound sense, one can call Rainer's art critical: a critique of the veneer which uncovers the violence and anguish denied by conventional language and the mechanisms of social control. Werner Hofmann has called Rainer a "redeemer,"[18] but the process of redemption is one of negation—negation of the photograph, negation of the surface and negation of the appearance of nature. Rainer's path is contradictory; unlike Kadishman's direct return to nature, it progresses via the destruction of the immediate image and only thereby suggests the possibility of transcendence.

General conclusions are difficult to draw, for, despite the thematic unity of the Biennale, the projects inherent in the individual works of art were extraordinarily diverse. The clearest result was an indication of the path a critical art and a critical aesthetics may take, both thematically and theoretically. The question of nature as the crisis of environment and everyday life appears as an increasingly politicized matrix, but, due to its all-encompassing character, it demands new forms of response. It is not simply a limited issue which one can view, unaffected from afar, as in illusionist art and traditional politics. On the contrary, the subject is very much immersed in the objective catastrophe. Meanwhile, on a theoretical level, the new situation cannot be integrated immediately into the old structures as an artificially appended dimension of social concern. A fully new vocabulary is necessary, which can only be developed as a concrete negation of tradition. Hence, for example, the continuous allusions to older genres in the works presented at the Biennale. Not where new contents are introduced into conventional structures but where those structures are forced to explode is the

17. *General Catalogue*, p. 130.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 75.

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locus of progress. The crooked path of a strenuous confrontation with the problems immanent in the aesthetic constructions and theories inherited from the past is more direct than a straight-forward politicization, which, as often as not, is more conservative than its intention. After Hiroshima, the aesthetic vocabulary cannot be the same as that which echoed the storming of the Bastille. And in an age which may have less to do with the end of capitalism than with the end of nature, beauty and its concepts can only anticipate an improbable better future by remembering what the past repressed.

PICCONE'S FOURTH DIMENSION

By John DeBrizzi

After a reading of Paul Piccone's "The Crisis of One-Dimensionality," one suspects that it is the work of a man gone adrift in a fourth dimension or a twilight zone.[1] While it is certain that Piccone is beyond critical theory, it is not clear as to whether or not he is entirely beyond any form of Marxism. The reader has difficulty rendering such a judgment due to Piccone's failure to indicate just what aspects of Marxist analysis retain any utility.[2] Now, although Piccone may justifiably take critical theory to task for "the unwarranted retention of too much traditional Marxist baggage," it is just as debilitating to embark on an intellectual journey equipped merely with the clothes on one's back. This is evident in that Piccone's article is full of contradictions and needless, tortured analyses which do not extend our understanding of contemporary social dynamics beyond a level already attained. Such futile efforts might have been obviated had he employed even a basic Marxist analytic category as class.[3]

A class analysis seems more fruitful in coming to understand the social movements of the 1960s than does Piccone's considerations of them as manifestations of "artificial negativity." For Piccone the anti-war movement introduced the process of "artificial negativity" in that, "unable to translate its moralism into a qualitatively different form of social organization, it merely accelerated the shift to the new rationalized phase (of domination)..."[4] That is, the movement served as a link between the transitory and full monopoly phase of capitalist development in the United States. In the end, Piccone maintains that once this function was satisfied the New Left, in general, collapsed in the face of a fortified monopoly capitalist system.

What is more significant and useful to recognize, however, is that the anti-war and New Left movements were movements primarily attractive to middle class students. Despite much rhetoric to the contrary, these movements were from the beginning aimed at advancing the interests of middle class youth. In this regard it was no

1. See Paul Piccone, "The Crisis of One-Dimensionality," *Telos* 35 (Spring 1978), pp. 43-54.
2. Though C. Wright Mills was not always clear in terms of precisely where he stood, he did note that he found the general model of Marxist analysis to be useful time and again. See Mills, *The Marxist* (New York, 1962).
3. Piccone does not appear to think highly of class analysis for understanding contemporary events. See his contribution to "Symposium on Class," *Telos* 28 (Summer 1976).
4. Piccone, "The Crisis of One-Dimensionality," p. 48.

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accident that the most intense of the campus frenzy occurred at elite institutions at a time when the draft began to threaten the student population. Student groups and organizations did not raise voices in protest when plans for an all "volunteer" army were promulgated. In essence, the anti-war movement lost its steam when it became clear that the poor and minorities were to constitute the nation's first line of aggression—defense. Once this occurred all that remained of the New Left were isolated splinter groups (e.g., Weathermen) which became such precisely because they attempted to drag an essentially middle class movement into ostensibly non-middle class directions. This interpretation strikes me as more sensible and parsimonious as compared to that forthcoming from analysis evolving about such notions as the emergence of "artificial negativity." The latter concept appears to be more a device for rationalizing the failure to appreciate the true meaning of the movements of the 1960s in the first instance.

The superior utility of the more traditional class analysis is also evident should one focus on the movements among minorities in the 1960s. Contrary to Piccone's idea, the civil rights movement was at least a result of a rise of black militancy. Surely the black movement did receive an impetus from the 1954 court decision. However, black Americans were also discovering a new outlook as a result of the great migrations to the North during and after World War II. The emergence of the Black Panther Party and the Detroit Revolutionary Union Movement were but two, albeit unrepresentative, manifestations of this changed perspective among minorities.[5] Of course, both of these organizations were the victims of repression. Here, however, it is interesting to note that the repression visited upon such organizations was more severe than that experienced by middle class student groups.

While anomie and criminality may be a rule among minorities "in the age of artificial negativity" it is also the case that blacks and the poor in Newark, Bed-Stuy, and the South Bronx have at least some recognition that it is "the system" which has placed them in a concentration camp-like existence. It is, in part, for this reason that certain notorious black criminals are regarded as "primitive rebels" by some youth in minority communities. In this sense at least some rudimentary form of political consciousness has begun to develop in these areas to challenge the void produced by anomie.

The 1960s represented a period in which significant groups of middle class people began to chafe under the pressures of monopoly capital. In part, the problems and revolts in minority communities were a reaction to middle class attempts to foist more of the burden onto the shoulders of the lower classes. The middle class struggle to relieve the pressures exerted by monopoly capital began with the student revolt against the draft. It continues today in the guise of "proposition 13" and the so-called tax revolt. In terms of the latter it is instructive to note that most supporters of proposition 13 believed that they were voting to reduce government payments to welfare recipients and minorities. As was the case with the student movement, the middle class attempts to shift the burdens downward. But all this does not occur because monopoly capitalism has only now emerged fully in the United States. Why, then, all the anxiety and movement within the middle classes?[6]

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5. For a good consideration of the political and ideological difficulties encountered by D.R.U.M., see James Geschwender, *Class, Race and Worker Insurgency* (New York, 1977).

6. Indeed, the level of anxiety is increasing. Eighty-five percent of the families in the state of New Jersey cannot afford to buy their own homes. There seems to be a growing belief that the great American Dream has become but a fantasy.

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If American monopoly capital is as supreme and stable in the international arena as Piccone believes, there should be relative calm within middle America. After all, during the golden age of British capitalism (roughly 1840-1875) the middle classes rested secure and content as they perused the latest writings of Spencer. Today the American public reads "disaster" novels and attends "disaster" films. The fact is that American monopoly capital is in trouble. I do not intend to claim that American capitalism is in danger of imminent collapse. The point is simply that the tendency of capitalism in the United States is downward. From this viewpoint, then, Piccone's periodicization of American capitalism is obsolete already.

The golden age of American monopoly capitalism was in the 1950-1970 period. The present era marks the beginning of a long-run tendency toward decline. Thus, the middle class movements which began in the 1960s represented the initial manifestation of this shift and the reaction to an increase in the social pressures generated by a capitalist system in difficulty. The United States has not enjoyed the highest per capita GNP since the 1950s. Standards of living within a nation are determined by world market position. Market positions, in turn, are determined by industrial productivity. Since the early 1970s three nations have outstripped the United States with regard to productivity: Sweden is ahead by 11%, West Germany by 17%, and Japan by 25%.[7]

It would not be an exaggeration to indicate that the United States is currently suffering from a process of technological and industrial deterioration to such a severe extent that the industrial system, itself, is eroding at its base. Entire industries (many of them "basic") are collapsing into conditions of technical disrepair. The plight of the steel industry is but the most obvious example. More specific signs of deterioration are that American industry operates the world's oldest stock of metal-working machinery, railroad networks are decrepit, and the merchant fleet ranks a poor 23rd with regard to capacity and age.[8]

In sum, then, whereas the United States could reap the benefits of its world market position in the 1950-1970 period simply by sitting back and collecting its due, it may no longer do so today. The new competitors for economic hegemony, Japan and West Germany, are the products of American expansion during its golden age. Increasingly, the United States will find itself unable to compete with its progeny. Despite such adverse tendencies, American business has not experienced really severe setbacks to date. This, however, is due only to countervailing pressures exerted by business to maintain its earnings. The overly cumbersome concept of "artificial negativity" mentioned by Piccone is, at best, nothing but an expression of this basic fact. Thus, relevant to maintaining incomes derived from domestic activities, corporate taxes have decreased over the past 10 to 15 years (thus, the notion of "decentralized" government comes into vogue as a means of lessening a demand for federally financed services). The increased taxes placed on the middle class (especially in terms of greater state and local levies—hence the property tax revolt) were but one of the means to fund State functions once business balked at absorbing any losses due to the system's increasing inefficiencies and non-competitiveness.

Given these present tendencies it is difficult to take the following Piccone statement seriously: "All that is necessary today to safeguard international domination is trade and cultural imperialism. The struggle is no longer fought in the battlefields, but in

7. Lester Thurow, *Newsweek*, February 14, 1977, p. 11.
8. Seymour Melman, *Pentagon Capitalism* (New York, 1970), p. 3.

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the disproportionate confrontation between the American way of life and traditional cultures."[9] Sure! The problem, however, is that in an era when the U.S. will no longer be capable of competing economically with Japan, etc. in third world areas and reaping an automatic advantage vis-à-vis that nation, the option of gun boat diplomacy becomes more attractive. This situation is exacerbated to the extent that the Soviet Union, as a "sub-imperialist" agent of the U.S., also becomes interested in securing foreign markets (e.g., Africa).

As Piccone himself acknowledges, "Given the tendency of the system to overproduce and underconsume, the thrust toward economic crisis can be averted only by successfully disposing of the surplus and exporting the ecological problems generated by intensified production."[10] Despite Piccone's proclivities, there appears here a reliance on the rather traditional Bukharin-Lenin thesis of imperialism. The point to grasp is simple enough—with Japan, West Germany and the Soviet Union all interested in the same things, militancy, scrambling and confrontation are increased in likelihood. Unfortunately, Piccone is so enamored with his new concept that he overlooks this. In fact, Piccone's fetish for "artificial negativity" leads him toward quite opposite conclusions.

What is somewhat ironic is that Piccone sees hope for the future in Southern Europe. Again, there is an unacknowledged reliance on Lenin in that these nations represent, so to speak, the weakest links in the industrial chain of the world capitalist system. Yet, Piccone also warns against "the socialism resulting from Bolshevik-type revolutions."[11] Here, Piccone relies on the outdated assumption that Bolshevism inevitably leads to Stalinism. But scholars, today, increasingly question that assumption. It is coming to be accepted that not only was Stalinism a contingent development in the Soviet Union, but also that Bolshevism is not exhausted by the concept of Leninism.[12] Thus, here, too—in Piccone's reliance upon "Bolshevik" analyses while simultaneously warning against "Bolshevik-type" revolutions—one encounters a manifestation of thinking in the twilight zone. As was true in terms of his reliance on the concept of "artificial negativity," Piccone remains unclear to himself with regard to how much "Marxist baggage" is appropriate for the contemporary intellectual traveler. Though he may dislike bringing his Marxist luggage in through the lobby, in the end Piccone is forced to sneak some of it in by way of the back stairs.

It is the case that Piccone's difficulties can be traced to the fact that he has fallen victim to the arch-nemesis of clear and critical sociological thought—neologism. Unfortunately, Piccone has become so attached to his new concept of "artificial negativity" that he fails to recognize that it is wholly inadequate. It simply does not permit one to make much sense of past and present social and political-economic events.

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9. Piccone, "The Crisis of One-Dimensionality," p. 47.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 51.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 54.
12. For example, see Stephen Cohen, *Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution* (New York, 1973), and Robert Tucker, ed., *Stalinism. Essays in Historical Interpretation* (New York, 1977).

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DEBRIZZI'S UNDIMENSIONALITY

By Tim Luke and Paul Piccone

It is not surprising that Marxists find "artificial negativity" a bitter pill to swallow. It deals with Marxism in exactly the same way that Marxism has dealt with every other competing doctrine—with one important difference. In dialectically relativizing previous forms of thought as historically specific expressions of various forms of being, it carefully avoids the totalitarian cancer nesting within the Marxist dialectic by substituting it with a version of the Hegelian dialectic grounded in Husserlian phenomenology. And this is what DeBrizzi suspects is the "lingering" Marxist baggage in the analysis of artificial negativity. But Hegel and Husserl can hardly be considered Marxists, even though a phenomenologically grounded dialectic tends to come across bearing some resemblance to its Marxist counterpart. In a nutshell, the theses of "artificial negativity" result from this historicization of Marxism and from the realization that capitalism need not give rise to communism as its ultimate reconciliation. Thus, the trajectory of Western capitalism not only appears to be far from exhausted, but has possibilities that are systematically occluded by orthodox Marxist analyses attempting to superimpose obsolete categories on new historical phenomena.

A good example of this is the way Marxists seek to locate the New Left within a traditional historical framework. What results are two conflicting and equally implausible accounts: either the New Left is merely reduced to a birthpang of the "new working class" sired by the latest capitalist developments (Mallet, Aronowitz), or it is simply discarded as a middle-class aberration of no significant sociological import (Anderson, DeBrizzi). That it may indicate the end of traditional class politics following the collapse of base and superstructure in a newly totalized system of monopoly capital cannot even be entertained by Marxists. It would transform the New Left from a penultimate episode in that by now boring Marxist play whose culmination is the explosive revolutionary transformation into a catalytic phenomenon ushering in a new and sturdier phase of monopoly capitalism.

But the latter account seems to explain more effectively the new wave of anti-bureaucratic neo-conservatism and the New Left's absorption (and, therefore, disappearance) into the system as a new ambiguous critical consciousness seeking to regulate it so that it can function more effectively in a situation whose main destabilizing feature is the absence of this internal regulatory mechanism. Here, DeBrizzi's account of the New Left seems particularly crude. His "Marxist class analysis" reduces the rich diversity of the New Left—which counted among its ranks advocates of the drug culture, the folk and rock music phenomena, environmentalism and ecology, civil rights and pacificism, feminism, gay liberation, minority rights, citizens' action groups, communalism, socialism, and anarchism—to nothing but middle class college students' resistance to the Vietnam war. In fact, the larger impact of these various movements in the New Left amounted to an anti-bureaucratic revolt against the almost totally administered society.

The drug culture, the commune movement and radical feminism all have challenged the suburban nuclear family with its upwardly mobile work ethic, which creates pliable clients for the interventionist state and passive consumers for the culture industry. The folk and rock music phenomena directly have assaulted the post-

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World War II culture industry by driving many to reject the commodified culture of television sitcoms, the insipid Muzak of suburban malls, and the wholesome mindlessness of Hollywood's Doris Day movies. Environmentalism and ecologism systematically have reversed, at least in part, corporate and private abuse of nature, which is reflected now in more rational forms of housing construction, automobile technology, energy use, and the private consumption of goods. The civil rights, citizens' action, minority rights and feminist movements all have sought to check or challenge the increasingly irrational practices of bureaucratic experts who program policies for big business and big government.

The New Left was much more than a middle-class anti-war movement and it survives beyond Kent State, the FBI's dirty tricks, and the all-volunteer army by being "co-opted" to provide internal control for bureaucratic excesses. Thus, the Tom Haydesn, Sam Browns and Gloria Steinems of the 1960s *can* and *do* run for public office, manage government bureaucracies and set up alternative cultural outlets in the 1970s. And, by doing so, the remnants and survivors of the New left now are among the shock troops in the counter-offensive being mounted by large corporations and federal bureaucracies against their own over-regulation, extreme homogeneity and excessive intervention.

On the other hand, a Marxist account that sees the New Left as a phase of working class history cannot explain the *conservative* turn of the resulting critical consciousness (checkmating of the ERA, Proposition 13, new "right-to-work" legislation, etc.), while its counterpart that sees it as a middle-class phenomenon fails to explain the radical nature of new anti-bureaucratic sentiments. Although the artificial negativity account is so far a mere hypothesis, it seems to provide a much more satisfactory interpretation of the New Left as a phenomenon *sui generis* to be explained in terms of the exhaustion of the model of transition from entrepreneurial to monopoly capitalism. Although DeBrizzi's dismissal of the New Left may be more "parsimonious," it also happens to be utterly inadequate in accounting for the phenomenon in question and the aftermath.

The same can be said of DeBrizzi's ascription of radical political significance to the fact that blacks came to see the system as the source of their problems. This could have been entertained eight or ten years ago, when blacks' political demands had not yet been totally defused of any radical charge and successfully integrated in a fully corporatized welfare state, but it sounds ludicrous today. Of course, blacks naturally see the system as the source of their problems. Having been forcibly subjected for more than 40 years to a paternalistic system of debilitating dependence, it is not surprising that they should come to see that system as the *fons et origo malorum*. Yet, the fact that their demands remain entirely within the framework of the increasingly obsolete logic of the transition—DeBrizzi's "new outlook"—explains the disintegration of black militancy, the association of their corporate interests with the beleaguered welfare state, and their becoming a political rearguard frantically attempting to salvage a bankrupt liberal statist model. The Marxist science fiction account that dreams of black militancy as a moment in traditional working class struggles is rudely awakened by the stark fact that black corporate interests conflict with privileged traditional working class interests as shown by the success of Proposition 13. To identify Big Capital as the common enemy only reinforces the false consciousness of a non-existent growing homogenized opposition sharing the same program.

If *rigorous* Marxism is inadequate to make sense out of the present state of affairs, *sloppy* Marxism ends up projecting politically regressive conclusions. Thus, DeBrizzi

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talks about a "middle class" as if it were a legitimate Marxist or sociological category, contraposed to its similarly dubious counterpart, "the lower classes." Not only do these categories have no analytical value, but this way of posing the problem only confuses the issues by reducing them to simplistic and politically misleading confrontations.

Thus, a lower-class vs. middle-class lineup tends to identify the lower class with big government-statist interests, and the middle class with reactionary pre-New Deal ideologies. The present political scenario consequently assumes the guise of a massive resurgence of conservatism presumably as a result of a forced indirect austerity and a general decline of the system. Fortunately, such an ominous recycling of the tragic European course to Nazism and fascism is not applicable to the contemporary American scene.

DeBrizzi argues that the social pressures generated by constant crisis in the American capitalist system sparked middle-class protest and reaction in the 1960s and 1970s. In fact, it is the crisis of the New Deal state and the increasing strength of corporate capital's resistance to this state's counter-productive policies that one must recognize and comprehend. The fiscal policies and tax burdens attendant on buying butter for the Great Society and paying for the guns in Vietnam on top of the existing social programs of the New Deal and the military program of the Cold War provided the impetus that forced corporate capital abroad and government bureaucracies into a struggle with each other for fiscal resources.

Notwithstanding the dollar's recent decline, rising inflation, and other similarly threatening trends, if it is true that the system is undergoing a major internal restructuring, then they are only symptoms of a more fundamental quandary having to do with the eventual character of the full monopoly capital model. After all, the dollar's decline tends to solve the problem of the balance of payments with its OECD and OPEC trading partners, inflation solves the riddle of the national deficit and, although everyone is somehow affected by this, the causes are readily identifiable and potentially solvable. Both have to do largely with overconsumption of oil and can be contained by a strong internal economic policy emphasizing more mass transit and indirectly restricting oil consumption. It is only a matter of time before a stronger and more decisive administration comes along and implements a new and more adequate social and economic strategy.

These points obviously do not suggest that the post-World War II American world system is not in trouble. The problem, however, is that in a situation in which there is no viable alternative, crises tend to become therapeutic phases leading to the gradual strengthening of the entire system as its managers become increasingly adept at dealing with the scope and impact of economic, political and social crises. At this juncture, it is ridiculous to look to either West Germany, Japan, or even the Soviet Union as potential challengers to American hegemony. Clearly, the relative modernity of the West German and Japanese industrial plant and the shrewd aggressiveness of the German and Japanese export industries *vis-à-vis* the United States have improved their international power and prestige.

Yet, both West Germany and Japan must export to survive as a substantial percentage of their GNP is generated by foreign trade whereas the economic health of the United States remains far more dependent upon its own domestic economy. Furthermore, West Germany and Japan are the nations most closely interlocked through the multinational banks and transnational corporations with the American economy. Since President Jimmy Carter and Treasury Secretary W. Michael Blumenthal constantly summon German and Japanese officials to Washington in

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order to program guidelines on growth rates, export targets and import ceilings to coordinate all three nations' economies, it is difficult to see these nations challenging American world hegemony, at least for the time being. In addition, the West Germans are checked by East Germany and the USSR in the east, by English and French suspicions in the west, and by Eurocommunism in the south. Japan, on the other hand, with its lack of natural resources, remains dependent on growing foreign trade and American military power.

Similarly, the Soviet Union is so internally beleaguered and so internationally discredited that it is forced into an increasingly defensive stance. It is no accident that the Russians are drinking Pepsi and driving Fiats and that only historical backwaters like Afghanistan, Angola and Ethiopia, which even capitalism left undisturbed, are having "proletarian revolutions" these days. To believe, as DeBrizzi does, that the Soviet Union is shooting its way into the African marketplace in order to sell its goods there is an insult to the Africans' intelligence. The fact that the People's Republic of Angola has Gulf Oil pumping crude in Cabinda, Boeing Corp. organizing its airport and airline system, and International Harvester importing its tractors also illustrates the absurdity of this postulate.

DeBrizzi's Marxist science also suggests to him that the United States has not enjoyed the highest per capita GNP since the 1950s. This may or may not be true—depending on whose statistics one uses. Still, even if his statistics are correct, it does *not* mean that the American standard of living or quality of life has not been "the highest" since the 1950s. It simply means that the aggregate GNP of Kuwait or Abu Dhabi divided by their total population gives them a higher GNP per capita measure than the United States. Moreover, it is doubtful that "world market position," whatever DeBrizzi means by that, determines the standard of living in many nations. Canada, New Zealand, Australia, Denmark, Iceland and Switzerland or even Finland and Gabon have relatively high standards of living but hardly have a domineering presence in the "world market." Likewise, industrial productivity does not necessarily determine world market position or the quality of life—Denmark and New Zealand sell butter, ham and a lot of eggs in order to maintain their high living standards. Finally, Sweden, West Germany and Japan may or may not be surpassing the United States in industrial productivity. If they are, however, the extensive exploitation of "guest workers" in Sweden and West Germany, the more modern capital plant of West Germany, and the relatively lower standard of living among Japanese workers can be cited—instead of *Newsweek* statistics—to account for a major part of these trends.

The total collapse of American industry is likewise overstated by DeBrizzi. Surely, some of the capital-intensive, goods-exporting industries such as US Steel, the Penn Central or Zenith television are suffering losses and losing markets. At the same time, however, the knowledge-intensive, technology-exporting industries such as Exxon, IBM, Texas Instruments or United Technologies are continually making gains and establishing new markets. And, in doing so, these new agents of transnational capital are providing another source of negativity and otherness in the post-transition period as their transnational policies and corporate goals contradict and conflict with those of both their home and host countries. One need only re-examine the corporate public relations campaign against the regulatory interventions of the federal government in corporate and private affairs in the United States to see how corporate negativity has been operating.

All of this appears at first sight as an extremely pessimistic outlook. Yet, a closer examination reveals a very different picture. In destroying any meaningful opposition,

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capital finds itself confronted with the need to reproduce it internally in order to regulate itself and, at the same time, it implicitly assumes the emancipatory task previously upheld by the now defunct external opposition. Thus, capital itself must today begin to reconstitute that individuality which it so successfully destroyed during the transition period to accommodate the requirements of monopoly capitalism. The intrinsic unresolved ambiguity there is that, although such a reconstitution guarantees a more efficient functioning of the system, it also creates the conditions within which new alternatives can be developed. When all is said and done, without a minimum of individuality no project of radical transformation can even be envisioned.

Where does this leave more or less traditional Marxists such as DeBrizzi? In the rare moments when their theories touch on concrete politics, they end up as indirect apologists for that big government—rationalized to be sure—which is presently under attack not only from below but also from above. To the extent that their model is that of the transition, thus historically specific and already obsolete, Marxists find themselves fighting losing rearguard actions of no importance. Waiting for the final crisis that never comes, they end up as crusty liberals fighting for a past that they confuse with the future. "Artificial negativity" may still be vague and in need of elaboration, as contraposed to the clarity of the traditional Marxist account. This clarity, however, leaves no doubt as to its ultimate political profile: that of the left-wing of liberalism, which was long since exhausted.

INTRODUCTION TO THE LUXEMBURG—JOGICHES CORRESPONDENCE

By David Gross

The best way to learn what a person was like, as compared to what he or she merely thought, is to consult a good biography. In this respect, Rosa Luxemburg was luckier than many on the Left in having two or three excellent biographers who provide perceptive insights into her character. Still, a balanced biography can only reveal so much; its main purpose is to explain an individual's accomplishments, not to explore the configurations of a personality for its own sake. consequently, most of the idiosyncratic, apparently meaningless, details that the biographer encounters in his research, are not passed on to the reader. In order to truly grasp the personality of an individual untouched and untampered with, letters are sometimes much more helpful. If they are written with openness and vulnerability—instead of being carefully "composed" with an eye to posterity (as, for example, Thomas Mann's letters were)—they can express qualities of soul and character that cannot be garnered from other kinds of documents. Rosa Luxemburg wrote letters in this way—spontaneously, often in white heat, and with no thought of how they would be received by future generations. For this reason, there is a naturalness and warmth in them, almost as if she were not writing but speaking intimately and with animation to her correspondent.

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1. The selection of letters included here is excerpted from the forthcoming book, *Letters to a Lover: Rosa Luxemburg to Leo Jogiches*, translation and introduction by Elzbieta Ettinger (MIT Press).

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These qualities come out particularly in the (previously untranslated) letters she wrote to her lover and confidant, Leo Jogiches. Jogiches, like Luxemburg, was a Polish revolutionary who was radicalized in his teens, and was later compelled to go into exile in Switzerland. Rosa's affection for him notwithstanding, Jogiches was, by all accounts, a moody and difficult person (as some of the letters below indicate). To most of his colleagues on the Left, he seemed aloof, arrogant, and manipulative—and not without reason. As a revolutionary, Jogiches preferred to operate by clandestine and conspiratorial means, feeling more comfortable with behind-the-scenes activities than in public political engagement. He also had a strong streak of authoritarianism in his character, and could at times be bullying and insensitive. (In fact, it has been said that Jogiches caused ruptures and movements of dissention within the ranks of the SDKP simply because of his abrasive personality.) Likewise, there was something almost inhumanly ascetic about him which Rosa Luxemburg was constantly trying to modify or dispell altogether. Unlike her, Jogiches seemed easily willing to subordinate his own private interests, even his personality, to the cause of revolution. To Rosa, this appeared too severe a sacrifice—and also a misplaced understanding of what a revolution was all about in the first place. In so many ways, Jogiches was driven, in both his personal and political relationships, to control, guide, and dominate others. This, ironically, seems to have been one of the sources of Rosa's early attraction to him, but later it was also one of the reasons she felt compelled to break from him. Eventually his possessive attitudes toward her conflicted with her own urge for freedom and independence, and the relationship was unable to endure the tension of these conflicting forces.

Luxemburg met and fell in love with Jogiches when they were both in exile in Zurich. She was twenty and somewhat unsure of herself; he was twenty-three, and a more practiced and self-confident revolutionary. In cooperation with a few others they formed, in 1893, the first important Polish Marxist Party, the Social Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland (SDKP), which was later reorganized as the Social Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania (SDKPIL). From this point in their lives, and over the course of the next fourteen years, their personal trajectories varied greatly, adding additional strains to their relationship. Rosa, for example, moved from one success to another until she became a major figure in the theoretical debates within the Second International. Leo, by contrast, felt increasingly alienated and ineffective. As an exile in Switzerland, he was unable to operate to his best advantage as he would have in Poland. The inactivity, the lack of opportunity for covert action, the "boredom" of merely theoretical discussions, weighed on him and slowly incapacitated him. (Both Jogiches and Luxemburg were ostensibly students enrolled at the University of Zurich in the 1890s, but whereas Rosa finished her Doctor of Law studies with a brilliant dissertation on *The Industrial Development of Poland* (published 1898), Leo failed to get a degree after ten years of work.)

By 1907, when Luxemburg was nearly at the height of her fame, the ties between them broke. There were undoubtedly many reasons for this, but one was certainly sexual jealousy. Reacting to an apparent indiscretion of Jogiches' part, Rosa rebounded by taking a lover of her own in the person of Konstantin Zetkin (the twenty-two year old son of her friend Clara Zetkin) who gave her the attention and admiration she did not get from Jogiches. Though Rosa and Leo continued to write each other after this, their relationship was almost purely formal, having mainly to do with party business, money matters, and the like. The coolness of their letters after 1907 contrasts sharply with the emotional tone of their earlier correspondence. No

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affectionate terms were used between them, and the letters were usually written impersonally, without salutation and without signature (see the last three letters below). Their written communication ended in 1914, but curiously, in the years that followed, the two drew somewhat closer to each other since Luxemburg was imprisoned during most of the war, and Jogiches found himself doing necessary things for her on the outside. From November 1918, when she was released from jail, until her death in January, 1919, their friendship became still closer. The last two months of Jogiches' life were spent pursuing Rosa's murderers, until he too was assassinated in March, 1919.

The Luxemburg letters included here are selected from the nearly one thousand letters she wrote to Jogiches between 1893-1914. (None of his to her survive.) What is most noticeable about them is the humanity and passionate involvement with life which they reflect. Luxemburg was a person of enormous energy and compassion; she was rarely demoralized, even in the worst of times. Her liveliness and vitality constantly come through in these letters, but so do certain other tendencies, e.g., a capacity to be petty on occasion, and too easily hurt or offended by misunderstandings. It will probably seem to many readers that her everyday concerns were surprisingly ordinary, and that she held on to a number of "bourgeois attitudes" which were not sufficiently thought through or analyzed. At times, the private seems sharply (and intentionally) separated from the public rather than, as we like to imagine with exceptional individuals, integrally and successfully fused with it. This, however, should not be the cause of *Schadenfreude* on our part. Rather, it should only serve to make clear how difficult it is to live a life well, with wholeness and integration, with work *and* with love.

[Paris] Sunday 3:30 p.m. [March 25, 1898]

My Dear! I've been very angry with you. I must bring up some ugly things you did. I was so hurt that I decided not to write at all for the rest of my stay here. But emotion took over. This is what I hold against you:

1. Your letters contain *nothing but nothing* except for *The Workers' Cause,*[2] criticism of what I have done and instructions about what I should do. If you answer indignantly that you never fail to say plenty of warm words in your letters to me, let me tell you that *sweet talk* is not what I want. You can have it. I want you to write me about your personal life. But not a single word! Our only tie is the "Cause" and the memory of old feelings. This is very painful. I realized it here with particular clarity. When I sat down to catch my breath, totally exhausted by the neverending Cause, I looked back and realized I don't have a home anywhere. I neither exist nor live as myself. In Zurich the same, or rather still more annoying, editorial work. I don't want to stay here or go back to Zurich. Don't tell me I can't stand the never ending work, that all I want is some rest. No, no, I can stand twice as much; what I can't stand is that wherever I turn there's only one thing—"The Cause." It's boring, draining. Why should everybody pester me when I give to it all I can? It's a burden—every letter, from you or anyone else, always the same—this issue, that pamphlet, this article or that. Even that I wouldn't mind if *beside, despite* it there were a *human being* behind it, a soul, an individual. But for you there's nothing, nothing but "The Cause." Have you had no experiences all this time? No ideas? No books? No impressions? Nothing to

2. *The Workers' Cause* (*Sprawa Robotnicza*), a secret party organ of the Social Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland in 1894-1896, printed in Paris and smuggled into Russian-annexed Poland. Luxemburg was editor-in-chief from 1894.

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share with me?! Possibly you'd like to ask me the same questions? Why, unlike you, I have impressions and ideas all the time, the "Cause" notwithstanding. But with whom am I supposed to share them? With you? Oh, no, I've too much self-respect. Rather I'd share them with Heinrich, with Mitek [Hartman][3] with Warski,[4] but alas, I don't love them and don't feel like doing it. I do love you but—I suppose I'm repeating myself.

It's not true that now you're pressed for time. There's always something to talk about and time to write. It all depends on one's attitude. Here's a typical example for you—and my second objection. Let's say that you indeed live only by our and your cause. Just take the Russian cause. Did you write me a single word about it? What's going on, what's being published, how are the fellows in Zurich? No, it didn't occur to you to write me anything about it. I know nothing special has happened, still one writes about small unimportant things to someone close. But you think that for me it'll do to scribble articles for [*The Workers'*] *Cause* and to follow your "modest opinions" to the dot.

Very Characteristic.

3. Another example. Hein[rich] went to Zurich. As I learned from his letter he told you about the whole affair and he discussed it with you, and you *insisted* on changes in the organizational relatons between [*The Workers'*] *Cause* and the Party. Without telling me a word? Without my opinion? Without telling me anything you make and *push* your decisions? At least H[einrich] was honest enough to write and ask for my opinion. You never did.

4. I found out from Brzez[ina's][5] letter that he instructed Heinrich to tell me about the situation on the frontier. Of course Heinrich informed you at once, but you didn't tell me a word. I'm sitting here, rushing the work, shipping the paper, *with no idea* whether there is any frontier, whether and how much of it will reach its destination, how soon, who's doing what—Brz[ezina] or Hein[rich]. All this is regarded as information I can live without.

Your magnanimous advice not to *bother* about practical matters, they'll be taken care of without me, could only be given by somebody who *doesn't know me at all.* Such advice, "Don't bother, your nerves are too weak," would just do for Marchlewski.[6] For me such an attitude (even with the "sweetheart" thrown in) is insulting, to say the least. On top of it your directions are as frequent as they are crude: with Warski do this or that, at Lavrov's[7] behave in such and such a way, stick to this or to that. In the end one gets an intense sense of distaste, weariness, fatigue and impatience which overcomes me when I have time to think. I'm telling you this not because I bear you a grudge. I can't *demand* that you be what you are not. I'm writing partly because I still have the stupid habit of telling you what I feel, and partly because I want you to be

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3. Wladyslaw Heinrich and Mieczyslaw Hartman, Poles studying in Zurich, closely connected with the SDKP.

4. Adolf Warszawski-Warski (1868-1937), a leading organizer of the Polish workers movement, co-founder of the SKDP and the SDKPiL, and in 1918 of the Polish Communist Party. Perished in Stalin's purges; rehabilitated in 1956. In her letters, Luxemburg refers to one and the same person by the first or last name, initials, diminutives, etc. For the sake of clarity, the last name only is used in the translation.

5. Karol Brzezina, a go-between, smuggling *The Workers Cause* to Poland.

6. Julian Marchlewski (1866-1925), economist, journalist, active in the Polish and international workers movement; co-founder of the SDKPiL, and in 1919 co-organizer of the Communist International.

7. Piotr Lavrov (1823-1900), Russian emigrant, leading theorist of the Russian Populists (*Narodniki*).

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aware of what's going on between us....

...I must stop, it's getting late for the mail. You don't consider it necessary to send me some newspapers, do you? You know well that the French newspapers print nothing but Parisian trivialities. I've no idea what's going on in Germany and in Austria. Strange, it shouldn't come to your mind. Is Anna still in bed, isn't she any better? I'd certainly have written to her but *have no time*. Did you get the (400) issues? Did you get the pamphlet and what's wrong with it?

How large should the edition of the February issue be [of *The Workers' Cause*]? Where and how many copies should be sent?

What's the matter with the German proclamation, it is *urgent*! And what about the Polish, there's no way I can do it.

I mailed the brochure to Krichevsky. Did he like it? Did Anna?

Shipped off 2000 brouchures to Munich. What do you want me to do with the remainder?

Had a letter from Mozhdzh[ensky]; it probably won't work.

"Read my letter carefully" and answer *all* questions.

[Berlin] July 2, 1898

Dyodyu, you silly, I'm up to my ears in Bernstein, and you ask "do I love you?" In short, yes, yes, yes. I do love you, yes, "with a little passion" too. You'll hear from me for that "little," you just wait. You're lucky you aren't within my reach.

Thanks for the money—it came today. Paid Auer back right away. Humblot's silent, obviously printing. Didn't get the money from Jozio yet. Your fears about my [German] language are absolute nonsense, you find errors in perfectly acceptable idiomatic expressions. I asked Sch[önlank] to correct my German; wait and see, he won't change a thing.

Tomorrow I'll get my article and will send it to you at once; you'll like it better when you see it in print. Sch[önlank] wrote back immediately reminding me *Hamlet* was stout. I answered briefly, in my former tone, that though I don't know if he can argue like the Prince, I've no doubt he equals him in fencing.

Now, most important—Bern[stein]. Although I've a good idea about the whole article, I don't feel any better because I also see enormous difficulties. I worked out an excellent outline. There are two difficult problems: 1. to write about crises; 2. to prove beyond doubt that capitalism must break its neck; it is *indispensable* to prove it, but this means writing a new, concise argument for scientific socialism. Help, for heaven's sake, help! *Speed's* essential because: 1. if somebody gets ahead of us the entire work is wasted; 2. polishing requires plenty of time. We started out very well. The pieces I wrote in Zurich are the dough (half-baked, of course) we need; if only I knew *what* to write the form would take shape then and there, I feel it in my bones. I want it so badly, I'd give half my life for that article...

But mail *Neue Zeit*, for heaven's sake! I've no idea what they're saying!

Another request. In Zurich I put aside the [Russian] *Financial News*, some torn out pages with the numbers marked in pencil, all stuff about crises in America and cartels. I've no idea where I put the pile, but I'd like to have it. The issues: No. 22, 1897, on the oiltrust; an article in the same issue about the steel cartel in Austria; No. 42, 1893, about the same Oiltrust; No. 52, 1893, about the crisis in America; No. 13, 1895, on the same. If you find it, take a look at it and send it right away, will you?

Do write to Warski, my dearest treasure, I swear to god, I *cannot*. I didn't go to Leipzig. Parvus and I keep inviting one another, to no avail. I get *Säch[ische*

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Arbeiterzeitung].

Kiss you on the mouth.
Roza.

Would my dearest boy by good and send me my books?! Mommsen too, please.

[Berlin] March 6, 1899

My dear, beloved Dyodyo! A thousand kisses for your dearest letter and the birthday present even though it hasn't come yet.[8] This year presents shower on me. It's a real horn of plenty. Just imagine—a 14 volume deluxe edition of Goethe from the Schönlands. With your books it makes a whole library. My landlady will have to give me another book shelf. You can't imagine how happy your present made me. Rodbertus is my *favorite* economist. I can read him over and over again for sheer intellectual pleasure. I feel it's not a book I got but an *estate*, a house or a piece of land. As soon as all our books are here we'll have an impressive library, and when we finally settle down together we must buy a glass enclosed bookcase.

My golden, my dearest, how you delighted me with your letter. I kept reading and rereading it from beginning to end. At least six times. So, you are really pleased with me! You write that maybe, deep down, I know there is a man named Dyodyo who belongs to me! And you, don't you know that everything I do is with *you* in mind. Always. When I write an article my first thought is, you'll have fun with it. And on days when I doubt my strength and can't work, one thought nags me, how will it affect you? Will I be letting you down? Disappointing you? Proof of success, like this letter from Kautsky, I see only as moral support for *you*. I *give you my word*, cross my heart, that I *myself* don't care about Kautsky's letter. I was ecstatic about it because I read it with your eyes and felt your pleasure. So, I'm waiting impatiently for your response. (It will probably come tomorrow with the books, a double pleasure.)

I only need one thing for my inner peace: to see *your* life and our relationship settled. Soon I'll have such a strong moral position here that we'll be able to live quietly together, openly, as husband and wife! I know you understand, I'm happy your citizenship is at last almost settled and your doctorate near completion.[9] I sensed in your last letters your excellent mood to work. In fact, during the Schippel campaign your letters stimulated my thinking day by day, and in your last letter you gave me an entire piece for my article which stands out like a jewel—the piece about the effects of the "relief" on workers I translated word for word from your letter.[10]

Don't you know I see and appreciate that at the "sound of a trumpet" you are at my side at once, supportive, encouraging me to work, the scoldings and my "negligence" all forgotten! . . You can hardly imagine with what joy and impatience I wait for every letter from you. I know that each will bring me strength and joy, support and encouragement to go on.

I felt happiest about the part of your letter in which you wrote that we are both still young and able to arrange our personal life. Oh, Dyodyo, my golden one, if only you kept your promise! . . . Our own small apartment, our own nice furniture, our own

8. March 5 was Luxemburg's 29th birthday.

9. Jogiches never obtained the doctorate.

10. Luxemburg's series of articles, "Militia and Militarism," published in *Leipziger Volkszeitung* in February 1899, disputed Schippel's "crusade. . . in favor of the present military system." She wrote: "for capital, militarism is one of the most important forms of investment; from the point of view of capital, militarism is indeed a *relief*. . ." [but not "from the point of view of workers."]

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library; quiet and regular work, walks together, an opera from time to time, a small, *very* small, circle of friends, who can sometimes be invited for dinner; every year a summer vacation in the country, one month with absolutely no work! . . . And perhaps even a little, a very little, baby? Will this never be allowed? Never? Dyodyo, do you know what all of a sudden possessed me during a walk in Tiergarten? Without any exaggeration! All of a sudden a little child got under my feet, three or four years old, blond, in a pretty little dress, and staring at me. A compulsion swelled in me to kidnap the child, to dash home with him, and keep him for my own. Oh, Dyodyo, won't I ever have my own baby?

And we will never fight at home, will we? Our home must be quiet and peaceful, like everybody else's. But, you know, what does worry me—somehow I feel so old and homely. You won't have a handsome wife to take out for a walk in Tiergarten. —We'll keep away from the Germans. Despite Kautsky's invitations I'll keep to myself, let *them* curry my favors and let them see how little I care.

Dyodyo, if only you settled your citizenship, finished your doctorate, lived with me openly in our own home, and we *both* worked, our life would be *perfect*! ! No couple on earth has the chance we have. With just a little goodwill we will be happy, we must. Weren't we happy when just the two of us lived and worked together for long stretches of time? Remember Weggis? Melide? Bough? Lonay? Remember, when we are alone together in harmony, we can do without the whole world? More, I'm afraid then of the least intrusion. Remember, last time in Weggis, when I was writing "Step by Step" (I always think with pride about that little masterpiece!), I was sick, writing in bed, all upset, and you were so gentle, so good, sweet. You soothed me saying in that warm voice of yours which I still hear: "Now, now, calm down, *everything will be fine.*" I will *never* forget it.[11] Or, do you remember, the afternoons at Milide, after lunch, when you sat on the porch, drinking black thick coffee, sweating in the scorching sun, and I trudged down to the garden with my "Administrative Theory" notes. Or, do you remember, how once a band of musicians came on a Sunday to the garden, and they wouldn't let us sit in peace, and we went on foot to Maroggia and came back on foot, and the moon was rising over San Salvadore, and we had just been talking about my going to Germany. We stopped, held each other on the road in the darkness and looked at the crescent moon over the mountain. Do you remember? I still smell that night's air. Or, do you remember, how you used to come back from Lugano at 8:20 at night, with the groceries; I ran downstairs with a lamp and we carried the bags upstairs together; then I unpacked them and put the oranges, the cheeses, salami, the cake on the table. Oh, you know, probably we have never had such magnificent dinners as those, on the little table in that bare room, the door to the porch open, the fragrance of the garden sweeping in, and you, with great finesse, scrambling eggs in a pan. And from afar in the darkness the train to Milano was flying over the bridge, thundering. . .

Oh, Dyodyo, Dyodyo! Hurry up, come here, we'll hide from the whole world, the two of us in two little rooms, we'll work alone, cook alone, and we'll have good, such a good life! . . . Remember you said: "there are no other hands like yours, delicate hands."

Dyodyo dearest, I throw my arms around your neck and kiss you a thousand times. I want you, I often do, to lift me in your arms. But you always make excuses that I'm too heavy.

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11. More memories of her Swiss vacations with Jogiches appear in other letters.

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I don't want to write about business today. Tomorrow, after seeing Kautsky. I'll go without the article because I'm waiting for your letter.

I hug you and kiss you on the mouth and on my darlingest nose and absolutely want you to carry me in your arms.

Yours Roza.

[Berlin] April 19, 1899

Dyodyo! Finally I've got a free minute—I sent out the proofs and am exhausted—too tired to sleep. I have to write you now. For a long time I've wanted, actually needed to tell you something but there hasn't been a second! !

Do you know what I've been feeling very strongly? Something is moving inside me and wants to come out. It's something intellectual, something I must write. don't worry, it's not poetry again or fiction. No, my treasure, it's in my brain that I feel something. I feel I haven't used a tenth or a hundredth part of my powers. I'm not happy with what I've been writing and absolutely and clearly know I can do much better work. In other words, as Heinrich says, I need to "say something important."

It's the *form* of my writing that no longer satisfied me. In my "soul" a totally new, original form is ripening which ignores all rules and conventions. It breaks them by the power of ideas and strong conviction. I want to affect people like a clap of thunder, to inflame their minds not by speechifying but with the breadth of my vision, the strength of my conviction and the power of my expression.

How? what? where? I still don't know.

Laugh to your heart's content, it leaves me cold. I'm convinced that something is stirring inside me, something is being born. You're probably saying: "A great mountain goes into labor and a silly mouse is born." Never mind. We'll see.

I've been thinking again tonight about *your* situation, how and what to do? I'd give anything in the world, half of my life to have it all settled. Oh, Dyodyo!

Write to me *every day*. I made a decision: to write to you daily, time permitting, even if it's only a line or two. It's a dreadful mess that neither of us has word of the other for *several* days.

My darling Dyodyuchny, I imagined you today awakened by a special delivery letter, crawling out of bed, cautiously sticking out your sleepy, blond disheveled head through the crack in the door, a silly look on your mug, and I was sorry it wasn't me standing at the door so I could plant a kiss on that silly nose—so hard it hurts.

Rozia.

Liepzig got 600 copies of "Social Reform or Revolution" already. 3000 will sell quickly, and I'll request royalties for the second edition.

I wrote back to Warski a long time ago and to the "Warsaw Library" as well.

[Berlin, c.] January 22, 1900

My dear Dyodyu! I wanted to write you a long letter but again I got news from Father which left me drained—I can deal with urgent matters only!

Let me explain about the job at Kautsky's; it involves sharing the editorship with him: editing a part of the manuscripts, maintaining contact with the contributors, writing "Notes," if no one else does, and occasionally writing book reviews. Writing articles is not included. Working hours: morning till noon, 3-4 times a week.

The job is not that of a private secretary to Kautsky—but of the editor of *Neue Zeit*, who is not being hired personally by Kautsky but by J.H.W. Dietz [12] (GmbH), i.e.,

12. J.H.W. Dietz, active in the SPD, owner of a publishing house in Stüttgart.

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by Dietz, Singer and Bebel.

I mentioned it to Kautsky noncommittally and he was very pleased; he immediately talked to Dietz and Bebel. Bebel said he could imagine no one better than me for *Neue Zeit*. Dietz likewise. There's one problem—they must find another job for Cunow,[13] and are still looking for it. Cunow's salary was 200 m. monthly but Dietz wanted to cut it. I told Kautsky I wouldn't take a lower salary than Cunow.

Now in view of Father's condition, I want this job badly, but where the hell can one find a position for Cunow?

As to our plans, of course we must live together in Berlin. I didn't start thinking about this question after you had reminded me; I have been thinking about it for a long, long time.

You write that the part-time job with Kautsky is something unusual. You're wrong. I had almost gotten a job at Hayman's library, 2 hours a day, 180 m. monthly, but it turned out they needed a professional librarian. In a big city, and when one makes an effort and has some connections, part-time jobs are available, and it's clear that we cannot manage without an additional income.

You think that my plans to earn money threaten my scholarly and political future. You're wrong. I'd need more time to explain; anyhow it isn't all that bad. I, for one, follow the principle: people's *primary* concern is to support themselves and their children or their parents, *and next* to think of becoming great scholars. Besides—*sind's Rosen, nun sie werden blühen* [if these are real roses, they'll bloom.] No genuine talent ever flourished just because it devoted *all* it's time to self-development.

As to *what* arrangements should be made here all I know is that furnished rooms scare me out of my wits. There is time, I suppose, to talk about details, meantime I'd like to know *when* you're coming?

A propos, the job at Kautsky's includes one month of summer vacations, or two, or three, as I please, as long as I don't leave at the *same time* as Kautsky; we'll work it out.

My connections already proved a bit helpful to the "Polish cause."[14] A few weeks ago Kautsky received an article about Poland from Plochocki and asked me what I think of Plochocki. He wanted to know how I'd react if he published it. Naturally I politely let him know and the article vanished. I hope it won't be published. Send Struve back, *soon*.

Affectionate kisses.
Roza.

[Berlin] April 24, 1900

Dyodyu, my dear! Your letter came just in time, just as I was desperately trying to figure out when this turmoil between us would end.

To explain my recent attitude and behavior let me tell you briefly: what has been going on between us of late—especially my visit to Zurich—has led me to believe that you. . . stopped loving me, that you might even be involved with someone else, that I was no longer the one who could make you happy, if to make you happy is possible at all.

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13. Heinrich Cunow, sociologist, journalist, member of the SPD, eventually turned revisionist.
14. Luxemburg meant it ironically. Plochocki was a co-founder of the PPS and its leading publicist, standing for Poland's independence and subsequently in opposition to the SDKPiL and Luxemburg herself.

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This thought struck me that night when I was lying on the sofa at [Clara] Zetkin's. I couldn't sleep—thoughts kept crowding in on me. Then, suddenly everything was crystal-clear—your reluctance to come to Berlin, your recent behavior—in the light of *this* fact it became understandable and, so help me god, I breathed freely. I felt like someone who after endless riddles, tangles, jumbles and confusion, at last finds the clear thought the most painful answer to *all* questions. At once I decided to make the parting easier for you. I'd stop writing to you so I wouldn't influence your mood or create new ties. I kept telling myself this was the solution: if he loves me and wants us to live together he'll come, if not—he can take advantage of the break in our correspondence and slowly detach himself, and let the relationship "dissolve."

So, I started to live in complete solitude, knowing that I am, and always will be, alone. It made me feel slightly cold but proud, too. How many times have I watched other people being together, how many times have I felt the beauty of being alive in the spring—I watched it all knowing you'd never find anyone with whom you could live *the life* that you can live with me and, inadvertently, I would begin to weave new plans and hopes. Yet each time a single, simple thought would sneak in: *he* is already living a different life, you have nothing to give *him*—this thought was enough to sweep the mirages away and send me back to my work with clenched teeth.

Judging by your letter it seems that—that I was wrong (I too am incapable of spelling out certain words) and that there's a foundation and a hope for our relationship. But are you sure of yourself? Are you fully aware of what's going on within you? Isn't it inertia? Dyodyu! . . .

But if everything is all right don't tell me what happened or why, just tell me when and how we're going to arrange our life. This is urgent for many reasons.

Now briefly about other things. Dyodyu, my dear, if I "pushed" you out of my affairs it was *only* because I felt guilty about burdening you with the Polish work. I told myself if I didn't stop doing that I'd ruin you forever—and only out of plain egoism. Remember how often you've told me that in order to keep our relationship normal you must know I can get along without you?! Well, I did everything I could to manage by myself, to free you from me. And you took it for "pushing out?". . . If only you knew how hard it is for me to have no one to give me advice, no one to lean on or share my doubts with. But I suppressed this feeling thinking I shouldn't drag you into my affairs—it would be deadly for you. If you only wanted, how delightfully we could work and live together! There's plenty of work and I can't handle even one tenth of it all by myself.

Now in addition to the German work I have the Polish work too. It's impossible to describe the meeting,[15] I must tell you about it. For two whole days there was a fight against me. I dominated the whole meeting and finally they put themselves into my hands. Since at the editor's request, I wrote the report for *Vorwärts* covering the second day I could hardly advertise myself and besides I didn't want to provoke the losers. In effect—complete victory on all fronts; I even won over the most implacable enemies. This caused a virtual panic in the intelligentsia wing of the PPS [Polish Socialist Party]. They're already trying to distort events—this is evident from the article in *The Workers' Journal* which I'm enclosing (send it back *at once*). My answer will appear in the next issue.

My review of Schuller's book will appear in *Neue Zeit*. I was honored twice: 1.

15. The Fifth Congress of the Polish Socialist Party (PPS) in German-annexed Poland, held in Berlin.

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Kautsky gave me the French translation of his work against Bernstein and inscribed it to: *Meiner lieben Freundin* R...L...—K...K...; 2. he asked if I'd agree to edit Marx's manuscripts in case Marx's legacy contains more manuscripts than just the fourth volume of *Das Kapital*. Of course, I agreed. In a few days he's going to Paris to take the legacy over from Lafargue.

I haven't written much for the *Leipziger Volkszeitung*, first there was the Poznan trip, then my illness (I was laid up for a week), then this meeting. I just sent off the third article, am finishing the fourth and with the fee from the *Neue Zeit* will balance my budget.

The other day in Poznan was a success: I wrecked a catholic meeting and spoke at three meetings—shoemakers, tailors and a party meeting. [...]

I go to Kautsky rarely and stay shortly, more often he comes to my place. They bore me to tears. In general, mankind makes me want to throw up, and you, you wicked, mean creature, make my heart ache.

When will you stop dawdling in Switzerland?!

Kiss you on the mouth!

Yours, R.

The news from my family is painful but let's not talk about it.

[Berlin] Monday, April 30, 1900

Dyodyu, my dear! [...] Yes, you are quite right. We've been living separate spiritual lives for a long time. But it didn't start in Berlin. Even in Zurich we were spiritual strangers—the loneliness of these last two years is engraved on my mind. But *I* was not the one who withdrew, who shut myself off. Exactly the opposite. You ask if I've ever asked myself how *you* live, what's happening within *you*? All I can do is smile bitterly. Yes, I did ask. I asked myself thousands of times; and I asked *you*. Again and again. Loudly, insistently. I always got the same answer—that I don't understand you, that you can't count on me, that I have nothing to give. Finally I stopped asking and never showed that I was conscious of or interested in anything. Now you ask how I could ever think you were attracted to another woman; you say no woman but me is capable of responding to you, of understanding you. Exactly what I told myself. In the past.

You have forgotten, haven't you, that you kept repeating over and over again that I too don't understand you, that you feel utterly lonely with me as well. Then what's the difference? *This* realization brought home to me that I don't exist for you anymore. So, my reaction to the same doubts was different in 1893? Of course it was. I've changed since then. I was a mere child, now I am an adult, a mature person perfectly in control of myself, capable of gritting my teeth in pain, of showing nothing, absolutely nothing. But you, no matter what, refuse to believe that I have changed, that I am not the same person I was eight years ago.

One more thing. You persistently ask how I can write off our relationship so casually. The "casually" I don't want to discuss. How did I manage to do it? Here's the secret: my last visit to Zurich left me with no shade of doubt that you've grown utterly blind to my inner self, that all I am for you is a such and such, perhaps different from other women in that she writes articles. Here in Berlin I constantly see *the kind of women* men live with; how those men worship them and yield to their domination, and all the time, in the back of my mind, I am aware of the way you treat me. After a long time I finally understood that you had lost all sensitivity to me, to my inner self. Indeed, you have even lost all memory of it. This, more than anything else, made me

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acutely and painfully aware that deep inside you had grown cold.

You ask if I *want* to renew our common spiritual life? The answer is clear, but remember, its realization depends on *you*. It is impossible to build a *common* spiritual life if we continue to live as we do. An agreement between us is possible only if you get rid of your mistrust; you must believe that I'm capable of understanding you and that I do care about your inner life.

There are so many, many things I want to tell you, but god knows, I don't have the strength to write. Once you are here, once we start living at last, we'll tell each other everything. But perhaps then words won't be necessary.

I'll write to Forrer one of these days, the divorce drags on and on. Considering future arrangements, why not go back to the original plan: settle in the South for half a year. Here it's impossible to live openly together and short of that our life will turn into a caricature I fear more than loneliness. We need peace in order to live, and we cannot find it hiding. Think about it. How are things with Anna? I haven't written to her, you know why.

Hundred kisses.
R.

[Berlin] Friday evening, May 25, 1900

Dyodyunka, my love!

[. . .] Kautsky keeps pressing me for articles for *Neue Zeit*, and I'm getting sick of it. N.B. the day before yesterday, they invited me for dinner again, and he took the opportunity to ask if I'd help him work on Marx's fourth volume [of *Das Kapital*]. It didn't take me long to find out what this "work" means; he's transcribing the whole manuscript (terribly illegible) and intends to put it in order later on. Clearly, my "help" would consist in transcribing, or in taking his dictation. He's anxious for me to do it because, he said, after Engels' death, except for E. Bernstein, he's the only person left able to read Marx's handwriting. He wants to initiate me into Marx's hieroglyphs, so that were he to die while working on the fourth volume, I'd continue the work (! . . .) He is much too honest and simple a man to have consciously tried to trick me into scribing, but *unconsciously* that naive story about his possible death had no other purpose. Knowing full well that neither our contemporaries nor our posterity would ever learn about my silent contribution to Marxism, I told him straight out: I'm nobody's fool! Of course, I put it in an elegant form, i.e., poking fun at his fear and assuring him it would be pointless to teach me Marx's handwriting, since my chances of a sudden death are the same as his. I also advised him to buy a Remington typewriter and to teach his wife to type.

A propos, you ask why I'm "at odds" with her. I'm not, on the contrary, she loves me enormously, kisses me all the time, addresses me as "thou." But I've been observing her, and I don't like her character. She's very much like the Kalmansonov-woman [Pawel Akselrod's sister-in-law] only more sure of herself. That type of *woman* puts me off. In women I look for nobility and she has none.[16] *Hinc illae lacrimae* and that's all.

I went to a good ladies' tailor whom my landlady knows from her better days. In a

16. Louise Kautsky became one of Luxemburg's closest friends. In 1923, she published *Rosa Luxemburg, Briefe an Karl und Luise Kautsky*, followed by *Rosa Luxemburg, Ein Gedenken buch* in 1929. Fleeing the Nazi occupied Austria, Louise Kautsky rescued other of L's letters, which her son, Benedikt Kautsky, published in 1950 as *Briefe an Freunde*, "to fulfill my mother's wish."

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week, for Whitsuntide, I'll have my black skirt ready, and after the holidays, the yellow dress. I also ordered a nice little hat with a feather, English style, modest but elegant. It'll be delivered on Saturday.

What I get from *Neue Zeit* this month will cover my living expenses but it won't be enough to pay for the tailor and for the hat. [...]

Have a nice Sunday!
Yours R.

[Berlin] February 11, 1902

My dear Dyodyu! [...] As usual, there were some funny moments on the tour. In Reichenbach, after the meeting (in each town it's a must to talk with a few comrades afterwards, till 2 a.m., which I don't mind)—well, in Reichenbach one of the local bigwigs kept staring at me. Finally, he spoke up, "you can't be more than 27 years old and I thought you were 42." "Why?" I asked, surprised. "Well, from your picture in *Süddeutschen Postillon*." You can imagine how I laughed. They'd obviously mistaken the caricature in the paper for a real picture and each and everyone had loyally kept a copy of it.

For a change, in Meerane, after the meeting I was stringently questioned about women's rights and marriage. A splendid, young weaver named Hoffman, has been eagerly pursuing the question, reading Bebel, Lili Braun and *Die Gleichheit*. He's been arguing tooth and nail with the older comrades who insist women belong in the home and want us to fight for the abolition of factory work for women. When I agreed with him, Hoffman was triumphant! "You see," he shouted, "authority supports me!" When one of the older men said it was a shame for a pregnant woman to work among young men in a factory, he cried: "These are perverse moral concepts! Mind you, if our Luxemburg were pregnant delivering her speech today I'd have liked her even better! " I felt like laughing at this unexpected *citum* but they all took it so seriously I had to bite my lip.

Anyhow, I'll have to do everything I can to be pregnant by the next time I come back to Reichenbach. Understand? Before we parted (at 2 a.m.) the young fellow stopped me. He wanted my opinion on an important matter: should he get married even though today's marriage is a hypocritical institution? Luckily, I said "yes" and my answer clearly made him happy. From the smiles and whispers, and later from his own admission, it became apparent that he's about to get married. It's about time, too. His fiancée is already in the condition he likes so much. [...]

Lots of people joined the unions and subscribed to the party papers at the meetings. The whole trip's been spiritually refreshing though physically tiring. I visited the local weaving school in Glauchau. The foreman was very polite and showed me around. I learned a lot of interesting stuff. Must stop and write to Clara and to Mehring! Hugs!
Yours R.

[Prison in Zwickau]
Friday, September 23, 1904 (13-4-9)

My beloved Leonia![17] To start with, figure out the cabalistic formula above. Many thanks for the parcel. The blouse is excellent. I made some alterations and wear it all the time. The cap too made an "interesting topic," didn't it? I wish you wouldn't dwell

17. Because of prison censorship, Luxemburg addressed Jogiches as a woman-friend; his name Leo became Leonia or Leonie.

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on these topics like some pedantic spinster, Goldilocks, or I'll lose my patience. When I finally get a letter from outside there are many things I'd rather hear about than a shopping-for-a-blouse Odyssey. I got neither *The [Communist] Manifesto* nor the clippings attached to Louise's letter (Karl's article.) Tell her it's pointless to send them. Of course, *Kladderadatsch* you could have risked—I suppose I'd have gotten it. A good joke is my only cure for all worries, and the last issue was just magnificent.

That you live such a lonely life is insane and abnormal, and I take a very dim view of it. My present mood makes me hate such "asceticism" more than ever. Here, I keep grasping greedily at each spark of life, each glimmer of light, each tune in the *feuilletons* and theater reviews in *Berliner Tageblatt*. I promise myself *to live* life to its fullest as soon as I'm free, and you, you just sit there overflowing with riches and, like Saint Anthony in the desert live on wild honey and locusts! You'll turn into a barbarian, my dear girl, and when I come out of prison your Nazarene bloodlessness will clash violently with my Hellenic full-bloodedness! —"Watch out, Buseli," as Frau Löwe used to say to her little kitten. Remember? It's too bad I can't brandish the rug beater as ominously as she did.

You want me to describe my cell, do you? No small order, *my darling*. Where do I get the brush and water-colors to do justice to these riches! I just noticed on the wall a hectographed inventory of my cell and much to my surprise discovered there are about 20 objects here. And here I was convinced the cell was entirely empty! The moral of the story: whoever feels poverty-stricken should sit down and make an "inventory" of his earthly possessions, then he will discover how rich he is. You should make an inventory of your riches more often, and if you don't forget to include my modest person, as you unfortunately so often do, you will feel like Croesus. [. . .]

Many, many kisses.
Yours R

[Berlin] December 3, 1905

My Dear! I received all your telegrams and just this minute your special delivery (double) letter came.

You ask why I haven't written and how things are with me. Well, "what can I tell you, Herr Cohn?" —I feel rotten.

Vorwärts, as you rightly noted, is rapidly descending to the level of *Sächische Arbeiterzeitung*, and what's worse I'm the only one who understands it, and to some extent Kautsky.

The editorial board is made up of morons, conceited morons to boot. "Journalist"—not a single one. And besides, Eisner & Co. along with a band of revisionists are waging a ferocious press campaign against us answered by either Bebel (!) or Cunow, or suchlike(!!). I can but cover Russia, write an editorial now and then, offer good advice and suggestions which are carried out so disastrously as to make my head swim. A little example: right after "our first issue (of November 1st) I told Strobel that his piece against Calver [revisionist] was worse than if Eisner himself had written it, that we didn't come to *Vorwärts* to shirk like cowards, that articles must be sharp and clear. Next day he said to me: "Well, now I shall do better and you'll be pleased with me." And here in today's issue this dreadful blah-blah called "The Revolutionary Tempest," a mish-mash of senseless cliches, "radical" gibberish and this, no more no less, is the leading article in the "Political Review" section. Can one help screaming?

If you could just see their style! I want to jump out of my skin! Needless to say all that's in store for us (i.e., radicals) is utter disgrace.

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And I see no way out because we have no *people*. Add to this that I'm *dog tired* and can barely drag my feet, and you'll have a complete picture. I go to the editorial office every day at 4 p.m., gabble with this gang until 9 p.m., and it drains the life out of me. Besides I get up every day at 8 a.m. on the dot (since I've had the maid); anguish keeps me awake at night and I'm forever sleepy. In short—it's a beauty.

I'm terribly happy about the work our people in Poland are doing. Unfortunately, I can put very little about it in *Vorwärts*, space is so scarce. I praised not the *Russian* Social-Democracy but Social-Democracy in the whole country, i.e., *our* tactic in regard to the Duma, if you'll just read it carefully.

Hugs. R.

[Switzerland, Aeschi] August 5, 1910

I am in a fine mess. *Vorwärts* refused to publish my article, a very important one, about the Baden [social democrats]. *Neue Zeit* refused to publish my reply (murderous) to Mehring (No. 44 NZ). I've sent the first to *Dortmunder* [*Arbeiterzeitung*], the second to *Leipziger* [*Volkszeitung*]. Don't know whether they'll accept. (In Dortmund, Haenisch is away on vacation, the others are cowards, and Lensch is, on the whole, unreliable.) Just now I received No. 45 [of *Neue Zeit*] with Kautsky's "answer."[18] He wriggles like a cornered snake. I'll write again, to set straight at least the charge about the "distorted quotation." But Kautsky will probably again refuse to take it. With me far away he feels secure, besides he has nothing to lose. The material for *The Society* hasn't arrived yet, why?

[London] Sunday, December 14, 1913

I'm going back tomorrow morning (if my migraine allows). It seems we suffered a complete defeat at the meeting,[19] though through no fault of mine. Plekhanov didn't come, neither did Lenin. The Bolsheviks were represented by a complete idiot,[20] while the Mensheviks came in droves. Kautsky (on behalf of the German executive committee) right away introduced a resolution recommending that the executive of the Bureau reach an agreement "with all who consider themselve social-democrats! " I opposed the resolution, but I was entirely isolated; the scoundrel just kept messing things up. The rest personally.

[Berlin] 1913

It's almost midnight. I'm working on the article. I feel very sick (I had trouble with my stomach during the night) and that's why it was so hard to get started. But now I am writing and it seems this will be a splendid article.

Tomorrow morning, as usual on Wednesdays, I don't teach, so I'll finish and send it off at noon. The article will most certainly be finished tomorrow, so I am asking for extra time because I must lie down, my eyes just won't stay open.

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18. Twelve years of friendship and close collaboration between Luxemburg and Kautsky ended when she accused him, and gradually the entire SPD leadership, of theorizing about the revolution rather than working toward it. In her article, *"Die Theorie und die Praxis,"* Luxemburg, quoting Engels, charged Kautsky with distorting Marx's and Engels' theories. Kautsky, in turn, accused her of distorting quotations from Engels. The polemic continued with Luxemburg's article "Zur Richtigstellung" ["Correction"], published in *Neue Zeit* on August 19, 1910.

19. Meeting of the International Bureau of the Second International. Kautsky's motion (accepted) called for a meeting of all the different Russian social-democratic factions; Luxemburg's motion (withdrawn) called for a "unification conference" aimed toward uniting the Russian Social-Democratic Workers' Party split since 1903 into the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks.

20. M.M. Litvinov (1876-1951), an early Bolshevik; after the Munich pact was replaced by Molotov as foreign commissar; ambassador to the United States from 1941-1943.

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NOTES FROM A PLANNING OFFICE

By Hop Jan

Introduction

A superficial reader will no doubt find these notes disconnected in an impermissible way. He will seek an underlying structure on the level of logic. That underlying structure, however, cannot be found there. I dare to claim that the disconnectedness of the notes is their basic structural feature. I ceased fighting for unity where it cannot be found, but can only be imposed by a rational mind thirsty for order. At least temporarily, I must add optimistically! For if there is underlying structure here, then it first must be discovered, and it could be discovered only if I honestly record my present confusion. And this is permissible only because I am not the only one in this part of the world who presently denies the possibility of mending what has been torn assunder. Therefore, nonidentity is the true mark of these notes, of their author, and of his friends and acquaintances. The remainder of every useful concept, to use Adorno's words from *Negative Dialectics*, is looming too large to be swept under the rug.

July 22, 1978

Ne Quid Nimis

In a stagnating post-revolutionary society the party finds itself in a dilemma: Marxist thought remains intrinsically revolutionary, and therefore dangerous to spread; on the other hand, it provides the very core of its legitimization. Marxism cannot be suppressed in general, but only in its specific forms. But, this deals with the problem only partially. What about the classics? They cannot be prohibited! But, our party bureaucracy found a better strategy, one that presents itself as its very opposite: they stuff the classics down people's throat and thus make it odious. They advertize Marxism *ad nauseum*. The more they insist, the more they succeed in alienating the people from the potentially inflamatory critical theory. At the same time they are free to parade around claiming that they did everything in their powers to propagate the theory they supposedly realized in practice.

May 21, 1976

Plurima Que Aggregitur, Nil Apte Perficit

Revolutions tend to overshoot. Objective conditions are not taken into account when the masses are on the move. The less developed the society, the greater the overshot tends to be. The greater the overshot, the more serious the problems associated with an organized retreat, that is, the greater the danger of a rout. The greater this objective danger, the greater will the terror tend to be. Etc. One problem with this: What are the "objective conditions?" Is not that concept too strong?

August 8, 1976

*Lukács Revisited**

If planning is a *conscious* activity of the associated producers, whose objective is to govern the affairs of the community in general, then we must consider the fact that

*Cf. Lukács' "Towards A Methodology of the Problem of Organization," in *History and Class Consciousness*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: The M.I.T. Press, 1971 (first published in 1922), pp. 295-342; also Lukács' *Lenin: A Study on the Unity of His Thought*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: The M.I.T. Press, 1971 (first published in 1924).

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consciousness is not equally distributed over a population. This has far reaching *organizational* consequences.

October 5, 1976

Control and Communication

Under the "control" of economic laws community exists only in the sphere of exchange, in the market. Under the control of the central planning institution community exists only at the top of social hierarchy. Control denies community, that is, it denies communication which underlies it. Only control by freely associated *individuals* implies and demands a mode of control that directly corresponds to a real community, that presupposes free communication between the individuals. All other forms of control are not separable from the control of communication or domination, from an un-free community.

December 21, 1976

Ab Initio

Hegel was the first to see the "natural" movement from the individualistic society of liberal capitalism to the authoritarian state in all its basic implications. Therefore, the analysis of the dialectic of conscious regulation of social processes starts with Hegel's results. Marx's critique of Hegel provides the second step. It is based on the critique of the state itself.

December 22, 1976

Property versus Control

Fetishism of commodities has two aspects: first, reification of relations between people, and second, personification of things. Fetishism of commodities that appears in the form of the *fetishism of management* actually takes this second form: personification of things. Management of the reified relations between people appears in a personified form. This form of personification develops out of the personification of capital (the capitalist), once ownership is detached from the management of production, or control. But capital remains in the background, even though it is not any more owned by private individuals, but by a collective (shareholders, the state, etc.). It is still the basis of social production. It is essential to see the source of this form of personification in the reification of the relations between people, as something prior in time. Also, it is possible to see a form of private property, that is, collective property, underneath the power of management.

January 3, 1977

Addendum

As Isaak Illich Rubin demonstrated in his *Essays on Marx's Theory of Value*, "Marx did not only show that human relations were veiled by relations between things, but rather that, in the commodity economy, social production relations inevitably took the form of things and could not be expressed except through things." [1] This should be demonstrated for the centrally planned economy as well. Where there is no community of people, there *must* exist a community of things![2]

June 13, 1978

1. Detroit: Black and Red, 1972; translated by Milos Samardzija and Fredy Perlman, from the third edition, *Ocherki po teorii stoimosti Marksa*, Moscow, Leningrad: Gosudarstvennoe Izadatel'stvo, 1928.

2. See the second citation from Stojanovic's *Between Ideals and Reality* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973) in the Addendum to by "Bellum omnium contra omnes."

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Ridentem Dicere Verum

An architect and an urbanist quarreled about the primacy of their professions. At one point the architect said: "When God created the world, he created order out of chaos; therefore, he was an architect." The urbanist exclaimed: "Yes, but who created the chaos?" (By the way, I heard this story in the Soviet Union. Moreover, it corresponded perfectly to what I saw there.)

May 7, 1977

Credo Quia Absurdum

1. We can provisionally agree with Horkheimer and Adorno (*Dialectic of Enlightenment*) that "terror and civilization are inseparable," since "What could bring men to develop in such a way that they are able to master more complex stimuli in a positive manner, but their own development is tied up with a hard effort to overcome outside resistance? The resistance is first embodied in the father, and later on dissolves into a thousand different forms: the schoolmaster, the superior, the customer, the competitor, the representatives of social and governmental forces. Their brutality stimulates individual spontaneity." Furthermore, they conclude that "it is impossible to abolish the terror and maintain civilization. Even a lessening of terror implies a beginning of the process of dissolution."

2. The pair of opposites, terror and civilization, seems to be ill-defined, however. First, terror is conceived as resistance, that is as a passive obstacle. The active side is missing. Second, as a consequence of this the resistance to terror is lost from the picture. Civilization is an interplay of these two moments, each of which is of two-fold nature. Terror cannot be separated from civilization as its opposite, but can only be conceived as its inseparable moment. The other moment, only mentioned by Horkheimer and Adorno, is the individual spontaneity and its collective forms.

3. Where does planning fit into this framework? As is the case with all the intellectuals, regardless of their pronouncements, the professional planner is caught between the two moments of civilization, between terror and spontaneity. The distinction between planning "from above" and planning "from below" is not helpful in this connection, since those below are capable of both terror and resistance to it, as well as spontaneity and resistance to it. The professional planner is incapable of making up his mind, incapable of definitely joining either the oppressors or the oppressed. He is a tragi-comic representative of both, since he knows that his spontaneity and terror are inseparable.

May 8, 1977

Factum Fieri Nequit Infectum

When a taboo is imposed on an ever larger number of people, they first stop doing what is prohibited, then they stop writing about it, then talking about it, thinking about it, and finally being conscious of it, as well as of the taboo itself. It becomes painful to hear anybody mention it, and a hostile reaction to any trace of it sets in. This hostility is temporarily the best ally of those who imposed the taboo. An ever larger number of people demands that the taboo be rigorously enforced. Taboos multiply in number and intensity. The hostility spreads, it becomes generalized. Fear and apathy without reason and purpose pervade every aspect of social life. The social fabric disintegrates. Almost anything can then turn into a spark, threatening to ignite unreflected destruction.

May 16, 1977

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Ne Sutor Supra Crepidam

In front of a large audience a Planner paraded explaining the Plan he had been working on for the past three years. He presented all the benefits of the plan, proudly pointing out how he had succeeded in solving all the present difficulties of the community. When he grew tired the people from the audience timidly began asking questions. After many such questions, somebody asked the Planner to explain *how* he came up with the Plan. Full of indignation the Planner shouted back: "*Ne sutor supra crepidam*!" He was happy he could show off his erudite command of Latin. "But...but...," the one who had asked the question stuttered, "I am not a shoemaker!" The Planner was amazed. This was the first time anybody had understood his Latin. The trick did not work, and he had to find a fast reply. Used to tight squeezes he replied almost immediately: "What does that matter? You think you can impress these honest people with your Latin? They cannot be duped by egg-heads like you. Isn't that so folks?" Everybody applauded.

The moral: Be sure there are shoemakers in the audience when you present a plan. Naturally, this advice is intended only for professional planners.

August 15, 1977

Dura Lex, Sed Lex

A Manager and a Planner met one day. Almost immediately they started to quarrel. At one point they said to each other: "For goodness' sake, why are we quarreling? Our purposes are not that different, after all. The whole issue revolves around precedence in the process of administration." And then the Manager said: "There must be a reasonable way out of this dilemma." "Not a *reasonable* way out," said the Planner, "but a *rational* way out is what we must seek!" "Reasonable!" They continued like this for quite some time.

A Policeman passed by. "What are you quarreling about? You are raising such a racket! Let me see if I can help." And they explained the matter to him. "Simple," the policeman said, "your dilemma must be solved in accordance with the Law, which is the highest expression of Reason!" The two belligerent parties sighed audibly, nodded seriously, and left the premises without saying a word. The Policeman was happy. After so many years he had finally really helped somebody. Merrily he returned to his duty. He happened not to know that these two guys had written the Law he was talking about.

The moral of the story is that intellectuals should never be allowed to serve as policemen. Otherwise the Law will be taken seriously. As a consequence, Order will be neglected. Because Law and Order are rather incompatible notions, as everybody knows.

August 15, 1977

De Te Fabula Narratur

Two frogs traveled together. They met a mouse. "Are you some kind of a frog?" asked the frogs. The mouse replied hurriedly: "No, I am a Planner." "Yes, but what does that mean? What do you do as a Planner?" The frogs were puzzled. "I plan everything," said the mouse. And he explained his occupation in some detail. The frogs were amazed: "You plan even our lives, even our travel?" "Naturally," responded the mouse. "Well, how come we know nothing about this?" The mouse was learned. He had a ready answer: "So what? This is a perfect example of the *List der Vernunft*." The two frogs were satisfied and continued their travel. After a while one of the frogs

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asked: "He must know where we are going, even though we think we are just traveling. What do you think about going back and asking him about that?" The other frog was less enthusiastic. "Our travel would lose all its charm if we knew the answer." The first frog was satisfied with this for a while. Still, somewhat later it repeated its question, this time a bit more insistently. The second one stuck to its original position: "Look, maybe the trick is precisely in making you ask your question, that is, in developing an interest in the future and in the way we unconsciously participate in its realization. If that is so, then it is up to us to answer this question and not to ask this strange creature we met." The two frogs thus became Planners and spread the word to all the other creatures they met along their way. Planning itself spread. Nobody ever noticed that the mouse who started this new craze did not notice that his story applied to himself as well.

The moral: When somebody mentions the *List der Vernunft*, do not fail to ask: "Whose *Vernunft*?"

August 15, 1977
To Walter Benjamin

Social Void versus void Society

In the Introduction to his *Towards A Theory of* [sic] *Planned Economy* Professor Horvat wrote the following refutation of the refutation of planning: "Many naive misconceptions are connected with the institution of planning. The following argument advanced by L. Robbins may be considered characteristic for the "theoretical" refutation of planning: "The alleged advantage of economic 'planning'—namely, that it offers greater certainty with regard to the future—depends upon the assumption that under 'planning' the present controlling forces, the choices of individual spenders and savers, are themselves brought under the control of planners. Therefore a paradox presents itself: either the planner is destitute of the instruments of calculating the ends of the community he intends to serve, or, if he restores the instrument, he removes the *raison d'être* of the 'plan'."[3] The paradox arises only because in the good neoclassical tradition Professor Robins makes an implicit assumption that "choices of individual spenders and savers" are made in a physical and social vacuum. In other words, he overlooks the fact that [sic] economic process occurs in time and space and makes a value judgment by implying that the distortions of choices due to social relations and economic institutions do not matter. Strangely enough, the quoted passage was written in the middle of the worst economic depression ever experienced (1931).[4]

Let us look into this matter a bit more closely. First, Professor Robbins is refering here to a model of (socialist) planning which deploys the market as its basic instrument. Therefore, his argument is not *general*, as Professor Horvat makes it appear. Second, Professor Robbins is indeed wrong, but not for the reasons brought out by Professor Horvat. Namely, the function of socialist planning is not to offer "greater certainty with regard to the future," as Professor Robbins puts it, and Professor Horvat tacitly accepts, but to *make* that future. In this definition of planning the paradox disappears. Still, it remains in the context of the "market socialism" paradigm, to which Professor Horvat ultimately subscribes. Therefore,

3. L. Robbins, *An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science* (London: Macmillan, 1932), p. 113.

4. B. Horvat, *Towards A Theory of Planned Economy*, Yugoslav Institute of Economic Research (Belgrade, 1964), p. 2 (fn.).

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Professor Robbins lost an argument he never made. Moreover, Professor Horvat won an argument he never made, since he implicitly argued that individual choices are not relevant at all, given the fact that these chooices are made in a social context. Naturally, in a market economy the individual choices are far from Professor Robbins' "controlling forces," but in the context of socialism these choices cannot be simply swept under the rug. And this is what Professor Horvat does. The individual is consequently swallowed up by society. In other words, the individual disappears from the social scene. The individual is abstracted away. Another apradox appears: If the future is to be made for all the individuals of a society, who has the right of making the future if not these very individuals? Professor Horvat abstracted this problem away together with the individual. Plans are supposedly made by society for society. But these two "societies" are clearly not equivalent. In the former case the planner implicitly represents "society." Professor Horvat replaces social void by a void society. Strangely enough, the quoted passage was written long after the most fantastic social calamities were committed in the name of planning.

August 15, 1977

Addendum

In a passage related to this topic Marcuse writes the following: "It is of utmost importance to note that Marx views the abolition of private property entirely as a means for the abolition of alienated labor, and not as an end in itself. The socialization of the means of production is as such merely an economic fact, just like any other economic institution. Its claims to be the beginning of a new social order depends on what man does with the socialized means of production. If these are not utilized for the development and gratification of the free individual, they will amount to a new form of subjugating individuals to a hypostatized universality. The abolition of private property inaugurates an essentially new social system only if free individuals, and not 'the society,' become masters of the socialized means of production. Marx expressly warns against such another 'reification' of society: 'One must above all avoid setting *the society* up again as an abstraction opposed to the individual'." There exists not a single model of socialist planning that could endure serious criticism on these grounds. The problem is serious, and cannot be abstracted away. Facile pronouncements and evasions of the issues involved here will not get us closer to the solution.[5]

February 16, 1978

Qua Diversus Abis?

The task of socialist planning is not to predict the future, but to make it.

The task of socialist planning is not to project the present into the future, but to project the future into the present.

The motto of socialist planning is "*Hic Rhodus, hic salta.*" Hegel is taken at his word.

August 16, 1977

Addendum

The task of socialist planning is not merely to satisfy people's needs, but to create

5. H. Marcuse, *Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1960) (first published in 1941), p. 283; Marcuse quotes Marx from "Okonomisch-Philosophische Manuscripte" (1844), in *Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe*, edited by the Marx-Engels Institute, Vol. III (Berlin, 1932), p. 117.

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new needs. *Ignoti nulla cupido.*

The task of socialist planning is to shatter the shell of that which merely is, and to set free that which is trapped in it, that is, to systematically deny the omnipotence of mere Facts.

The motto of socialist planning is "Do not leave for tomorrow what you cannot do today."

June 15, 1978

Revolution versus Evolution

Socialist planning is a radical critique of the present. It is an immanently practical critique. The social theory embedded in a plan must be directly related to a material force in society actually capable of realizing the plan in practice. This material force can be rooted only in the process of material production, the real material force of society. Therefore, a social plan must be rooted in the process of production not because it has an *a priori* primacy over other forms of social life, but because it is the locus of the motor of social transformation: the proletariat conscious of its tasks.

The parallel with the socialist revolution is obvious. Socialist planning is its most important offspring. The revolution is a prelude to the radical transformation of the object into the subject of social development, and *vice versa.* The revolution inaugurates a learning process rooted in this transformation. The gap between revolution and evolution is thereby transcended in socialist planning. In other words, the task of socialist planning is to accomplish the process of transformation of the object into the subject, revolutionizing all the aspects of social life by peaceful means.

August 18, 1977

Bellum Omnium Contra Omnes

It is wrong to question Yugoslav socialism on the basis of an argument that points to the fact that the *bellum omnium contra omnes* still persists here. That is indeed true, but its *form* is essential for understanding the character of the Yugoslav "road to socialism." The antagonism of particular interests is rendered explicit, that is, *conscious, via* self-government agreements and social compacts superimposed upon the market. Contract is generalized. Planning is regarded as a form of organization of the social process culminating in a network of contracts. Contract is the main instrument of planning. The fact that the antagonism of particular interests is becoming explicit is not the sufficient precondition for the transcendence of this antagonism, however, Yet, it is a necessary precondition. The fact that Yugoslavs believe that this model can work is essential for its transcendence. Otherwise it would not be developed as fully as it must be developed if it is to be transcended consciously. Through self-government an enormous number of citizens are becoming aware of the antagonistic nature of their particular interests. They will gradually become aware of the fact that self-government is incapable of curbing the market, that is, the blind and chaotic character of commodity production. Then, and only then, they will be capable of making the next step forward.

A danger that lurks behind this is that the centralized administration of social life will come back on the scene so as to "put things in order" once again. Such ambitions appear together with the process of gradual breakdown of the illusion already pointed out. The chaos of commodity production may then be *abolished,* but not *transcended,* that is, not consciously reworked into a higher form of social organization. After such a regression the historical process would have to be repeated again, since the lesson

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must be learned by a large number of people. It must be understood that the process of realization that the *bellum* is going on must be relatively slow in order to penetrate the consciousness of a very wide social sphere. Otherwise the social movement would not be supported by a wide enough social base. Hegel would call this the "cunning of reason." An historical experiment must fail thoroughly in order for the failure to be overcome.

September 22, 1977

Addendum[6]

A number of Yugoslav thinkers have already pointed out the *bellum* outlined above. Svetozar Stojanovic, for example, writes: "Yugoslav Marxist theory is absolutely correct when it opposes self-government to statism. More recent developments, howver, have exposed contradictions within self-government itself; between social and group-particularistic self-government...It is time to turn our attention more decisively to the tendency of individual self-governing groups to exploit and threaten other self-governing groups and thus society as a whole. Thus fragmented, the working class naturally displays egoism and particularism. Only in a system of integral self-government will it fully manifest its social character, solidarity and universality."[7] Furthermore, Stojanovic argues that in such an environment the state cannot but reappear as a "surrogate community:" "Self-government based exclusively upon groups will reinforce the power of the state rather than negating it, contrary to the claims of its protagonists. So long as integration, coordination, regulation, and planning are not inherent in self-government, these functions will have to be performed by an alienated part of the society—the state. When there is no real community, a surrogate for it is indispensable. The Yugoslav experience shows that the state can easily manipulate atomized self-government. Mired in the framework of self-governing groups, the working class cannot make its way onto the political stage to pose questions concerning the total distribution of surplus value."[8] Stojanovic stops at this, however. He implies that the problem he pointed out can be solved, provided some institutional reforms are made. I disagree with this implication. A social process is in question here.

October 19, 1977

Nec Hercul Contra Duos

1. Following Albert Schäffle,[9] Karl Mannheim[10] introduces the distinction between *administration* and *politics*: "...at any moment of socio-political life two aspects are discernible—first, a series of social events which have acquired a set pattern and recur regularly; and, second, those events which are still in the process of becoming, in which, in individual cases, decisions have to be made that give rise to new and unique situations.[11] If the dichotomy is conceived more theoretically, we may say: Every social process may be divided into a rationalized sphere consisting of settled and routinized

6. Suggested by my wife, who indicated that the following two passages from Stojanovic's *Between Ideals and Reality* demonstrate that the *bellum* has been noted by Yugoslav thinkers.

7. S. Stojanovic, *Between Ideals and Reality*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 119.

8. *Op.cit.*

9. A. Schäffle, "Ueber den wissenschaftlichen Begriff der Politik," *Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatwissenschaften*, Vol. 53 (1897).

10. K. Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge*, (London, Henlem, 1936) (first published in 1929).

11. *Op. cit.*, p. 100.

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procedures in dealing with situations that recur in an orderly fashion, and the 'irrational' by which it is surrounded.... The chief characteristic of modern culture is the tendency to include as much as possible in the realm of the rational and to bring it under administrative control—and, on the other hand, to reduce the 'irrational' element to the vanishing point."[12]

On the basis of this distinction Mannheim analyses several ideal-types of political thinking. Of particular interest are two of those: bureaucratic conservativism, and historical conservativism. According to Mannheim, "the fundamental tendency of all bureaucratic thought is to turn the problems of politics into problems of administration."[13] A bureaucrat "does not understand that every rationalized order is only one of many forms in which socially conflicting irrational forces are reconciled."[14] On the other hand, "historical conservativism is characterized by the fact that it is aware of that irrational realm in the life of the state which cannot be managed by administration.... Indeed it focuses its attention almost exclusively on the impulsive, irrational factors which furnish the real basis for the further development of state and society. It regards these forces as entirely beyond comprehension and infers that, as such, human reason is impotent to understand or to control them."[15] The representatives of this ideal-type, historically associated with the aristocracy, base their action on "political instinct" arising from the historical experience of a particular class, stratum, or group. Therefore, "the bureaucrat tends to conceal the political sphere while the historicist sees it all the more simply and exclusively as irrational even though he singles out for emphasis the traditional factors in historical events and in the acting subject."[16]

2. Mannheim's analysis may shed some light on an important feature of Yugoslav development: the anti-bureaucratic policy of the top party leadership. This feature is to some extent evident in other socialist countries as well.

An anti-bureaucratic attitude of the top leadership may appear either self-contradictory or manipulatory (*vis-à-vis* the population at large) if an analogous distinction of two strata of party functionaries is not made: those who lead the revolution *cum* liberation war, and those who held minor positions during the revolution, or joined the Party after the revolution. A revolutionary "pedigree" is of increasing value in Yugoslavia. The shrinking ranks of the top leadership are not penetrable by those outside it, regardless of their personal diligence, revolutionary fervor, etc. Some manipulation of the historical facts is always possible, but major revisions are conceivable only in one direction: that of exclusion. Those already inside jealously protect their ranks from possible intruders. In such a situation the middle- and lower-level functionaries, that is, the bureaucrats *sensu stricto* of the party hierarchy, will tend to adopt the bureaucratic posture defined above, since it is their only weapon against the "revolutionary aristocracy" on the top. In their quest for "rational administration" they tend to join forces with other social strata representing similar points of view. Industrial managers, most of whom come from middle- and lower-level party ranks, become natural allies. That something like this has actually happened in Yugoslavia is indicated by the fact that the anti-bureaucratic attitude of the top party leadership was expressed in the fierce struggle against the "bureaucratic-

12. *Op. cit.*, p. 101.
13. *Op. cit.*, p. 105.
14. *Op.cit.*
15. *Op. cit.*, p. 106.
16. *Op. cit.*, p. 108.

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technocratic" usurpation of the system of self-government. The allies were pitted against each other by a *divide et impera* strategy. The masses of the working people were called to join in the struggle against the "bureaucratic-technocratic" deformation, which they willingly did. The new Constitution of 1974 and the related laws that followed it were designed to seal the fate of the "upstarts." The move has been successful, at least temporarily.

3. The struggle is not over, however, since the revolutionary aristocracy is rapidly aging. After the departure of the old elite the new elite will not be able to legitimize its status in a fashion analogous to that of the present leadership. The alliance of the administrators will then most likely reappear, this time without serious opposition. The question is whether the system of self-government will be strong enough at that time to endure the pressure of bureaucratization? After all, as Mannheim maintains, the tendency toward bureaucratization is "the chief characteristic of modern culture."

October 5, 1977

Odysseus or Myth and Enlightenment [17]

What would have happened had Odysseus not been tied well enough to the mast? Imagine: He himself would have taken his ship to the Sirens! His cunning would have failed. So, sailors, plug your ears tight, tie him well, and let him enjoy the singing of the Sirens. Your cunning must complement his.

October 6, 1977

"This is Cute; and Yet..."

Some propagate freedom, some reason, and some freedom *and* reason. Those who propagate both will save the world. Not because they will show that these two concepts are intrinsically related, but because they will be driven to show precisely the opposite.

October 13, 1977

Conentur Sibi Res, Non Se Submittere Rebus

Nomadic life is an unconscious groping toward knowledge of the lawfulness of nature, and consequently of the necessity of acceptance of nature-imposed discipline. A space-time division of labor is arbitrary at first, since nature appears as arbitrary. Groping through space-time is not planned, that is, known in advance. Once nomadic life becomes routinized, cyclical, a space-time division of labor comes into existence. The route is planned, it is known in advance, even though only in general outline. Space and time are still not differentiated. Once space-bound, man becomes time-bound. Nomadic wandering, however routinized, still permits deviations from the customary. Agriculture fixes man in space, and consequently in time. Nature is now observed and acted upon from a new vantage point: one variable is now fixed, so that nature's lawfulness can be better appreciated. A new aspect of planning comes forth, although still in the form of unreflected custom. Given a particular location, an appropriate correspondence between man's activities and natural phenomena is gradually established. Precise sequence of community's activities is known in advance. *Planning first appears as knowledge of the discipline imposed by nature upon community.* History begins at this point. It begin with the recognition of lawfulness of nature-imposed discipline. The acceptance of discipline is simultaneously the first

17. Cf. M. Horkheimer and T.W. Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, "Odysseus or Myth of Enlightenment," pp. 43-80 (New York: Seabury Press, 1972) (first published in 1944).

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appearance of the subjugation of nature to human ends. Whatever is lawful can be subjugated from within, to the extent that subjugation is mutual. But, at this point subjugation of man to command of another man enters the scene as well. Nature imposes discipline *via* man himself.

October 14, 1977

Thesis XIa on the Philosophy of History[18]

Once labor has been pronounced the origin it was easy to pronounce it the destination. That accomplished, it has not been difficult to pronounce the abolition of labor the abolition of man. The working class has been universalized, while man has lost all the firm ground that had been left. Marx has been powerless against the new fetishism. *Arbeit macht frei*;[19] yes, but who has remained to receive the gift? Or, to put it bluntly, who has remained to refuse it? These questions seem strange today because we tend to confuse history and pre-history. Labor is only the bridge between the two. It is also the only bridge, which, paradoxically, tends to conceal the fact that it is but a bridge.

October 20, 1977

The Grand Inquisitor and Bureaucracy

The three features necessary for the maintenance of social order emphasized by Dostoevsky's Grand Inquisitor, authority, secret, and miracle, the modern bureaucracy reintroduces into social practice. And it reintroduces the enemy, an everpresent enemy, that is, those who do not *believe* in the social order. Thus the need for authority and secret. Science and industry provide miracles, a continuous stream of discoveries and innovations comprehensible to but a few. And Grand Inquisitors are coming back from their graves. They are not as picturesque, but they are even better equipped for their tasks.

November 1, 1977

De Dignitate et Excellentia Hominis

Once upon a time (in 1664) it was conceivable to argue *against* censorship as Milton did: "...For books are not absolutely dead things, but do contain a potency of life in them to be as active as that soul whose progeny they are; nay, they do preserve as in a vial the purest efficacy and extraction of that living intellect that bred them. I know they are as lively and as vigorously productive as those fabulous dragon's teeth; and being sown up and down, may chance to spring up armed men. And yet, on the other hand, unless wariness be used, as good almost kill a man as kill a good book: who kills a man kills a reasonable creature, God's image; but he who destroys a good book, kills reason itself, kills the image of God, as it were, in the eye. Many a man lives a burden to the earth; but a good book is the precious lifeblood of a master spirit, embalmed and treasured up on purpose to a life beyond life. 'Tis true, no age can restore a life, whereof perhaps there is no great loss; and revolutions of ages do not oft recover the

18. The eleventh thesis of Walter Benjamin's "Theses on the Philosophy of History" (*Illuminations*, Fontana, 1977, pp. 260-261) touches the central problem of our time: the fetishism of labor. I find it necessary to fortify his farsighted thesis, however. Walter Benjamin left the scene too early to make this elaboration himself.

19. Inscription on the gate of the Konzentrationslager Auschwitz (today—Oswiecim). There is no doubt that Walter Benjamin would find this "quotation" a great contribution to his collection.

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loss of a rejected truth, for the want of which whole nations fare the worse. We should be wary, therefore, what persecution we raise against the living labors of public men, how we spill that seasoned life of man preserved and stored up in books; since we see a kind of homicide has thus been committed, sometimes a martyrdom; and if it extend to the whole impression, a kind of massacre, whereof the execution ends not in eternal the slaying of an efemeral life, but strikes at that ethernal and fifth essence, the breath of reason itself, slays an immortality rather than a life."[20] Today, this is a kiss of death. Moreover, not only that we would never argue in this manner, in the towering presence of police establishments, but we are increasingly doubtful of the validity of such an argument. We feel impotent; even more, we feel Reason, "the image of God, as it were," equally impotent.

Why? Because we know that Milton's defense goes hand in hand with an optimistic *Weltanschauung*, as expressed here by Manetti (in 1532): "Nostra namque, hoc est humana, quoniam ab hominubus effecta, quae cernuntur, omnes domos, omnia oppida, omnes urbes, omnia denique orbis terrarum aedificia, quae nimirum tanta et talia sunt, ut potius angelorum excellentia, ivre censeri debeant..."[21]

We may only envy those brave pioneers of our world, the Renaissance authors who wrote with such an optimism about the beauties of human artifacts, about the immense accomplishments made in the name of Man. We may envy their naiveté, their élan, their powerful will.... Our world has darkened, and the new world is still hazy and remote. The enthusiasm of the early socialist and communist writers is inappropriate today. We know too much and our hopes are wearing down. Yet, the envy we feel exposes the last remnants of the optimism of our forefathers. That is practically all that remains *after* Auschwitz, as Adorno put it. This envy is our contribution to the world worthy of Man.[22]

December 25, 1977

In Praise of Excellence

Excellence is what the higher spirits are striving after. Their endeavors are not *pro bono humani generis*. That may be a latent moment of their strivings, but it is, nevertheless, a mere derivation. Neither are their endeavors egoistical, since they are compelled by inner necessity. What is excellence then? Excellence is mastership. The master wills to be a master, that is, his mastership is not something extrnal. The will to mastery is intrinsic. It is the definition of the master. To master means to be the subject of a predicate, or to rule over it, or to govern its development, which is based on the knowledge of the predicate itself. Since mastery over a predicate involves mastery over the material world populated by men—sovereignty over the social world is implied in mastership. If mastership is not possible, if a master is frustrated in reaching the excellence he strives after, if his sovereignty is threatened, the will of the master turns against the obstacles separating him from the predicate in question. Thus a master tends to universalize his rule. He may be forced by his very constitution to turn against the social order, if those obstacles are structural in character. The higher his creative powers, the more destructive he will tend to be. To the extent that a

20. "Areopagitica: A Speach for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing, to the Parliament of England," in *John Milton: Complete Poems and Major Prose*, edited by Merritt Y. Hughes (New York: Odyssey Press, 1957), p. 720.

21. From G. Manetti, *De dignitate et excellentia hominis* (Basileae, 1532); quoted in Karel Kosik, *Dialektika Konkretniho* (Prague, 1965).

22. T.W. Adorno, "After Auschwitz," *Negative Dialectics* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973) (first published in 1966), pp. 361-365.

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master has achieved his goal he becomes an obstacle himself. He contributes to the development of the civilization to the extent that he has not been successful. Furthermore, he contributes to the extent that his will could not be frustrated, whatever the obstacles he finds in his path. The test of his will is the test of his mastership.

February 16, 1978

Addendum

Is it possible for a professional planner not to understand social planning as planning of society?

June 14, 1978

Back to Society

The death of an animal, or even a plant, that we loved, most directly exposes the human, that is, social and historical, character of "natural" categories. The tendency to get rid of the affective moment in our conception of nature, whether sympathetic or antipathetic, to objectivize the concept of nature, means merely to generalize the hate and fear of nature, and to bury it into the unconscious at the same time. To systematically expose the social and historical essence of natural phenomena must then be attempted in order to check the atavistic drive to annihilate everything threatening and to enslave everything potentially useful. The exploitative character of the social and historical substratum of natural categories, once exposed, demands a reevaluation of the "social" categories as well. The division of man from nature eventually must fall together with the division into social classes.

May 29, 1978

Paraphrasing Marx?

History is nothing but the activity of men pursuing the ends of other men. To man, degraded to a mere executor, history appears as something independent not only from himself, but from all men alike. The phantasm of history is a phantasm only to the extent that it is thus generalized. Otherwise, the phantasm is real. It is criminal to deny that some men *are* while the others may only *become*—history.

May 30, 1978

In Praise of Ideology

Anti-ideology is most often satisfied by exposing ideology. Implicitly or explicitly, anti-ideology brands ideology as untrue. Ideology worthy of that name is true, however. It is ideology by virtue of the fact that it interprets its truth affirmatively. The task of a relevant critique of ideology is to reinterpret that truth negatively, and not to merely negate it. All the efforts of anti-ideology are, therefore, ideological in essence. Anti-ideology are, therefore, ideological in essence. Anti-ideology preserves the truth of ideology by negating it, that is, it preserves the reality behind it by denying it. The reality exposed by ideology is thus buried even deeper.

May 30, 1978

Two-fold Domination

The domination over nature goes hand in hand with the domination over society. Moreover, the domination over nature is always mediated by the domination over society. Man exploits nature *via* another man. The concern for "ecology" today

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exposes the bourgeois fear of nature that turned out to be much less managable than originally believed. An age-old threat reappears when it was least expected. But, this concern exposes another, deeper, insecurity. The bourgeois domination over society, the domination over the instrument of domination, seems to be dissolving. The drive to conserve nature is the drive to conserve bourgeois society.

June 1, 1978

Loin des Yeux, Loin du Coeur

This is the motto of Yugoslav architects and urban planners. Or, as Brecht put it in another wider context:

Denn die einen sind im Dunkeln
Und die andern sind im Licht
Und man diehet die im Lichte
Die im dunkeln siehet man nicht.

The meaning of which is, simply: Beautiful and comfortable appartments for those who are lucky(?!) to get them, beautiful and comfortable kindergartens for those whose children are lucky (?!) to get a place in them, etc. Those who are left out be damned!

Naturally, this is just the surface of something much deeper, and much more problematic: Beautiful and comfortable jobs for those who are lucky (?!) to get them. Self-government for the employed. Those who are unemployed be damned!

The drive for professional excellence in this sphere only accentuates the imminent inequalities of Yugoslav society.

June 7, 1978

Administration of Servitude

To administer means to serve. Immediately we come to the essence of the Administrative World: we only have to remind ourselves of Hegel's master-servant dialectic. The better the servant, the better this dialectic works. Ironically, we most often complain of bad administration, our only blessing!

June 14, 1978

I am Only Kidding!

Imagine how a professional planner would react to this variant of one of the Ten Commandments (or any of its secularized versions, as is Kant's Categorical Imperative, for example), if you suddenly flung it in his face: "Plan unto others as thou would have others plan unto thyself." "Are you some sort of a masochist? A religious nut, or something? Do you want to lose your job? Is it not clear to you that they would screw up the whole thing, destroy the basis of rational government...I mean, the people?" Etc., etc. And you would just stand there, smiling.

June 15, 1978

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REVIEWS:

Norbert Elias. *The Civilization Process.* New York: Urizen Books Inc., 1978.

The Context and the Text.

Norbert Elias received the first "Adorno Prize," awarded in Frankfurt in 1977, on the occasion of his 80th birthday. He had known Adorno in the early 1930s, when both were young professors at Frankfurt's Johann-Wolfgang Goethe-Universität. Adorno was in the philosophy faculty, teaching Walter Benjamin's *Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels*. Elias was Karl Mannheim's "junior partner" in sociology,[1] and had his office in the same building as the *Institut für Sozialforschung*, the director of which Adorno's close friend Max Horkheimer became in 1931. Elias recalled meeting Adorno "occasionally," but hearing "indirectly much...and he perhaps also about me" through the intellectual grapevine of the university and the city cafes.[2] Both moved freely across traditional disciplinary boundaries; the work of both reflected the Frankfurt intellectual climate of phenomenology, historicism, a non-dogmatic Marxism and the new Freudian psychology. With Jewish backgrounds, they shared the same fate as exiles in England during the pre-war Nazi period.[3] Yet, even in his detailed critique of Karl Mannheim in the 1930s,[4] Adorno never, to my knowledge, mentioned Elias in his writings. As for Elias, his speech in acceptance of the Adorno Prize indicates appreciation, but only cursory knowledge (and rather superficial understanding) of the work of Adorno.[5] Despite parallels and crossings in their careers, the lines of their thinking never quite touched.

Elias' major work, *Ueber den Prozess der Civilisation*, was first published in Basel in 1939, an inauspicious year for the theme of society's evolution as a steady increase of "civilized" behavior. The edition found no reception in the homeland of its author, and for twenty-five years, it remained little-known.[6] But recently, with the disintegration of the left student movement and the falling out of fashion of the neo-Marxism it espoused, the book was 'rediscovered" in France in a 1973 translation, where it was heralded as a precursor of work by the *Annales* historians and of Philippe Aries' history of childhood.[7] Then Elias, who had been teaching in relative obscurity in England,[8] was invited to Holland, where a group of younger scholars quickly formed what can rightly be called an Elias School.[9] Suhrkamp Verlag, established

1. Norbert Elias, "Adorno-Rede. Respekt und Kritik" (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1977), p. 38.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 39.
3. For biographical information on Elias, see articles by Johan Goudsblom, Gisele Freund and others in *Human Figurations: Essays for Norbert Elias*, eds. Peter R. Gleichmann, Johan Goudsblom and Hermann Korte (Amsterdam: Amsterdams Sociologisch Tijdschrift, 1977); on Adorno, see Susan Buck-Morss, *The Origin of Negative Dialectics: Theodor W. Adorno, Walter Benjamin and the Frankfurt Institute* (New York: Macmillan Free Press, 1977), esp. Chapter I.
4. Theodor W. Adorno, "Ueber Mannheims Wissenssoziologie" (Adorno Estate, Frankfurt am Main, 1947[?]).
5. Elias, "Adorno-Rede," esp. pp. 42-60.
6. There were international exceptions. E.H. Gombrich at the Warburg Institute knew of the book, as did Arnold Toynbee, and the American historian, Charles Beard. For details on the book's history, see Johan Goudsblom, "Responses to Norbert Elias's Work in England, Germany, the Netherlands and France," *Human Figurations*, pp. 87-98.
7. *Ibid.* See also the informative article by Rod Aya, "Norbert Elias and 'The Civilizing Process'," *Theory and Society* 5 (1978): 219-228.
8. He had taught several years in Ghana, but most recently at the University of Leicester.
9. They have issued *Figurations* as a *Festschrift* for Elias. Noteworthy among the works generated in Holland by Elias' influence are: G. van Benthem van den Bergh, "Is a Marxist Theory of the State Possible?" *Figurations*, pp. 157-178; Anton Blok, *The Mafia of a Sicilian*

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publishers of Adorno, Benjamin, Ernst Bloch, Bertold Brecht, and Herbert Marcuse, all Elias' contemporaries, came out with a two-volume paperback edition of *Ueber den Prozess der Zivilisation* in 1976. The following year Urizen Press published an American edition of the first volume, translated as *The Civilizing Process.*

It is important to note that Elias' sudden international acclaim has been initiated by the book industry, rather than reflecting a truly popular groundswell. The "Adorno Prize" is an invention of Suhrkamp publishers, a promotion measure, no matter how deserving this or future recipients. (Suhrkamp also held an 80th birthday party for Walter Benjamin, long since dead, and "Hegel Prizes" as well as "Adorno Prizes" are awarded to in-house authors [e.g., Jürgen Habermas], whose acceptance speeches provide the occasion for further publications.) Urizen launched vol. 1 of *The Civilizing Process* with a 3-day spring conference in New York, and (almost) everyone was there. Modestly titled "The History of Body, Mind and State," it included presentations by Alvin Gouldner, Jessica Benjamin, Richard Sennett, Leonard Krieger, Andrew Arato, Oskar Negt, Ferenc Feher, Claus Offe, Anson Rabinbach, Sherry Ortner to name a few, and Elias himself (an eloquent, gentle man) was flown in for the occasion with a sizeable Dutch contingent. There were consistently civilized, lower-Fifth-Avenue restaurant meals (Italian if you were with Arato, French if with Schulz-Keil), wine and cheese after evening sessions, and a last-night all-night (not so civilized) party in Wieland's Soho loft.

I don't wish to malign publishers' promotion attempts. For the publications of Urizen one can only be grateful. The show at the conference was worth the price of admission. Moreover, Elias' recognition is indeed overdue. Yet, there was a qualitative difference when, a decade ago, the demand for certain books came from a student audience that caught publishers unaware: Paper-back editions were repeatedly sold out, high-priced linen editions were shop-lifted from shelves, and illegal but cheap "*Raubdruck*" editions became available to fill the need. Much Frankfurt School literature circulated in this way, while partial English translations appeared in journals (like *Telos*) long before established presses could get moving to capitalize on the demand. When popularity comes from above, it is because a book tends to go along with current intellectuals trends (in the present case, the reaction against Marxim) rather than being critical, reflecting the spirit of the times negatively by rubbing it against the grain (as did, for other reasons, Elias' book when it first appeared in 1939).

Adorno, following Benjamin, argued that the truth-content of a book is not eternal, but changes with history, because its meaning is mediated by a changing social context.[10] As one of 1978s intellectual trend-setters, *Ueber den Prozess der Zivilisation* needs to be scrutinized carefully as a text in context. Elias said in his speech accepting the Adorno Prize that, while Adorno was content "to discover in the work of Marx and Engels a theoretical frame for his humanism," he himself, "—quite alone—had to go further on my own way."[11] Is his indeed a fresh beginning, a new, not so much non-Marxist as a-Marxist path,[12] which avoids the much-discussed "dead end" of

Village, 1860-1960 (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1975); Johan Goudsblom, *Sociology in the Balance: A Critical Essay* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1977); Abram de Swaan, "On the Sociogenesis of the Psychoanalytic Setting," *Figurations*, pp. 381-413.

10. Buck-Morss, *The Origin of Negative Dialectics*, p. 52 and passim.

11. Elias, "Adorno-Rede," p. 45.

12. In Amsterdam these days, the a-Marxist position is referred to as "going beyond Marx by going around him."

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Critical Theory? To what degree does following Elias on his hitherto "lonely way" lead the rest of us farther forward? Or, to what degree does it lead us to fall behind the critical insights of Adorno and others who, with their radical re-reading of Marx and Freud, spoke a short decade ago to some of us with such conviction?

The Civilizing Process.

What does it mean to be "civilized?" For Elias, the scientific answer to that question must be an empirical one, not some timeless, abstract definition, in which a normative judgement in fact lies concealed. Nor does he accept Sombart's more historical distinction between "civilization" and "culture," with its nationalistic, pre-German (*Kultur*) and anti-French ("*civilisation*") implications. Instead (not unlike Michel Foucault or Raymond Williams), he searches out the historical genesis of the term, seeing it as an expression of social behavior and charting the transformations in its use and in the reality which it has signified. What he discovers is this: In France, the term "*civilité*" replaced the earlier term "*courtoisie*" at a turning-point in interpersonal relations, when the immediate expression of affect became no longer acceptable. The new self-control resulted in "greater individuation, stronger armour-plating of affect, stronger distancing from nature, people, and oneself. . ."[13] Civilization developed in the space opened up by this distancing. It became manifested in the form of mediations: objects which intervened, preventing direct contact with people and things (including one's own body); manners and etiquette which provided ground rules for the widened social playing field. Historically, this transformation coincided with the change from the feudal era, a warrior society with decentralized political power, to the era of absolute monarchy, with its development of court society and a centralized state. The first volume of *Ueber den Prozess der Zivilisation* documents the change of affect relations. The second tries to show how it connects to larger political, economic and social developments.

It is a very simple theory, yet simplicity—this is what is so disarming about Elias' writing—lends its implications all the more clarity of focus. They are striking, not only for how we view history, but for modern social science methods as well.[14] For, by extending his argument into the modern, bourgeois era, he provides a critical explanation of the origins of its notion of the subject, the self-contained, separate "individual," the basic category of social science, demonstrating that notion's historical specificity, and hence challenging its pretentions to universal validity. Gradually, argues Elias, the social space between persons widened until it reached a point when subjects really felt as isolated and walled-off from each other as philosophers like Leibniz and Kant began to describe them. Hence, the whole notion of the "bourgeois individual," apart and closed in on itself, reflects the real experience of the distancing effect of civilization.[15]

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13. Norbert Elias, *Die höfische Gesellschaft; Untersuchungen zur Soziologie des Königtums und der höfischen Aristokratie, mit einer Einleitung: Soziologie und Geschichtswissenschaft* (Neuwied: Luchterhand, 1969), p. 361.

14. In fact, all his work is an indirect attack on positivism, particularly on two premises: its essentially static conception of society where change is labelled as dysfunction or instability; and its search for universal social laws. This criticism of the Parsonian position he has in common with Adorno (see below, "Configuration v. Class").

15. This argument is summarized most explicitly in the new, 1968 introduction to Norbert Elias, *Ueber den Prozess der Zivilisation. Soziogenetische und psychogenetische Untersuchungen*, 2 vols. (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1977), vol. 1: *Wandlungen des Verhaltens in den weltlichen Oberschichten des Abendlandes*, esp. pp. lviii-lxiii.

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Adorno (following Marx) was also convinced that the notion of the "individual" subject was specific to the bourgeois historical era. The point of his 1933 book on Kierkegaard[16] was to demonstrate just this, again, with the larger purpose of discrediting static notions of society and abstract, psychologistic concepts of human consciousness. Yet, as Elias rightly noted,[17] Adorno's method of presentation was philosophical, whereas for him the illumination of social concepts has been a task for historical research. The relative merits of these approaches, the philosophical adequacy of their methods and the empirical adequacy of their results, are questions to which I will return. But judged on its own merits, Elias' skill in historical interpretation is impressive. His sources are books on etiquette and manners, memoirs, and pictoral illustrations, which present the details of everyday life, of food preparation, table manners, control of body functions, customs of sleeping and male-female relations. He documents changes in these details: cooked animals are no longer brought whole to table; forks, introduced from Turkey and first considered scandalous, become commonplace; the evidence of knives, symbols of aggression, becomes subdued; napkins are introduced; eating utensils become more differentiated, and every individual has his or her own plate and portion. Body functions once considered natural—urinating, spitting, expelling gas—are first regulated and then banned from public view. Public nudity is avoided. Private beds and then bedrooms become desirable. In each of these details Elias interprets in microcosm the same civilizing process: All these changes contribute to an "invisible wall of affects"[18] increasing the social distance through a series of mediations that transform behavior; social tolerance for the immediate expression of affect is curtailed, while social demands for self-discipline and body-control increase.

Elias' empirical research is of high quality, giving conviction to his argument that what he calls the "economy of affect" (*Affekt-Oekonomie*) has not been a historical constant, not even within the ruling class. In the feudal era, class distinctions in manners existed, but displays of violence, sexual openness and the lack of feelings of shame and guilt about body functions were as characteristic of rulers as of ruled.[19]

Elias' Reading of Freud.

Implied, of course, is a fundamental criticism of Freud, who, accepting the bourgeois notion of the subject as a self-contained individual, assumed a biologically universal, totally internal structure of the psyche. Elias doesn't deny the latter may exist; but he considers it insufficient as an explanation of psychic phenomena;[20] and thus an analysis of *Affekt-Oekonomie* as well as what Freud called *Trieb-Oekonomie* (economy of instinct) is necessary. Yet, Elias' theory doesn't rest alongside Freud's peacefully. Although Elias does not confront Freudian theory directly,[21] the examples

16. Theodor W. Adorno, ***Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Aesthetischen*** (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1966).

17. Elias, "Adorno-Rede," pp. 56-57.

18. Elias, *Ueber den Prozess der Zivilisation*, vol. 1, p. 89.

19. See particularly his analysis of medieval illustrations of everyday life which, as the closing chapter of the first volume, provides a summary: *Ibid.*, "Blick auf das Leben eines Ritters," pp. 283-301.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 204.

21. He makes general references to psychoanalytic theory without noting specific sources (e.g., *Ibid.*, pp. 167, 173-174, 262-263), and it is difficult to judge just how much more than a general climate of Freudian thinking Elias absorbed. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 324n: "It scarcely needs to be said, but perhaps for once it can be stated explicitly here, how much this study is indebted to the ongoing research of Freud and the psychoanalytic school. The connections are clear for everyone

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that illustrate his theory of eating, body-elimination, aggression, and physical desire are surely not accidentally related to the oral, anal, and phallic stages, and to the libidinal and aggressive instinctual drives. Yet the dividing line between instinct and social conditioning is by no means clear. Elias recognizes that a society cannot exist without some control of affect, but by concluding that in the feudal era no guilt surrounded expressions of violence and no shame surrounded body functions, he suggests that the super-ego, as "the internalized imprint of society,"[22] is almost entirely sociogenetic in origin, emerging in the bourgeois era as a late phase of the "civilizing process." It is the point when a "veil of silence" falls between persons regarding the expression of affect. Anticipating Philippe Aries' argument that childhood is a discovery of this same bourgeois era, Elias sees a second axis of the civilizing process emerging at this time. If the first was a horizontal distancing between people which resulted in the mediation of affect, this second one is vertical, a distancing between child and adult, and in the behavior appropriate to these chronological stages. The ontogenetic process whereby children are acculturated into adulthood is precisely the learning of controlled affect-behavior which characterizes the phylogenetic process of civilization, at least in regard to the history of Western culture. (If feudal knights and ladies ate with their hands, so do all children.) By the time of the bourgeois era, the distance which children must travel in reaching adult behavior-levels not only necessitates the development of a super-ego as the internalization of social constraints, but means that any lapse into earlier behavior can be conceived as "infantile regression," and hence the very tension between the child's desire for pleasure and the adult's sense of shame and guilt which provides the structural dynamics of Freud's concept of the psyche is seen to be a specific, historically generated phenomenon.[23]

The argument is illuminating,[24] not only because it historicizes Freudian theory (which the writings of contemporaries, including Adorno and other Frankfurt Institute members, were doing as well),[25] but because, in stressing the relation between adult and child in the civilizing process it corrects a defect of child psychology theories which treat psychic development as if it could be isolated from social interaction and social context, while at the same time exposing the blindness of sociological theories to the fact that the "individual" whom they view as problematically opposed to society was once a child who, far from developing outside society, only came to see itself as "individual" by a socially induced process.[26]

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acquainted with the literature of psychoanalysis, and it seemed unnecessary to refer to specific points, particularly as this could not have been done without a more detailed confrontation. The not inconsiderable differences between the Freudian point of departure and that of the analysis put forward here are at any rate not stressed particularly since, after a discussion, an agreement is perhaps possible concerning them without all too much difficulty. It seemed more important to build a thought construction as clear and evident as possible than in this or every point to take issue [with Freud]."

22. *Ibid.*, p. 173.

23. Cf. *Ibid.*, pp. 193-194, 240 and *passim.*

24. One would wish, however, for an explicit discussion of the connection between childhood and lower classes (as well as women and non-whites) regarding socially anticipated or acceptable behavior.

25. Cf. [Institut für Sozialforschung], *Studien über Autorität und Familie*, ed. Max Horkheimer (Paris: Felix Alcan, 1936); Theodor W. Adorno, "Thesen über Bedürfnis" (1942), *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 8: *Soziologische Schriften* I, ed. Rolf Tiedemann (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1972), pp. 373-391.

26. Norbert Elias, *Was ist Soziologie?* series, *Grundfragen der Soziologie*, ed. Wolf Lepenies (Munich: Juventa Verlag, 1970), p. 125.

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Here and elsewhere, as a criticism of positivist sociology and idealist psychology, Elias' work is repeatedly insightful. But when he is moved to systematize those insights under a theoretical umbrella, the result is, to my mind, disappointing. His concepts, which at first seem almost tediously transparent, become muddy; and the lines of connection between them would seem to lead him necessarily into contradictions, were he to articulate them fully, rather than lapsing as he does into silence at some most crucial moments.

Such a lapse occurs even in Elias' later writings in regard to Freud's own theory of civilization, which traced its origins to the taboo against incest, an instinctual repression Freud claimed was the basis of social organization.[27] The essential difference, of course, is that Freud begins with a concept of the individual, in possession of antisocial biological drives that need to be repressed from the start, whereas Elias begins with individuals-in-society, in "configuration" with others, and the "civilizing process" is the moving apart of that configuration so that space for regulated behavior opens up between people, a space which, historically, becomes increasingly large, as it is filled by social customs, mores, and rules of decorum, while the socialization process becomes more complex and differentiated. For Freud, the child becomes civilized by becoming autonomous, adapting to social constraints and giving up the mother as the primary love-object. For Elias, it is not so much moving out of dependency as entering into another more general web of social interdependency.

While Elias doesn't try to suggest that culture can structure the instincts totally, in speaking only of affect, that is, external behavior, he tells us nothing of how this relates to the inner biological component of needs like hunger, sex and body elimination. Ultimately, his coining of the phrase "*Affekt-Oekonomie*" as somehow parallel to Freud's "*Trieb-Oekonomie*" is more confusing than enlightening. The latter is based on an energy model: instinctual drives are energy projected outward directly or in culturally sublimated forms, or they are turned inward, censored, and as repressed energy return to seek release in dreams or neurotic behavior. *Affekt-Oekonomie*, on the other hand, appears rather in limbo in the cultural space between people, without clear connection to inner motivations. Its energy comes from somewhere outside, from cultural pressure rather than libidinal pressure, and its rule of conservation would have to be stated something like this: the greater the social pressure of individuals upon each other, which is manifested by greater cultural regulation of affect, (but where does affect originate?), the more the body recedes from direct social contact, and the greater the social distance between persons.

On the one hand challenging Freud's concept of "instincts" by demonstrating the historical transformations of emotional life, and on the other hand assuming it as a complement to his own theory, which is silent about what drives or motivates displays of affect, Elias tries to have his cake and eat it too. He keeps his theoretical assumptions within the external, cultural space of social interaction, telling us nothing of the dynamics between instinct and cultural behavior, and it is no accident that in the few theoretical remarks he makes about child socialization, he is led into the company of behaviorists:[28] the child's development of affect sensibilities occurs through mimicking the affect sensibilities and associations of parents and other adults;[29] whether "inborn tendencies" are repressed, sublimated, or given full play is

27. Freud developed his ideas of civilization in *Totem and Taboo* (1913), *Civilization and its Discontents* (1930), and *Moses and Monotheism* (1934-38).

28. Elias, *Ueber den Prozess der Zivilisation*, vol. 1, p. 319n.

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ultimately "socially conditioned."[30]

A theory of cultural affect that was truly complementary to Freud would need to develop a theory of sublimation. Elias has none. The approach of social conditioning remains external to this problem, which would need to address directly Freud's theory of the instincts and the implied constancy of psychic structures. It would also lead away from exclusive concern with the arena of human interaction, as sublimation is concerned with processes of production and creation that transform nature, that is, with subject-object relationships, and not only with intersubjectivity.

Civilization and Barbarism.

Affect-expression would seem to be the most malleable component of social relations. Cultural sensitivities vary in the extreme, and they provide shaky theoretical ground for constructing the entire edifice of civilization. The same cultural spheres may be regulated for different reasons. Regulations surrounding eating in a context of scarcity may need to be distinguished from those in which gluttony is a problem. The complex rituals of mealtime which underscore caste distinctions in Hindu societies, far from repressing the physical aspects of eating, stress the connectedness between mind and body, endowing food and its preparation with moral qualities that effect the body directly.[31]

There is another, even more fundamental difficulty. Not only are individuals capable of acquiring new cultural sensitivities—precisely concerning food and cleanliness—with striking rapidity, as anyone who has lived in a different country is aware. Not only will the most "civilized" among us fail to wait for a fork if we are starving or to react with good manners if attacked. The real problem lies in the opposite direction, that civilized behavior can exist side by side with barbarism, both within one society and within one person. To put it crudely: Nazi society was full of affect-regulation (more Puritan indeed than the Weimar culture of the twenties); Hitler or Goebbels, to my knowledge, ate with proper bourgeois decorum.

No one can be more aware of contemporary barbarism than Elias. Not only did he endure the disruptions of exile in his personal life and his work, but the post-war edition of *Ueber den Prozess der Zivilisation* has a dedication that reads as follows:

To the Memory of My Parents:
Hermann Elias, d. Breslau 1940
Sophie Elias, d. Auschwitz 1941 (?)

Even more than the infamous place-names, that question mark epitomizes barbarism. yet, the reader will search in vain even in the new 1968 introduction for a theoretical discussion of that fascism which challenges the very idea of "civilization" and which formed the concrete historical context for the book and its theoretical formulations. Even his later publications[32] do not address that barbarism which he himself suffered, detested, and struggled against. Elias, a radical realist in the reconstruction of past history, has chosen silence concerning his own. This "veil of silence" is more than civilized. It is an act of extraordinary faith, surely a manifestation of Elias' deep

29. *Ibid.*, pp. 260-261.
30. *Ibid.*, p. 323n.
31. Cf. R.S. Khare, *The Hindu Hearth and Home* (Durham, North Carolina: Carolina North Academic Press, 1977).
32. The one time Elias applied his theory directly to German fascism (as an appendix to his book on court society under Louis XIV) it was to argue that totalitarianism is not monolithic but, like all state forms, is a power configuration of competing groups of elites (Elias, *Die höfische Gesellschaft*).

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humanism, that he has remained throughout his life stubbornly persistent in arguing that the process of history has been, despite setbacks, a gradual evolution in one direction: toward greater control of affect in general, and of the expression of violence and agression in particular, a "civilization curve" in which wars and other forms of social violence are seen as merely temporary interruptions.

Adorno and Horkheimer wrote *Dialektik der Aufklärung* a decade later than Elias' book on civilization, when not only Nazism but also the wartime destruction of Hiroshima had illuminated the outlines of contemporary barbarism in all its horror. Theirs is also a book about the course of civilization, defined in very much the same way as the suppression of the natural body and the rational control of affect which eliminates its spontaneous and immediate display. Yet, their dialectical, materialist method is different in three ways. First, it connects the domination of the natural body with the domination of external nature, and thus extends the discussion beyond interpresonal relations into the realm of production. Second, by demonstrating the structural parallels between a specific mode of production and its corresponding mode of affect-behavior, it argues that a qualitative difference has occurred in both which marks a *discontinuity* with the previous feudal era: According to them we are witnessing, not a gradual spreading out and trickling down of civilization from king's court to princes' courts to bourgeois homes, but a qualitative change of affect structure which reflects developments in class structure and in the mode of production that sustains it. Third, inherent in this structure from the start has been not only the potential for human "enlightenment," for rational, humanely civilized behavior, but for its opposite as well, a new form of barbarism, of calculated, emotionless, mediated brutality. Thus, the most modern developments perpetuated what they name the "ever-identical:" what remains, despite qualitative changes in affect structure, is the same old barbarism of exploitation and oppression.[33]

Elias said later that Adorno was traumatized by the experience of exile.[34] But there are two ways to manifest trauma. One is continuously to focus attention on its source; the other is to repress its memory and keep silent. The legitimacy of the second alternative was recognized by Adorno when he expressed doubt after Auschwitz whether it was possible to write lyric poetry.[35] Whether the critical, humanist goals which, as Elias rightly noted,[36] he has in common with Adorno and wishes to further by his work are better served by being silent about contemporary inhumanities or by riveting one's gaze upon them, whether or not Walter Benjamin was correct that the consciousness necessary for historical progress is formed by looking backward rather than forward, "nourished by the image of enslaved ancestors rather than that of liberated grandchildren,"[37] may be a debatable point. It is certainly a matter of political position, and also of historical position (to try to forget the inhumanity one has oneself suffered is quite different from being ignorant of the sufferings of one's ancestors).

But if we stick to an immanent criticism, it must be said that on philosophical

33. Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer, *Dialektik der Aufklärung* (Amsterdam: Querido Verlag, 1947).

34. Elias, "Adorno-Rede," p. 60.

35. Buck-Morss, *The Origin of Negative Dialectics*. I've lost the exact reference. It must be somewhere in the footnotes. See pp. 191-306.

36. Elias, "Adorno-Rede," p. 44.

37. Walter Benjamin, *Ueber den Begriff der Geschichte* (1940), *Gesammelte Schriften* I:2, eds. Rolf Tiedemann and Hermann Schweppenhäuser (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1974), p. 698.

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grounds, as a theory of history, Elias' evolutionary gradualism is problematic. If, as Elias himself argues, not only the contents of knowledge have a social and historical genesis but also the concepts used to describe them (*vid.* his analysis of the sociogenesis of the "individual" discussed above), then his own concepts are themselves inextricably entangled in the historical present. Adorno accepted this, not as a lamentable limitation to thinking, but as its fundament. He argued that the past has meaning only as mediated by the present, and hence a search for "origins" never leads simply to a prior historical point in time, but reconstructs past history as it connects along conceptual lines to the present.[38] It was his and Horkheimer's intent to provide illumination of their own era by reconstructing the history of enlightenment as a dialectic of reason *and* barbarism, change and the "ever-identical." The dialectics of their approach allowed them to demonstrate the violence inherent in that very control of affect which Elias sees as the mark of civilization, so that fascism and the war are seen, not as momentary aberations from the civilizing process, but as immanent moments in its development. Because Adorno's search for origins was philosphical rather than empirical, Elias claimed it was a "history of ideas."[39] In contrast, his own empirical-historical search for "sociogenesis" would appear to be more concrete, more materialist. But it seems to me that the opposite is the case: Adorno's approach is rooted in the concreteness of his own historical present, (and of its distinctive mode of production) while Elias tries to think his way out of the present, historical limitations to thought. Assuming a vantage-point outside history from which it can be viewed as a whole as a progressive evolution (and the barbarism of his own age disappears), he ends up with feet dangling in an a-historical, ideal realm, bolstered only by an illusion that somehow he can get outside of that time which he himself recognizes as determining.

Of course, Elias defends himself against the most obvious criticisms of the evolutionary gradualism inherent within his concept of sociogenesis. He does not equate the civilizing process unequivocably with historical progress. The second volume of his major work is primarily concerned with the other side of the process: while private individuals are forced to give up immediate displays of aggression as they enter increasingly complex and differentiated webs of interrelations, the state, with an increasing monopolization of violence centrally administered through the police and army, by no means becomes less destructive, particularly as new technologies of warfare develop.[40] Indeed, Elias is not arguing that (at least between states) the *actual amount* of violence has decreased, but that the social acceptability of personal displays of violence has decreased, so that now it is allowed to become manifest only in dreams, during "times of social upheaval," or in "colonial areas where social control is looser,"[41] whereas robbery, plunder and murder were the accepted way of life of the feudal knight.[42] Since the late eighteenth-century, he claims, when children began to

38. For a fuller discussion of Adorno's theory of history, and of the philosophical consequences of historicism, see Chapter III of Buck-Morss, *The Origin of Negative Dialectics.*

39. Elias, "Adorno-Rede," p. 56.

40. "As for violence today, I don't think it is such a big thing—except, of course, for those who suffer it. We are choir boys compared with our ancestors. I speak, of course, of violence between private persons, within societies, not of violence between states, which has changed enormously since science and technology and the mobilization of the masses have supplied it with gigantic means." Norbert Elias, interviewed by Stanislas Fontaine, "The Civilizing Process Revisited," *Theory and Society* 5 (1978): 249.

41. Elias, *Ueber den Prozess der Zivilisation*, vol. 1, p. 265.

42. *Ibid.*, p. 268.

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be governed by the rule of "look but don't touch," the eye has become the major "mediator of pleasure."[43] By modern times, socially acceptable participation in violence has become limited to the passive role of spectator, for example, in movie theaters or at boxing matches.[44] Moreover, even in wartime, modern weapons technology demands *control* of affect rather than lust for battle on the part of those who are charged with releasing its destructive power. The mechanization of war requires greater self-discipline from soldiers, who follow "an unseen, or only mediatedly visible enemy."[45]

Again, these observations are striking. But at the same time they threaten Elias' own theoretical schema. First, if what we are charting is the historical development, not of *actual* civilized behavior, but of social sensibilities no matter how great their violation in practice, then we are involved here in fact with a history of ideas and not with empirical, material history (as, by his own admission, the *actual* degree of civilization depends today more on what is produced than on how people feel or even how humanely they act).[46] Secondly, the reversal which technology has brought about regarding the connection between control of affect and actual violence (so that they now stand in direct rather than inverse relationship) necessitates, not a theoretical frame of historical gradualism and continuity, but one of qualitative *dis*continuities, and then it can be argued that on the basis of the material and insights Elias himself supplies, Adorno's and Horkheimer's dialectical, materialist frame provides a more adequate conceptual interpretation.

Class Struggle and the Structure of History: Continuity or Discontinuity?

Now it must be understood that Elias consistently recognizes qualitative differences in the affect structure of the bourgeois-industrial era compared with that of court society.[47] *Ueber den Prozess der Zivilisation* in fact begins by outlining what distinguished bourgeois from aristocratic decorum, as that difference was articulated by contemporaries at the beginning of the bourgeois era (Kant, Lessing and others). Elias's very critical, very enlightened purpose is to show that the difference between *civilization* and *Kultur* is not a national one, as his chauvinist countrymen, glorifying German *Kultur* over French *civilisation*, were claiming in the 1930s. Instead, the distinction had historical roots: at the turn of the nineteenth century, *Kultur*, connoting "internalization, depth of feeling, absorption in books, formation of the individual personality," was praised by that rising German bourgeoisie whose reality these "virtues" described, while the qualities of the politically still dominant aristocracy, who aped the manners and customs of the French, were defined negatively, as "superficiality, ceremony, external convention."[48] Hence, the argument over terms reflected the struggle for power between two classes within Germany. But watch Elias's argument presentation closely and it becomes evident that his theoretical frame of historical gradualism obliterates seeing any link between this change and the change in mode of production, while the concept of sociogenesis, with its stress on the

43. Elias interviewed by Fontaine, *Theory and Society*: 240.

44. Elias, *Ueber den Prozess der Zivilisation*, vol. 1, pp. 280-281.

45. *Ibid.*, p. 279. At the same time, technology, by fixing the civilizing apparatus of society, can allow more freedom of affect (*ibid.*, p. 190).

46. Elias contradicts himself on this point, on the one hand acknowledging the determining nature of technologies, and on the other claiming: "It is the destructive power of human beings, not of atom bombs, which human beings must fear...." (Elias, *Was ist Soziologie?* p. 24)

47. See, e.g., explicit reference in Elias, *Ueber den Prozess der Zivilisation*, vol. 1, pp. 206-207.

48. *Ibid.*, p. 22.

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continuity of developments, interprets qualitative changes in the dominant class as just part of an ongoing power struggle, neutralizing the initial suggestion that forms of social behavior have a class origin.

In the history of affect behavior, Elias points to two qualitative transformations. First came the regulation of affect, marking the transition from the politically decentralized, warrior society of feudal Europe to the absolutist court society which reached its zenith in the reign of Louis XIV (analyzed by Elias in a later book[49] in impressive detail). The second occurred in the period of bourgeois ascendency, particularly in the nineteenth century, when the "veil of silence" fell, and affect was no longer merely regulated, but *repressed*. Elias describes this change as the result of the same civilizing process, that ever-greater distancing counterbalanced by ever-greater pressure of individuals upon each other which occurred "very gradually,"[50] incorporating more and more people due to a trickle-down effect, "a tendency pressing down from above."[51] Hence, *Kultur* was simply a later phase of *civilisation*. Elias connects this process to the development of a money economy which allowed for the increasing integration of society. This economic development in turn favored the rising bourgeoisie at the same time it worked against the aristocracy who, with their fixed incomes from rents of land, lost economic power.[52]

Like Marx, then, Elias examines economic change in terms of its effects on the rearrangement of social relations, but he defines the latter quite differently. For Marx, the basic category is class, because it defines the structure of economic oppression. Elias speaks about power "configurations," which capture changing patterns of interdependency. Marx is concerned with the mode of production: "Capital," as surplus value, is the key to the nature of class exploitation. But money is "an incarnation of the social web, a symbol for the mesh of the acts of exchange, and of the human links into which a ware is admitted on the way from its natural state to its consumption."[53]

Where Marx saw a structural transformation of social relations as the result of capitalist production, which created a new class (the proletariat) and simultaneously exploited it, Elias sees the social relations of capitalism as simply an extension of money economy which lengthens the chains of human interdependency, reflecting a developmental tendency toward greater complexity and abstraction. For Elias, the decisive period, marking a turning-point in social relations, was seventeenth-century France, due to a confluence of economic (money economy) political (monarchial absolutism) and psychological (affect control) conditions. All qualitative changes since this time—from aristocratic to bourgeois ruling class, from peasant to industrial production, from monarchy to nation state, from the regulation of affect to its repression—are only apparent, or superficial discontinuities, underneath which lies the continuity of a "gradual increase" in the control of affect on the personal level, the centralization of power on the political level, and the extension of market networks on the level of economic organization.

While providing a connecting thread between political, socio-psychological and economic changes, this argument totally dismisses the significance of *dis*continuities

49. Elias, *Die höfische Gesellschaft,* first published, 1969; French edition: *La societe de cour,* trans. Pierre Kammnitzer (1974). This book is a revised edition of Elias' *Habilitationsschrift*, written when he was working with Mannheim in the early 1930s.
50. Elias, *Ueber den Prozess der Zivilisation*, vol. 1, p. 245.
51. *Ibid.*, p. 168.
52. See *ibid.*, vol. 2.
53. *Ibid.*, p. 61.

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brought about by bourgeois class dominance. Hence, for example, at the close of the first volume of *Ueber den Prozess der Zivilisation*, Elias notes that the present, bourgeois ruling class, unlike preceding ones, remains a "working" class instead of leading a life of leisure, and asks the question, why do they work, when in fact, as the dominant group, they don't have to: "The question requires a more detailed answer than is possible in the present connection. Clear, however, is the parallel to what has been said above.... In the courtly-aristocratic phase the constraints applied to desires and affect were grounded primarily in the regard and respect which was due to others, and particularly to those of higher social standing. In the following phase, what forces the denial and regulation of drives and the holding back [of affect] is represented far less by specific persons; it is, speaking provisionally and generally, more directly than before, the less visible and more impersonal pressures of social interconnectedness, the division of labor, the market, and competition which pressures toward the inhibition and regulation of the affects and drives.... That applies to the regulation of drives and inhibitions necessary for 'work;' that applies for the whole scheme of drive organization in the bourgeois-industrial society."[54] Here economic elements—markets, competition, the division of labor—are seen in terms of human interdependency, significant because they extend and intensify the web of interconnectedness.

But is bourgeois social behavior really a continuation of aristocratic patterns? Specifically, is the bourgeois work ethic simply a more abstract and intensified version of the regulation of behavior in court society?

Sociogenesis v. Class Origins of Behavior: Relations to Objects.

If Elias had been slightly less insistent on going his "own way," he would have had to respond to the argument of Max Weber (to whom, in another context, he acknowledges a debt)[55] that the sociogenesis of the psychic structure peculiar to the capitalist era can be discovered in the Protestant ethic of the rising bourgeois class, with its parsimony, Puritan self-discipline and deep sense of individual guilt.[56] The ability to postpone gratification, which Freud saw as the distinguishing mark of psychic maturation, can be seen as a psychic prerequisite for the accumulation of capital.[57] This line of argument had a strong influence on Adorno, who considered nineteenth-century morality, despite national differences—whether it was called *Kultur* or *civilisation* or Victorian ethics—as indeed a reflection of bourgeois class dominance. The new affect structure was in his view not the result of the gradual spread of court behavior to wider and less exclusive circles; it was related to a new mode of production which required not only self-control and asceticism, but also rationalization and the systematization of social relations in a way fundamentally different from the regulation of relations at court. The latter *articulated* the body and its functions, elaborated behavior in social contact, and controlled nature for aesthetic purposes. The former *repressed* affect for the purpose of production. The elegant rationality of the gardens at Versailles, for example, was an end in itself, quite distinct

54. *Ibid.*, vol. 1, pp. 206-207.

55. See, e.g., Elias, *Die höfische Gesellschaft*, pp. 180ff.

56. See Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, trans. Talcott Parsons, foreword by R.H. Tawney (New York: Scribner, 1958).

57. Elias asks why "the professional work which becomes the general life form with the rise of the bourgeoisie makes precisely a particularly strong disciplining of sexuality necessary" (*Ueber den Prozess der Zivilisation*, vol. 1, p. 255) but the focus on historical continuity with the past epoch does not provide a theoretical frame that could answer the question.

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ffom the instrumental rationality of an assembly line.

Elias focuses exclusively on interpersonal relations, rather than human beings in relation to the objects which they produce, exchange and consume. The result is a spiriting away of material objects. Hence, for example, he makes the statement: "The fork is nothing else than the incarnation of a particular affect and sensibility standard."[58] This bracketing out of the object, the mediator of human interactions, may not do violence to the truth of lived experience in the king's court, which, like the peasant villages which supported it economically, was a face-to-face society and hence still relatively transparent. But it is surely a distortion of the reality of industrial existence. If Elias would give due attention to the objects, he would have to comment on the fact that those "invisible walls" of affect which by the nineteenth century separated individuals from one another in their social relations had a counterpart in some very visible walls as well. For if by this time a "veil of silence" falls over natural functions so that they are limited to a private and intimate realm out of public view, "behind closed doors,"[59] a second veil of silence is lowered with the separation of domestic life from factory production. (In Adorno's writings, the nineteenth-century "bourgeois *intérieur*" is seen as an image of this separation, over-full of commodities, the origins, the mystery of production, of which cannot be experienced from inside Victorian drawing-rooms.)[60] In contrast to the periods of peasant production and cottage industry, home and workplace become physically distinct (often literally walled off), as do the living quarters of workers and capitalists. Among new generations of children, only those employed as child laborers actually penetrate this second veil, while bourgeois children are as much shut out from the world inside the factory or on the other side of the tracks as they are from what transpires in their parents' bedroom.

Similarly, although Elias recognizes the increased importance of objects in the regulation of social behavior and in bestowing social prestige,[61] he sees the social relations behind the secret of commodities not in terms of the class exploitation that was the condition of their production, but of increased pressure due to more complex webs of interdependency. His speech at the Urizen conference, "Time and its Reasons,"[62] makes the point: When, in an urban, industrial environment, we experience the pressure of time, it is not the clock or the schedule itself that oppresses us, but the growing complexity of human interactions which is regulated by the exact measurement of time. Such an insight certainly contributes to the general critique of reification, which has occupied the thoughts of many twentieth-century writers. But in stressing the intensification of a past trend, it fails to conceptualize what is really new in the present era: The timing precision of an assembly line is only weakly explained by "increasing pressures of interconnectedness." It is a deliberate and scientific

58. *Ibid.*, p. 171.

59. *Ibid.*, p. 261.

60. Adorno, *Kierkegaard*, pp. 75-86.

61. "Whereas we make a thing out of everything personal, court persons also even personalize things." (Elias, *Die höfische Gesellschaft*, p. 153.) "The sense of social distinctions becomes more exclusively than before the possession of money. And the reifications made by people, their accomplishments and products, become more important than their conduct." (Elias, *Ueber den Prozess der Zivilisation*, vol. 1, p. 142.) But, predictably, Elias sees the "decisive difference" between the *anciene regime* and today in terms of consumption rather than production, and the fact that in industrialized societies prestige consumption is much more "privatized" than then. (*Ibid.*, p. 111.)

62. Unpublished, but see Norbert Elias, "An Essay on Time," Part I, *de Gids*, vol. 137, no. 9-10 (1974): 604-605.

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response to the goal of increased productivity, and hence of increased surplus value, experienced by the capitalist as corporate profits and by the worker as corporeal fatigue.

But even the nature of "interconnectedness" is different in an industrial, urban context, and not just because it is more abstract. It is experienced, on the one hand, as isolation, that *anomie* which has become a hallmark of our age; and on the other hand, as submission of the individual within the mass, where physical distance between strangers is obliterated and sensibilities are so bombarded that self-numbing processes are generated in defense. In the crowd, only the most truncated social interactions are possible, and as the literal, the physical pressure of people on each other increases, there is no corresponding increase of civilized behavior. It can well be asked whether the non-identities are more crucial than the identities in the holding back of affect of 1) a modern city-dweller packed in a rush-hour subway car 2) a nineteenth-century, pleasure-denying bourgeois entrepreneur working to accumulate capital, and 3) a courtier whose consumption of luxuries and refined behavior are part of the artful manipulation of court power intrigues. Moreover, the degree to which reifications and technologies obstruct the view of the social configurations we now create is unevenly distributed among people: In the Jet Age, it is precisely because of technology that the increased degree of economic and political interconnectedness is still experienced by the ruling class directly, that is, among the well-travelled, well-plugged-in business executives and political heads of state. Yet, the workers of multi-national concerns or the citizens of militarily over-armed nations, whose fate indeed is tightly interconnected, seldom reap the advantages of technologies which, by providing media for the reestablishment of personal contact, might reveal to them their common, supra-national interests.

It is perhaps unfair to criticize Elias' comments on the most modern period (was it ushered in with the introduction of *plastic* forks?) as they are peripheral rather than central to the focus of his work. More's the pity, as the extension of certain of his theories cries out for comment. We would wish for his illumination of the changes in social sensibilities when they begin to be shaped by mass media, when ideas of cleanliness and good taste, when notions of social status and the objects which confer them, are inculcated by advertisements rather than books of etiquette.

Needs may have always been socially induced, but the felt need for a fork is qualitatively different from the felt need for a vaginal deodorant. Only in consumer-capitalist society, the survival of which is dependent on an insatiable market, does the production of needs become such a naked reflection of the needs of production.[63] One such reflection is that not only have people become more linked but objects have too. Even eating utensils are parts of massive technological networks, and due to economies of scale, these have gotten the upper hand over all pretenses of politeness.[64] Where are we to plot on the "curve of civilization" the painful experience

63. Cf. what may have been a much more spontaneous evolution in the court of the aristocracy, which "for several centuries" was a "workshop" where "modes of conduct were invented." (Elias interviewed by Fontaine, *Theory and Society*: 251.)

64. Elias connects such developments in technology to social developments rather than production needs, and reverses the causal connection. Discussing seventeenth-century technologies of eating, he says the "growing sensitivity" came first, creating a demand for new production, and he concludes generally that the development of socially felt needs precedes technological innovations and scientific discoveries, which have their own "sociogenesis." (Elias, *Ueber den Prozess der Zivilisation*, vol. 1, p. 189.) While recognizing that, once developed, technologies take on a life of their own, creating "an extraordinary stabilization of the changed

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of trying to be civilized when eating a plastic-covered meal on an airplane with a seat-back for a dinner partner? And what of the new generation, weaned on vending machines, for whom such an experience may no longer be felt as painful?

Configuration v. Class: Relations of Subjects.

Elias would no doubt consider that his own major theoretical contribution has been in exposing and correcting the way the reification of social and psychological concepts has distorted our understanding of social reality. At every opportunity he struggles to demystify these concepts by translating them out of the abstract realm to which they have been elevated by the search for universal social laws, and into concrete historical processes and social "configurations." Hence, "civilization" is not statically defined, but presented as a historical process which becomes visible in the changing meaning of the term, while history itself has no supra-empirical reality, no higher meaning than the development of those people who compose society: "What one in fact observes [as history] is human beings who develop in and through relations to other human beings."[65] Writing at the height of German nationalism, he demystifies the concept of "nation:" "The social units which we call nations distinguish themselves to a great degree through the type of their affect-economy, through the schemata according to which the affect life of persons is continually modelled, under pressure of institutionalized tradition and the actual empirical situation."[66]

But there are limits to the effectiveness, and moreover, to the empirical validity of this approach, which may be a necessary, but not a sufficient corrective of positivist social concepts. At times Elias' attempts to re-personalize our thinking about society appears as a kind of sociological Buberism—for example, in his recent textbook on sociology, where he argues against the concept of the "individual:" there is no "I" without "you," no "he or she" without "We" or "you;" pronouns are expressions of the "fundamental relatedness of every human being to the others...."[67]

Not all social abstractions dissolve into human "configurations" without leaving a remainder. Money may be an "incarnation of the social web" (see above), but capital is more than that. A state may be a social configuration, but it is not merely this.[68] Elias' intersubjective reductionism prevents him from acknowledging a fundamental antagonism between concept and configuration, specifically, between the notion of the state and the reality of "civil society," which lies at the heart of Hegel's political philosophy and, through Hegel, so deeply influenced Marx's thinking. In fact, the non-identity between society and state may be precisely what distinguishes the bourgeois state from the absolute monarchy of the preceding era, when the monarch, an allegory of society, indeed personified the state,[69] and kings perhaps had reason to proclaim *L'état, c'est moi.*"

Adorno and his colleagues at the Frankfurt Institute also criticized the ahistorical

habits," he judges this kind of reification positively, seeing it as securing self-constraint to a degree that in the twentieth century, new freedoms—dancing, swimming, more natural dress and behavior—can be tolerated within the civilizing process. (*Ibid.*, p. 190.)

65. Elias, *Die höfische Gesellschaft*, p. 44.

66. Elias, *Ueber den Prozess der Zivilisation*, vol. 1, pp. 40-41.

67. Elias, *Was ist Soziologie?* p. 134.

68. Here Elias is caught in a logical contradiction: If the state is nothing more than a human configuration, how is it that those human beings which compose it become increasingly civilized at the same time states remain (or become more) barbaric?

69. This is a theme in Walter Benjamin, *Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels*, ed. Rolf Tiedemann (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1972).

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abstractness which characterized the concepts of positivist, and particularly Parsonian social theory, because of its reifying effect on thought.[70] But they argued dialectically that the static nature in the resulting picture of the world contained a moment of truth: class oppression and the barbarism which was its cultural by-product had indeed been a constant in history. To be truly adequate to empirical reality, social theory needed to acknowledge both this static side of historical development and a dynamic side, the latter marked by discontinuities, reflecting qualitative changes in the economic mode of production.[71]

In the absence of such a dialectical analysis, Elias' description of historical processes take on a Bergsonian character: The personal configurations which comprise social units are constantly in flux, moving on independent but interconnected levels of economics, politics and socio-psychological development. These levels change at different tempos, yet constantly cross each other. Elias compares the process to a musical score, composed of a "polyphony of themes," while people in the constantly fluctuating configurations are like dancers, forming patterns in response to the movements of others.[72]

The dance metaphor is another example of a potentially critical insight gone flat. In this happy ballroom image, where everyone can link up with everyone else, we lose sight of the qualitative differences in the ways people are linked together. Specifically, when the fluctuating configurations are superimposed on a constant structure of class oppression,[73] the boundaries of class define the parameters of the dance, and of just how civilized we are with each other.[74]

Of course, classes are also mutually dependent. Each is dialectically defined by the other. But the metaphor that not only describes this but captures its internal dynamics is not the dance, but Hegel's allegory of the master and the slave: The master realizes that he is in fact dependent on the productivity of the slave, while the slave, through his labor, achieves mastery over nature and awareness that his position as slave is in total contradiction to his actual power, and this consciousness has potential for a historical transformation of the class structure itself.

Elias' insights apply within the ruling class, not between classes. And if the class barrier defines the limits to the valid application of the concept of "configuration" (as it does to Elias' historical gradualism, and the trickle-down theory of civilization),[75] then precisely this defines its value as well.

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70. See Adorno *et. al.*, *The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology*, trans. Glyn Adey and David Frisby (New York: Harper & Row, 1976).

71. Adorno and Horkheimer, *Dialektik der Aufklärung* Chapter I.

72. Elias, *Ueber den Prozess der Zivilisation*, vol. 1, p. LXVIII.

73. I am aware that in an article to which I do not have access Elias has considered the flux of configurations within a (changing) structural context. See "Problems of Involvement and Detachment," *British Journal of Sociology*, VII, no. 3 (1956): 226-252.

74. Elsewhere Elias uses a game metaphor with the same results, as class barriers prevent certain people from entering the game at all. See Norbert Elias, "The Genesis of Sport as a Sociological Problem," Eric Duning (ed.), *Sociology of Sport: A Selecton of Readings* (London: Cass, 1971), pp. 88-115. Also in this volume, see two articles Elias wrote with Duning: "Dynamics of Sport with Special Reference to Football," and "Folk Football in Medieval and Early Modern Britain."

75. See above. The fact that the surplus value of capitalist production (cf. fixed land rents) can support a numerically expanding ruling class gives the optical illusion of a gradual widening of "civilizing" trends. There are limits to this process of "democratizaton," as has been shown historically by the bourgeois reaction against any real threats of a proletarian bid for power. Take away Elias' historical gradualism and what is left of "civilization" looks very much like class morality.

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Dialectic of the Master Class.

The real contribution of Elias' works is neither a theory of civilization (because it cannot account for the simultaneity of barbarism) nor a theory of the process of state formations (because it dismisses the revolutionary rupture between monarch and bourgeois state), but a theory of the dynamics of cohesion within the ruling class. It is not a replacement for Marxist theory. But it is a significant refinement. Marx's own notion of collective subjectivity, (e.g., the concept of the proletariat as "universal class" or his reference to the peasantry as a "sack of potatoes,") is markedly undifferentiated in comparison. And although Marx recognizes that petty bourgeoisie shop-keepers and land-holders identify themselves with the bourgeois rulers for reasons of status, even if objectively they do not benefit from that identification, he doesn't explain *how* that false identification is *maintained.*

Weber elaborates the importance of a shared belief system in creating class cohesion. Adorno and Horkheimer point to the role of mass culture as the "social cement." But Elias provides us with material to show that the daily reproduction of the class structure is due not simply to shared beliefs or passive acquiescence. It demands as well the active, daily assertion of dominance by the very few with actual power to maintain the appearance that their superiority is legitimate.

Elias' description of the court at Versailles shows that violations of etiquette contained their own dialectic, in the form of a double-bind: If courtiers violated the elaborate behavioral rules, they lost face, and with it, power, in the game of competition for the king's favor; but the rules of this game in turn reinforced the social hierarchy which kept the nobles dependent on the king's favor in the first place. In short, in order to maintain power, they had to manifest subservience in their behavior, and the real brilliance of the Sun King was his skillful manipulation of this paradox.[76]

Inherent in Elias' thinking, its radical core, is the essential equality of people which, in unequal societies, makes power games and status configurations both necessary and precarious: Elias understands the greatness of Louis XIV by seeing him as one aristocrat among many, who needed to expend a great deal of energy every day to be recognized by the others as most powerful. The daily practice of ceremony and etiquette, far from superficial affectation was vital to achieving this end. The objective, economic dependence of courtiers on royal salaries was significant; but it was their subjective, status-dependency, resulting in extravagant luxury consumption, which in turn made that economic dependency so binding. Etiquette, which functioned to control affect in social interactions and to regulate status competition among members of the ruling class, served a double purpose, keeping potential overthrowers of the king both distanced from each other and psychologically dependent on the ruler. In the late eighteenth century, under a less skillful monarch, the forms of etiquette became empty formalities, the queen herself espoused a return to simplicity, and the power configuration around the king dissolved. Predictably, Elias considers the desertion of the nobility as *the* fundamental cause of the French Revolution,[77] pointing out the dialectic within the ruling class, whereby the King, in turn was dependent on the aristocracy which was dependent on him.

Today in Western societies status has become depersonalized, reified in the form of

76. Elias sees the paradox clearly in *Die höfische Gesellschaft* (pp. 316-317, 332 and *passim*), another example of the dialectical sophistication of his insights, which gets lost with their undialectical systematization.

77. See appendix 2 in *ibid.*

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consumer possessions. Only a small minority of the "ruling class" actually rules. (Women, for example, with few exceptions, are considered members of the ruling class for status rather than power reasons.) Yet, among those counted as its members, the psychological terror of loss of status appears to take on an importance which totally overshadows the fact of powerlessness. The ruling-class cohesion that results is a negative parody of class solidarity.

A radical reading of Elias can yield such a message to his bourgeois audience, in whose interests present society is supposed to be structured although, objectively and increasingly, the majority of them do not benefit. Yet, this is not the conclusion stressed by Elias. (Nor is it, I suspect, the reason for his recent popularity.) Instead, in identifying the "increased binding of the ruling class"[78] with the "civilizing process" itself, he suggests both the inevitability and the desirability of centralized political power, for, according to him, in the centripetal and centrifugal swings of the political pendulum,[79] the periods of strong state control have been marked by advances of "civilized" behavior. By implication, periods of revolution are periods of atavism for the human race, as nothing in Elias' theory would differentiate the violence of revolution from that of warfare generally. Such "strong, regressive moments are not unthinkable."[80] But they are intermittent aberations of the general historical process. Although the future can't be known, "one thing is certain:" the long-term trend of our time is toward larger and larger monopolies of political and economic power.[81] Elias is optimistic about this state of affairs, because these centralizations of power are indications of the greater interdependency and interconnectedness of the human race. But interdependency itself is no guarantee of peaceful co-existence. As Elias himself has argued brilliantly, national enemies in wartime are no less "interdependent" than allies at peace.[82] The same, of course, can be said of class enemies.

Against Elias, it can be maintained that the concept of civilization contains a utopian impulse not exhausted by the actual historical process. A truly "civilized" society would be one in which human interdependence was not based on the pattern of domination and submission. But that is a future project, rather than present reality. Then (as Adorno argued on repeated occasions) sublimation would replace repression as the predominant form of affect-control; then (as Marx argued a century and a half ago against Hegel)[83] mutual interest would replace competitiveness as the source of social cohesion.

Then there would be no need for a state at all.

Susan Buck-Morss

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78. Elias, *Ueber den Prozess der Zivilisation*, vol. 1, p. 207.
79. *Ibid.*, vol. 2, p. 88 and *passim*.
80. *Ibid.*, vol. 1, p. 169.
81. *Ibid.*, vol. 2, pp. 438-439.
82. Elias, *Was ist Soziologie?* p. 80.
83. Karl Marx, *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, 1843. Cf. Theodor W. Adorno, *Drei Studien zu Hegel* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1969), pp. 40-42.

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Roberto Racinaro. *La Crisi del Marxismo*. Bari: De Donato, 1978. 262 pages.

The immediate reaction to a title such as *The Crisis of Marxism* is to inquire as to which one. Although Marxism in Europe is now in the middle of a crisis as a result of Eurocommunism and the anti-Marxism that has followed the explosion of the Gulag on contemporary political consciousness, this is nothing new. During this century Marxism has *always* been in crisis: it was in crisis in 1968 when Russian tanks restored law and order in Prague; in the early 1960s, when the Sino-Soviet split destroyed the myth of a monolithic communist movement; in 1956, when the Hungarian revolution revealed the nature of Russian imperialism; in 1953 when the East Berlin workers challenged "their" state; in 1948 when Tito refused to buckle under Stalin's *Realpolitik*; in the middle 1930s when the Moscow trials completed the shift from a party dictatorship to a personal one; in the late 1920s, when Trotsky and the left opposition were administratively eliminated; in the early 1920s, when Leninization sought to turn all national communist parties into various franchises of the Moscow-controlled International; at the break of World War I, with the collapse of the Second International; at the turn of the century with the revisionism debate; and, last but not least, even in Marx's own lifetime, when the clash with the anarchists resulted in the disbanding of the First International.

Of course, most Marxists readily dismiss or tend to explain these crises as exceptional political episodes that do not significantly affect Marxism as such. They are understood mainly as peculiarities of Russian history explainable in terms of backwardness, Western conspiracies and blockades, industrialization requirements, Cold War tensions, etc. This is at least partly true of most of the listed crises, except for the last two, which raised fundamental questions concerning the very nature of Marxist politics and Marxist theory. Of the two, the one concerning the "revisionism debate" dealt for the first time with central issues involving the labor theory of value, the dialectic and the very nature of Marxist economics. Notwithstanding the fact that over three quarters of a century have passed, these issues remain crucial to much contemporary Marxist discourse and still in need of *full* elaboration. What has tended to happen is that the issues in question have been immediately identified with certain specific political strategies whose subsequent historical failures are projected back as conclusive demonstrations of intrinsic theoretical deficiencies.[1] What ends up short-circuited in this crude pragmatic approach, of course, is a systematic analysis of the merits and shortcomings of the various accounts. Thus, the shipwreck of the Second International at the outbreak of World War I is taken to have closed the case against the revisionists. Yet, many of the questions raised by those critics participating in the revisionism debate have remained largely unanswered. In this sense, it is

1. This peculiar mode of refutation, of course, is not restricted exclusively to the "revisionism debate" to avoid confronting Bernstein's, Sorel's, and Croce's objections, but is also used to dismiss even positions such as Bakunin's largely prophetic critique of Marxism as to centralization, the disregard of freedom, and the nature of socialism in general. See Gian Mario Bravo, *Il Socialismo da Moses Hess alla Prima Internazionale* (Turin, 1971), p. 98, who considers it strange that some people still seek to vindicate some of Bakunin's theses, since "one of the two parts of the contest (the anarchism-Marxism confrontation) has been 'condemned' by the history of the last hundred years, i.e., it has not had further development nor (and this is what counts) any influence on the events of the modern world." That historical "condemnations" of this type are never final is shown, among other things, in the recent return of what can at best be described as caricatures of Bakunin's positions—even after the publication of Bravo's book—in the guises of "la nouvelle philosophie" to help prevent a socialist-communist victory in the March 1978 French elections.

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fortunate that by "the crisis of Marxism" Racinaro refers to that particular crisis whose main outlines he carefully reconstructs primarily in terms of how it unfolded in Italy.[2]

Reading this book, however, is somewhat analogous to watching Lone Ranger re-runs in the late movies: the spectator's suspense as to the outcome is prejudiced by the prior knowledge that in the end, "good" will prevail over "evil," and the hero will happily gallop away into the sunset. Racinaro writes as if he has all the answers so that the book deteriorates to an exercise in showing how all those turn-of-the-century critics of Marxism fell victim to their own lack of a correct understanding of the Marxist perspective.

Following Lukács' approach in *Die Zerstörung der Vernunft*—which he explicitly acknowledges (pp. 255-256)—Racinaro interprets the various critiques challenging the unitary character of Marxism as expressions of a general strategy whereby bourgeois hegemony is re-established in the age of imperialism (pp. 130, 159, 162, 223, 250, etc.). In order to evaluate the whole debate, he carefully reconstructs Labriola's positions in *Socialism and Philosophy*[3] as representing an accurate interpretation of Marxism, which is subsequently identified with *the* Marxist tradition and used to discredit what in fact has been the *orthodox* Italian interpretation of that tradition (the Crocean-Gramscian-Togliattian line). Although he manages to miss the most important outcome of the whole revisionism debate, substantially distort Labriola, and ultimately ends up as a sophisticated neo-Stalinist account, Racinaro's work is worthy of a careful examination. His philology remains valuable in spite of the conclusions that he draws—in fact, it is precisely because of its rigor that the philological part escapes contamination by the bogus political framework within which it is placed.

In order to properly understand the book's various arguments, it is necessary at first to locate it within contemporary political debates, to examine critically the validity of the theoretical reconstructions that it undertakes and in terms of which the Italian version of the revisionism debate is evaluated, and, only after this, to draw its full socio-political implications. Thus, although the *manifest* crisis under examination is purported to be the revisionism debate, when all is said and done, the real issue turns out to be the *present* crisis, and the upshot of it all is a rehabilitation of a type of Marxism that would successfully avoid the damaging implications of all the previously listed crises. This ambitious operation is carried out by reconstructing Labriola's thought as a crypto-Althusserianism where theory is sharply cut off from any empirical reality.

It is no secret that the Italian Communist Party has been and remains constituted by various internal factions.[4] This state of affairs can be readily verified in the language of official documents, which has been aptly described as "curious mixture of Leninist remnants, Gramscian snippets, and Italian political circumlocutions."[5] Far from being merely a Latin idiosyncrasy or an expression of political expediency, this state of

2. That these issues remain unresolved is demonstrated, among other things, by the appendix to the book, where Racinaro polemicizes against contemporary critics who are accused of recycling positions originally put forth precisely during the "revisionism debate." Cf. pp. 239-257.

3. Antonio Labriola, *Socialism and Philosophy* (Chicago, 1907).

4. Cf. Stephen Hellman, "PCI Strategy and the Question of Revolution in the West," in Shlomo Avineri, ed. *Varieties of Marxism* (The Hague, 1977), pp. 195-225; and by the same author, "The PCI's Alliance Strategy and the Case of the Middle Classes," in Donald L.M. Blackmer and Sidney Tarrow, eds., *Communism in Italy and France* (Princeton, 1975), pp. 373-419.

5. Hellman, "PCI Strategy...," *op.cit.*, p. 203.

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affairs reflects a historical *ambiguity* which has permeated the Party from its very beginning. Because of the socio-historical conditions under which Italian unification was attained, Hegelian thought became a major cultural force in that country.[6] It is not surprising, therefore, that when Marxism spread internationally toward the end of the century, it came to Italy in neo-Hegelian trappings and was almost immediately met by the systematic critiques of Croce and Gentile[7]—who were to become the two most powerful and influential intellectuals of this century. Not accidentally, as Racinaro takes pains to show, both of these critiques were immediately connected with the disintegration of the Hegelian system well under way in Germany by the 1980s. The most long-lasting effect of these critiques was to destroy any type of scientistic or neo-positivist Marxist in Italy so that when Gramsci undertook to re-elaborate Marxism, both in terms of the policies of the Italian Communist Party and in the theoretical reflections of the *Prison Notebooks*, it could only take the form of neo-Hegelian *pedagogical theory*, which *explicitly* did not seek to put the Humpty-Dumpty of a materialistically transubstantiated Hegelianism-qua-Marxism back together again—since any effort in that direction had been effectively shot down once and for all by Croce—and whose primary aim was not the traditionally advocated overcoming of the anarchy of the capitalist economy through Party-directed central planning, or any of the more pedestrian Marxist-Leninist policies, but the political education of the masses so that they would be able to participate in national political life, in what eventually was explicitly put forth as Togliatti's "new party" in the post-World War II period.[8] Because of the advent of fascism, the jailing or the emigration of the Party's leadership, and the subsequent identification of the future of socialism with the Bolshevik Revolution, the peculiar Crocean-Gramscian-Togliattian brand of Italian

6. For a detailed account of this, see my "From Spaventa to Gramsci," *Telos* 31 (Spring 1977), pp. 33-65.

7. Ironically enough, Gentile wrote his dissertation on "the critique of historical materialism"—the first one ever written on Marx in a European university—which he himself described as "compromising" and which made it difficult for him to secure a teaching job. When he finally obtained one, it was in Campobasso—a remote mountain town. Cf. *Carteggio Gentile-Jaja*, edited by Maria Sandirocco (Florence, 1969), vol. I, pp. 190ff.

8. This goal, which has almost become a slogan after the Second World War, was present from the very beginning. See Palmiro Togliatti, "La Nostra Ideologia," originally published July 7, 1925, now in *Opere*, vol. I (Rome, 1967), edited by Ernesto Ragionieri, pp. 647-653, where Togliatti was answering Bukharin's charges of a resurgence of voluntarism and idealism within the Italian party. Cf. also Ragionieri's "Introduzione" to Togliatti's *Opere*, vol. I, *op.cit.*, pp. *cci* ff. At any rate, Togliatti's frontist policies have always been a major source of criticism from the more orthodox Left, beginning in the early 1920s during the struggle with Bordiga, up to the more recent criticism by the New Left in the 1960s. For a particularly biting attack, see Mario Tronti, "Classe e Partito," originally in *Classe Operaia*, 10-12 (December 1964), but now in his *Operai e Capitale* (Turin, 1971), pp. 110-120. As for Gramsci, the theme runs through his work, from his earliest essay on "Oppressed the Oppressors" of 1910, to the theme of the "new man" in the *Prison Notebooks*, where he defines the aim of the new state as "...always that of creating new and higher types of civilization; of adapting the 'civilization' and the morality of the broadest popular masses to the necessities of the continuous development of the economic apparatus of production; hence of evolving even physically new types of humanity." Cf. *History, Philosophy and Culture in the Young Gramsci*, edited by Pedro Cavalanti and Paul Piccone (St. Louis, 1975), pp. 156-158; and Antonio Gramsci, *Prison Notebooks*, edited by Quintin Hoare and Goeffrey Nowell-Smith (London, 1971), p. 242. Gramsci, of course, has also been the target of the more orthodox Italian New Left's attacks for downgrading the primacy of the class in favor of a frontist pedagogical approach. Cf. Stefano Merli, "I Nostri Conti con la Teoria della 'Rivoluzione senza Rivoluzione' di Gramsci," in *Giovane Critica*, 17 (Fall 1967); and Giacomo Marramao, "Per una Critica dell'Ideologia di Gramsci," in *Quaderni Piacentini* vol. XI, 46 (March 1972).

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Marxism was systematically presented as a version of the orthodox brand of Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism.[9] This almost historically unavoidable compromise with Stalinism has created a schizophrenia within the party itself, between an ambiguous but rapidly fading apology for a unitary and uninterrupted international Marxist tradition in most official past theory, and a post-World War II pedagogical practice which the Cold War, of course, did nothing to help resolve until the 1970s, when just about all ideological ties with the Russian brand of Marxist theory and practice had been severed. For a number of reasons, however, a total break with the Marxist-Leninist past has not been possible[10] so that a full, official clarification of the distinctly Italian Marxist tradition remains yet to be undertaken.

Given this systematically ambiguous state of affairs, it is not surprising that the Crocean-Gramscian-Togliattian line has tended to co-exist within the party with a number of very heterogeneous tendencies, ranging from followers of Della Volpe to those of Panzieri and Tronti, as well as, lately, some Althusserian factions.[11] These heterogeneous factions are becoming more and more vociferous in the face of political setbacks of Eurocommunism and of the historical compromise line which, far from representing a "new" departure, is the logical outcome of a fully developed Gramscian strategy.[12] Racinaro is part of this general tendency[13] and his particular contribution consists in the attempt to recycle a type of Marxism whose epistemological premises failed at the turn of the century and necessitated a rethinking of the whole framework and the beginning of what was to become the Italian Marxist tradition.

The crux of the problem lies in what is to be considered the very nature of Marxism. Racinaro never explicitly outlines his views on the matter, but it is clear from his entire presentation that he considers Marxism a general science similar to what Labriola had in mind when he wrote the first three of his four major essays concerning the nature of historical materialism. It is very close to what Lukács put forth as "orthodoxy" in *History and Class Consciousness*. But Lukács, it should be recalled, first grounded his conceptual edifice on a collective subjectivity still in the process of being attained and, when it became clear that the revolution needed to bring it about had failed, he forcibly came to identify it with the Party and subsequently in the person of Lenin himself. This empirical identification of a materialist version of the *Geist*, however, entailed the discarding of the whole neo-Hegelian framework in favor of a realist

9. For a systematic analysis of the differences between Gramsci and Lenin, see my "Gramsci's Marxism: Beyond Lenin and Togliatti," in *Theory and Society* 3:4 (Winter 1976), pp. 485-512.

10. For some of these reasons, see Donald L.M. Blackmer, "Continuity and Change in Post-war Italian Communism," in Blackmer and Tarrow, ed., *op. cit.*, pp. 63-68. Written a few years ago, this article does not take into account more recent developments in PCI policy. Yet, the general thrust of the argument remains valid.

11. For favorable expositions of some of the guiding positions of these factions, see Mario Alcaro, *Dellavolpismo e Nuova Sinistra* (Bari, 1977); and Sandro Mancini, *Socialismo e Democrazia Diretta, Introduzione a Raniero Panzieri* (Bari, 1977).

12. The previously described "historical ambiguity" of the Italian Communist Party has tended to obfuscate the origins and meaning of Eurocommunism. Thus, relatively uninformed accounts attempting to explain this allegedly "new" political strategy tend to see it as a result of the May Events, as, e.g., Andrew Feenberg does in "Remembering the May Events," *Theory and Society* 6:1 (July 1978), pp. 29-53, or of the Italian Fascist experience, as in Alastair Davidson, "Italian Communism and the Experience of Fascism" (mimeographed paper), overlooking altogether its roots in the specifically Italian Marxist tradition resulting from the outcome of the revisionism debate at the turn of the century.

13. For a recent articulation of these views, see the articles in *Rinascita*, 28 (July 20, 1978). For a general evaluation of the whole series of articles, see "Marx è Vivo, ma Gramsci è un po Sciupato," in *Espresso*, July 2, 1978.

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metaphysics. Lukács, of course, fully realized what was the price to be paid and, not without ambiguities, eventually came to reject the perspective of *History and Class Consciousness*.[14] He had come to recognize that the new realist framework clashed with the rigorously monistic neo-Hegelian reconstruction of Marxism so that, although he always fought to defend the dialectic, he had to substitute a "materialist" (i.e., neo-positivist) foundation for the earlier neo-Hegelian one, thus degrading that dialectic to a relatively secondary conceptual tool subsequently to be read back into the independently given material dimension. What had to be given up was precisely that rigorously immanentist perspective upon which Labriola always insisted.[15] Unlike Lukács, Racinaro holds on to the neo-Hegelian framework—Labriola's variety—while ascribing to political positions (e.g., the primacy of the party) maintainable only after the realistic reconstitution and the related acceptance of the infamous reflection theory of knowledge. His theoreticism clashes with his political realism. He longs for the *necessity* and *confidence* provided by the neo-Hegelian framework while operating within the empirical world of political contingencies.[16]

In fact, only by means of such a unitary and all-encompassing account can he systematically criticize the turn-of-the-century critics of Marxism for *immediately* attempting to have Marxist theory and facts correspond (Georg Adler, p. 84); provide a nominalistic account of theory (Conrad Schmidt—and even the old Engels—pp. 94-95); reduce theory to a regulative principle (Sombart, p. 102), or within a naturalistic framework, to a rigorous science in order to show later how Marxism falls short (Boehm-Bawerk, p. 128); to a heuristic principle for historiography (Croce, pp. 162-164); or to the expression of a definite and obsolescent phase of capitalist development (Sorel, p. 202). Racinaro's version of Marxism cannot be challenged by facts (p. 75),[17] and it relates to politics through the mediation of the party (p. 236). By

14. For a fuller elaboration of this problem, see my "Dialectic and Materialism in Lukács," *Telos* 11 (Spring 1972), pp. 105-133.

15. For Labriola, of course, the *philosophy of praxis* understood as "the philosophy immanent in things" is the kernel of historical materialism. Cf. *Socialism and Philosophy, op. cit.*, p. 60. Under the subsequently acknowledged influence of neo-Kantian Marxism (especially Max Adler), Lukács in *History and Class Consciousness* had already presupposed a dualism—eventually rejected in the "Preface to the New Edition (1967)" (London, 1971), p. xvi—which was criticized by Gramsci in the only reference to Lukács in the *Prison Notebooks* (p. 448). Although both for Labriola as well as for Lukács the dialectic is always a method, the role that it fulfills is quite different within an Hegelian Marxism and a Diamat or realist account. In the first it has *structuring* and *constitutive* functions, while in the second it is forcibly superimposed and relatively irrelevant to the content. This difference, of course, cannot be investigated in detail here. For present purposes, however, what is crucial is that *only* in the first case can the dialectic sustain Labriola's "morphological prediction" which Racinaro wants to retain at all costs (pp. 60-63). As Racinaro himself convincingly shows in his discussion of those critics of Marxism who considered the theory an empirical generalization, any subsequent effort to evaluate theory with the same criteria generally used in the natural sciences fails and, in the specific case of people such as Boehm-Bawerk, had lead to the rejection of Marxism (pp. 112-129).

16. This is why Racinaro carefully reconstructs the Hegelian dialectic as a *logic of forms* against the Crocean version as a *logic of foundations* (pp. 163-172). What he does not question is how such a logic can be sustained in the absence of collective subjectivity or, if such a collective subjectivity is identified with the party, how to reconcile theoretically the two dimensions between which the party is to mediate. Either there is a unitary perspective—in which case the party becomes superfluous given the presupposed subject-object identity—or there is a dualism for the party to mediate but which excludes the possibility of a unitary perspective. *Tertium non datur.*

17. This is a standard Hegelian position. Lukács himself closed the first draft of "What Is 'Orthodox' Marxism?" by quoting Fichte to the effect that, in the event of a conflict between

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simultaneously (and contradictorily) accepting both a unitary neo-Hegelian account and a dualistic perspective necessitating party mediation, Racinaro ends up ascribing a crucial function to the mediation between theory and politics. But since such mediation is neither clearly specified by the theory nor immediately obvious from the very nature of the facts, the whole approach turns out to be completely arbitrary. In this sense, Racinaro falls squarely in line with the neo-Stalinist tradition. On the one hand, there is Marxist theory unpolluted by any historical events, facts, or other empirical irrelevancies, and on the other hand, there is a reality that presents itself always as phenomena or appearance to be deciphered dialectically (with the help of the theory) by party intellectuals.[18] All the previously haphazardly listed crises of Marxism thus become so many accidents accountable through an appropriate number of mediations relating them to the still and forever pure theory![19]

What is most problematic in this account is that, in reconstructing this brand of Marxist theory as "the tradition," i.e., as "the dialectical unity of the process," Racinaro must postulate a break between *his* Labriola and Gramsci (p. 14) and dismiss, without providing any arguments for doing so, Labriola's last work—the fourth essay—(p. 16), which is actually *the missing link* between the two thinkers in the tradition of Italian Marxism. It is in that essay that Labriola came to accept the necessarily fragmentary nature of his work and the impossibility of Marxism as a philosophy of history or a general science. Thus, he wrote: "...these chapters remain fragmentary. He who would blame me for this should attempt to tell me what path he, the severe critic, would follow in order to overcome this fragmentary state of our knowledge at the present time, and in order to integrate it in the totality of a perfect vision. The wisest and most profound objection that has ever been made against every *system* of philosophy of history is Wundt's: we do not know where history will end up. Which means—if I have understood it correctly—that we never have it all under our eyes as something already done, in the same way that we examine the individual animal or vegetable organism. *En attendant* that, who knows, the total retrospection

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theory and facts, "So much the worse for the facts." Cf. his *Political Writings 1919-1929* (London, 1972), p. 27. In the second draft, in *History and Class Consciousness*, the quote is omitted but the position is even strengthened by characterizing facts as *"the products of a definite historical epoch"* and by arguing that only in relation to the totality "can knowledge of the facts hope to become knowledge of reality." *Op.cit.*, pp. 7-8. The same, of course, is true of Labriola and Gramsci, who repeatedly discussed the constituted character of facts. Cf. *Prison Notebooks, op. cit.*, p. 445. Needless to say, with the theory of reflection of dualistic and positivistic Marxism, this is no longer the case and, in the words of the aging Engels, "dialectical philosophy itself is nothing more than the mere reflection of this process (objective historical development) in the thinking brain." Cf. Frederick Engels, "Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy," in Marx-Engels, *Selected Works* (Moscow, 1962), p. 363.

18. The problem with this grafting of a neo-Hegelian version of Marxism onto a dualistic framework where theory's translation into practice is mediated by the party is that the latter cannot fulfill the epistemological task required to displace Lukács' subject-object identity or some other version of Hegel's Absolute. As Castoriadis has shown, the forced substitution of the party for this Absolute degrades revolutionary theory to the level of the ideology of a manipulative bureaucracy (cf. Cornelius Castoriadis, *L'Institution Imaginaire de la Societe*, Paris, 1975, p. 82) and becomes vulnerable to all the impressionistic but highly effective attacks massed by the French "New Philosophers." For a controversial discussion of the latter, see the series of comments in the section on "Nouvelle Philosophie" in *Telos* 33 (Fall 1977), pp. 93-122.

19. The orthodox Marxist-Leninist character of Racinaro's account can be readily seen, among other things, in what he considers major crises of Marxism. In addition to the crisis precipitated by the revisionism debate and the present one, he, along with Paggi, admits of only one other crisis: that precipitated in the 1930s by "the abandonment of the model of transformation typical of the Third International" (p. 18n).

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of the life of the human species is realized in the brain of a fortunate and perfect philosopher of the future, let us be content for the time being with that partial vision that we can presently gain. As for myself, I am satisfied with this."[20] Given this state of affairs, it is also understandable why, a few pages later, Labriola explicitly rejected the kind of theoreticism that Racinaro attempts to recycle as the Marxist "tradition:" "In a few words, the criteria of sociological analysis must be from now on the guiding principles of every historical research: but the latter remains always bound to the ineliminable empirical reasons of the representation of the fact and must reject whatever pretense of aprioristic imperatives."[21] Thus, the arrival point of Labriola's intellectual trajectory—the rejection of any philosophy of history, the recognition of the necessarily fragmentary character of theory, the emphasis on what Adorno would later call "micrology"—anticipated many of the positions later articulated by the Frankfurt School.[22] It is ironic that Racinaro reconstructs Labriola as a stalwart of precisely that Marxism-Leninism of which the main figures of the Frankfurt School became some of the most outspoken opponents.

Racinaro accounts for Labriola's theoretical retreat in terms of the latter's inability to develop a concept of imperialism and of the party, and thus to update Marxism in terms of the new historical phase of capitalism. Accordingly, the fragmentation of thought reflects an actual fragmentation of life (p. 11) and represents an effort to re-establish bourgeois hegemony in a context in which earlier classical syntheses were no longer adequate. Of course, the development of the party is the Marxist answer so that a unitary perspective can be reasserted as the self-becoming of that party's implementation of what by now has become a *dogmatically* hypostatized system of ideas apologizing for whatever policies happen to be followed. What degrades Marxism to the level of dogma is precisely the substitution of the party for any genuine theoretical foundation. This party as "the social brain" (p. 27) is a euphemism for a would-be bureaucracy attempting to displace the one presently in power.

This, however, is Marxist-Leninist science fiction. Historically, the Italian Marxist tradition unfolded in quite different ways. Far from constituting a retreat, Labriola's conclusions became Gramsci's fundamental premises—even though the theoretical path leading from Labriola to Gramsci took a wide detour through Croce. It is well known how Gramsci began his political career as a Crocean and remained more or less under that influence throughout his life.[23] Thus, it is not surprising that Gramsci always violently rejected any attempt to present Marxism as a science, which he regarded as superstructure and ideology—even a "superior form of witchcraft" when too much is expected of it.[24] Marxism is for Gramsci pedagogical theory: "it is a superstructure, it is the terrain upon which determinate social groups become conscious of their own social being, of their own strength, of their own tasks and of

20. Cf. Antonio Labriola, *La Concezione Materialistica della Storia*, edited by Eugenio Garin (Bari, 1965), p. 323.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 346.

22. For a fuller elaboration of this point, see my "Labriola and the Roots of Eurocommunism," in *Berkeley Journal of Sociology*, 1978.

23. Gramsci himself admitted as much: "In February 1917...I was tendentially rather Crocean." And even toward the end of his life he insisted on the need to carry out "for Croce's philosophical conception the same reduction that (Marx and Engels) have carried out for the Hegelian conception." He even suggested that the writing of an Anti-Croce was worth 10 years of the intellectual activity of "a whole group of men." Cf. Antonio Gramsci, *Quaderni del Carcere*, edited by Valentino Gerratana (Turin, 1975), vol. II, pp. 1233-1234.

24. *Ibid.*, pp. 1455-1457. Of course, Gramsci's entire polemic against Bukharin is an attack on all forms of scientistic Marxism. Cf. *Prison Notebooks, op. cit.*, pp. 419-472.

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their own becoming... is the expression of these subaltern classes who want to educate themselves in the art of government and who have an interest in knowing all the truths, even the most unpleasant ones..."[25] In this formulation, however, Marxism no longer has its "managerial" pretensions and the party is reduced from a team of social technicans ready to become bureaucrats running reality according to the metaphysically guaranteed principles of a super-science, to mostly pedagogical functionaries. Whereas in the traditional Leninist framework politics deteriorates to a manipulative technique whereby the unenlightened come to accept (or are forced to do so) the higher scientific mandates, in the Gramscian and Togliattian tradition politics *in the classical sense* remains central since the main goal is the emancipation of the masses to the level of political competence rather than any fixed or definitive plan of social reconstruction.[26] It is not difficult to recognize in the latter version the official policy of the Italian Communist Party, which in the past has been taken with more than a grain of salt, given the Leninist rhetoric, the existence of strong internal Marxist-Leninist factions, and the traditional support of Russian foreign policy.

Considering that the pretended "dialectical unity of the process" has neither theoretical nor historical foundations and, at best, thrives only in the imagination of relatively marginal groups still taking Leninism seriously, the increasingly louder requests that the Italian Communist Party break with its lingering Marxism-Leninism by people such as Bobbio and Salvadori—who are the real targets of Racinaro's attack—remain valid as premises for a politically unified Left to seriously develop a Eurocommunist program. The kind of strategy pursued by the Communist Party in relation to the Christian Democrats, i.e., of acknowledging internal divisions within them and wooing the progressive wings, should be pursued by libertarian socialists in relation to the Communist Party itself. This would entail the vindication of the Crocean-Gramscian-Togliattian tradition of Italian Marxism, the isolation of lingering Leninist or "scientistic" elements, and the full unfolding of the historical compromise line as both the continuation of the authentic tradition as well as the premise of a politically viable Eurocommunism.

Where does this leave Racinaro's account of the "revisionism debate?" Since his rehabilitation of Labriola's defense of the theory of value as "a typical premise without which all the rest is unthinkable" (p. 136) presupposes Marxism as a general science sustained by a notion of collective subjectivity (p. 63) which bit the dust with the disintegration of the Hegelian system as well as in Labriola's last work—and, furthermore, which cannot be resuscitated by any theory of the party as mediator—the turn-of-the-century critiques of Marxism remain far from buried. Although things such as the problem of the transformation of value into prices, or the alleged contradiction between the first and third volume of *Capital* today may appear a little on the scholastic side, the question of the status of social theory, the relation between Marxism and socialism, the genesis and structure of capitalism, the connection between historiography and sociology, and scores of such similar issues remain very much on the agenda. It is no accident that Racinaro's interlocutors seem

25. *Quaderni del Carcere, op.cit.*, pp. 1319-1320.

26. This is also a result of the fact that, as Bobbio has shown, not only are there no *viable* alternatives to representative democracy, but there is no such thing as a distinctly Marxist theory of the state. Cf. Norberto Bobbio, "Is There a Marxist Theory of the State?" and "Are There Alternatives to Representative Democracy?" both in *Telos* 35 (Spring 1978), pp. 5-30. Of course, the Marxist-Leninist "alternatives," especially as they have been historically implemented, are definitely no improvement over the "bourgeois model."

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to be still busy threshing them around. Far from settling matters once and for all with the various Max Adlers, Werner Sombarts, Conrad Schmidts, etc., Racinaro unwittingly ends up inviting us to dust off their books from the remote library shelves where they have long ago been relegated, and to re-examine their arguments with care.

Paul Piccone

Francis Hearn. *Domination, Legitimation, and Resistance: The Incorporation of the Nineteenth-Century English Working Class.* Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1978. 309 pages. $17.95.

There is a hidden history of industrial capitalism. It has two related parts. One is how pre-capitalist traditions, non-rational forms of culture, play, fantasy, and imagination provided sources of resistance to exchange and formal rationality. The other involves the systematic repression and elimination of these traditions and cultures. Over the past century or so, the assimilation of people with non-industrial traditions into an individualized labor market, harsh and alienating labor, the separation of work and leisure, and a reified world of quantified values and ideas, was beset with suffering, anguish, pain, and conflict. Not merely the contradictions or anarchy of the competitive market, but more importantly, the severe antagonisms prevailing between the popular culture of the working classes and the objective requirements of self-expanding capitalist economy generated those now-forgotten battles between workers and owners over the nature and direction of the industrial economy.[1]

The entrepreneurial period of Western capitalism was one in which exploitation and domination generated class conflict through the symbolic mediation of conflicting cultural traditions of the workers and the various radical ideologies promulgated through intellectuals and political parties. Never a mere figment of Marx's Hegelian imagination, the class struggles of this period were serious and bloody affairs fought not merely over the equal distribution of the social product but over issues of power, dignity, justice, and social accountability.[2] At various historical junctures, there were imminent possibilities of proletarian revolution: America in 1877; the Paris Commune; Germany, Hungary, and Italy in 1918; and England during the 1820s-30s, as Hearn demonstrates in his history of the English working class. If Adam Smith's *The Wealth of Nations* represented the laissez-faire ideology of the bourgeoisie, then Karl Marx's *The Communist Manifesto* represented that of the struggling proletariat. The correct history of this period, as Hearn reminds us, is not one of the linear expansion of private capital and the acquiescent assimilation of the working class into the benefits of liberalism, but of a battle between classes over whose hegemony would govern industrial society.

1. In addition to Hearn's book, cf. also E.P. Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class* (New York, 1963); Stuart Ewen, *Captains of Consciousness* (New York, 1976); Herbert Gutman, *Work, Culture and Society in Industrializing America* (New York, 1977); Melvyn Dubofsky, *Industrialism and the American Worker, 1865-1920* (Arlington Heights, Illinois, 1975); and Robert W. Malcolmson, *Popular Recreations in English Society, 1700-1850* (New York, 1973).

2. For America, one excellent source on this is Jeremy Brecher, *Strike!* (San Francisco, 1972).

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Notwithstanding the efforts of such works as Aronowitz's *False Promises*, the entrepreneurial period of hegemonic struggle—a struggle which Marx accurately interpreted as that between classes—is long behind us. It is an aspect of our collective history, but no longer a living social formation.[3] The reason seems apparently simple: the bourgeoisie won the battle through its control over the official means of violence and through a protracted process of cultural and ideological hegemony. While these processes were differently timed in the various countries of the West, the end result was generally the same: the systematic destruction of all pre-capitalist and non-rational forms of tradition and culture and of those social formations which had been supportive of individuality, social privatism, and protest (Italy and France, with different political traditions, would be exceptions to this generalization).

As capitalism shifted to its monopoly stage through such strategies as Taylorism, mass production and consumption, the culture industry, mass education, and the administrative state, it no longer needed to rely on either repressive force or ideological controls in order to reproduce itself.[4] New processes of socialization were able to incorporate latent patterns, or unconscious codes, of thought and behavior *reflective of the social totality of social capital and instrumental rationality.* Individuals were no longer the representatives of a distinct social class or private personalities. They became the monadic embodiments of a social totality who have long since learned to be self-seeking and competitive, with a generally instrumentalized outlook on self and society.[5]

It is to Hearn's credit that he shows us a portrait of our past when this was not the case, a past that has been long forgotten because of the "social amnesia" which characterizes the reification of contemporary consciousness.[6] While others will surely read this book as yet another "technical" historical study of the making of the English working class following the historiographic breakthrough of Thompson's now classic work, this would be to mis-read its political meanings and messages.

One message is that the contemporary anguish, lack of political vision and hope, boredom, and anxiety,[7] is the result of an inability to fantasize and imaginatively reconstruct a past through play and communality. Because of one-dimensionality—the reproduction of the rationality of the social totality within the person's character structure—individuals have been robbed of that ability to contextualize themselves within a historical continuum beginning in the past and extending into the future. Having been separated from the past and its traditions, individuals no longer have

3. See my "Beyond Class: The Decline of Industrial Labor and Leisure," *Telos* 28 (Summer 1976), pp. 55-80; Dean MacCannell, *The Tourist: A New Theory of the Leisure Class* (New York, 1976); and Jean Cohen, "False Premises," *Telos* 24 (Summer 1975), pp. 135-157.

4. The work of the Frankfurt School (as well as that of the American sociologists C. Wright Mills, Alvin Gouldner, Seymour M. Lipset, and Daniel Bell) was an attempt to come to terms, often from within Marxian assumptions, with these developments. Excellent historical analyses of this transition are Harry Braverman, *Labor and Monopoly Capital* (New York, 1974); David Noble, *America by Design* (New York, 1977); Stuart Ewen, *Captains of Consciousness, op. cit.*; and Alvin Gouldner, *The Dialectic of Ideology and Technology* (New York, 1976).

5. In addition to the works of Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse, cf. Maurice Stein, *The Eclipse of Community* (New York, 1965); Richard Sennett, *The Fall of Public Man* (New York, 1977); Philip Slater, *The Pursuit of Loneliness* (Boston, 1976); and Christopher Lasch, *Haven in a Heartless World* (New York, 1977).

6. "All reification is a forgetting" stated Horkheimer and Adorno, as quoted in Russell Jacoby, *Social Amnesia* (Boston, 1975), p. 4.

7. Excellent descriptions can be found in Christopher Lasch, "The Narcissist Society," *New York Review of Books*, 23:15 (September 30, 1976), pp. 5-12; and Herbert Hendin, *The Age of Sensation* (New York, 1975).

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access to those symbols or myths through which they could articulate a social consciousness which would expose the reified legitimations of advanced capitalist society. They have also been separated from communal and spontaneous forms of play through which this past could be romantically and imaginatively reconstructed. Hearn's purpose is to reveal our collective past, a past in which class-autonomous cultural traditions sustained secure social identities and which provided the psychic and social infrastructure for resistance to domination. Not merely documenting the historical onset of one-dimensionality, then, Hearn is reconstructing our past so that we may employ it as a force with which to transcend one-dimensionality.

Hearn's thesis that a critical consciousness can be generated through the noninstrumental activity of play, fantasy, and remembered past is articulated through an analysis of the rise and fall of the early 19th century English working class. Hearn demonstrates that the radical period of working class activity (1820s-30s) was neither a romantic defense or call for a return to the past nor mere negations of the emergent industrial society, but an organized and concerted effort to realize the ethical ideals of the pre-capitalist past through a radical change in the structure of industrial society. This future-oriented radicalism of the workers came about through the imaginative reconstruction of past traditions within the social context of play, ritual, and institutions embedded within distinct and protective working class communities. Within these communities, play and ritualism combined with imagination and remembrance to form both the structure and content of their protest and rebellious activity. Traditional culture—natural law ideology, an integrated sense of work and leisure, a multi-dimensional time sense, religious beliefs and practices—were reinterpreted and relived through non-rational and egalitarian social relations, and intentionally guided political activity which sought to impose a communalist ideology over the workings of the industrial economy.

Through a comprehensive interpretation of the secondary literature on this rebellion, Hearn convincingly argues that this protest had an intentional meaning of both negation and transcendence. As he documents, the Luddite, Swing, and Owenite movements were actions with the implicit long-range objectives of redistributing wealth (economic equality) and institutionalizing social responsibility (social justice), goals which emerged both out of the remembrance of past ideological traditions and the communal and playful institutions of the working class community. Neither remembrance nor play, but their interaction as content and form, ideology and social relations, were a necessary condition for radicalism within the material possibilities offered by industrial society. The middle class, in its new alliance with the government, found itself unable to legitimate effectively the new relations of capitalist domination and was forced to employ massive violent and legal repression to maintain social order.

Beginning in the 1830s the structure and content of working class protest began to change qualitatively. No longer radical or politically transcendent, working class protest assumed new institutional forms (such as trade unions) which articulated demands from within the presuppositions of industrial capitalism itself, which to Hearn marks the beginning of one-dimensionality. Through the hegemony of laissez-faire ideology with its stress on possessive individualism and self-help, the issue of social responsibility was individualized and implied only a social responsibility to one's self. Society was legitimate because it claimed to provide the necessary opportunities for personal achievement. This was coupled with the reified ideology of the exchange of equivalents whereby mutual obligations were specified in the form of

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the contractual exchange of monetary equivalents. The domination of capital was successfully masked through individualized and quantified criteria emanating from the performance of the economy itself, not through autonomous moral and ethical criteria. Individual behavior became tied to the performance criteria of the new economy—profits, progress, and self-help—which negated external ideological criteria of assessment.

As political consequence, the performance of the economy and the worker's individualized relationship to it was perceived as an objectified, or thing-like, process which was neither bound by normative obligations nor influenced by personal or social relations. The new working class cooperative societies and unions focused largely on increasing the individual worker's lot through such self-help efforts as moral improvement and education. In this context, working class demands became oriented either to the defense of status privilege (the labor aristocracy) or quantitative changes in work time or wage amount. Conspicuously absent among the working class was any adherence to the critical and transcendent ideologies from the past which had stressed social reciprocity, economic equality, and social justice. Notwithstanding the radical political challenge of the Chartist movement (which Hearn shows to have been a result of distinct working class groups still attached to traditional cultural forms and beliefs), working class protest was thus effectively contained and incorporated as another building block for capitalist development.

This incorporation of the working class had little to do with either a rising standard of living or political suffrage, as is argued by liberal scholars. Hearn persuasively shows that both political repression and cultural hegemony by the middle class and the state brought about the incorporation. The political repression of working class protest and organized movements was savage and total. Deviating from Thompson's argument that the worker's maintained a distinctive class culture within their own communities, Hearn argues that this culture had become "flattened out" or stripped of its playful and imaginative components by the 1830s. Traditionally, play had been a social medium for the expression of fantasy, new meanings, and politically transcendent visions of a better future—or, as Hearn puts it, a medium for the remembrance of the idealized past. With the reification of both time and work, from which play was removed, the outright political repression of communal festivities and sports, and the successful middle class efforts to get the workers to accept self-help and moral improvement as the dominant means of social amelioration, the working class slowly lost the culture necessary for the remembrance and critical interpretation of past traditions.

Herein lies Hearn's central message regarding the incorporation of the English working class. Working class culture was primarily an oral culture, and the cultural and ideological traditions of the past were transmitted through distinct cultural practices, especially play and communal festivals. With the reification of work and time, and the outright repression of these cultural forms, the working class lost the social infrastructure necessary for the remembrance and transmission of counter-ideological beliefs and values. These beliefs and values were not carried on in the "mind" of the individual, nor did the worker have access to this tradition through a written culture, but instead, reenacted this tradition through communal forms. Therefore, the loss of these cultural forms *plus* the savage repression of political protest laid the necessary conditions for the working class' reception of new forms of ideological hegemony compatible with industrial capitalism.

Unfortunately, Hearn ends his historical analysis at this moment and winds up by

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arguing that the process of cultural repression, ideological hegemony, and commodity fetishism signals the onset of one-dimensionality as the workers' culture, the symbols of legitimacy, and political protest were transformed into the efficiency and calculability of exchange rationality. One-dimensional society is conceptualized as that society which organizes and legitimates itself solely in terms of formally rational and quantitative criteria (symbols of legitimation provided from productive activity alone), which is in contrast to two-dimensional society which organizes and legitimates instrumental activity in terms of social obligations and relations and autonomous mroal and ethical criteria. In the passage from two-dimensional to one-dimensional society, which Hearn locates in the entrepreneurial state of industrial capitalism, the industrial working class most radically challenged the capitalist order in terms of their interpretation of traditional modes of legitimation (especially norms of reciprocity). The subsequent incorporation of the working class into bourgeois society is interpreted as the successful domination of one-dimensionality. The primary dynamic of this early historic process was the repression and subsequent disappearance of the worker's ability imaginatively and playfully to reconstruct the past.

There are some problems with this conceptualization of one-dimensionality. Hearn's tendency is to equate two-dimensionality with traditional, pre-capitalist and emergent capitalist society, and one-dimensionality with a mature bourgeois society in its entrepreneurial phase. This abstract ideal-typification of concepts robs both capitalism and the one-dimensional thesis of its historical concreteness.[8] The repression of traditional culture, ideological hegemony (laissez-faire), and socialization into reified thought (the appearance of the market) does mark the onset of one-dimensionality but does not yet guarantee its completeness. To be sure, Hearn's documentation clearly shows that the repression of the worker's cultural and political activities forced the rebellious generation of English workers into a passive resignation to industrial capitalism and some gradual acceptance of its laissez-faire ideology. It is also clear that one of the politically vital results of all this was a severe reduction of the importance of traditional ideologies and communal forms of play and festivity. Yet, as Hearn admits, working class culture, while "flattened out," still remained a protective and distinctive class community not totally integrated into the social totality through the socialization of personality or character structure. While no longer a battleground for the ideological interpretation of the past, the working class community remained a distinctive sanctuary of sorts.

The problem is that Hearn too narrowly assumes that the repression of the playful attachment to the past sufficiently lays the social basis for one-dimensionality, thus ignoring the total loss of private individuality and class sanctuaries which would occur after a new stage of class conflict had emerged in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Because of this, Hearn erroneously assumes that the dialectic of domination and resistance in bourgeois society ends with the cultural repression and ideological incorporation of the radical generation of the early working class, or more generally, with the loss of play and remembrance. It is not surprising, therefore, that he is absolutely silent on the subsequent historical rise of Marxian ideology and politics among later generations of English workers, and of a new historical form of the class struggle generated by the antagonisms and anarchy of late entrepreneurial capitalism.[9] If one-dimensionality was as complete as Hearn portrays it by the 1840s,

8. Hearn follows Weber, Horkheimer and Adorno in identifying one-dimensionality with the all-encompassing processes of rationalization and reification attributed to pre-capitalist tendencies and all of bourgeois civilization.

9. Cf. Pauline Gregg, *Modern Britain* (New York, 1967), pp. 388-417; George Lichtheim, *A*

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how then was a Marxian and anarchist-inspired working class movement possible by the latter half of the nineteenth century (in England and other capitalist countries)?[10] To explain this we must consider the subsequent political importance of the still existent individuality and its interaction with the more formalized ideology of Marxism transmitted by intellectuals and embodied in political organizations.

Marxism as a formal ideology of critique and transcendence, and leftism as an organized politics, emerged precisely at that historical moment when tradition ceased as a source of politics and when ruling class ideological hegemony was inculcated on a mass-scale. The historic function of formal political ideologies is precisely that of organizing and mobilizing people's discontent and energies in a counter-ideological manner in the historical absence of a critical cultural tradition.[11] Subsequent generations of English workers would become radicalized by the organized efforts of a Left which would embody past traditions (equality, justice, and social responsibility) in the form of a radical ideology transmitted by intellectuals and political parties. In other words, following the cultural and ideological incorporation of the English working class, Marxism (and anarchism) replaced oral traditions while formalized political parties and organizations replaced communal institutions and play. One-dimensionality may begin but it does not end with Hearn's thesis of incorporation, since new ideological and political forms of resistance reemerged in the latter parts of the nineteenth century among English workers (such as the Labor Party, Fabianism, syndicalism). Such forms also envisioned an alternative future but did not necessitate the playful remembrance of the past, as new radical ideologies had incorporated many of the ideals of this past which was now transmitted by intellectuals and the written word.

Hearn's attempt to equate one-dimensionality with the repression of the playful reconstruction of the past and his silence on the role that radical thought and practice played in the working class struggle implies the following political interpretation. Once the industrial working class had lost its ability playfully and communally to reconstruct an ideological heritage, class struggle and revolution become dead issues. The subsequent attempt of Marxism and critical theory to posit the emancipatory possibilities of both private individuality and radical ideology were thus pipe dreams which had lost their material base. If this is the case, then the subsequent total socialization of the individual personality and the reification of all radical and political thought associated with monopoly stage of capitalism were mere trimmings on a project of domination that had long been completed. The Hegelian Marxism dream of theoretically mediating the empirical struggles of the workers was doomed to fail so long as the working class had lost its own culturally indigeneous sources of critical consciousness (tradition, play, remembrance).[12] I take this to be both one of

Short History of Socialism (New York, 1970), pp. 157-236; and H. Collins and C. Abramsky, *Karl Marx and the British Labour Movement* (London, 1965).

10. That these movements would themselves succumb to the reifying logic of commodity fetishism and positivism cannot be attributed solely to the "flattening out" of working class culture. On this, cf. Andrew Feenberg, "Reification and the Antinomies of Socialist Thought," *Telos* 10 (Winter 1971), pp. 93-118; and Lucio Colletti, "The Marxism of the Second International," *Telos* 8 (Summer 1971), pp. 84-90.

11. Cf. Gouldner, *The Dialectic of Ideology and Technology, op.cit.*, and Zygmunt Bauman, *Socialism: The Active Utopia* (New York, 1976).

12. Hearn is very explicit on this: "The source of critical thought—or, more specifically, critical reason—must be sought in the non-rational and non-instrumental, in man's culture-creating, as distinguished from structure-creating capacities. In this regard, play, imagination,

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Hearn's messages to contemporary radicals and expressive of the populism which resonates in much of American radical thought.

My critique, then, is this: the playful remembrance of past traditions was one historical source of a critical consciousness within a material context of crisis. This possibility only existed in the early stages of capitalism where pre-capitalist traditions informed consciousness and activity. Following the repression of tradition and play another source and form of critical consciousness emerged which joined with the remnants of the first: this is intellectually-created ideologies transmitted in public spheres to individuals with some semblance of personal autonomy. The historic function of Marxism in this entrepreneurial period was precisely that of recovering what was lost in community traditions and beliefs and doing battle with the ideology of laissez-faire and the consciousness of commodity fetishism. That Marxism lost this battle has to do with new historical forms of domination and socialization associated with the rise of monopoly capitalism which witnessed the destruction of the individual and the total reification of liberal and radical thought. The point is that one-dimensionality does not truly emerge until the systematic destruction of individuality through Taylorism and consumerism, the reintegration of private life into the social totality, and the reification of political theory. Contrary to Hearn, one-dimensionality can only exist in the *absence* of repression and ideological hegemony, whereby the social totality is reproduced within the very character structure of the individual through various social mechanisms.[13] Where there is only overt repression and ideological control then there is a possibility for counter-ideological challenge.

There is another, more important, issue rising from Hearn's book. That is the contemporary historical relevance of a theory of critical consciousness and revolt which posits the primary importance of play, tradition, and remembrance. Ignoring his own arguments on the historical repression and eradication of play, tradition, and remembrance during the last century, Hearn seeks to preserve these long-gone historical moments on a theoretical level by ontologizing (or reifying) a historical moment (revolt sustained by tradition and play in the industrializing stage of capitalism) into a theoretical truth.[14] Rejecting the claim that all social theories are bound to the historical concreteness of the concepts they employ, Hearn seeks to generalize his theory of critical consciousness and revolt beyond the early stage of capitalism where it so clearly applies.

Hearn fails to separate the historical concepts of the theory from its meta-theoretical foundations, and to acknowledge that the former are no longer applicable to the modern situation which must be reconceptualized in terms of the meta-theoretical base. The historical theory which must be shed is that the predominant medium

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and tradition (in the form of the remembered past) are of crucial importance. With the suppression of these culture-creating capacities, systematic resistance to deprivation, exploitation and domination becomes impossible" (p. 267).

13. I take this to be the central meaning of Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno's *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (New York, 1972) and Herbert Marcuse's *One-Dimensional Man* (Boston, 1964). For an excellent interpretation on the Freudian and social-psychological mechanisms of this domination, see Jacoby's *Social Amnesia, op.cit.*

14. He thus offers the generalization that "Rebellious and revolutionary activity become morally imperative only to the extent that the remembered past, as a community resource, is successfully mobilized. The rebellious impulse, which is after all an expression of compassion, is not delivered by economic crisis or disaffected intellectuals..." (p. 270). Hearn has written on this generalized political theory of play in "Toward a Critical Theory of Play," *Telos* 30 (Winter 1976-77), pp. 145-160.

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through which critical symbols emerge is the playful reconstruction of a romantically-imagined past, concepts which are rooted in a specific period of historical development. What is to be retained is the meta-theoretical base: the profoundly important insight that popular political radicalism presupposes some adherence to standards (symbols of evaluation) which can judge the efficacy or fairness of the prevailing state of affairs or current modes of legitimation. Falling into the same trap of orthodox Marxists and many critical theorists, Hearn seeks to reify a phenomenon which is historically specific into a trans-historical truth, thus preventing the theory from confronting new historical developments.[15]

Thus, paralleling Marcuse's own political trajectory, Hearn locates the possibilities for a critical consciousness in those lingering and marginal social formations within American society which have not yet been totally instrumentalized, especially working class ethnic communities and blue-collar shop floors. Committed to the trans-historical applicability of the theory, Hearn can only locate it within those marginal sectors where it may still apply. Thus, all is not lost as the historical past survives in those still-identifiable remnants of an industrial working class with a relatively autonomous culture and heritage, notwithstanding efforts of many liberals and radicals to write them out of existence. In the urban villages of large American cities one can still find the Irish, German, Italian, and the like, who partake in a way of life which has not been totally administered out of existence. Here are the remnants of tradition, communality, and perhaps ideological heritage which constitute the last line of defense against the administered society. Radical possibilities resonate, not with countercultural youth or the new left (however defunct), but with old-fashioned, ethnic, working class communities which still bubble with tradition.

Only romantic nostalgia articulated through a reified theory of rebellion can identify an infrastructure of critical consciousness within the ethnic communities of Boston's West End (long obliterated), Chicago's South Side, Philadelphia's Germantown, or old St. Louis. What Hearn fails to perceive is that the tradition and communality within these communities had long been "flattened out" in a manner comparable to the English working class community well over a century ago. But more to the point, the transition to one-dimensional society in America beginning in the 1920s, in working class communities as well as the suburbs, has socially and psychically replaced spontaneity, fantasy, play, and tradition with social privatism, the immediacy and cultural importance of present-time involvements, and a formally instrumental outlook on the self and its cultural activity.[16] In short, people were stripped of the social relations, ability, and need to either play or remember in a social context devoid of communality and tradition. Not only did one-dimensionality rid society of non-rational communal traditions and ideological heritages (with marginal exceptions to be sure), but transformed character structure in such a way as to preclude their recurrence. People no longer have that "ability" to relate to or be part of some organic community rooted in tradition.[17]

15. This problem of theoretical reification, especially as it applies to critical theory, is addressed by Paul Piccone, "The Changing Function of Critical Theory," *New German Critique*, 12 (Fall 1977), pp. 29-37.

16. Cf. Robert Lynd and Helen Lynd, *Middletown* (New York, 1929); Bennett Berger, *Working Class Suburb* (Berkeley, 1968); William Pilcher, *The Portland Longshoremen* (New York, 1972); William Kornblum, *Blue-Collar Community* (Chicago, 1974); and Lillian B. Rubin, *Worlds of Pain* (New York, 1976).

17. The narcissist personality is the severest, but not the only expression of this. Cf. Lasch, "The Narcissist Society," *op.cit.*

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But one-dimensionality is itself a historical, thus transitory, social formation only identifiable with the maturation of monopoly capitalism and the latter's success in destroying those non-rational phenomena which hindered its development. Once-realized, the administered society finds that it cannot function efficiently without that very affectivity, otherness, community, morality, or critical thought which it found necessary to obliterate in the transition period from entrepreneurial to monopoly capitalism.[18] In the contemporary context of this crisis of one-dimensionality, the repression of play, fantasy, or imagination is no longer necessary; they are encouraged and artificially created by those very institutions which had once eradicated them. Thus, we have witnessed the revival of ethnicity, fairs, and festivals in the cities, the programming of recreation and play for the over-regulated employees of corporations, a revival of the study and vocation of play and recreation within education, a pervasive interest among people for new and adventurous forms of sport and play (hang-gliding, motorcycling, canoeing, etc.), and the like. While the popularity and effects of the culture industry linger on, many are discovering the lost art of individualized and communalized forms of play, sport, and leisure.[19] These cultural activities, once contradictory to a society which was industrializing, now become necessary for its continued reproduction.

However, this playful response to an over-reified society performs more than just a new hegemonic function for advanced capitalism. The emancipatory moment of a revitalized play element in modern culture is the daily struggle to create a new individuality which takes the form of psychic-bodily expression and sensation in various new and spontaneous modes of play, sport, and leisure. These tendencies, ranging from the now-traditional counterculture to running, wilderness experience, disco dancing, travel and tourism, fairs and festivals, and participatory sports, take on all the proportions of an emergent and growing cultural movement bent on revitalizing the dehumanizing and over-socialized culture of one-dimensionality.[20] These new forms of cultural individuality are never totally privatized experiences programmed by the culture industry or consumerism, nor are they necessarily instrumental for the exchange or instrumental logic of capitalism. This new cultural tendency is expressed politically in those protests which seek to validate the rights of the individual for autonomy within institutional routines, for "time-out" from institutional demands, for more recreational space and objects within the city, and for an unspoiled wilderness. Surely, this modern cultural movement was and remains a central motivating factor in the student movement, the New Left, wild-cat strikes, and

18. For thematizations of this, cf. Paul Piccone, "The Crisis of One-Dimensionality," *Telos* 35 (Spring 1978), pp. 43-54; Tim Luke, "Culture and Politics in the Age of Artificial Negativity," *Telos* 35 (Spring 1978), pp. 55-72; and Hans Peter Dreitzel, "On the Political Meaning of Culture," *Beyond the Crisis,* ed. by Norman Birnbaum (New York, 1977), pp. 83-132.

19. For phenomenological descriptions of these cultural tendencies, cf. John Irwin, *Scenes* (Beverly Hills, 1977); Stanley Cohen and Laurie Taylor, *Escape Attempts* (New York, 1978); Hendin, *The Age of Sensation, op.cit.*; Andrea Fontana, "Over the Edge: A Return to Primitive Sensations in Play and Games," *Urban Life,* 7:2 (July 1978);, pp. 213-229; Louis A. Zurcher, *The Mutable Self* (Beverly Hills, 1977); and Daniel Bell, *The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism* (New York, 1976).

20. For groping and tentative attempts to theorize the new cultural movement, see Bell, *The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism, op.cit.*; Alain Touraine, *The Post-Industrial Society* (New York, 1971); pp. 193-226; MacCannell, *The Tourist, op.cit.*; and Joffre Dumazedier, *Toward a Society of Leisure* (New York, 1977). For pessimistic interpretations of modern cultural tendencies, still trapped within the Frankfurt School thesis of the demise of the individual, see Sennett, *The Fall of Public Man, op.cit.*, and Lasch, *Haven in a Heartless World, op.cit.*

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organized union demands.[21]

In both its cultural and political modes, then, the modern search for a new individuality and sociality of autonomy, playfulness, and community constitutes a historically-new teleology of everyday life and rebellion. This rebellion, grounded in an infrastructure of one-dimensionality rather than either tradition or remembrance, envisions play and communality as the goal of cultural activity and political rebellion. The historical situation is thus reversed: play and community, once an infrastrcuture for protest against exploitation and inequality, now become the goals for protest against one-dimensionality. There are hints and suggestions of all this in Hearn's work, but he has not explicitly worked out the modern historicity of the relation of play and rebellion as I suggest here. The point is simply that a modern critical theory of consciousness and rebellion can no longer rely on the strict cultural interrelationship of play, communal traditions, and remembrance in the traditional way.

While there are thus historical limitations to Hearn's theory, which needs to and can be rethematized as a social theory of rebellion, it nonetheless contains important insights for a *political* theory of the problem and failure of traditional as well as modern leftism. Leftism, as well as earlier workers' rebellions, failed because they became instrumentalized in terms of the quantitative and bureaucratic logic of capitalism. From the Social Democrats to the late New Left, the twentieth-century left has systematically shed itself of, or failed to consider, the practical or strategic significance of play and communality as a medium of political expression. An important political deduction from Hearn is that play and festivity, not bureaucratic organization, is essential to the development and maintenance of the rebellious disposition and a sense of community and esprit-de-corps among any tendency or movement for social change. His examples from the student rebellion of the late 60s and of shop-floor rebellions among workers point to the practical importance of spontaneous and festive play relations, or non-instrumental social activity generally, for the development and critical expression of a rebellious cause. Bureaucratic forms of leftism have robbed social movements of those relationships and feelings of playfulness, imagination, and spontaneity which are truly generative of an oppositional community.

My focus here is to point out the practical significance of play and communality in terms of a theory of appropriate political action in the context of a capitalism which easily instrumentalizes or destroys bureaucratic modes of opposition. Therefore, the rebellious impulse (whatever its social determinants or cultural mediations) must assume some playful mode so as to sustain community and purpose and to ensure political effectiveness in the long run. This is not, however, to argue for a politics of either spontaneity or subjectivity which has led to a retreat into a personal narcissism in the past, but only to point to the strategic importance of play in sustaining a community of rebels and in a way which counters the social logic of the organized system. Playful forms of political activity combined with leadership and ideology must be willed and created among the left as a new historical project. The modern challenge, upon which the future of leftism rests, is to synthesize a playful community

21. No one has yet ferretted out the cultural teleology of the search for a new individuality in these four political movements in any systematic and comparative way. For fragmented analyses, cf. Alfred Willener, *The Action-Image of Society: On Cultural Politicization* (New York, 1970) and John Zernan, "Organized Labor versus 'The Revolt Against Work'," *Telos* 21 (Fall 1974), pp. 194-206.

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of rebels with leadership and ideology; that is, the traditional antinomy of anarchism and Marxism must be broached in new ways.

The significance of playfulness as a teleology of modern culture and politics, and the strategic importance of play and communality in modern leftism, together highlight the strengths of a political thematization of play. When shorn of the historical encrustrations of tradition and remembrance, play is central to a theory and practice of modern rebellion: as the theoretical self-reflection of people striving for a renewed individuality in opposition to one-dimensionality and as a political practice which sustains a community of shared identity. A reading and critical discussion of Hearn is absolutely necessary for this project. Yet is must be remembered that Hearn's documentation of our repressed past and the political significance of remembrance and play through the social metaphor of the English working class is simultaneously a political obituary on that past and that theoretical and historical scholarship cannot bring back the good old days of the industrial worker, organic cultural communities, or ideological heritages.

John Alt

REPLY TO ALT

The rebellious disposition, Barrington Moore has recently reminded us, is rooted in moral outrage.[1] Rebellion and revolution presuppose moral categories and standards which give meaning and direction to outrage and enable people to discredit the legitimacy of the present order, legitimate opposition to this order, and anticipate future, alternative arrangements. Such categories and standards are not given by the present, nor are they offered by the future which, after all, has no content of its own. In *Domination, Legitimation, and Resistance*, I argue that these categories are created and sustained in the interaction of past and play, receiving content from the past and the context from play. In this interaction, the past is playfully or imaginatively reconstructed, portrayed not as it actually was, but as it should have been. Thus, the future, envisioned as a revitalization of an idealized past, is anticipated with reference to a historical moment that never was. More concretely, this argument suggests that the playfully remembered past gives people both contact with and distance from their situation, thus providing a basis for reflecting upon that situation and, if desirable, acting to change it. In this way, people are mobilized into movements or communities committed, at least temporarily, to forging a better future.

The political component of play resides in the open space and the time out of structure created by people in play. Within this space and during this time, new social arrangements and relations previously precluded by conventional constraints, are tested with virtual impunity. It is important to recognize that play does not conceal or deny the existing reality, rather it reorders and represents this reality, making it more manageable and meaningful. Just as play allows children to represent and transcend themselves, so it also enables the collectivity to re-present and transcend itself, to establish a set of criteria which permits a reflective and critical assessment of the

1. Barrington Moore, *Injustice: The Social Bases of Obedience and Revolt* (White Plains, N.Y., 1978).

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present. In this way, the real is examined in light of the possible, and the possible projected in play promises freedom from compulsion, hierarchy, inequality, and injustice. In play we are afforded a momentary glimpse of a better society, a society that does not produce moral outrage. When the human capacity to play and, along with it, the ability to formulate meaningful alternatives are suppressed, as was the case with the 19th century English working class, challenges to the established arrangements lose their transcendental thrust and become institutionalized.

In this merely a truth of the 19th century, a truth which becomes false, as John Alt suggests, with the supersession of entrepreneurial, industrializing capitalism by advanced industrial capitalism? I think not. The capacity to play with history and reality was not lost with the onset of one-dimensional society (despite Alt's remarks to the contrary), it was suppressed. And suppressed capacities, as Gorz notes, "persist—although the possibility of expressing [them] is denied... by the falsification, misinterpretation, and commercialization of the language and the objects... through which they seek to assert themselves."[2] The persistence of the playful return to the past (and its importance to popular insurrection) continues to be demonstrated in contemporary society—in wildcat strikes and work stoppages, in the short-lived communitarian and millenarian movements that often develop in the aftermath of the natural disaster, and, only ten years ago, in the student movements in the United States, Western Europe, and Japan.[3] The 1968 uprising in France was as much festival as anything else. Spontaneity, gaiety, a reverence for the past and a playful irreverance for the present prevailed. Of course, the better, the more decent society was merely celebrated during the 'May days,' it was not realized. In part, the failure of this most recent effort to remember—to make active in the present—the French Revolution can be traced to the opposition it encountered from the organized left—those same political parties, those same guardians of formal Marxist ideology, Alt manages to construe as the modern equivalent of the nonrational, community-based sources of the rebellious disposition.

If the events in France serve as still another reminder of the failure of traditional Marxian politics, they also highlight the limits and the anti-political potential of the playful politics. Play can provide people with a political sensibility, a sense of where to go and of what ought to be. To discover how to get there given what is—namely, the empirical constraints of the established order—is a theoretical question. To engage in those practices, guided by theory, that will bring us closer to our destination is a question of organization. The theoretical and organizational work necessary to the realization of a better society will be done only if we leave the open space and free time created in play and reenter, in order to confront, the administered space and time of the prevailing arrangements. This does not mean that spontaneity must be subordinated to organization, merely that some regular alternation be established between the playful celebration of the better society and the concrete steps being taken toward its realization. Otherwise, play becomes an end-in-itself, an avenue of escape,

2. André Gorz, *Socialism and Revolution,* trans. N. Denny (New York, 1973), pp. 26-27.

3. See, for instance, Richard A. Cloward and Frances Fox Piven, *Poor People's Movements* (New York, 1977); Bill Watson, "Counter-Planning on the Shop Floor," *Radical America,* 5:5 (1971); Michael Barkun, *Disaster and Millenium* (New Haven, 1974); Richard Flacks, "The Importance of the Romantic Myth for the New Left," *Theory and Society,* 2:3 (1975), pp. 401-414; Robert Lifton, "Individual Patterns in Historical Change: Imagery of Japanese Youth," *Comparative Studies in Society and History,* 6 (Winter 1964), pp. 369-383; Sherry Turkle, "Symbol and Festival in the French Student Uprising," pp. 68-100 in *Symbol and Politics in Communal Ideology,* S. Moore and B. Myerhoff, eds. (Ithaca, 1975).

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a way of dissociating from reality and the constraints and injustices sustained in that reality. Alone, without a language through which the experiences it engenders can gain theoretical expression, play produces not political sensibility but merely the appearance of freedom within unfreedom.

Dissociated from reality, play makes possible happiness in the midst of unhappiness and allows people to escape temporarily and forget the conditions of moral outrage. It comes as no surprise then that contemporary society sponsors a resurgence of play in the form of jogging, disco dancing, and guided tours of the wilderness. But these forms of play are administrative and unplayful, they close the open space and structure the time out of structures which are found in genuine play. Alt is right—these (unplayful) forms of play are tied up with the search for self-identity in one-dimensional society. However, they define not the crisis of this society, but its continued viability. We are witnessing not an emancipatory moment, but, as Jacoby very clearly shows, a subjective search for subjectivity, a meaningless quest for meaning.[4] As the open space possible in play is intruded on by professional gamesters, recreation experts, and entrepreneurs of human potential, it becomes more and more difficult to gain a sense of self-distance, and thus it becomes more difficult to play. "To play requires a freedom from the self," Sennett writes.[5] The contemporary playfulness in which Alt finds a liberating potential entails absorbtion in the self and merely masks continued submission to reality. Promoted by and expressed in terms set by the established arrangements, it is a playfulness that never comes into tension with reality, and it does not do so since the better society it anticipates, defined in terms of flashing lights and funky music, is already here, down the street in the local disco palace. This type of play, by giving the appearance of freedom in the midst of unfreedom, depoliticizes.

Despite my disagreements with Alt, I do concur with what is perhaps the most fundamental point he raises. If we take seriously the critical and political implications of play (as I believe Alt and I do), then it becomes one of our tasks to discover how to bridge the kind of political sensibility generated in play with the rational discourse of Critical Theory, to link the playful sense of where to go with a theoretically guided program of how to get there. This is the central contribution critical theorists as speakers of rational discourse are able to make to the playful forms of political activity popular insurrections initially take.

The general outline for this historical project is, as I have suggested elsewhere, presented in some detail in Gouldner's recent work.[6] In their effort to understand the whole, Gouldner argues, critical theorists order and conceptualize the social totality and in the process create extraordinary languages, languages able to mediate between the world and man's quest for meaning, between deficient and incomplete understandings of reality and the reason and reflexivity provided by critical discourse. This aspect of critical theory becomes important when, as is often the case with a playful politics, ordinary language and understanding become deficient, incapable of giving clear and political expression to experience. Critical social theory has the

4. Russell Jacoby, *Social Amnesia* (Boston, 1975).

5. Richard Sennett, *The Fall of Public Man* (New York, 1977), p. 319.

6. See my "Toward a Critical Theory of Play," *Telos* 30 (Winter 1977), pp. 145-160 and "Communitas and Social Theory," unpublished manuscript. Gouldner's relevant work on these matters includes *The Dialectic of Ideology and Technology* (New York, 1976); "Prologue to a Theory of Revolutionary Intellectuals," *Telos* 26 (Winter 1976), pp. 3-36; "The Metaphoricality of Marxism and the Context-Freeing Grammar of Socialism," *Theory and Society* 1 (Winter 1974), pp. 387-414; and "The Politics of the Mind," in his *For Sociology* (New York, 1973).

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capacity to link affect and sensibility with the analysis and cognition afforded by rational discourse, to give coherence and direction to the rich and imaginative symbolism generated by the playful return to the past. However, the potentially emancipatory rationality carried by critical theory has a tendency to cool down the 'collective effervescence' that develops in playful forms of political activity. In Gouldner's words, this rationality not only "entails an escape from...tradition but [also] imposes new constraints on expressivity, imagination, and play, and insists on control rather than openness as the key to truth, on a certain domination of nature, including the self, rather than on a surrender to it."[7] The avoidance of these rationalizing and, indeed, elitist tendencies requires the formation of theoretical communities.

Though grounded in rational discourse, the theoretical community—constituting an open space, one without hierarchy and injustice where equals can entertain and enact new social arrangements and relations has much in common with the nonrational communitas grounded in play. Unlike communitas, however, the theoretical community is always engaged with structure, and it is in this engagement with structure, its own structure, that it becomes fully reflexive. By reflecting upon its ongoing practice, its own effort to constitute itself as a decent society, the theoretical community might be able to suggest the direction needed if the decent society imagined and played in communitas is to be seriously pursued.

The theoretical community is capable of preventing the degeneration of a playful politics into some kind of countercultural escapism. At the same time, an infusion of play will reinforce the reflexive capacity and the sense of equality and of fairness which are necessary if the theoretical community is to avoid elitist developments that might transform it into a vanguard party. Of course, the theoretical community must never surrender its commitment to critical and rational discourse, but on occasion we, its members, must playfully celebrate the decent society which underlies and gives meaning to this commitment. Only in this way can we prepare ourselves to help mediate between the sense of a better society we experience in play and the truth of this society we discover as critical theorists and make as members of a theoretical community.

Frank Hearn

7. Gouldner, "Prologue to a Theory of Revolutionary Intellectuals," *op.cit.*, p. 20.

Zoltan Tar. *The Frankfurt School: The Critical Theories of Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno.* New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1977. $17.95.

Tar's thesis is simple: the "Critical Theory" or "Theory of Society" is neither Marxism nor sociology but rather an existential philosophy. With it he hopes to enlighten all those who have been duped into believing that the Frankfurt School represents "a Marxist orientation in sociology" (p. 2). Tar wishes to exercise this spectre of a radical sociology that he sees as haunting sociology. The book is, therefore, explicitly political in its value-committment to a "scientific sociology" that is compatible with establishment thinking; it sees radicalism and radical sociologies as merely infantile disorders of those headed for an establishment maturity (pp. 4, 12).

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Thus, Tar subscribes to that unwritten law that Jacoby criticized Jay of adhering to in relation to the Frankfurt School itself: "that radicals become conservatives, and Marxists, liberals."[1] However, Tar does not subscribe to this thesis in relation to the critical theorists themselves; for him they were never particularly Marxist. Tar totally assimilates their position to German Romanticism's critique of technology, as well as to certain elements of Judaic thought, thus justifying the labelling of "critical theory" as just another existential philosophy.

The thesis is truly ground-breaking. Whereas both Jay and Slater see the Frankfurt School as sliding away from Marxism, they never denied its substantial Marxian inheritance. Yet, it is this inheritance that Tar wishes to deny through what Adorno might have described as transcendent criticism. That is to say, his book criticizes "critical theory" not through an investigation of its internal coherence or contradictoriness and, thereby, its revelation of, or resignation to, reality. Rather, Tar seeks to establish external criteria of what constitutes the essence of Marxism and the essence of a "scientific sociology." With these criteria in hand, he is in a position to wield the axe. Not surprisingly, this method turns its subject matter into dead matter. The critique is a reified one, to borrow from Jacoby, because it seeks to establish criteria with which to measure cases of deviance.[2] Thus, it cannot fail to become yet another Frankfurt School interpretation which is, in fact, a distortion.

Another one of the main reasons for its distortion of the Frankfurt School lies in its organizational framework. Tar criticizes Jay for having stopped short by concluding his study in 1950, as well as of presenting a court history, thus claiming superiority for his own study by including critical theory's later stage, when supposedly, the Judaic influence became manifest (pp. 5,6). Yet, although Tar may cover a wider time-span, his study is nowhere near as comprehensive as Jay's, which was hardly a court history given its main thesis. Tar reduces the Frankfurt School to Horkheimer and Adorno, thus eliminating from consideration Marcuse, Benjamin, Pollock, and a host of others. In addition, he reduces their critical theories to their reflections on philosophy and sociology, thus almost eliminating the vital aesthetic moment of, especially, Adorno's thought (p. 8). Tar justifies this procedure by referring to Horkheimer and Adorno's textual pronouncements as to the identity of their philosophy; yet, although this stance informs the organization of the book in its refusal to offer equal and parallel treatments of Horkheimer and Adorno's separate developments (Adorno's early works are simply not treated), he is concerned to argue their ultimate dissimlarity, hence the subtitle of his book. Perhaps Tar is looking for the Frankfurt School's problematic, through which the various critical themes can be compared and differentiated. If so, the nearest he comes to finding it is in the term "existential philosophy," but for Tar this term is exclusively pejorative.

This leads to the most important reason for Tar's distortion of "critical theory:" he is a stranger to its mode of thought and to the Hegelian-Marxist tradition from which it is derived. For Tar, the "critical theory" possesses no truth-content due to the fact that it is non-scientific. Because it is mere (existential) philosophy, the task becomes one of formulating the elements of a reductive explanation of this strange concoction. Tar employs three interconnected modes of reductionist explanation. Firstly, he becomes a sociologist of knowledge concerned to argue critical theory's grounding in being: it is the manifestation of a group of intellectuals whose old social order was collapsing and who were not at home in the new (p. 10, 204-7). Tar also tries to

1. R. Jacoby, "Marxism and the Critical School," *Theory and Society*, 2 (1975), p. 232.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 265.

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illuminate further the individual dimension in relation to Horkheimer by locating the existential matrix of his throught. Here Tar discovers the old Oedipal conflict (p. 18). Closely connected with this is his emphasis on Horkheimer's Jewish origins, which enables Tar to dabble in the sociology of religion and culture (p. 181-189). He represents a more extensive mauling of the Frankfurt School than Slater, who acknowledged both its Marxism and limited truth-content before engaging in Marxist metacritique. Tar acknowledges neither their Marxism nor their truth-content. Reductionism replaces metacritique; the going-beyond becomes a going-under.

Tar tries to locate the non-Marxist character of the Frankfurt School's thought in Horkheimer's early writings, which is generally where most people try to locate its Marxism. He does not deny that Horkheimer's critical theory was an interpretation of Marxism; he merely argues that it was a wrong interpretation. This is because it deviates from basic tenets of Marxist epistemology and ontology, although he does admit, to be fair, they adhered to certain basic tenets of Marxian social theory. These basic philosophical tenets of classical Marxism turn out to be nothing more than the Engels-Lenin misinterpretation of Marxism as an eighteenth century materialism—the total separation of subject and object, in which the object's predominance is affirmed by the copy theory of knowledge etc.—all of which Horkheimer attacked in his critiques of logical positivism. Tar realizes this, of course, yet maintains that these are the classic criteria of Marxism and, therefore, Horkheimer is a case of deviance, a non-Marxist. Tar continues his criticism by arguing, in contradiction to what he said before, that they eventually eliminated all traces of Marxism from their "Critical Theory:" "Critical theory cannot qualify as Marxist because it deviates from the basic tenets of Marxist social theory, on the one hand, and because it never represented a synthesis of theory and praxis on the other" (p. 43).

Tar proves the identity of opposites by handling the theory-practice question as badly as Slater. Firstly, he explicitly reduces the theory-practice question to one of the use of violence. Through the skillful use of Weber, it is suggested that both Lukács and Horkheimer stood on the wrong side of the ethic of absolute ends—ethic of responsibility dichotomy: Horkheimer was pacifist, passive-pessimistic-Messianic while Lukács was militant, active-progressive messianic (p. 47). In other words, Horkheimer's shortage of practice is linked to his pacifism, the influence of Schopenhauer, of Judaic-messianism and so forth. It is not linked to the historical situation in which Horkheimer was writing, and it cannot be, for otherwise Tar would be forced to recognize that the advocacy of violence is not equivalent to practice; and practice itself, in the sense of a practice theoretically informed in an on-going debate between the intellectuals, the political avant-garde and the masses, as was Horkheimer's original formulation, was at that stage not objectively possible. While there is no doubt that Horkheimer and Adorno later came to reject the possibility of such a practice, Tar's explanation of this resignation in terms of Horkheimer's existential determinants is unsatisfactory. Not only that, it is a distortion of his own project, which is to "uncover" the Frankfurt School itself, for he reads the Frankfurt School backwards; Horkheimer's reactionary departure governs Tar's interpretation of the whole Frankfurt School's project, trajectory, and finale. If the Frankfurt School's resignationism is, indeed, inherent in its original problematic, then neither Tar nor Slater has proved it.[3]

Thus, in Tar's account the diminution of the significance of Marxism for the

3. P. Slater, *Origin and Significance of the Frankfurt School*, (London, 1977), p. 165.

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Frankfurt School is inevitable. In particular, the Marxian notion of reification, as revived by Lukacs, is totally ignored. It is this concept, rather than Romanticism or Judaism (pp. 54-55), which is the basis of Horkheimer and Adorno's critique of the domination of nature and their consequent compassion with the dominated. Tar acknowledges Lukács' influence (p. 23), but he does not relate it to Horkheimer and Adorno's *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, which is treated as one of the three phases in the Frankfurt School's interpretation of fascism. As to the first phase, fascism as the highest stage of capitalism, Tar reduces Horkheimer's position to an expression of Dimitrov's definition of fascism, thus assimilating their theoretical position to the ravings of the Comintern (pp. 74, 77). The second phase is that of the *dialectic of Enlightenment*, which for Tar marks a "definite turn from a militant though somewhat ambivalent *Critical Theory* to a social philosophy of despair" (p. 79). His interpretation is similar to Jay's, where class conflict is replaced by the wider conflict between man and nature (p. 80).[4] Yet, Tar takes the interpretation to its logical conclusion, for if the *Dialectic of Enlightenment* is not linked to the Marxian notion of reification, then it can be assimilated to traditional German philosophy of nature (p. 95).

György Markus has argued that Marx's use of the term reification can be found most clearly expressed in the following passage of *Capital*: "In capital...the reification (*Verdinglichung*) of social relations, the *immediate consequence of the material relations of production with their historical-social determination*, is accomplished...."[5] The expression "material relations of production" only seems to be a contradiction *in adjecto* because it depicts a contradiction in reality. It conceptualizes the fact that production is not a technically neutral metabolic relation between man and nature, but, because of the class nature of society, the social relations of production "determine—in a spontaneous way—the specific content, the specific historical economic goal to be fulfilled within the limiting conditions imposed by the material—"technical" requirements of proportionality."[6] The class-based aims of production and their rational-technical implementation are interwoven; it is this which makes possible the reversal of ends and means, which is a major theme of the *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, the *Eclipse of Reason*, and *Minima Moralia*. To quote from the latter: "If uninhibited people are by no means the most agreeable or even the freest, a society rid of its fetters might take thought that even the forces of production are not the deepest substratum of man, but represent his historical form adapted to the production of commodities. Perhaps the true society will grow tired of development and, out of freedom, leave possibilities unused, instead of storming under a confused compulsion to the conquest of strange stars."[7] I have quoted this passage because it provides the basis for the utopian vision of "eternal peace" that follows, and which Tar refers to as an example of Adorno's own desire to "cop-out:" "the wish and will" to have their peace and enjoy themselves," albeit with a bad conscience, is an attitude that continued with the critical theorists" (p. 11). The "Grand Hotel" thesis cannot be treated at the level of textual misinterpretation and personal vilification.

Thus, "critical theory" clearly recognized it was the historical form of production which has brought about this reversal of ends and means—the elevation of production

4. M. Jay, *The Dialectical Imagination*, (London, 1973), p. 256.
5. G. Markus, *Alienation and Reification in Marx and Lukács*, unpublished manuscript.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 9.
7. T.W. Adorno, *Minima Moralia*, (London, 1974), p. 156.

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to the telos of man's existence, and not simply technology or the necessity of material production as such. Yet, for Tar their position is a new *naturphilosophie* composed of Freudian psychoanalysis and speculative historico-sociological dimension (p. 95). The conclusion that "critical theory" has nothing to do with "real Marxism" is inevitable, for did not Marx admire natural science (p. 99)? For Tar, the Frankfurt School is neo-Romanticism posing as neo-Enlightenment; it "sees the roots of evil in the technological apparatus" (p. 101). Such a view leads Tar to challenge the *Dialectic of Enlightenment's* most original thesis: that unrestrained instrumental rationality leads not to an enlightened world, but to a new barbarism. Tar, quoting Lukács, argues that irrationalism, not reason itself, leads to fascism (p. 115). Yet, irrationalist thought is itself a product of a rationalized world, for if practical reason is robbed of all validity by the dominance of instrumental reason, then philosophy's reaction has been immediately to ground its ethical impulse in some quasi-biological or quasi-theological principle, thus trying to give itself a pseudo-scientific necessity it can never possess. As Adorno pointed out, this can lead to a rationalism or irrationalism, as in the case of the early Husserl. In relation to the third phase of the Frankfurt School's theory of fascism Tar has an ambiguous attitude, for the *Authoritarian Personality* is an academic classic, yet even here he tries to insinuate that perhaps a "true" Marxist would have looked to Pavlov, rather than Freud, for a psychological theory; after all, only Trotsky had defended Freud (p. 111).

The Frankfurt School's middle period gives way to their late period, which Tar sees as dedicated to a codification of their sociology—a thesis he textually signifies by replacing the label Critical Theory with "Theory of Society" (p. 137). Yet, the Theory of Society turns out to be, in fact, not a theory of society, for it is non-scientific. What is a scientific sociology? Tar has all the answers, five to be exact: science is built on the idea of discontinuity—no evolutionism; the idea of complementarity—any and all explanations are by no means mutually exclusive; relativity— cultural relativism; microcosm—small group studies; indeterminacy and statistical causality—empirical sociology's research methods (pp. 166-68). The most one can say of these mistaken banalities is that they are presented in an equally banal language (p. 196). Worse is to come: "there is general agreement among sociologists on two additional canons of modern science: on verification and on the principle that the community of scientists be the sole judge of the validity of scientific findings" (p. 169). This is a complete contradiction; the two principles belong to two entirely different schools of the philosophy of science: logical positivism and critical rationalism. The inductivist concept of theory-formation of the former meant that the theories themselves can only be verified by reference back to the reality which supposedly generated them. The Popperian critique of inductionism stresses the presentation of bold conjectures that are submitted to the criticism of fellow scientists; they are never verifiable, but only falsifiable if a single instance is found to contradict the theory. Only such a deductivist concept of theory-formation allowed room—from within the tradition of the modern philosophy of science—for a community of scientists to act as judges of scientific findings. Inductionism allows them no such right, for it makes truth a correspondence, rather than a consensus—an error which critical rationalism ultimately falls into and with which it does not reconcile its emphasis on problems and theories.[8]

8. J.A. Habermas, "Positivistically Bisected Rationalism," *The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology*, (London, 1976), pp. 203-4.

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With these pseudo-scientific criteria in hand, Tar is now ready to wield his sociological axe: the "Theory of Society violates the canons of scientific sociology significantly and therefore cannot qualify as a sociology" (p. 170). What is the purpose of such a conclusion given the fact, which he notes, that the Frankfurt School disdained sociology as a "child" of positivism? (This thesis Tar's book aptly, but unintentionally, demonstrates). It reads like an invocation to all Sociology Departments to extirpate heresy. The book is not a critical investigation, it is a sociological inquisition. Once again, as the "Theory of Society" is non-science, mere "artistic reflections combined with Marxian categories and elements, and a pessimistic philosophy of history," the task becomes to explain it away, and here Tar speaks of "existential overdetermination" (p. 170). Put simply, this translates as: Adorno—the artist. Of course, it cannot be denied that the Frankfurt School was short on concrete empirical work and that the sociological work they did produce represents a reduction of the original project of a historical materialism to a social psychology; yet, it is to be denied that Tar's scientific sociology could provide any satisfactory alternative. Besides, the empirical work they did produce stands, as previously implied, too close to the academic tradition Tar supports; while their speculative work stands too far from all empirical investigation, especially for Tar's value-free science that finds any philosophical moment detestable and artificial.

It is their refusal to separate philosophy from social theory which makes "critical theory" critical after the possibility of directly influencing practice disappears; and it is Tar's willingness to separate them that leads directly to his conclusion that critical theory is an existential philosophy. Through a total mis-reading of Hegel, which assimilates his idea of philosophy comprehending its age in thought to an historicism Hegel criticized in the very same *Introduction*, Tar argues that critical theory is another existential philosophy that expresses the crisis of its age. It is a "specific expression of a certain socio-historical condition and the situation of a social group, the marginal bourgeois-Jewish intelligentsia" (p. 205). They are no free-floating intelligentsia, as in Jay's portrayal, for this sociology of non-knowledge; this sociology of philosophy.

For Hegel, philosophy expresses not its age, but the truth of its age; it finds the ideal in the real, the rational in the actual, unlike Plato who projects the ideal into the beyond. In a certain way, this is a problem that also haunts Marxism, for although it convicts the real of a rationalized irrationality, it still must discover the elements of reason within the real which would explode the prevailing reality itself. If it does not, it collapses into Positivism or Platonism; perhaps, even into nihilism, which is what Tar accuses Adorno of adopting. Yet, this is simply untrue, for Adorno asserts the possibility of stepping out of (negative) dialectics; the possibility of a micrology that would study the pieces of authentic art that remain, for it is only in these that intimations of what lies beyond resides. This solution avoids nihilism, but it is still no solution, for although capitalism may have invented the proletariat it did not invent art; it is in no way a determinate negation of existing reality and if pressed into performing what it cannot perform it risks lapsing into affirmativism. If the micrology exists as a small step outside of dialectics, then it also exists as a small step outside of material exitence. Are not a material existence drained of possibility and an ideal sphere filled with it, the two sides of the complex Marcuse termed the affirmative culture? Of course, Adorno does not exhibit "the beautiful as present," but this is the problem, for, unlike Benjamin, he does not assign the "image sphere" any potentially revolutionary function at all; the beautiful is present only for the curator of the

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museum that micrology creates.[9]

If the dialectic is defined as merely negative, as that which explodes the structure of necessity by following its course, then the "ought" takes on a pure ideality. This is fruitful insofar as it refuses to give any material element a material necessity, but it is unfrutiful insofar as it is now only purely ideal elements that possess any possibility; any negating potential, any beyond. This distorts both the character of the real and the potentiality of ideals: Adorno makes the distance between them unbridgeable. Adorno has constructed a negative utopia for his negative dialectic, while the possibility of real negation retreats into the authentic utopias that authentic art-works project, and which micrology uncovers. The only thing that keeps this theory from affirmativism is the sense of "bitter resignation" (Arato and Piccone) with which it is carried out. Yet, on the political level, there is no doubt that for both the later Horkheimer and Adorno it results in a resigned affirmativism.

However, for a true believer of the "Church of Scientific Sociology," art and philosophy lie outside the province of a value-free science that Tar has elected to defend. Critical theory was founded on a critique of the possibility of any such science, and the attacks on it by defenders of value-free science have been invariably unfruitful. One could conclude that the two traditions have simply argued past one another, except for the fact that the depth of understanding and insight into positivism that critical theory has shown, has in no way been reciprocated. Tar's book does not confront critical theory with its own contradictions, but with positivism's own contradictions. Tar simply argues past critical theory, and beneath it.

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9. H. Marcuse, *Negations*, (London, 1968), p. 121.

Michael Löwy. *Pour une Sociologie des Intellectuels Revolutionnaires: L'Evolution Politique de Lukács, 1909-1929*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1976. 319 pages.

As a materialist theory of history and society which has placed its hopes on the consciousness and activity of the proletariat, Marxism has nurtured an endemic hostility to those "idealists" who come to the left from outside the working class: the intellectuals. The intellectuals have, in turn, responded with an equally long lasting and endemic tradition: self-abuse, and guilt, a kind of permanant legitimation crisis of left intellectuals who yearn to join the collective identical subject-object of history. A primitive "sociology of the intellectuals" has been the theoretical handmaiden of the often unhappy marriage of Marxism and the intellectuals. It postulates that because intellectuals are far removed from "material production" and or the proletariat, they are susceptible to a number of "idealist" viruses such as humanism, individualism or cultural criticism. Conversely, because the proletariat is immersed in "material" production it "naturally" inclines toward (falls into?) materialism. Alvin Gouldner has pointed out that this scheme cannot account for the fact that all of the communist revolutions of this century have been led by intellectuals, a lacuna he attributes to a

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deficit of historical self-consciousness in Marxism.[1] Michael Löwy's new book is an extremely important attempt to revive the historical self-consciousness of intellectuals, Marxist and non-Marxist alike, in a world of instrumental reason. An English translation by New Left Books is forthcoming.

Grounded in Lukács' own analysis of the domination of the economy over society (and Trotsky's analyses of "combined and even development" and "Stalin's Thermidor"), Löwy seeks a critical Marxist account of the socio-historical origins of Western Marxism. First, he develops a sociology of the German and Hungarian intelligentsia in the first third of this century by unfolding the forms of "romantic anti-capitalism" in each country. Second, he takes Lukács as a model of romantic anti-capitalism and follows the twists and turns of his political evolution out of the "tragic vision of the world" before 1917 to left wing communism (1919-1921) and then centrist Leninism (1923-1926). Third, he discusses Lukács' relation to Stalinism, a relation based, Löwy argues, on political views firmly established by 1929 and which changed very little until 1968.

Why is Lukács in particular a model for a larger sociology of revolutionary intellectuals? Löwy's answer is instructive. First, after Marx, Lukács was the most important traditional intellectual, that is, one deeply immersed in European culture as a whole, to join the worker's movement; second, because he came to Marxism at a relatively late point in his life, Lukács traversed a "long march towards Marx and Lenin" from 1909-1929; third, Lukács' thought was rooted in two cultures, Hungary and Germany, a grounding which added to the universality of his thinking; fourth, this universality was an intellectual expression of the "combined and uneven development" of industrially advanced Germany and relatively backward Hungary; fifth, at every stage in his political and intellectual development, Lukács displayed the quality of *Grundlichkeit*, that is, the tendency to push his position to its final consequences with "profound coherence and rigor." Lukács at various times in his evolution was an ideal typical neo-romantic, ultra leftist, Leninist and Stalinist.[2] Löwy's general sociology of revolutionary intellectuals is the following. Intellectuals are not a class but a social group defined by their "ideological role...(as) the direct producers of the ideological sphere" (p. 17). In their "relative autonomy" from both the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, they resemble the petit bourgeoisie (here not intended as a term of abuse.) What distinguishes intellectuals from the petit bourgeoisie as a whole is their immersion in a universe of "qualitative" values—"ethical, cultural, political and moral mediations." Hence, as intellectuals, they "spontaneously" come into conflict with the expansion of exchange value. "Instinctive, visceral anti-capitalism" is endemic among intellectuals who seek to defend "the old culture" against the "new culture" based on commodity fetishism. The opposition between "Culture" and "Civilization" established by the central European intelligentsia of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, that is, its "romantic anti-capitalism" was "precisely the expression" of this resistance to the domination of the economy over life (p. 23). Furthermore, intellectuals take ideas seriously and European intellectuals in this period took the ideas of the bourgeois revolution seriously.

Thus when the bourgeoisie, following the logic of capitalist growth, broke with its

1. Alvin Gouldner, "Prologue to a Theory of Revolutionary Intellectuals" *Telos* 26, Winter 1975-1976, pp. 3-36.

2. Paul Breines develops this point in his "Young Lukács, Old Lukács, New Lukács: A Review Essay" which is to appear shortly in the *Journal of Modern History*.

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own culture, the intelligentsia emerged as the defender of a bourgeois humanism which became incompatible with capitalist practice. (For Lukács' generation, World War I was the major trauma which revealed the gap between bourgeois culture and capitalism.) In order for the intelligentsia to become left wing revolutionaries however, its visceral repulsion with capitalism must be matched by an equally powerful attraction to Marxism. Marxism's particular appeal to the intellectuals lies in its claim to not only explain the origins of the domination of the economy over society and culture, but also to promise the abolition of this condition through the activity of the collective subject-object, the proletariat. The intellectuals, drawn to Marxism on this basis, display an anti-capitalism that is total, radical and incompatible with social democracy and orthodox Marxist scientism. For Löwy, Lukács' leap from a pre-Marxist, apolitical cultural critic to a utopian, left communist in 1917 displays this process in pristine form. In order to explain these metamorphoses in Lukács' political and philosophical thought, Löwy develops, in two very important chapters, an analysis of the vicissitudes of romantic anti-capitalism in Germany and Hungary from the turn of the century through the immediate post war years.

Löwy sees the German intelligentsia as the ideal typical case of romantic anti-capitalism engendered by the clash of *Kultur* and capitalism. Romantic anti-capitalism in Germany was "ideologically hermaphroditic," that is, it existed on the political right (Oswald Spengler, Paul Ernst), the left (Lukács and Bloch) and the liberal center (Max Weber, Thomas Mann). Löwy's escellent discussion of the Max Weber circle in Heidelberg (which included at various times Tönnies, Simmel, Alfred Weber, Robert Michels, Ernst Troeltsch, Ernst Bloch, and Lukács) confirms that romantic opposition to capitalism was by no means confined—as Lukács and Mannheim were later to argue—to conservatism and/or fascism.[3] The "tragic consciousness" of German sociology itself—expressed most clearly by Weber, Tonnies and Simmel—is the product of romantic-anti-capitalism which can see no way out of a reified world. What distinguished Weber and Simmel from the right and the left was not rationalism vs. irrationalism but a tragic resignation before an unsurmountable process of rationalization. In order to clarify the claim that the entire German

3. See Mannheim's "Conservative Thought" in *From Karl Mannheim*, ed. by Kurt Wolff, (New York, 1970); and Lukács' *Die Zerstörung der Vernunft*. In Löwy's view, Marx is an important exception to the predominance of neo-romanticism among German intellectuals. "Marx's socialism has nothing to do, socially or ideologically, with romantic anti-capitalism: it finds its roots in a completely different sector of the petit-bourgeoisie-jacobin, enlightened, revolutionary and democratic, anti-feudal and 'francophile.' Heinrich Heine, the great enemy of romanticism, was the great literary representative" of this tradition. Michael Löwy, *Pour une Sociologie des Intellectuels Revolutionaires, L'Evolution Politique de Lukács, 1909-1929,* Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1976. As Morris Abrams fine study, *Natural Supernaturalism* (New York, 1971), once again demonstrates, the impact of the romantic tradition in Germany on Marx was a strong one. Löwy's effort to seal Marx off from his romantic roots is not convincing. That Löwy seeks to understand the romantic tradition while keeping his distance from it is apparent from this evaluation of Lukács' accomplishments. "One of Lukács' greatest merits is to have reformulated in Marxist terms, with the theory of reification, the intellectual's confused and romantic critique of the inexorable process of quantification of the capitalist mode of production." Löwy, *op. cit.*, p. 23. Breines has made the important rejoinder that "that particular insight requires reformulation from the Romantic side: one of Lukács' great merits, it should be said, is to have criticized and reconstructed Marxism by way of the theory of reification which he derived from the intellectuals' 'confused and romantic critique'.... The importance of the young Lukács, in other words, is to have sought to restore to Marxism its lost Romantic dimension." Paul Breines, "Marxism, Romanticism and the Case of Georg Lukács: Notes of Some Recent Sources and Situations," *Studies in Romanticism*, Vol. 16 (Fall 1977), pp. 473-489.

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intelligentsia in this period—right, left and center—existed within the parameters of romantic anti-capitalism, Löwy offers a provocative interpretation of the character Naptha, in Mann's *Magic Mountain*. Lukács himself interpreted Naptha as an ideal typical fascist intellectual. Lukacs' critics have seen Naptha as a portrait of Lukács, Leninist in Jesuit disguise. Löwy sees Naptha as Mann's brilliant portrayal of an ideal typical romantic anti-capitalist in Germany, at once conservative and revolutionary.

The Hungarian intelligentsia in this period was also romantic anti-capitalist yet, unlike its German counterpart, it was not "ideologically hermaphroditic" but prodominantly on the revolutionary left. Why? Here Löwy employ's Trotsky's notion of "combined and uneven development" to explain the Hungarians' left turn in 1917-1919. As in Russia, the task of "permanent revolution," that is, moving directly from the destruction of feudalism to the overthrow of capitalism in one continuous process, fell to the proletariat. The intelligentsia in Hungary in this period was ideal typically "free floating." It was both anti-feudal and anti-capitalist and thus became "an intelligentsia abandoned to itself. . . its moderate wing deprived of its natural allies due to the absence of a liberal, democratic bourgeoisie and its revolutionary wing rejected by the social democratic worker's movement" (p. 86).

Why then did the neo-romantic protest, the search for authentic life expressed by Endre Ady and Erwin Szabo ("the spiritual fathers of the revolution of 1919") and their epigone, turn to revolution rather than reaction or resignation as it had in Germany? Because "in the absence of a revolutionary democratic bourgeoisie, the Jacobin intellectual tends irresistably toward the ideological camp of the proletariat. . . . What Marx in 1850 and Trotsky in 1906 called the permanent revolution is found in the lyrical vision of Endre Ady" (89). Unlike Germany, in Hungary the pre-capitalist world was not in an idealized past but part of an oppressive present. Löwy discusses the "free floating intelligentsia" in which Lukács traveled—the Galileo Circle, The Sunday Circle, and the Free School of the Human Sciences—as the product of an explosive brew: romantic anti-capitalism and Jacobin anti-feudalism. Up to 1917 these "revolutionaries without a revolution" (including Lukács of course) sustained a "tragic vision." Unlike their German counterparts, however, the Hungarians did not succomb to resignation because the immediate tasks of the anti-feudal revolution were simply too pressing. Hence, "the massive adhesion of intellectuals influenced by Ady and Szabo to the Hungarian Soviet Republic was the logical and coherent outcome of their ideological crisis" (p. 103-104). The revolution pointed beyond despair and anguish to hope.

Lukács' own path to Marxism from 1909 to 1919 is a biographical microcosm of these historical processes. Löwy sees in Endre Ady "the most revolutionary representative of Jacobin democracy in Hungary" and in Ernst Bloch "the most radical representative of cultural (romantic) anti-capitalism in Germany" (p. 107), the decisive personal and intellectual influences on Lukács in this period. With them, Lukács shared a complete break with the Hegelian concept of *Versöhnung*, "reconciliation," with reality, the concept that defined the resigned consciousness of the romantic anti-capitalism of German sociology, i.e., Weber and Simmel. Lukács' tragic consciousness in this period (as evident in *The Soul and the Forms,* (1910), *The Poverty of the Spirit*, (1912), and his correspondence) stemmed from a radical rejection of a corrupt and inauthentic world that allowed no escape, except perhaps elitist mysticism and or suicide—both of which Lukács considered and then rejected only after much inner struggle.[4] As other commentators on Lukács have pointed out,

4. The depth of Lukács' despair is evident in these entries from his diary during a period in which he considers and then decides not to commit suicide. "December 15, 1911. . . the crisis seems to be finished. . . . But I consider my 'life,' my capacity to continue to live as (a form of) decadence: for in committing suicide I would be living at the peak of my existence. . . . Now (after deciding not to commit suicide) everything is only a sad compromise and degradation. Löwy, *op. cit.*, p. 127.

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this conflict between authentic life and an "age of total degradation," "is" and "ought," remained absolutely intractable as long as no social force existed which could transform the world in accordance with authentic values.

However, what is especially interesting in Löwy's discussion of Lukács' way out of this impasse is his argument, based on an analysis of *The Theory of the Novel*, Lukács' wartime letters to Paul Ernst, and the outline for a major work on Dostoyevsky found after Lukács' death, that this path was blazed first by Dostoyevsky, not Lenin.[5] Through the prism of Dostoyevsky and Tolstoy's literary perceptions, Lukács saw a "prophetic light" which pointed beyond the rationalized, bourgeois West, beyond the misery of the First World War to a golden age of authentic community, culture and soul. Ernst Bloch, in an interview printed as an appendix to the text, confirms the powerful attraction the "Russian soul exercised on Lukács. Bloch suggests that the appeal of the Russian revolution to romantic anti-capitalist intellectuals such as Lukács took on "not only a moral but also a religious passion," and that this passion was directed toward the "Russian soul" whose profundity stood in stark contrast to the "superficial" rationalism of the West. It was from Dostoyevsky and Tolstoy, not Lenin, that Lukács discovered the nature of this "Russian soul." (In view of Löwy's analysis of the Hungarian intelligentsia and of his discussion of Dostoyevsky's importance for Lukács, it seems that the label "Western Marxism," (which, after all, is only a product of the debates at the 5th Congress of the International) has obscured the "Eastern" sources of Lukácsian theory. I will return to this issue.) Lukács' "passage to communism" out of his pre-Marxist "tragic vision of the world" took place under the impact of the October Revolution of 1917. What Löwy stresses as the central issue of this transition on the political level was Lukács' resolution of the dilemma of tactics and ethics, immoral means and moral ends, revolutionary violence and Kantian morality in the direction of "greater realism." Lukács' political essays of 1918 still insist upon the complete subordination of politics to ethics—good ends cannot be achieved with "evil" means, proletarian terror is no better than capitalist terror, etc. For Lukács to accept Bolshevism this absolute bifurcation of "ethical ends and immoral means" had to be jettisoned. As an active participant in revolutionary politics, Lukács reluctantly accepted the "tragic necessity for the revolutionary to kill on the field of battle in order to realize the final goal, the emancipation of the working class" (p. 162). For Löwy, this reluctant acceptance was the "decisive mediation" which allowed Lukács to pass "from the position of a tragic spectator to that of an engaged actor, from abstract moralism and metaphysics to a more realist(ic) political ethics" (p. 162).

What made this "realism" possible? In part, the violence of revolutionaries paled into insignificance—or some thought—in comparison with the bloodbath in the trenches of World War I. But, given the *Grundlichkeit* of Lukács' thought, his ruthless and frank honesty, this was not the major reason. In *Tactics and Ethics*, Löwy points out, Lukács argued that although murder can never be morally justified, it is at times *politically necessary* (italics mine). Hence, the revolutionary sacrifices his morality and soul to achieve the final goal. Between Tolstoian abstention from political violence, and the possibility of bringing about the good society little choice remains but to see in the proletariat the "dialectical mediation" between is and ought and hence resolve the "Faustian problem of ends and means" in favor of Bolshevism (p. 169-170). But what Löwy adds to the existing literature on Lukács' turn to Bolshevism is the fundamental, perhaps obvious, yet seldom discussed insight, that the Lukácsian critique of passivity, determinism, fatalism, etc., a critique which has often been assumed to be peculiarly anti-authoritarian and emancipatory, did *not only* involve a critique of reformism or

5. See Ferenc Feher's "The Last Phase of Romantic Anti-Capitalism," *New German Critique* (Winter 1977), pp. 139-154; and his "Am Scheideweg des romantischen Antikapitalismus: Typologie and Beitrag zur deutschen Ideologiegeschichte gelegentlich des Briefwechsels zwischen Paul Ernst and Georg Lukács," in *Die Seele und das Leben*, pp. 241-327 for more material on the impact of Dostoyevsky on Lukács.

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positivism or a stress on the importance of the *Geistige Faktor* i.e., consciousness and subjectivity. It also was justification of political violence that entered into what Marcuse has called the "authoritarian voluntarism" of Soviet Marxism. In other words, from the standpoint of emancipatory socialism Lukács' "defense of subjectivity" was a mixed blessing.

Löwy divides Lukács' political activity in the years immediately following the Russian Revolution into three phases. "Ethical leftism" marked the first phase (1919), during which time Lukács saw the proletariat as a wholly pure and uncorrupted revolutionary subject which must make absolutely no compromise with bourgoeis society. "Political leftism" characterized Lukács in 1920, when he was head of the Hungarian Communist Party in exile in Vienna, close to the "ultra-left" (Pannekoek, Gorter, Roland-Host, etc.) in the Third International, and a member of the editorial board of *Kommunismus*. "Political leftism" meant anti-parliamentarism, support for workers' councils but a move away from the ethical messianism" of the ultra-left to greater tactical "realism." By 1921, Lukács, partly in response to Lenin's criticism of the ultra-left in *Left Wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder*, moved to what Löwy calls "left Bolshevism," that is, a muting of council communism in favor of an acceptance of the Leninist theory of organization. Hence according to Löwy, Lukács' career as a "leftist" in the early communist movement lasted a grand total of three years, 1918-1921!

In other words, when *History and Class Consciousness* was published in 1923, Lukács' political leftism was already a thing of the past. In his political essays of this period, Lukács continued to insist, against economistic Marxism, that socialism must involve a moral and cultural, as well as institutional transformation. Nevertheless, Löwy argues that Lukács' political-moral evolution as a whole in this period, that is, from joining the Hungarian Communist Party in 1918 to the Third Congress of the international in 1921 can be described as being that of an "idealist intellectual who was suddenly thrown into the revolutionary torrent and whose moral fervor is little by little chilled by the glacial current of actual political struggle. . . a progressive descent to earth after a mystical ascent toward the absolute" without abandoning a revolutionary and humanist vision of socialism (p. 196). We can take issue with Löwy whether Lukács' "descent to earth" was progressive or regressive. But what is interesting to consider, especially for the social theorists of the 1960's who rediscovered the young Lukács because of his affinity to anti-authoritarian leftism, is that from the time Lukács joined the communist movement in 1917 until 1956, a period of 51 years, according to Löwy, he was an active exponent of anti-authoritarian leftism for only four years, 1917-1921.

The most important residue left by Lukács' "progressive descent to earth" was, of course, *History and Class Consciousness*. Far from expressing the utopian, council communism of this era, *History and Class Consciousness* is, for Löwy, the overcoming of the infantile leftism of 1918-1921. it represents the apogee of Lukács' political and theoretical evolution because it marks the point at which "the rigid opposition, inspired by a rigid ethics is abolished, *aufgehoben*, by a new conception: revolutionary realism. *History and Class Consciousness* is. . . the final stage of the ideological journey which led Lukács from the tragic vision of the world to Leninism" (p. 201). It overcomes both tragic but futile ethical protest at a soulless world as well as an undeserved reconciliation with a bad reality. The "revolutionary realism" of *History and Class Consciousness* "initiates a new theoretical universe. . . which abolishes and goes beyond the utopian tendencies of the 1919-1920 years" (p. 212).

Löwy sees *History and Class Consciousness* as Lukács' self-criticism of "antinomic Fichtean leftism" which produced an "unmediated" juxtaposition of is and ought, tactics and ethics "vulgar empiricism" and "idealist voluntarism." Once Lukács came to the conclusion that the consciousness of the proletariat established the objective

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possibility of mediating "is" and "ought" he, according to Löwy's account, surpassed the leftism of 1919-1920. Lukács at this point was a convinced Leninist, critical of embryonic signs of "degeneration" in the "empty and soulless" bureaucracy he saw, for example, in the Hungarian Communist Party in its Viennese exile.[6] *Lenin*, published in 1924 is then simply a continuation of the theory of the party articulated in *History and Class Consciousness*. The difference is that in 1923 Lukács stressed the cultural tasks of the proletariat as lying in the fulfillment of the promise of a humanism abandoned by the bourgeoisie. In 1924 he stressed its political task as one consisting of realizing the democracy which the now counter or non-revolutionary bourgeoisie was not able and willing to assume. Löwy takes issue with those who argue that the Stalinist seed was planted in *History and Class Consciousness*. Only when Lukács rejected the notion of "permanent revolution" and the "primacy of internationalism," that is, only from 1926 on did he take the steps that led him to Stalinism.

The revival of the young Lukács has not focused on Lukács' relation to Stalinism. To some extent, Löwy reproduces this focus.[7] In a 281 page text, the chapter on "Lukács and Stalinism" takes up 26 pages. It seems that a fundamental disproportion has been at work in the Lukács revival. The predominant part of his adult life, 1926-1956, remains little discussed. Here Löwy has begun to put things in proper focus. What became obvious from Löwy's account is that not only did Europe's most "important Marxist since Marx," the author of the founding text of humanist "critical" Marxism not use his grasp of European culture and his obvious genuis to make a straightforward opposition to Stalin's Gulag. Even worse, he provided a rationalization for Stalinism that was beyond lesser thinkers and party apparchiks.

Löwy's analysis of Stalinism follows Trotsky's very closely. "Beginning in 1924, after Lenin's death, a process of bureaucratization began in the USSR, which progressively substituted for the bolshevik old guard a conservative stratum whose most qualified, representative and incontestable leader was Joseph Stalin" (p. 227). The first sign of Lukács' reluctant reconciliation with Stalinism appeared in 1925 in his essay "Moses Hess and the Problem of the Idealist Dialectic." Whereas Lukács earlier had drawn close to Ady because he rejected all forms of "reconciliation" with a bad reality in "Moses Hess..." for the first time he praises the older Hegel for his "grandiose realism" and his "refusal of all utopias" (p. 229). Lukács compared himself to the older Hegel and he reconciled himself to Stalin's Russia after 1926 as Hegel had become reconciled to the Prussian state. After the "utopian revolutionary state of 1919-1921," a "monumental apogee of revolutionary realism" (1922-1924) came a turn "toward realism *tout court*" that is, "adhesion to the Soviet Thermidor" (p. 231). In 1935, Lukács wrote "Hölderlin's Hyperion," an essay which juxtaposed Hölderlin's completely futile, isolated opposition to the Prussian Thermidor, to Hegel's "realistic" reconciliation to the status quo. Löwy interprets the essay as constituting Lukács' response to Trotsky's "tragic and solitary" intransigence, and as "one of the most intelligent and subtle justifications for Stalinism, an unfortunate but "necessary" phase on the path of proletarian revolution (p. 233).

Lukács' political "realism" was demonstrated within the Communist movement in

6. In "Noch einmal Illusionpolitik" an essay published in *Voros* Ujsag (The Red Journal), a left opposition journal of the Hungarian Communist Party, in December 1921 Lukács criticized the bureaucratic impulse toward bosses, employees' cult of authority and servile rules of obedience he saw in the Party's Vienna office. Hence the Lukács of this period criticizes the "prefigurations of Stalinism" in "the name of a Leninist conception of the revolutionary party. His (Lukács') acceptance of Stalinism could take place only after 1926, that is, with the rupture—implicitly or explicitly—with the theses of *History and Class Consciousness*." Löwy, *op. cit.*, p. 222. In the debate over the roots of Stalinism, Löwy seeks—along with Trotsky—to juxtapose a non-Stalinist Leninism and Lukácsism to a later "degeneration."

7. An English translation of Löwy's analysis of Lukács' relation to Stalinism can be found in *New Left Review* 91 (May-June, 1975), pp. 25-41.

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1928 when he published the "Blum Theses," a position presented to the second congress of the Hungarian Communist Party which called for a turn away from the immediate council communism toward a popular front against fascism. Unfortunately for Lukács as a politician, the publication of the "Blum Theses" coincided with the beginning of the Comintern's Third Period (1928-1933), a period marked by ritual denunciation of social democratic parties as "social fascists." After the Béla Kun faction denounced him as an "opportunist," Lukács published a (totally hypocritical) "autocritique" confirming the "right opportunism" of his position. This "autocritique" Lukács saw as an "entry ticket" to anti-fascist political activity, that is, he believed that such activity was possible only within the Communist Movement. The "small humiliation" of the autocritique was bearable because Lukács was convinced that the Comintern would shift away from the disastrous policy of the Third Period. After his political defeat, Lukács withdrew from active political activity, or rather fought his battles on the place of literature and philosophy. Löwy sees the "Blum Theses" as the endpoint of "Lukács' long and tortuous spiritual iternary: they are the last stage of his political evolution, the ideological foundation of all of his intellectual production after 1928" (p. 237).

Löwy makes clear that Lukács did have a specific political position which did not change with every twist and turn of the Comintern line. From the late 20s to the 50s Lukács was in the Stalinist Center, i.e., he accepted socialism in one country and the end of internationalism as "realistic" if unfortunate necessities, but never abandoned the popular front position he took in 1928 in the "Blum Theses." Hence when the Comintern turned to the popular front (1934-1938; 1944-1948) Lukács became an eminent member of the Communist cultural establishment. He fell into "disgrace" during the Third Period (1929-1930), during the Hitler-Stalin Pact and in 1949-1950 when his affinities for Western bourgeois culture got in the way of an intensified cold war. From this pattern, Löwy concludes that "Lukács constituted a counter-current every time Stalinism found itself in brutal opposition with the democracy and culture of the bourgeois West" (p. 246).

In 1941, during the period of the Hitler-Stalin pact, Lukács was arrested by the NKVD, held in jail for several weeks, accused of being a Trotskyist agent and forced to write a political autobiography, a document which was unknown until Löwy discovered it in the Lukács Archives in Budapest. What is astonishing about the document is that there is not a single reference to Nazism or fascism, the struggle against which justified Lukács' adhesion to the "Soviet Thermidor" in 1928. What coherence can be found in such activity? "Lukács' intellectual and political career after 1928...was a constantly tentative and repeatedly renewed conciliation between Stalinism and the culture of the democratic bourgeoisie" (p. 242). Given Lukács' desire to, first, defend traditional bourgeois culture, second, secure a foundation for a new culture and third, remain in the communist movement, his compromise with Stalinism from the 1920s to the 1950s was necessary. As Löwy puts it, when the revolutionary hopes of the 1920s collapsed, Lukács held to the two remaining standpoints, "the USSR and traditional culture" (p. 243).

But what of Lukács' anti-Stalinism after 1956? Did the anti-authoritarian leftist then reemerge? On the contrary, Löwy sees Lukács' critique of Stalinism as "incomplete and right wing." For example in 1962, Lukács wrote only that the purge trials were "politically superfluous, since the opposition had already lost power." Stalinism was a "leftist" or "sectarian" subjectivism or an "invalid" continuation of methods appropriate to the civil war. It was not until 1968, at the age of 83 that Lukács—under the impact of the international new left—turned back to the leftism of the 1918-1924 period. Only then did he turn away from his four decade *Versöhnung* with a bad reality, away from the spirit of the older Hegel and the Thermidor, towards the poets of intransigent opposition, Hölderlin and Ady.

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In the final chapter, Löwy applies the notion of "romantic anti-capitalism" to the world wide revolt of students and intellectuals in the 1960s. The new left appears, then, as the romantic anti-capitalism of proletarianized intellectuals, a similar response to the conflict between culture and capital which produced the romantic anti-capitalists of Lukács' era. The combined political-moral-cultural radicalization of the 1960s, like its romantic anti-capitalist predecessors of the 1920s, attacked the "root" of the system "the domination of human life by exchange value" (p. 279). Simply put, the radicalization of the intelligentsia in capitalist society stems from its existence as defender of "the old culture" against expanding reification. Of course, without a revolutionary proletariat the revolt of the intellectuals is doomed to failure. The intelligentsia must adhere to the working class, whose interests are identical with those of humanity and a "new culture."

Differences of opinion with Löwy over judgements made on Lukács are inevitable. Was Lukács' political "realism" a progressive descent to earth or a regression? Was *History and Class Consciousness* the *Aufhebung* of left wing utopianism or its expression? How long did Lukács' leftism last—1921, 1924, 1926? When did he "really" accept Stalinism—1926, 1928? Is "Tolstoian abstention" more realistic than the "revolutionary realism" that lent prestige to the Stalinist regime? But, Löwy has performed a major accomplishment: a Marxist or Lukácsian sociology of revolutionary intellectuals focused on the concept of "romantic anti-capitalism." In so doing, he has stressed the centrality of tactics and ethics in Lukacs' turn to the left and has opened up the problem of Lukács and Stalinism in a way that previous work on Lukács has not done.

Löwy's discussion of Dostoyevsky suggests the following. Lukács is the founder of Western Marxism. He is also Western Marxism's *Eastern Marxist*, in the literal sense (he turned to Moscow when Korsch turned West) and in the metaphorical sense that he saw in the "East" a powerful emotional attraction away from the superficial rationalism of the West. Thus, the identical subject-object which Lukács found was not only the proletariat but the *Russian* proletariat, the working class with a *soul*. In this sense Lukács is not only a precursor of the anti-authoritarian lefts of the 1960s. He is the first Eastern Marxist, that is, the first Western Marxist, who in the face of failure of the revolutionary dream in the West turned his gaze upon the identical subject-object in the East. Dostoyevsky, not Lenin, provided the emotional pull behind this attraction. Perhaps it is this emotional pull which led Lukács to the "reconciliation" of his Stalinist years. In this sense, Lukács prefigures the anti-authoritarians of the 1960s who turned their gaze to the third world and reconciled themselves to different forms of dictatorship under the guise of "proletarian internationalism." A sociology of the romantic anti-capitalist left would then be able to account not only for the anti-authoritarian, cultural revolutionary moment of the intelligentsia but for an equally pervasive moment: the subsequent self-repudiation of the first moment and reconciliation to the identical subject-object of history, which, in our time, carries a national rather than a class insignia. Romantic anti-capitalism is then not only, in Löwy's terms, "ideologically hermaphroditic." When it is left, it does not necessarily remain "anti-authoritarian." It's "romanticism" has often produced "realistic reconciliations" to Stalinism of one kind or another. In short, in the history of the Stalinism of the Western intellectuals, a chapter should be devoted to the contribution of romantic anti-capitalism.

Partly because Löwy is close to Trotsky's analysis of Stalinism he would not accept this effort to draw out implications of his own argument. But in view of the barbarism of the Gulag, the categories "right" and "left" "revolutionary" and "counter-revolutionary" "internationalism or socialism in one country" sound beside the point. The linguistic universe within which these terms made sense was in part responsible for paralyzing not only Trotsky but Lukács as well from resisting Stalin soon enough if at all. Once the Trotskyists—and Lukács—had accepted Lenin's theory of the party and a

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"realistic" justification of "revolutionary" violence, the ground had been cut out from under them. Whether one believed in "socialism in one country" or "internationalism" appears in retrospect to be completely insignificant when compared with the central issue of that period—the Gulag. As Löwy's excellent chapter on Lukács' Stalinism demonstrates very well, the founder of modern humanist Marxism did not *at any time* during the 1930s and 1940s actively oppose the Gulag. His genius evidenced itself on a tactical plane but not on the ethical plane.

In these matters nothing is cheaper than morally outraged hindsight. After all, we cannot know what we would have done had we lived through such terrible times as the 1930s and 1940s. Lukács' illusion was that it would be possible to create a mediation between Stalinism and "the culture of the democratic bourgeoisie." But at least we can learn from our own checkered past. One of the illusions of the 1960s was that a wholly untainted moralism from the advanced west could be set in defense of the world-wide identical subject-object—the Vietnamese, Chinese, etc. Löwy's conclusion, that the revolt of the intellectuals is "doomed to failure" without the revolutionary subject restates the dilemma. For when the intelligentsia has "reconciled" itself to this revolutionary subject it has liquidated itself as a critical intelligentsia—or such could be the lesson to be learned from the *totality* of Georg Lukács' "political evolution." The "false premise" of Lukács' romantic anti-capitalism lay in his search for a "wholly other" subject of history in whose name violence and repression are justified. Partly because Lukács anguished over questions which contemporary leftists have at times casually tossed off, he remains important. The romantic anti-capitalist tradition is not only, as Löwy made clear, "ideologically hermaphroditic." Its *moral hermaphrodism*, (and ours)—anti-authoritarianism and reconciliation to Stalinism—cannot be repressed. Löwy would, most likely, take issue with this conclusion. His very fine book has, however, raised the issues that lie behind it.

Jeffrey Herf

Witold Kula. *An Economic Theory of the Feudal System: Towards a Model of the Polish Economy 1500-1800.* Trans. Lawrence Garner. London: NLB, and New York: Schocken, 1976. $12.50 cloth.

Pierre Vilar. *A History of Gold and Money 1450-1920.* Trans. Judith White. London: NLB, and New York: Schocken, 1976. $18.50 cloth.

Kula's *An Economic Theory of the Feudal System* analyzes the non-monetarized natural economy of precapitalist Poland. On the other hand, Vilar's *A History of Gold and Money 1450-1920* discusses the role of precious metals and money in the developing market relations of nascent European capitalism. Despite the obvious differences in subject matter, the works are complementary. They both address the issues of economic rationalization and "development," and reflect the mutual influences of Marxism (although less in the case of Vilar) and the *Annales* school of economic and social history—so much so that they must be discussed in reference to it in order to be understood properly.

The *Annales* approach is identified with French historians such as Lucien Febvre, Marc Bloch, and Fernand Braudel. The school's name derives from its journal, *Annales d'histoire economique et sociale*, which was established in 1929 as an alternative to modern historiography's narrow positivism. The *Annales* historians

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attacked positivist history—"event history"—for equating truth with "documentary authenticity." Event historicians, as a result of their drunken obsession with the "fact," tend to condemn general ideas and concepts as philosophical abstractions. They hold that only historical particularities are real. The positivist historian is limited, then, to exact, short time-frame description of well-documented events. Many historical documents are either direct products of the powerholder or at least owe their preservation to the fact that they did not contradict his interests. Thus, event history tends to be a political history of "great men." The event historian's emphasis upon the collection and arrangement of "facts," often degenerates—for obvious reasons—into ideological fantasy. As *Annales* critics suggest, the particularist positivism of event historians encourages a literal approach to documents that results in the recording of legitimations rather than reality.

The *Annales* historicians criticize the lack of duration in both modern historiography and in the social "sciences." Fernand Braudel, a leading representative of the school (who wrote the laudatory "Presentation" to Kula's book) argues that adequate historical scholarship must express appreciation of historical duration. The data of the positivist—*events*—are the mass of short-term phenomena that occupy the mundane consciousness of everyday life. Although they are its matter, events do not constitute the truth of history. In fact, complete immersion in events blinds the scholar with triviality and makes him prey to ideological deception. To avoid this destructive intimacy, scholars must distance themselves by considering events in relation to long time frames and broad systems of facts.

The historian (and social analyst) must consider cyclical oscillations—*conjunctures*—which are trends that go beyond the isolated event. These fluctuations involve aggregate data in time spans of approximately ten to fifty years. Braudel further suggests that both events and conjunctures should be related to *structures* having time frames that last hundreds of years. Structures refer to social totalities with determinate *historical* content. This concept implies an approach to human phenomena which stresses holistic interpretation of historical particulars. It involves the use of totalizing concepts which stress the internal relations of interconnected events and facts. This approach should not be equated with sociological functionalism or systems theory, because the totalities of the *Annales* have historical depth, i.e., the models have a "life span" unlike the timeless paradigms of the sociologist. Braudel's own example of a structure is *mercantile capitalism*. Kula's concept of *Polish Feudalism* is another illustration. Both concepts refer to structural totalities with determinate historical character. Positivists view this type of long time frame concept as a pure mental construction—a fictional synthesis of facts which is at best a heuristic device. On the other hand, as Kula (p. 20) implies, the *Annales* models are not the product of an "intellectual game" but are determinate totalities which "must correspond to the existing conditions in the societies under examination." *Annales* historians' totalizing concepts refer to historical realities of which events are a part. Events that cannot be understood in terms of conjunctural movements and structures are likely to be trivial and are better left to the journalist.

The Kula and Vilar books are examples of that "serial history" which began with Labrousse's (1933) *Esquisse du mouvement des prix et des revenus en France au VIIe siecle* (Kula and Vilar acknowledge this heritage and cite Labrousse repeatedly). Serial history involves the study of the long term and short term trends in the movement of quantifiable historical data (e.g., wages, prices, population, mortality, illness, trade). It is important to distinguish this approach from general quantitative history which

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also employs statistical methods. As Vilar (p. 39) implies, the serial historian seeks to understand "the rhythm of development" by connecting the data to the 'totality of all conditions' in which a problem or an event is located." The quantitative data are not framed in a "causal" schema but are treated as a "barometer" of other economic, political, cultural and social conditions (Vilar, pp. 16-17; Kula, pp. 132-133). In short, the serial historian does not use his knowledge of data cycles to test simple cause and effect relations, but uses it to analyze the nexus of different institutional sectors: the serial historian studies "social phenomena from the standpoint of the functional connection between all the elements of social life" (Kula, p. 132).

Kula's and Vilar's Marxism, however, distinguishes their work from the mainstream of the *Annales* school. Kula (p. 12-15) begins his *An Economic Theory of the Feudal System* (first published in Polish in 1962) by pointing out that Marxist scholars have not devoted enough attention to feudalism. He attributes the lack of an adequate theory of feudalism to the hesitancy of Marxists during the Stalinist era to formulate general social theories. Stalinists feared such theories would be used to criticize Soviet society. Yet, an adequate economic theory of feudalism is necessary for understanding capitalist development. According to Braudel's "Presentation" to Kula's book (p. 8) the subject of the study is "underdevelopment in modern history..." This does not mean that Polish feudalism should be equated with contemporary non-industrial societies. Instead, as Kula indicates (p. 10), this work is "an attempt to develop *methods* (reviewer's emphasis) which enable us to study the history of economic life in a country in which the market economy is weakly developed..."

Kula's primary methodological concerns are problems resulting from imposing market categories on precapitalist societies. He warns of the distortions that follow from the application of "economic calculations and economic rationality in economic systems not based on the play of market phenomena" (p. 33). He supports his argument with illustrations of the extreme errors that result from the rational economistic analysis of the Polish feudal enterprise. Market economists feel that it is always necessary to consider goods and services in terms of their market prices. They believe that anything without a price would inject a destructive "nonrational" element into their calculations. To avoid this situation, the market economist employs one of two tactics. First, a price can be assessed to all elements that enter production, but do not pass through the market (*in-kind* goods and services). Second, the economist can leave all in-kind elements out of his calculations. In analyzing the feudal economy, where most goods and services are in-kind, both of these tactics lead to disastrous distortions. Kula illustrates with Polish data that the assessment of prices for in-kind goods results in the conclusion that the feudal enterprise ran at a large loss, while the exclusion of in-kind factors makes it appear to have run at a great profit. Economists do not seem to be troubled by the fact that their complex computations grossly twist the reality of feudalism and even violate common sense.

Economistic rational calculations of feudal life are doomed to failure because they do not recognize the fact that values in-kind were calculated in-kind. Market analysis is predicated on the clearly absurd assumption that feudal persons had an economically rational action orientation. This would have been impossible because the daily existence of feudal people was for the most part divorced from market activity. Most exchanges of goods and services were regulated by traditional, rather than market meanings. For this reason, feudal in-kind calculations escape any modern cost accounting scheme. Kula does not carry out far enough the implications of this argument. If he had, he would have stressed that understanding feudal economics

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requires an in-depth hermeneutical analysis that transcends the economy. His arguments at the end of the book hint that such an analysis is necessary (in any era), but the issue is left undeveloped.

Kula attempts in "The Short-Term Dynamic" to reconstruct the Polish feudal economy. Throughout this section he emphasizes how the latter is antithetical to rational capitalism. He argues that in capitalism high prices stimulate productive forces to increase production and national income. The opportunity for high profit activates labor reserves and or leads to labor shifts from unprofitable to profitable sectors. In contradistinction, Kula explains that the feudal estate lacked reserves and could not shift production because most labor was engaged in necessary activities. Furthermore, given feudal technology and limited population, the lord had only two means to enlarge his surplus. He could either increase the land under cultivation or reduce the size of the peasant plot. Both alternatives expanded exploitation of peasants by either intensifying labor or decreasing consumption. However, neither tactic was reasonable because the rate of exploitation was already extremely high. When exploitation pushed the social limits it was often counterproductive because peasants could retaliate by starving demesne cattle (which they cared for) or consuming seed marked for cultivation. If the lord reacted by instituting higher levels of coercion the peasant's health and productivity declined. Ultimately, if conditions became intolerable, the peasants could flee to distant towns. In any respect, the greedy lord eventually suffered the economic consequences of his own repressive regime. Finally, even if the lord was successful at extracting large surpluses, the lack of storage facilities, poor means of bulk transport, absence of credit mechanisms etc., made it impossible for him to rationally exploit market forces for profit. Given the nature of the feudal economy, it is not surprising that the nobility retained from antiquity the traditional emphasis on consumption over investment. The maintenance of a luxurious life style was far more important to the feudal lord than rationally planning expansion of capital.

Kula asserts that the feudal economy depended upon harvests, not prices. Prices were not active forces in production, but were completely subordinate to it. This means that feudal "national income" was not the product of rational, economistic calculations. Instead, agricultural production, conditioned by problems such as war, drought, disease and other social and environmental upheavals, was the determining factor. Adjustments to destructive conditions generally took place outside the market and did not usually involve changes in labor organization or activation of reserves. In feudal society prices had a completely different meaning than in capitalism. Under feudalism high prices indicated a weak economy, while low prices reflected abundance. The feudal price structure was a mere reflection of the relative scarcity or abundance of agricultural goods. On the other hand, under capitalism high prices usually indicate prosperity, while low prices mean a depressed economy. In the capitalist market, prices become a motor force of economic planning that involves complex calculation and speculation in the management of production.

Kula explains that the guild system resulted in monopoly and social regulation of artisan production. Such conditions make application of economic rationality to the feudal town economy as absurd as the attempt to use it in explaining production on the country estate. The guild determined prices and regulated production in accord with a variety of economically non-rational norms. Price levels did not serve as incentives or disincentives to production. Generally, artisan prices remained stable, despite fluctuations in the primary source of feudal wealth: agricultural production.

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In "The Long-Term Dynamic," Kula considers the development of Polish economic structure over a 300 year period. He uses price cycle data to analyze its structural changes. Through rather ingenious uses of scanty data, Kula shows that the period of 1500 to 1800 was marked by increased class disparities caused by the upper nobility's growing relation to an expanding international market. The upper nobility enjoyed a strong economic position based upon a number of favorable conditions. Because their holdings were spread over vast geographical areas, destructive conditions such as war, drought and disease, which tended to be somewhat localized, had less devastating effects upon the great lords than they had upon the lower nobility, who were more vulnerable to economic collapse. Also, the great lords were both economically diversified and had the necessary resources for reaching the developing "world market." Between 1550 and 1750 the upper nobility not only increased their market activity (by approximately 300%), but their terms of trade (the purchasing power of products sold to those purchased) tripled (pp. 119-134).

During the same period, population expansion, without a corresponding increase in cultivated land, brought a slight decline in agricultural productivity. Furthermore Polish manufactured goods could not compete with imports from more industrially advanced sectors of Europe. Thus, despite the economic gains of the great lords, internal markets and Polish industry were retarded. Lesser lords, who were more vulnerable to economic crises, sometimes ceded their fiefs to upper nobility in exchange for positions on the latter's military or administrative staffs. As a result the upper nobility not only tended to become richer, but also became much more powerful.

The upper nobility's activity on the world market had numerous internal consequences (e.g., the growth of a national market geared to long distance trade, the development of national prices, monetarization, increased capitalist calculation, and a more active role for prices) that resulted in the transformation of Polish feudalism. According to Kula, his model cannot explain the new economic relations which followed this transformation, pointing out that this "is an example—certainly not the only one—of changes external to the model which deprive it of validity" (pp. 183-184). The transformation of Polish feudalism cannot be explained on the basis of its own internal dynamics, but must be understood in relation to world economic development. In short, the crucial factor in the decline of the former was Poland's relation to the more advanced, capitalist areas of Western Europe. This condition has methodological implications for the study of "development:" "[e]vents in Economic" history cannot be explained within the boundaries of one country" (p. 132). Furthermore, it is necessary "to study social phenomena from the standpoint of the functional connection between all elements of social life." Finally, Kula emphasizes that persons affected by these global forces are seldom aware of them. In short, Kula's discoveries could not have been made by naive, positivist analysis of documents, but are a result of his long-term, totalizing historical perspective.

Kula's work broaches important issues in the socio-historical analysis of capitalist rationalization. First, the study anticipates the "world systems" approach to economic development that Wallerstein's recent *The Modern World System* has helped popularize among sociologists. (Wallerstein, who cites Kula's work, was probably influenced by the latters' emphasis on the priority of international over national economics). Secondly, the book also addresses one of the central controversies concerning capitalist development. In the 1950s Maurice Dobb and Paul Sweezy disagreed in (*Science and Society*) about the European transition to industrial

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capitalism. Kula's work lends at least indirect support to Sweezy's position that international trade rather than internal changes in the petty mode of production (peasants and craftsmen) stimulated precapitalist economic transformation. Sweezy's argument has its origins in the non-Marxist work of Henri Pirenne, while Dobb's position reflects the Marxist doctrine that systems crumble from their internal contradictions. While Kula (p. 183) gives lip service recognition to this doctrine, the thrust of his work clearly contradicts it.

There are problems in Kula's work. First, he did not develop a sufficiently strong connection between his short-term and long-term dynamics. In short, it would have been helpful if he had provided a more detailed analysis of the relation of economic rationality to the long-term transformation of Polish feudalism. Furthermore, Kula did not explain fully enough the internal changes—particularly those related to rationalization—stimulated by Poland's growing linkage to the world market. The reader is simply not informed of the exact consequences of the latter for capitalist development. Finally, despite his deviation from Marxist orthodoxy, Kula does sound mechanical at times, specifically when he refers to economic "laws" (pp. 11-18) and social determinism (p. 169). In the latter part of the book (pp. 165-175), Kula hints at a global critique of economic rationalism since even the most market oriented monetary transactions cannot be understood fully on the basis of technical, economistic calculations. Such transactions always involve social values and personal priorities. It is a pity that Kula did not discuss this issue in much greater detail.

Vilar's *A History of Gold and Money 1450-1920* deals with the monetary elements of the commercial grounds for the development of modern capitalism. The study is even broader than the title suggests since Vilar discusses silver in as much detail as he does gold, and in describing the emergence of the modern monetary system, touches on a vast number of other issues related to capitalist development: the formation of national banks, the development of credit mechanisms, the extension of commerce, colonial exploitation and even the comparative economic development of several Western European nations.

This work, although far less ambitious theoretically, is similar to Kula's study in that both utilize date concerning short-term and long-term price cycles. Vilar is especially concerned with the relation of the scarcity-abundance of precious metals to fluctuations in general price indices. Like Kula, Vilar analyzes these trends in relation to more general socio-economic processes. Praticularly important throughout the work is Vilar's treatment of competing monetarist and non-monetarist theories of economic development. The monetarist position emphasizes the nature and quantity of money as a crucial force in shaping the economy. On the other hand, non-monetarists argue that money is largely an epiphenomenal factor that merely reflects the total system of production. These contradictory positions, in their historically specific forms, confront one another throughout the long period that Vilar discusses. One of the strong features of Vilar's study is that it supplements the history of money with analyses of the various theories of money, their practical implications, political meanings and relations to broader socio-economic conditions.

Vilar begins his substantive analysis with a discussion of the European "price revolution" of the 16th century. He explains that 15th century increases in European population, production, cultivation and trade resulted in the decline of commodity prices relative to gold. The promise of inflated profits from gold discoveries stimulated European incursions into Africa and America. Vilar argues convincingly that Columbus and his backers were motivated as much by gold as the famed passage to

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Eastern spices and luxury goods. Furthermore, Vilar explains that the colonial expansion that followed Columbus' discovery was strongly influenced by the Europeans' continuing desire for precious metals. The book provides detailed portraits of the monstrous forms of human domination that resulted from the quest for and procurement of precious metals. The discussions of the relation of gold to the depopulation of the West Indies, the horrors of Potosi (Peru's rich silver mine of the 16th century), and various conquests involved in the search for *El Dorado* add a human dimension to the more objective economic analyses.

In analyzing other cyclical movements of prices (between 1600 and 1920), Vilar claims that the flow and quantity of precious metals were always important socio-economic forces. The impact of precious metals, however, is reduced as capitalism advances. Price movements are then stimulated by an interplay of factors reflecting the more complex economic system. As Vilar (p. 256) states in respect to 18th century capitalism, precious metals tend to become "regulators and the consequence of other aspects of growth," rather than the motor forces of change. This is consistent with his earlier assertion that money is a "barometer" and should not be attributed special status as the major factor in socio-economic arrangements (p. 16). Throughout the work, Vilar tries to provide a balanced view of monetarist and non-monetarist approaches. Despite the fact that he clearly favors the latter, he never reduces money to purely epiphenomenal status—it remains a significant factor even in its role as regulator in late capitalism.

The primary weakness of the work is the author's failure to develop an adequate theoretical framework. The relation of money to the development of capitalism is never fully articulated. In contrast to Kula's work, which related data analysis to a clear concept of feudalism which is a major economic structure, Vilar's study fails to connect the conjunctural data to an adeaute conception of the social totality. Structures like feudalism, mercantilism and capitalism are crucial to Vilar's work, but remain in the vague, unelaborated background. He fails to provide the totalizing analysis that would clarify the work's meaning. Thus, despite broad coverage of a great deal of valuable material, Vilar's work seems incomplete. After 340 pages of detail, he devotes slightly more than 4 pages to his concluding chapter "In Search of a Global but not One-sided Explanation." In this short section there is no sign of a global explanation, but only the promise of one if proper methods of analysis are used in the future.

The Kula and Vilar books are not examples of immanent critique. Both works lack a well developed concept of emancipation. However, both suggest the interesting possibility of a method that combines Marx's totalizing problematic with the *Annales* appreciation for (and knowledge of) historical particularity. This method does not involve fetishizing Marx's concepts, but constitutes a critical reinvestigation of them using the *Annales* method of historical analysis in long time frames. The latter would provide laser surgery for the silly and repressive reifications of liberalism and mechanical Marxism. Ideas such as inevitable historical stages, the optimistic conception of proletarian consciousness, automatic class struggle, the free market etc., would be shown to be non-historical and worthy of junking. Historically grounded immanent critique of capitalist (and state socialist) development provides another path for disenchanted Marxists who desire more rigor than radical journalism and more concreteness than "theoretical archeology."

Robert J. Antonio

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Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia.* New York: Viking, 1977. 400 pages.

An unemployed black man entered a Rolls Royce showroom, chose the automobile he desired, and handed the salesman his life savings of two hundred dollars. "I want that one." When refused the keys, the man became vociferous and demanding. The police were called. He was taken to a nearby hospital and diagnosed as schizophrenic. This man assumed that he deserved a Rolls Royce as much as anyone else, and protested loudly when denied what he felt he deserved. In other words, his "madness" resided in his unwillingness to accept the assumptions underlying the distribution of privileges and possessions in this society. As he expressed his desires openly, he became a threat and was locked up. Not infrequently, such "mad" pronouncements contain kernels of protest and liberation, however fragmented or obscured.

The paradox of madness is that no matter how lucid and potentially revolutionary the madman's vision, the privacy of his or her world precludes significant effect on others. Madness lives alone, disavowing the social reality it finds so dangerous and unnurturing. Though this radical questioning of even our most fundamental assumptions and this passionate free floating desire contain great revolutionary potential, madness revolves in pain, horror and failure. The madman creates, in an imaginary world, what had been lacking in the real one. That real world is mirrored in madness. If we look into that mirror, we might discover some otherwise mystified social truths. This is what Deleuze and Guattari try to do.

In *Anti-Oedipus,* they talk about schizophrenia. They claim that "non-coded flows of desire would introduce disorder and revolution into the socius." By flows or flux they mean energy, matter, spirit or whatever else flows in life and society. These flows are "interrupted," "territorialized" or "coded" in very specific ways. For instance, we form, divide up, and decide where to limit our thinking according to lines constructed from our current language, logic and knowledge.[1] Similarly, our feelings, our actions, our relationships and our experiences are all shaped and limited by lines and compartments we construct in our social existence. We territorialize the flux. "To code desire—and the fear, the anguish of decoded flows—is the business of the socius" (139).

Capitalism is a unique social formation. It decoded the flows for awhile, "substituting for intrinsic codes an axiomatic of abstract quantities in the form of money," (i.e., an interchangeability of commodities and energies), and thus allowed for the necessarily deterritorialized energies required to achieve Manifest Destinies and Industrial Revolutions. But Capitalism reterritorializes what it has deterritorialized, locking up the flows once again in the machines man has been appended to.

Ideology, alienation and reification are codes and territories capitalism employs to interrupt and trap the flux. We are all machines and our parts are machine parts. Of course, we have life to differentiate us from inanimate machines. But we are as connected to and part of all the other machines of our society as is the bumble bee connected to the red clover it fertilizes. Man is a "vertebro-machinate mammal" (258). This is the "surplus value of the code." Our very organs and their flows of fluids and feces are hooked up to the machine of production.

But the "body without organs" disconnects. Psychotic Judge Shreber "lived for a long time without a stomach, without intestines, almost without lungs, with a torn

1. Gregory Bateson, *Naven* (Stanford, 1958), epilogue.

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oesophagus, without a bladder, and with shattered ribs; he used sometimes to swallow part of his own larynx with his food."[2] For Deleuze and Guattari, "the body without organs is the ultimate residuum of a deterritorialized socius" (33). "As for the schizo, continually wandering about, migrating here, there, and everywhere as best he can, he plunges further and further into the realm of deterritorialization, reaching the furthest limits of the decomposition of the socius on the surface of his own body without organs" (35).

Schizophrenia is a "break through" rather than a "breakdown." Deleuze and Guattari carefully explain they are talking about schizophrenia as a process and not a disease. They have "never seen a schizo." So all we are talking about here is an ideal subject they extrapolate beyond the disease trap. The disease concept evolved in a society set on interrupting the free flowing of desire that Schizophrenia as a process epitomizes.

Traditional Psychiatry is the instrument for the interruption of these creative flows of desire. Psychiatry knows less and less about the schizophrenic process the more it refines its diagnostic cubby holes and controls with its drugs, locked wards, and treatments. Such interruptions trap people at various points in the schizophrenic process, preventing the breakthrough, precluding growthful resolution and leaving the "diseased" person in a flattened out, diluted, but indefinite state of pain and emptiness. This image motivated R.D. Laing's work. John Weir Perry is discovering the creative and growthful potential of providing sanctuary rather than interruption for people experiencing the process.[3]

Freud declared schizophrenia could not be cured by psychoanalysis. Deleuze and Guattari rebut that "the only incurable is the neurotic" (361). Psychoanalysis, at its inception a decoder of flows (e.g., Freud freed libido from the constraints of a purely reproductive function), has become an important instrument of capitalism's reterritorializations. And Oedipus is the main villain. To understand why Deleuze and Guattari are so "Anti-Oedipus," we must appreciate their interest in Nietzsche.

One of Nietsche's polemics was against the "reactive man." "The active, aggressive, arrogant man is still a hundred steps closer to justice than the reactive man; for he has absolutely no need to take a false and prejudiced view of the object before him in the way the reactive man does and is bound to do."[4] Declining to be the subject of active outward forces, the reactive man turns those forces inwards against himself. He is the silent majority, and he is some part of the psychoanalyst and even the revolutionary. Oedipus is his myth, and he must be dealt with.

The neurotic revels in Oedipus, trapped there by obsessions over one or another character in the myth. Such ambivalence precludes revolution. Deleuze and Guattari claim that Oedipus and the familialism his myth protects from incest and other unrestrained flows of desire are the bulwark of modern capitalism. Wilhelm Reich showed us how authoritarian familialism supports Fascism. Deleuze and Guattari go further to attack the very territorializations constructed out of our triangulated family power relations. Reactive man obsesses about Oedipus and listens to the psychoanalyst. Why should this matter? Only because "Psychic repression is such that

2. Sigmund Freud, "Psycho-Analytic Notes upon an Autobiographical Case of Paranoia," *Collected Papers* (New York, 1959), Vol. 3, p. 396.

3. John Weir Perry, *Roots of Renewal in Myth and Madness* (San Francisco, 1976), and *The Far Side of Madness* (New York, 1974).

4. Friedrich Nietzsche, *On the Geneology of Morals*, trans. W. Kaufman (New York, 1969), p. 75.

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social repression becomes desired" (119).

The flows of our desire (our subject-ness) are interrupted, coded and territorialized as we become mechanical parts connected by Oedipally shaped links (relations and ideologies) to a machine we do not control (we become objects.) I constructed this statement out of the terms of *Anti-Oedipus*. But important formulations by Marx on alienation and reification fit into it nicely. Desire is socially derived, just as are the codes and territories that interrupt its flows. But how are we to know our true desires in the midst of media programming? Why would any proletarian desire fascism? Why would a poor Black mental patient desire stronger tranquilizers? Our phantasies are group phantasies. And our unconscious is a social unconscious. So is our passivity, our "reactive"-ness, our numbness.

Deleuze and Guattari insist that social (material) production is desiring—production. It is only capitalist alienation that makes us forget this hook-up and forces us to split off social production in the factory from desiring production in the home and playground.[5] And it is capitalist reification that makes us forget that desiring is producing, and not just representation of images predetermined elsewhere and relayed through symbols and myths. Man becomes object the minute he splits off desire from labor, and reacts appropriately to the way desire's flows are supposed to be channelled and interrupted. But reification cannot be total. Even in the midst of moment of *rupture* of prior territorialities. The Schizophrenic "scrambles all the codes" (15).

There are problems with Deleuze and Guattari's concepts. They fail to distinguish between deterritorialization and uprooting. A lack of roots (e.g., in family, community, culture, or even familiar technology) is already experienced by modern man as a big problem. Does the struggle against "reactive man" require that we become even more rootless? We need to attend to this question. Otherwise, we would essentially be defining revolution entirely in terms of total rupture. It is not, any more than artistic creation is solely the spontaneous outpouring of the unconscious.[6] Modern man's crying out about a lack of roots, a lack of intimacy and a lack of spirituality is precisely the experience of alienation. Revolutionaries must begin here. By calling forth indiscriminate and across the board rupture, Deleuze and Guattari risk terrifying the already alienated even more, and losing potential comrades in the struggles ahead, even causing some others harm. But rupture and total rootlessness need not be synonymous. This was Artaud's dilemma: "My sufferings until now consisted in refusing the Void. The Void that was already in me. I know there has been a wish to enlighten me by the Void and I have refused to let myself be enlightened..."[7]

"Show me the Void," says modern man, "and I will fill it with my knowledge, my mastery, my aspirations and my accomplishments." And so the Void disappears, only to re-emerge as a felt lack of meaning, of intimacy, of creativity, of "soul" in our increasingly mechanized, routinized and alienated lives. Artaud's message has fallen on deaf ears for the most part, while the "reactive man" has gone off to his or her faddish therapy, training, or spiritual experience to fill more than to encounter the Void. Artaud's others did not follow him in his rupture. He was cut off from social roots.

5. Eli Zaretsky, "Capitalism, the Family and Personal Life," *Socialist Revolution*, 13-15 (January-June 1973), also published as a book, *Capitalism, the Family and Personal Life* (New York, 1976).

6. Consider Marcuse's discussion of aesthetic transcendence in terms of the dialectic of negation *and* affirmation in *The Aesthetic Dimension* (Boston, 1978).

7. Antonin Artaud, *Artaud Anthology*, ed. J. Hirschman (San Francisco, 1965), p. 85

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He was then forced to undergo therapy, too. He spent his last years in asylums where every attempt was made to reterritorialize the desiring flows that his "disease" had set loose in him. He was "suicided by society" to the extent that psychiatry successfully interrupted his schizophrenic process and turned it into a disease. The totalness of his rupture insured his entrapment in the paradox of madness: vision revolving alone and terrified.

But creation is linked to the experience of the Void. It is from the zero point that the creator bounces back to produce the new. Revolution is creation. The hero must demystify discoveries for others, so they will dare to follow his or her leap and thus take society to a new place.[8] Artaud failed to encourage enough others to encounter and transcend the Void. The totalness of his rupture left him without the lifelines (i.e., roots) that social connectedness provides, so he became lost, adrift in the Void of inner space. Revolution is not solely rupture. It is collectivity, too. The dialectic here is a delicate one.

Oedipal territorialization is not the whole problem. Deterritorialization or rupture is needed along another line: the division of manual and mental labor. *Anti-Oedipus* is difficult reading. Lacan evolved the style.[9] He felt the reader should struggle with his text and his labyrinthine logic in order for the learning to be meaningful. Deleuze and Guattari add humor. But their reading is often esoteric, always a struggle. As such, it will appeal to a very narrow strata of psychologically minded intellectuals. The piling of ideas upon ideas in abstraction from practical events and struggles has long been the plight of a frustrated Left. Particularly in France, ideas become more and more esoteric, and the adherents more elite, as the frustrations mount and the system seems ever more impregnable. This is the trap Deleuze and Guattari fall into, a territorialization of a different kind, as they speak a language few will understand and supply no mediations to facilitate others' struggle.[10] At the same time, Jonathan Kozol correctly reminds us that a radical critique need not supply pragmatic correctives to be valid. The last thing we want to do is prematurely close complicated questions. Deleuze and Guattari stand firm here.

We cannot really talk about Artaud's work. We can always only talk about our experience of reading Artaud. He cannot be contained. He grabs us. And this is an important way he frustrates those who attempt to bottle him in paper back book sales or theater gates. The same applies to Deleuze and Guattari. Their far reaching, fragmented meanderings set up experiences for the reader that are frequently important openings, through which no one can lead another. Deleuze and Guattari can light the reader's entrance. In the midst of the seeming arrogance of their esoterica, this humility shines through.

So what does all this mean? Deleuze and Guattari suggest we concentrate on putting the desire back into production and the production back into desire. This is the task Friere takes on in *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*.[11] But where Friere tries to help students become the subjects of their own knowledge, these authors try to free more general desiring flows. Their instrument is *Schizoanalysis*.

Guattari, in an earlier book, combines his clinical skills as a psychoanalyst with his commitment as a militant to talk of developing "subject groups" to replace the

8. Joseph Campbell, *The Hero with a Thousand Faces* (Princeton, N.J., 1949), pp. 193-244.
9. Jacques Lacan, *The Language of the Self*, trans. A. Wilden (Baltimore, 1968).
10. Jonathan Kozol, *The Night Is Dark and I am Far from Home* (New York, 1977).
11. Paulo Friere, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (New York, 1970).

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"subjugated groups" domination forces us into.[12] With Jean Oury and other analysts friendly to the views of Jacques Lacan, he has for several years worked in a large therapeutic community with schizophrenics: *La Clinique de la Borde*. His "*psychiatrie institutionnelle*" combines theories of the group unconscious (importantly the work of anti-psychiatry and that of Wilfred Bion) and revolutionary struggle. Now he and Deleuze go further to propose Schizoanalysis, or "curettage of the unconscious...; the exaltation of the process as a schizophrenic process of deterritorialization that must produce a new earth" (299). To understand what they mean, we must grasp the radical distinction they make between paranoia and schizophrenia, and then we must listen to a very important complaint they have about psychoanalysis.

Hitler, the prototypical paranoid, is blind to human persons as he engineers masses and organizes crowds. The paranoid practices "macrophysics," seeing only large numbers of "us" and "them." The schizo, on the other hand, splits his objects, focuses on parts of people (e.g., mother's breast, daddy's grin through gigantic teeth). The schizo "penetrates into singularities, their interactions and connections at a distance or between different orders" (280). He or she can discover what the paranoid cannot (figuratively speaking, of course—the two so often cohabit one body): "flows and partial objects that are no longer dependent upon the large numbers; infinitesimal lines of escape" (280). The "molar" paranoid and the "molecular" schizo are merely two opposite poles of the "body without organs" that is "the limit of the socius, its tangent of deterritorialization, the ultimate residue of a deterritorialized socius" (281). "Schizoid breakthrough" is a possible escape. Paranoid engineering can end in fascism. Or we can continue "the most miserably arranged territorialities of the modern world...getting caught up in the asylum aggregate of paranoia and schizophrenia as clinical entities, in the artificial aggregates or societies established by perversion, in the familial aggregate of Oedipal neuroses" (283).

Deleuze and Guattari pose the alternatives of "schizoid breakthroughs" or "Oedipal neuroses." They claim that we cannot live both. For example, Oedipus defines his three characters in terms of the phallus. Laius has one, Jocasta lacks one, and Oedipus fears losing his. "If the woman is defined as a lack in relation to the man, the man in his turn lacks what is lacking in the woman, simply in another fashion: the idea of a single sex necessarily leads to the erection of a phallus as an object on high, which distributes lack as two non-superimposable sides and makes the two sexes communicate in a common absence—*castration*.... Castration is the universal belief that brings together and disperses both men and women under the yoke of one and the same illusion of consciousness, and makes them adore this yoke" (295).[13] This is the Oedipal territory of psychoanalysis.

"The molecular unconscious, on the contrary, knows nothing of castration, because partial objects lack nothing and form free multiplicities as such; because the multiple breaks never cease producing flows, instead of repressing them" (295). Presumably,

12. Felix Guattari, *Psychanalyse et Transversalité* (Paris, 1972). See translation of the foreword to that volume by Gilles Deleuze, "Three Group Problems," *Semiotexte*, Vol. II, No. 3 (1977), pp. 99-109. This entire issue of *Semiotexte* is devoted to *Anti-Oedipus*, containing interviews with Guattari and reviews by Lyotard, Lotringer and others.

13. This is a restatement of Anthony Wilden's position: "Is the Phallus the measure of all things? ... All dissent must be of a higher logical type than that to which it is opposed." See my review, "System and Structure: Essays in Communication," *Telos* 22 (Winter 1974-75), pp. 201-206.

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this is why the revolutionary must root for the Schizo and not Oedipus or the paranoid.

This is all very well. But what do we do in our clinical work when people come to us seeking help but are in no place or mood to appreciate how revolutionary their fragmentation is? We must not forget Lukács' concern about modern literature's obsession with psychopathology: "Life under capitalism is, often rightly, presented as a distortion (a petrification or paralysis) of the human substance. But to present psychopathology as a way of escape from this distortion is itself a distortion. We are invited to measure one type of distortion against another and arrive, necessarily, at universal distortion."[14]

Deleuze and Guattari's complaint about psychoanalysis focuses on a distinction Foucault describes between representation and production.[15] They state, "Far from showing the boldness of psychoanalysis, this idea of unconscious representation marks from the outset its bankruptcy or its abnegation: an unconscious that no longer produces, but is content to *believe*. The unconscious (of psychoanalysis) believes in Oedipus, it believes in castration, in the law" (296). Thus, by merely interpreting meanings, the psychoanalyst perpetuates reactive man. The desiring subject creates his or her own myths and roles. Desiring is production, and not merely interpretation of symbols, myths and representations already deeply imprinted in an unconscious, merely awaiting a reading.

Deleuze and Guattari have a point here. Where total reliance on symbol interpretation leads to passive acceptance of a predetermined fate, therapy becomes false and reactionary. But at the same time, symbols and myths are part of that history that, if forgotten, is destined to be repeated. In fact, it may well be that the schizophrenic is providing for society's progress exactly the rediscovery of myths long forgotten or relegated to society's unconscious. Liberation is one myth sorely in need of rediscovery. That man was right. We should share the Rolls Royces.

Schizoanalysis, then, is a "curettage of the unconscious." Deleuze and Guattari do not discuss method in this book. Perhaps they will in the second volume to come. They speak here more about a *stance* against reactive man and in favor of free-flowing desire. Thus, no therapy process or couch will do. Schizoanalysis is inherently social, polemical and revolutionary. "The task of schizoanalysis is that of learning what a subject's desiring-machines are, how they work. . . . and causing the desiring-machines to start" (338-339).

They go on to the revolutionary struggle itself: "A revolutionary group at the preconscious level remains a *subjugated group,* even if that continues to enslave and crush desiring-production" (348). Why are some meetings so boring, some relationships between comrades so regressed, and some lines so rigid? "Revolutionaries often forget, or do not like to recognize, that one wants and makes revolution out of desire, not duty" (344). So the revolutionary has something to learn from the schizo.

But the schizo is *not* a revolutionary. "There is a whole world of difference between the schizo and the revolutionary: the difference between the one who escapes, and the one who knows how to make what he is escaping escape, collapsing a filthy drainage pipe, causing a deluge to break loose, liberating a flow, resecting a schiz. The schizo is not revolutionary, but the schizophrenic process—in terms of which the schizo is merely the interruption, or the continuation in the void—is the potential for

14. Georg Lukács, *The Meaning of Contemporary Realism,* trans. J. and M. Mander (London, 1962), p. 33.

15. Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things* (New York, 1970), pp. 208-211.

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revolution" (341). Perhaps it is for fear of the void, present during any revolutionary moment, that so many revolutionaries turn for security to dogma and sects.

Deleuze and Guattari discuss two kinds of revolutionary requirements. Class struggle and overthrow are critical, of course. But the new socius might then be maintained "in an order of molar causality that already makes of the party a new form of sovereignty." Also required are "unconscious revolutionary investments that perform a real rupture with causality in the order of desire" (378).

Schizoanalysis facilitates the emergence of an Artaud. But where is Artaud to live? Deleuze and Guattari suggest a place where "Madness would no longer exist as madness...because it would receive the support of all the other flows, including science and art.... In this perspective Foucault announced an age when madness would disappear, not because it would be lodged within the controlled space of mental illness ('great tepid aquariums'), but on the contrary, because the exterior limit designated by madness would be overcome by means of other flows escaping control on all sides, and carrying us along" (321). They do not tell us how to create that place, or what to do with the traumatized schizos in the places we are now in. Here is the weakness of their approach.

Deleuze and Guattari epitomize a strata of competent, very privileged people who can float above the usual territorializations, or "wander about, migrating here, there....," like the schizos they idealize. Their intellectual and professional accomplishments and skills allow them to do so without falling off into the pains and terrors of madness. But here is a lead on how to proceed. Madness would not be problematic if its bearer were at peace with self and circumstance. Attainment of such peace, or the consequent freeing of desiring flows, would be a far worthier objective for psychotherapy than the "cure" of "disease." How many others would avoid some of those pains and terrors if they had some of those skills, privileges and consequent support systems? Their exceptional freedom in this regard tends sometimes to distort these authors' perspective. But to the extent that society becomes more conducive to such a peace, social progress is made.

Henry Miller speculates about Rimbaud, who ceased writing midway through his short life: "He had perceived that there was a step beyond art, he had put his foot over the threshold, and then in terror or in fear of madness, he had retreated."[16] Deleuze and Guattari do not retreat.

Terry A. Kupers

16. Henry Miller, *The Time of the Assassins* (New York, 1962), p. 102.

Jerome Rothenberg. *The Notebooks*. Milwaukee: Membrane Press, 1976.

Rothenberg's little book consists of poems on the right-hand pages facing quotations from the Jewish visionary tradition on the left. It could just as well have been named "The Jewish Notebooks," both because it derives from Rothenberg's work in editing *The Big Jewish Book*, an anthology of visionary texts from ancient to modern, and because, in structuring his book as text and (poetic) commentary, he has given it a quintessentially Jewish form.

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It is a book about Jews and a book about vision. Rothenberg, who has transcribed Native American poetry as well as written his own, finds himself drawn (yanked?) into Jewish vision. In his poem for Paul Blackburn he is "exiled in Salamanca—& driven mad by—Image of the Temple." Some of the poems express precisely the obsessive character of vision, its inescapability for the poet, as in "The Children of the Flowers of the Priesthood," which reproduces Rothenberg's image of the Temple ritual, down to the song of the cock crow, "teki-ah—teru'ah—teik'ah." In his poem for Paul Blackburn, he speaks of poetry "made out of memory—of some incredible racial unconscious... —we're both certain memory begins there—like a flower blossoming—from esophagus—words seeking air."

Rothenberg takes us on a journey backward into time, to "something before light...—journey deeper—light beneath the skull—before my birth—my mind" (from "proem"). The poet as Jewish shaman, flying into the unconscious and perhaps Jewish only in the sense that Jewishness is his particular tribal conduit toward universality. Rothenberg's starting point for his 'descent into—the chariot—their (the mystics) wording" (5) is the present; he brings the questions and perspectives of our time. This puts him within that movement to re-evaluate rather than disown tradition which owes so much to the work of Gershom Scholem, an acknowledgement Rothenberg makes in *The Big Jewish Book*. (There is irony in the role Scholem has chosen to occupy: the strict historical scientist, abjuring the interpretative flights of say, Martin Buber, yet relentlessly confronting a secular world with the importance of symbolic and mythic thought.)

Buber once noted that calling God "he" was a misrepresentation arising from the need to fix God with a personal pronoun when he (?) was not being immediately addressed as "you." (That "he" rather than "she" was the misrepresentation of choice is the beginning of a train of thought that Buber does not pursue.) Rothenberg is sensitive to the way in which tradition has it that femaleness is the exiled portion of God; "Shekinah GOD THE MOTHER in her exile—sat outside the town & heard the train call—like the voices of her angels—she who first experienced the galut..." (9). At the same time, he does not automatically replace he-ness with she-ness: "the House of God—though if it's HIS house or if it's HER house who could say now?" (9). Similarly, he contrasts Lilith who "fought to be—above the man—at least be equal in that game" with "Eve the wife our Lady of the Contract" (33).

Above and beyond the particular ways in which Rothenberg encounters visionary tradition, this book is about vision itself. Poem after poem invokes vision as a saving power, the saving power; "we are all one man—the cry of vision covers—our last escape—from otherness from birth" (43). The problem here is not necessarily that Rothenberg's personal vision fails him. He can bring close a sense of awe, he can open the space we ordinarily inhabit, as when he "wonders—if the mind is endless—(endless)—who is lost?" (5), which recalls Machado's marvelous "Why should we call—these accidental furrows roads?—Everyone who moves on walks—like Jesus, on the sea." The difficulty is rather that he has given us a one-sided reading of Jewish visionary tradition, which in turn robs vision of power by denying it historical content.

There is a tradition of vision for vision's sake within Judaism with which Rothenberg is familiar and from which he chooses his texts. (One might make mention of the throne mysteries and early Kabbalah.) But there is another tendency which, if it surfaces more rarely, may still be the more significant one, where vision supplies the coordinates for meeting with history. Even the Kabbalah, impelled by the expulsion of Jews from Spain, develops from an elite property of visionary adepts into the collective

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ideology of the Jewish people, issuing into the messianic career of Sabbatai Zevi and finally into Hasidism.

The unity of spirituality and political direction is clearer still in the Biblical prophets, although if Rothenberg attempts to hear their religious and block their social message others may find it easier to do the opposite. For the prophets that division was impossible. Injustice was condemned as irreligious not because it contradicted some fixed tenet of religion, some "God said," but because it denied the possibility of awe mattering in life. It denied that things took place in infinity, in the midst of vast presence. Injustice could prevail only where people believed that they lived in a tiny world. We have seen in our own time how rarely the social world opens up and how related that opening is to the revolutionary movement. The prophets were permanently tied to that moment.

It may seem that a reading of the prophets places an unfair weight on Rothenberg's book of poems. But it is to serve as a background for taking issue with his "poets —whose vision realized is vision spurned" (39), which is poignant but convenient. Vision's chosen aloofness from reality is only the other side of reality's rejection of vision.

In Rothenberg's defense, it should be said that to treat tradition as vision and nothing more, poesis and nothing more, is a way of unfreezing what has come down to us as dogma. Seeing the sacred texts as shamanist writings allows us to re-enter them. Still, in setting limits to what can be imagined Rothenberg has chosen not to use perhaps the most remarkable aspect of Jewish visionary experience, the union of politics and poesis, and has given us only part of the poetry we need.

Harvey Blume

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SHORT JOURNAL REVIEWS:*

CANADIAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL THEORY, 1:3

Department of Political Science, University of Winnipeg, Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada R3B 2E9. $10 per year (students $7) for 3 issues. Foreign orders add $2. DALLAS W. SMYTHE, *"Communications: Blindspot of Western Marxism."* Some introductory (at times eclectic) theses on the rise, significance and unintended consequences of mass communications systems and their production and reproduction of "audiences" within advanced capitalism. Problems of aesthetic theory are dodged. F. MECHNER BARNARD, *"Infinity and Finality: Hannah Arendt on Politics and Truth."* A meticulous discussion of some antinomies and tensions in Arendt's quest to recover the uniquely political from modernity's forgetful obsession with making and consuming. ALKIS KONTOS, *"The Intellectual Life."* "The intellectual must plunge into the ocean of the past in a creative gesture of interpretation. In a monumental, imaginative monologue the meaning and truth of the past must be re-created and then united with time present and the promise of the future. This monologue founds and discloses the structure of the intellectual life: its rebellion and critical spirit, its wisdom, its ambiguity and passionate commitment." HAROLD CHORNEY *et al.*, *"The State and Political Economy."* On the recent revival of the critique of political economy and the problem of the qualitative, 20th-century expansion of the state. GAD HOROWITZ, *"The 'Myth' of the Red Tory?"* Plus review articles by Charles Taylor, George Woodcock and Ray Morrow. JCK

CANADIAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL THEORY, 2:1

STEPHEN KLINE, WILLIAM LEISS, *"Advertising, Needs and 'Commodity Fetishism'."* A pathbreaking, critical analysis of the symbolic field of contemporary advertising. Product images are seen as never designed merely to increase purchases, but as also concerned with transforming the personal significance of the products' everyday use. Within the sphere of consumption, individuals do not develop their preferences autonomously; the intensified competition for goods brings inevitable frustration, no matter how much real income rises. Further, the theory of false needs and the manipulation of consciousness is based on the false premise that an objective set of "true" needs exists beneath the manipulations. JOHN O'NEILL, *"Merleau-Ponty's Critique of Marxist Scientism."* Merleau-Ponty returns Marxist politics to the flux of the natural and historical world, rejecting its compromise with the ideals of objectivism which have made the tradition of rationality an enigma to itself. Henceforth, politics must abide in the life world, where Husserl found its roots and, from there, it must recover its own ontological history. CHARLES RACHLIS, *"Marcuse and the Problem of Happiness."* The problem of happiness is conceived as both the problem of domination and the occluded prehistory of humanity and that of the prospects for liberation and the construction of a free existence. Some implications of Marcuse's analysis are sketched, including an important response to Leiss on the issue of true and false needs. JAMES SCHMIDT, *"Reification and Recollection: Emancipatory Intentions and the Sociology of Knowledge."* While Mannheim's sociology of knowledge manifested 'practical' or even 'emancipatory' intentions, these were projected in a way that could not be preserved in a more modern version of the theory (e.g., that of Berger and Luckmann). HERBERT REID, *"Totality, Temporality and Praxis: Existential Phenomenology and Critical Political Theory."* On the human space-time as lived, as being-in-the-world. DOUG TORGERSON, *"Domination and Liberatory Politics."* An extended critique of Alkis Kontos' *Domination*; plus rejoinders and reviews. JCK

CINE-TRACTS, 1:3 (Fall 1977-Winter 1978)

4227 Esplanade Avenue, Montreal, Quebec, Canada H2W 1T1. RAYMOND WILLIAMS, *"Realism, Naturalism and their Alternatives."* In typically exacting fashion, Williams traces the historical evolution of 'naturalism' and 'realism'—terms often employed wrongly in cultural criticism. Both movements shared common attitudes toward 'reality,' but differed in their chosen conventions of representation. The particular appropriation of naturalism and realism undertaken by the bourgeoisie, and subsequently, by socialist movements, is said to have

*This section has been compiled by John Fekete, Department of English, Trent University, Peterborough, Ont. K9J FB1, Canada. The following have contributed reviews: Mark Gallops, Sue Hegger, Larry Irons, Harold Jordan, John Keane, M.P. Moss, Peter Murphy, Harland Prechel, Greg Renault, Robert Rucker, Brian Singer, Susan Wheeler, Jan Whitaker and Nancy Wood.

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important implications for television drama. JOHN BERGER, *"Jonah who will be 25 in the Year 2000."* A delightful extract from the script of Alain Tanner's film, in which the meaning of 'history' is taught with the use of a piece of blood pudding. BARBARA LEAMING, *"Toward a Psychoanalytic Reading of the System(s) of a Contemporary American Film."* The traditional use of Freudian psychoanalytic theory in film criticism, which attempts to locate the latent 'meaning' of a film text through an analysis of its linear relations, is shown to be conservative. Radical Freudian analysis must refuse such closure and attempt to open up the film to internal contradictions and ambiguities and intertextual relations. Brian de Palma's film, *Sisters*, is subject to this alternative methodology. JOHN FEKETE, *"Culture, History and Ambivalence: On the Subject of Walter Benjamin."* Benjamin's problem-ridden methodology and theoretical framework make ominous any immediate appropriation of his cultural criticism. Benjamin's valuable predisposition toward the principles of fragmentariness and discontinuity, his assault on subjectivity, and his own aphoristic articulation suffer from the same limitations that plague modern structuralism. In his more detailed formulations of a political communications theory, Benjamin reveals an almost functionalist aesthetic, which, in submitting questions of form to concern with the utilization of content, cannot account for the systematic reproduction of aura at the level of the social code. (This article appeared in revised form in *Telos* 35.) PETER HARCOURT, *"On Jacques Rivette."* In contrast to Godard, Rivette's experimentation with form does not seek to overthrow the cinema of *spectacle*, but to raise it to a higher level, where it can productively co-exist with the cinema of *écriture*. DAVID EHRENSTEIN, *"The Spectacle of Negativity."* SAUL LANDAU, *"The Truth Lies on the Cutting Room Floor."* NW

FEMINIST STUDIES, 4:1 (February 1978)

Women's Studies Program, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742. Subscriptions: $10 per year (3 issues). KRISTIN BOOTH GLEN, *"Abortion in the Courts: A Laywoman's Historical Guide to the New Disaster Area."* Discusses the implications of U.S. court decisions concerning abortion and argues that women's right to have abortions is upheld only incidentally, when access to abortion coincides with other interests (e.g., population control, racism, etc.). The "right" to abortions seems to be threatened and poor women may be forced to "choose" sterilization over costly abortions. JUDITH LOWDER NEWTON, "Pride and Prejudice: *Power, Fantasy and Subversion in Jane Austen."* WINI BREINES, MARGARET CERULLO, JUDITH STACEY, *"Social Biology, Family Studies and Anti-feminist Backlash."* A critique of the special issue of *Daedalus* (Spring 1977) on "The Family"; specifically, a critique of Alice Rossi's social-biological perspective, of Tamara Harevan's denial of the destructive effect of capitalist development on the traditional family, and of Christopher Lasch's nostalgia for the heyday of patriarchy. The authors point out that although these three writers disagree on the stability of the modern family as well as on the nature of the pre-capitalist, pre-industrial family, they share a failure to understand the source and nature of feminist hostility to the nuclear family, i.e., the gap between the promise and the reality of family life. JANE MARCUS, *"Art and Anger."* In an illuminating discussion of the work of Elizabeth Robins and Virginia Woolf, the author discusses anger as a primary source of creative energy in the work of women artists. NANCY CHODOROW, *"Mothering, Object-Relations, and the Female Oedipal Configuration."* Unlike many contemporary treatments of psychoanalysis and Freud, which primarily concern interpretations and clarifications of Freud's *oeuvre* (cf. Juliet Mitchell), Chodorow begins with the issues that motivated Freud's own work, then works through the Freudian and post-Freudian debates, restructures the arguments, and arrives at an original reformulation of the process of personality formation, in particular, of the creation of sexual orientation and male and female personality types. This article, a chapter of Chodorow's recently published book (*The Reproduction of Mothering*) focuses on the feminine Oedipus complex and its role in creating a feminine sense of self-in-relationship that underlies the emergence of sexual orientation itself. Chodorow's significant departure from orthodoxy concerns her contention that the female Oedipus complex is as much a mother-daughter issue as it is one of father and daughter, and that it is as much concerned with the structure and composition of the feminine relational ego as it is with the genesis of sexual object choice. ANNIS PRATT, *"Aunt Jennifer's Tigers: Notes Toward a Preliterary History of Women's Archetypes."* Recurring images in needlework that predate the narratives and images of poetry provide a link with our preliterate past. MARY ELIZABETH PERRY, *"Lost Women in Early Modern Seville: The Politics of Prostitution."* Prostitutes as an integral part of urban Spanish culture in the 16th and 17th centuries. SW

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INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF POLITICS, 8:1-2 (Spring-Summer 1978)

M.E. Sharpe Inc., 901 N. Broadway, White Plains, NY 10603. $22.50 per year. This issue includes translated sections of *Studies in Soviet Economic Planning*, by ARON KATSENLINBOIGEN. I. *"Some General Problems in the Development of Soviet Economic Science."* 1. *"Methodological Problems in the Study of Soviet Economics."* Economics is viewed as a single science, making it possible to analyze specific economic systems from a unified position. The Soviets are criticized for not accepting this position and relying on specific features of the mode of production as the methodological means of analysis. The author criticizes the Soviets for not training their managers in theory of management production, which he views as essential in a time of rapid technical progress. 2. *"The Role of Marxism in the Formation and Development of the Soviet Economic System."* A brief historical and critical account of Marxism in the Soviet Union. Criticizes Marxism for its dependency on abstraction, and maintains that experimentation is necessary for a properly planned economy since abstraction cannot take into account diversity of the individual. 3. *"Conflicting Trends in Soviet Economic Science."* A summary of Soviet economic history pointing out how mathematics has been introduced into the economic discipline. He describes the various economic camps that have developed. II. *"Economic Invariants and Their Use in the Soviet Planning System."* 4. *"Methods of Describing Economic Systems and Representations of the Soviet Economy."* Description of micro- and macro-economics as applied in the Soviet Union. points out how the distinguished Soviet scholars Kuntorovich, Novozhilov and Lur'e—the founders of the theory of optimal planning in the U.S.S.R.—have been compelled to mimic Soviet Marxism. 5. *"Value Parameters and Their Use in the Soviet Economic Mechanism."* First, the author examines the diversity of value parameters as productive invariants, demonstrating their function in any productive system. Second, he examines only those value invariants generated by man's participation in the system. Third, he investigates theoretical and practical aspects of the use of value invariants in the Soviet planned economy. 6. *"Economic Incentives and the Soviet Experience in Using Them."* A discussion on the shortage of consumer goods in Soviet society, attributing the problem to the existing planned economy that does not give proper worker incentives. As an alternative, the author discusses the introduction of competitive mechanisms, but points out the problems of economic incentives and the sentiment against a liberalized Soviet economy. 7. *"Market Colors and the Soviet Economy."* A description of the various categories of legal and illegal domestic markets in the Soviet Union, focusing on their origins and functions. The author predicts a dismal future for the black market, and increased expansion and effectiveness of the legitimate markets. HP

THE JOURNAL OF SOCIAL HISTORY, 11:4 (Summer 1978)

This journal has contributed a good deal of attention to recent attempts to develop a humanistic and critical approach to the historical study of crime. This latest issue provides valuable epistemological insights that propose a higher level of theoretical sophistication for the historical study of illegality as ideology. It features articles by ROBERT NYE, *"Crime in Modern Societies: Some Research Strategies for Historians,"* and PATRICIA O'BRIEN, *"Crime and Punishment as Historical Problems."* Nye interweaves insights from a social reaction perspective on deviance with Michel Foucault's archaeology of knowledge. He asserts that the inability of Foucault's perspective to incorporate the subjective and conflict-bound nature of epistemic ruptures can be partly corrected. But this *correction* entails a cautious appropriation of a conflict-orientation that centers on the historical emergence of the epistemic structure of social deviance. O'Brien's paper follows the concern of Nye with Foucault's perspective on crime and punishment. Her primary criticism, as in Nye, is that Foucault's analysis "does not explain the transformation from one system to another." Neither does it account for the particular social forms that result from the process of normalization and social differentiation. O'Brien insists that the focus of study must discover the mediations operative among social control institutions, i.e., police, courts, prisons and other "social phenomena." The key phenomena on which to center are the family, class and ideology. LRI

LEVIATHAN, 5:2 (1977)

Mommsenstrasse 66, D-1000 Berlin 12, West Germany. H. BAISCH *et al.*, *"Die Wirtschaftskrise in der BRD."* A lengthy critique of the (neo-classical, monetarist) assumptions and recommendations of a recent report of West Germany's Council of Economic Advisers. A short-term and massive full-employment policy could overcome the present disequilibrium in capitalist countries, even though inflationary tendencies would be reinforced. In the long run,

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only the democratic planning of the accumulation process could overcome the dilemma of inflation and unemployment. RAINER GENSCH, *"Forschungspolitik und gesellschaftlicher Bedarf. Das Beispiel Altersforschung."* On the morality of gerontology. JUERGEN GERAU, *"Zur politischen Oekologie der Industrialisierung des Umweltschutzes."* Increasingly, environmental protection is seen as a technical task to be solved by competent industries. This 'industrialization of environmental protection' conceals the possibility of alternative solutions, such as radical changes in the production process. HANS JOAS, *"Motivationskrise der Jugend?"* An examination of two recent studies of adolescent personality formation within the context of advanced capitalism. Ziehe's theory of a "new socialization type" is debunked as a false generalization derived from particular therapy data. Döbert and Nunner-Winkler's important research, on the other hand, fails to account for the exceptionalism of working class adolescents and applies socialization theory in a methodologically dubious, non-hermeneutic manner. JCK

LIBRE, No. 3 (1978)

Editions Payot, 106, Boulevard Saint-Germain, Paris 75006, France. KRZYSZTOF POMIAN, *"Entre l'invisible et le visible: la collection."* This article is rooted in a distinction between utility and signification, and in a subsidiary distinction within the sphere of objects, that between useful objects and semiophores. The latter term is seen as mediating a relation with the invisible, and this relation is in turn grounded in the very nature of language. On this basis the author attempts to write the history of collections ("an ensemble of objects, temporarily or definitively maintained outside the circuit of economic activity, protected in a closed and managed space, and exposed to the regard") with specific references to the development of changing attitudes toward the invisible and its constitution. PIERRETTE DESY, *"L'homme-femme."* The integration and codification of homosexuality among North American Indians. HELENE CLASTRES, JACQUES LIZOT, *"La part du feu."* An absorbing and philosophically astute examination of the Yanomani's interrogation of death. PIERRE CLASTRES, *"Les marxistes et leur anthropologie."* In a no-holds-barred critique aimed at Meillassoux and Godelier, the author concludes that Marxist anthropology amounts to a "radical nullity." CORNELIUS CASTORIADIS, *"La découverte de l'imagination."* Part of a projected book on the history of the concept of the "imagination" in philosophy. This concept is understood as that radically creative source of alterity which shatters the determinations of reason and their identitarian postulates. The article itself provides a close textual analysis of the "discovery of the imagination" in Aristotle, its incompatibility with the Aristotelian ontology, and its subsequent dissimulation. PIERRE MANENT, *"Marx: le travail et la marchandise."* The problem of social transparency as presented in the section on the fetishism of commodities in Vol. 1 of *Capital*. Concludes that Marx abolished what Rousseau considered the primary obstacle to the realization of such transparency: the economic and its dependency on needs. By displacing the problematic onto the terrain of abstract labor and production, Marx converted what was an obstacle to transparency into the means of its realization, for production, once fused into a "concerted plan," becomes the inexhaustible and unconditioned source of universal autarchy, and man becomes not the slave of the economy, but its author. Thus the fact that the Soviet economy favors the productive sphere, manifesting only a minimal dependence on the needs of the consumer, is seen as reflecting, if only at a distance, a strand of Marx's writings. CLAUDE LEFORT, *"De l'égalité à la liberté. Tocqueville."* In an attempt to further our comprehension of the "enigma of democracy," Lefort provides a careful reading of *Democracy in America*—a reading that stays fairly close to the text, uncovering the different, even contradictory, twists and turns by which this enigma is interrogated in what still remains one of its most compelling formulations. BS

MARXIST PERSPECTIVES, No. 2

420 West End Avenue, New York, NY 10024. $15 per year. ERIC FONER, *"Class, Ethnicity, and Radicalism in the Gilded Age: The Land League and Irish-America."* Discusses the thesis that the Land League assimilated Irish-Americans into the contemporary strains of American working class radicalism (abolitionism, Knights of Labor) as opposed to assimilation into American middle class values and complacency. ELIZABETH FOX-GENOVESE, *"Yves Saint-Laurent's Peasant Revolution."* An analysis of the politics of high fashion. The "peasant look" signalled a reaction against feminism as well as a restoration of upper-class cultural hegemony. E. ANN KAPLAN, *"Lina Wertmüller's Sexual Politics."* Though subtle and complex in their explorations of sex and politics, Wertmüller's films ultimately suffer from the director's despair over the possibility of authentic, individual emancipation. FRANCOIS HINCKER, *"The Perspective of the French Communist Party."* After a cursory review of post-war France, we

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are reassured that the PCF has been, is and will continue to be attuned to political, economic and social trends in France. Articulate, but an apology nonetheless. WILLIAM R. LEACH, *"Dictatorship of the Powerless."* An astute and critical review of Ann Douglas' book, *The Feminization of American Culture.* SH

MARXIST PERSPECTIVES, No. 3

MARK NAISON, *"Harlem Communists and the Politics of Black Protest."* A measured, historical review of the Communist Party's activities in Harlem during the Depression. The Hitler-Stalin Pact marks the decline of the party's often beneficial and perceptive role in the black community. MARGO A. CONK, *"Social Mobility in Historical Perspective."* A critique of both the methodology and content of influential studies on social mobility. JON ELSTER *"The Labor Theory of Value: A Reinterpretation of Marxist Economics."* Whoever wades through these mathematical formulas will reach the conclusion that the labor theory of value may have value for some sociologists, but has little value for economists. CHRISTOPHER LASCH, *"William Appleman Williams on American History."* A sympathetic look at Williams' contributions to the study of history. LINDA GORDON, *"What Should Women's Historians Do: Politics, Social Theory and Women's History."* Look to the Movement for questions and look to rigorous scholarship for answers. MAX GORDON, *"Italian Communism Today."* A review of Hobsbawm's book *The Italian Road to Socialism: An Interview with Giorgio Napolitano.* The PCI continues to be the only hope for transforming advanced capitalist society into socialism. So what else is new? SH

NEW GERMAN CRITIQUE, No. 13 (Winter 1978)

German Department, Box 413, University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, WI 53201. $6 per year (3 issues). *Special Feminist Issue.* HELEN FEHERVARY, RENNY HARRIGAN, NANCY VEDDER-SHULTS, *"Foreword."* The origins of this issue in the autonomous feminist NGC group's concerns with Marxism and feminism are discussed. This special issue is intended as a general introduction to questions of feminism specific to German history, society and culture. NANCY VEDDER-SHULTS, *"Hearts as Well as Bodies: Ulrike Prokop's 'Production and the Context of Women's Daily Life'."* General discussion of the synthesis of Marxism and feminism in Prokop's book. Situates Prokop's contributions in issues raised by Marcuse, Mitchell, Dalla Costa and Rowbotham; Prokop's explication of women's mode of production in the home and her analysis of strategy in the women's movement is said to demonstrate the complementarity of Marxism and feminism. ULRIKE PROKOP, *"Production and the Context of Women's Daily Life."* Selection from the above-mentioned book, which constructs a model of female experience using the form of Marx's analysis of the dynamics of capitalist political economy. Prokop expands the notion of production to include the elements of the need-oriented, communicative modes of production structurally rooted in the contemporary female life context. The everyday world of women bypasses the usual mental-manual division of labor to encompass the realm of the imaginary; however, the conditions under which these tendencies occur at the same time are responsible for their underdevelopment. Prokop thus identifies (what else?) a contradiction between the productive forces and the conditions of production that make women's everyday life an ambivalent compromise. JESSICA BENJAMIN, *"Authority and the Family Revisited: or, A World without Fathers?"* A discussion of Horkheimer's notion of the problem of fatherlessness. With the transition to the authoritarian state, domination is expressed not directly as paternal authority, but as the indirect transformation of relationships into objective, instrumental, depersonalized forms, resulting in a change to a personality type based on conformity to external standards rather than the internalization of authority. HILKE SCHLAEGER, *"The West German Women's Movement."* A brief treatment of its development and social context, contrasted with (a flawed understanding of) radical movements in North America. CHRISTEL SUDAU, *"Women in the GDR."* While the lot of women is said to be better here than in West Germany, subjugation by men continues in official practice, family structure, and through government exploitation. MICHELLE CITRON, JULIA LESAGE, JUDITH MAYNE, B. RUBY RICH, ANNA MARIE TAYLOR, *"Women and Film: A Discussion of Feminist Aesthetics."* An interesting discussion of the political potential of film as mass culture, marred by vulgar sexism: feminist is equated with female, a reduction of the social (and historically specific) to the biological (natural, eternal), which is paralleled by an equation of objective with male, subjective with female. This problematic schema leads the panel into two fundamental contradictions: the notion that men cannot make films about women, which contradicts the members' own statements about film production and reception by reducing the film's import to a function of the

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producer's sex; and, besides reproducing the same sexual stereotypes traditionally used to subjugate women, it hypocritically subjects men to the same sexist reification that the panel members are protesting against. CHRISTA WOLF *"Self-Experiment: Appendix to a Report."* A short story that explores the specificity of female experience and consciousness in East Germany through the use of science fiction literary devices. VERENA STEFAN, *"Shedding."* An excerpt from a forthcoming book in which subjective phases of increasing awareness are shed as protective layers of "armor" preventing truly human relationships. MARGIT MAYER, *"Report: The German October of 1977."* Further contribution to NGC's reports on growing repression in West Germany. MONICA JACOBS, *"Civil Rights and Women's Rights in the Federal Republic of Germany Today."* An exploration of the implications that the demagogic association of "women's liberation" with the rise of women's participation in terrorism has for women and the women's movement. ANNEMARIE TROEGER, *"Summer Universities for Women: The Beginning of Women's Studies in Germany?"* MIRIAM FRANK, *"Feminist Publications in West Germany Today."* A critical bibliographic essay compiled in August 1977. NGC FEMINIST GROUP, *"Bibliography—Part I."* GR

NEW GERMAN CRITIQUE, No. 14 (Spring 1978)

DALE TOMICH, ANSON RABINBACH, *"Georges Haupt 1928-1978."* GEORGES HAUPT, *"Why the History of the Working Class Movement?"* Adhering to the view of the working class as a teleological class, Haupt laments the appropriation of history by many Communists for the purpose of legitimating themselves and their policies. Although this trend was apparent as early as the First International, Stalinism represents the epitome of both the institutionalization and suffocation of history. Even the "New Left" is not immune to such criticism. Because working class history is rooted not only in considerations of tradition but also of praxis, an uncompromised working class history must have as its first premise an open discussion of whether the working class retains its position as "a teleological class with an historic mission." OSKAR NEGT, *"Georges Haupt—In Memoriam."* RAINER STOLLMANN, *"Fascist Politics as a Total Work of Art: Tendencies in the Aesthetization of Political Life in National Socialism."* After a promising introduction, the author launches into a discussion of bourgeois art and the corruption of this ideal by the fascists. Ultimately, though, it is the petty bourgeoisie who are to blame as their "flight from insight into its own situation" both necessitated and resulted in the artistic camouflage of politics. Although it could be a result of the translation, the article comes off as flat and rhetorical. OSKAR NEGT, *"Mass Media: Tools of Domination or Instruments of Liberation? Aspects of the Frankfurt School's Communications Analysis."* A lucid, intelligent review of the major figures in theories of culture and mass media. After debunking positivist communications theory, Negt analyzes the Frankfurt School's position as well as the socio-historical roots of contemporary interest in them. This is counterposed to the theories of Brecht, Benjamin and Balazs. SARA LENNOX, *"Women in Brecht's Works."* Brecht was really a sexist, but unbeknownst to him, several of his female characters transcend the limitations that Brecht imposed on them to point to a "vision of alternative human arrangements." This article is an example of the pitfalls that simplistic feminism too often falls into. ATINA GROSSMAN, *"Abortion and Economic Crisis: The 1931 Campaign Against Paragraph 218 in Germany."* A detailed historical narrative that pays particular attention to the role of the Communist Party. *"Bibliography: Part II."* A continuation of the bibliography of German women begun in No. 13. HUGH MOSLEY, *"Third International Russell Tribunal on Civil Liberties in West Germany."* Interesting report that documents SPD opposition to the tribunal as well as opposition by the Left. The DKP objected to the tribunal's statements about violations in the GDR, while other Leftists resented the tribunal's refusal to investigate immediately human rights violations in the GDR. SH

NEW LEFT REVIEW, No. 109 (May-June 1978)

15 Greek Street, London W1V LF, England. $2.90 per issue. RAYMOND WILLIAMS, *"Problems of Materialism."* A critical but overly respectful review of Timpanaro's writings. Williams argues for an open materialism, incorporating the work of the empirical sciences, but avoiding the man-nature dualism with its corollaries, the "domination of nature," and its reverse, Timpanaro's "materialist pessimism." LOUIS ALTHUSSER, *"What Must Change in the Party."* Originally published in *Le Monde,* the author hoped that this critique of the French CP would lead to a widespread internal discussion of the party's behavior during the recent electoral fiasco. The fact that this article appeared outside the party press and the subsequent attack on "troublemakers" from within its press would tend to prove the folly of such hopes. ROY

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MEDVEDEV, *"Bukharin's Last Years."* A historical reconstruction. NICOS POULANTZAS, *"Towards a Democratic Socialism."* Contrary to those who perceive the roots of Stalinism in Lenin's centralism, Poulantzas argues that the problem is already present in Lenin's concept of dual power and his exclusive reliance on council democracy. Unfortunately, this argument is not explored in depth but only buttressed with a few quotes from Rosa Luxemburg. The author then goes on to state that mass action must not be external to the state but must bear on its internal contradictions, advocating a combination of direct democracy with a transformed representative democracy. BEN FINE, *"On the Origins of Capitalist Development."* Critically drawing on Robert Brenner's analysis (No. 104), the author attempts to analyze the "interaction between the internal development of production and the 'external' stimulus provided by capital" in relation to the transition to developed and underdeveloped forms of capitalism. BS

NEW LEFT REVIEW, No. 110 (July-August 1978)

Issue theme: Feminism and Bolshevism. Despite the theme, only one article deals with feminism. There is no common subject or set of issues for this installment but continuity can be found in basic Marxian tenets that recur in various articles. HENRI WEBER, *"Eurocommunism, Socialism and Democracy."* Argues that the present Eurocommunist theoretical and tactical position (both left and right) is based on accommodation with and internal change of existing capitalist economic and political power relations. Claims that this route is doomed because it denies the primacy of class struggle and the potential for the revolutionary transformation of social relations. MICHEL AGLIETTA, *"Phases of U.S. Capitalist Expansion."* Puts forward the United States as the most exemplary form of capitalist development. Traces its particular development from petty commodity forms to the intensive capital accumulation stage. TERRY EAGLETON, *"Liberality and Order: The Criticism of John Bayley."* Discusses the centrality of Bayley to current English literary criticism and describes his failure to comprehend Hardy's work as a symptom of the inherent nullity in Bayley's brand of criticism. JACQUELINE HEINEN, *"Kollontai and the History of Women's Oppression."* Lays out the historical limitations of Kollontai's analysis of the women's situation in the emerging workers' state of Russia. This analysis is based on lectures that Kollontai gave at the Sverdlov Institute in 1921 that reveal her subjugation to the mechanisms of internal control developing in the party to circumvent the emergence of workers' opposition. IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN, *"The Crisis of the Seventeenth Centuiry."* Wallerstein uses a cyclic expansion-stagnation theory to describe and explain the world system in the period from 1450 to 1750. Accepts a framework of political and economic expansion and stagnation which recur in 300-year periods. HANS MAGNUS ENZENSBERGER, *"Notes on the End of the World."* A cynical note on a dispirited left that has lost its vision of a utopia or a messianic rupture. And notes by Lukács on Benjamin and Brecht. A new translation of an old dialogue on a critical (Marxian) theory of aesthetics. MG

NEW LITERARY HISTORY, 9:1 (Autumn 1977)

Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, MD 21218. $11 per year (3 issues). Issue theme: Self-Confrontation and Social Vision. LOUIS A. RENZA, *"The Veto of the Imagination: A Theory of Autobiography."* Argues that autobiography is a unique mode structured around an ironic perspective that occludes the writer's own continuity with the "I" of the narrative. PATRICK GARDINER, *"Sartre on Character and Self-Knowledge." Being and Nothingness* abolishes the notion of fixed character, emphasizing instead the "project of oneself" and the significance of the Other or third. Gardiner repeatedly stresses Sartre's distinction from British philosophy! DAVID SIMPSON, *"Putting One's House in Order: The Career of the Self in Descartes' Method."* Challenging the neo-structuralist attack on the Cartesian unified, stable self, Simpson argues that the *Discourse on Method* dramatizes in an ironic strategy the interaction between the conventional self and a radically unstable self. STANISLAW EILE, *"The Novel as an Expression of the Writer's Vision of the World."* The novel does not merely express a certain world outlook; rather the reader's active participation dynamically realizes the semantics of the text. A summary of Russian formalist narrative theory. CHRISTINE BROOKE-ROSE, *"Self-Confrontation and the Writer."* An avant-garde dialogue of self-confrontation. Many French-inspired puns. IRVING LOUIS HOROWITZ, *"Autobiography as the Presentation of Self for Social Immortality."* An editorial summary of the issue. Horowitz attempts to raise questions that push autobiography beyond a purely literary orientation: does autobiography entail an ethical imperative? Does the massification of society make autobiography obsolete? PM

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POLITICS AND EDUCATION, 1:1

Wesleyan Station, Fisk Hall, Middletown, CT 06457. $120 per year (6 issues). *Politics and Education* is a new left-wing magazine of higher education published by the Center for the Study of Education and Politics. It focuses on the recent retrenchment in education, and, in particular, on problems of unequal access to education and the push toward vocational programs in higher education. Most importantly, it views education as providing a network of communication between those who oppose this retrenchment in their critical scholarship and organizing efforts. DAVID WHITE, *"The Bakke Case."* In this discussion of the Bakke case, White criticizes the University of California's arguments in defense of special admissions programs and argues that an even stronger case can be made—one that takes account of the historical reality of racism and discrimination in medical education. Since the university argued that special admissions programs were necessary to integrate the schools because minority students were less qualified, it did not mention the fact that historically white medical schools excluded minority students because of their race. Thus, the university did not make the strongest and most penetrating argument for special admissions, largely because it did not wish to admit its own exclusionary past. In the second part of the article, White questions the presumed correlation between merit and admissions criteria and between admissions criteria and the quality of performance of doctors. He cites studies that show that there is virtually no correlation between MCAT scores and medical school grades and that, in fact, there is an inverse relationship between MCAT scores and clinical performance. Though the article was written before the Bakke decision was handed down, it has much to say of contemporary relevance; White stresses the broader significance of these issues. Here he makes two points: (1) The Bakke controversy and other recent Supreme Court decisions have already hindered the fight against employment discrimination; (2) In the present era of political retrenchment and economic "stagflation" minorities have been hit hardest and it has become increasingly fashionable to justify institutional racism by stressing the so-called "innate inferiority" of minorities. ABBE SMITH, *"Sexual Harassment at Yale."* Outlines the sexual harassment and assault of female students by male professors and the ensuing court suit against Yale University. DAN PERLSTEIN, *"Kent State, 1970-1977."* Discusses the May 4, 1970, massacre of students and describes recent attempts to have justice done. BARBARA PAGE, *"The Assault on Affirmative Action."* Page refutes the three main arguments of academics opposed to affirmative action: (1) That success, material reward and upward mobility are functions of individual talent and that affirmative action spells quotas, thereby undercutting individual rights and hurting academic quality; (2) That academics, by their very nature, are more enlightened than ordinary people and are committed to democratic decision making; their commitment to excellence and egalitarianism places them above the vulgar practices of sex and race discrimination; (3) That because women have a commitment to home and the family, their productivity is necesasarily inhibited. She concludes that the new backlash is a strategy designed to control or contain marginal female and non-white workers and to legitimate the existing structure of social and economic inequality. JACK ZIPES, *"A Report on German Universities."* A critique of the *Report on German Universities* issued by the International Council on the Future of the University. Zipes criticizes the report for arguing that radicals are the primary threat to the future of democracy at the university. Zipes argues that the crisis of the German universities has more to do with the policies of the West Germany government. JOEL LEFKOWITZ, *"Brazilian Student Movement."* Chronicles the activities of the student movement in Brazil, which has initiated strikes, demanded an end to torture and arbitrary imprisonment, criticized social inequality and called for a restoration of democracy.

HKJ

POLITICS AND SOCIETY, 7:3 (1977)

Geron-XC Inc., Box 1108, Los Altos, CA 94022. $9.50 per year (4 issues). DAVID ABRAHAM, *"State and Classes in Weimar Germany."* The different ways in which capitalist social dominance might have been expressed politically in the Weimar Republic are examined. JAMES SCOTT, *"Hegemony and the Peasantry."* Analyzes the revolutionary advantages that the pre-capitalist values and social structure of the peasantry may represent in sheilding it from much of the impact of the ruling hegemony. An attempt is made to explain why, in Barrington Moore's words, "the well-springs of human freedom lie not only where Marx saw them, in the aspirations of classes about to take power, but perhaps even more in the dying wail of a class over whom the wave of progress is about to roll." JOSEPH R. FISZMAN, *"Education and Equality of Opportunity in Eastern Europe, with Special Focus on Poland."* PAUL THOMAS, *"The Mao-Marx Debate: A View from Outside China."* Focusing on the symposium in recent issues of *Modern China*,

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Thomas examines four areas of concern: Marx's "Eurocentrism" and its applicability to areas outside Western Europe; the related problems of voluntarism versus determinism in Marx's thought; the rigidity or flexibility of Marx's theory of historical stages; and the relationship between what Marx wrote and later versions of orthodox Marxist doctrine. PFM

PSYCHOANALYSIS AND CONTEMPORARY THOUGHT, 1:2 (1978)

International Universities Press Inc., 315 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10016. $30 per year (4 issues). RAZIEL ABELSON, *"Psychotherapy and Personal Dignity."* Philosophical free-will argument claiming that the concept of psychotherapy is incompatible with the concept of a person. JOSEPH MARGOLIS, *"Psychotherapy and Persons: Reply to R. Abelson."* A case of academic moral philosophy (i.e., certainly boring and questionably relevant). Margolis criticizes Abelson's simplistic dichotomy between person and automaton, the ambiguity in his use of the notion of "responsibility," and the injustice done the practice of psychotherapy. This scholastic debate is followed by the usual pair of rebuttals: RAZIEL ABELSON, JOSEPH MARGOLIS, *"A Further Exchange on Psychotherapy, Personal Dignity and Persons."* WENDY OLESKER, *"Cognition and the Separation-Individuation Process: A Study of Three Boys at Nursery School."* HARTVIG DAHL, BARRY STRENGEL, *"A Classification of Emotion Words: A Modification and Partial Test of de Rivera's Decision Theory of Emotions."* GR

RADICAL AMERICA, 12:2 (March-April 1978)

P.O. Box BN, Cambridge, MA 02104. $8 per year (4 issues). JAMES D. and EVA S. COCKCROFT, *"People's Art and Change: The Community Mural Movement."* An examination of the relations between neighborhood people, local artists, and organizers on the left in the making of a community mural. The artist is portrayed as an organizer: someone who helps people articulate their political understandings and who in turn affects them. TIM DRESCHER, RUPERT GARCIA, *"Recent Raza Murals in the U.S."* A history of Raza murals examining the many sources of imagery and their eclectic and inventive style and content. These murals introduce into the community concrete images of a powerful people and an interpretation of their history. RUTH DOMINO, *"The Wonderful White Paper."* An allegory set in pre-republican Spain portraying art as a vehicle for expressing and awakening political consciousness. SUSAN PORTER BENSON, *"The Clerking Sisterhood: Rationalization and the Work Culture of Saleswomen in American Department Stores, 1890-1960."* This research suggests that at least in this major women's occupation, the effect of changes in management practice over the 20th century was, ironically, to increase the level of workers' skill and thus inadvertently to permit the development of a powerful and enduring work culture. FRANK ACKERMAN, *"Dare to Struggle, Dare to Influence People."* The text of a speech given at the 1977 convention of the New American Movement, examining some of the problems arising from the strategy adopted in 1975 that focused on the organization on work in unions and existing mass movements. JUDY SYFERS, *"San Francisco School Workers' Union Struggle."* A discussion of organizing paraprofessionals in the public schools. Concludes that working with unions is not always the best tactic. PFM

RADICAL AMERICA, 12:5

JOANNE BARKAN, *"The Italian Communists: Anatomy of a Party."* Shows how the Italian Communist Party—in trying to be both a government party and a party of struggle—has failed to exploit the revolutionary possibilities of the 1970s. Traces the roots of this failure through the party's development since the end of World War II. MANNING MARABLE, *"Reaction: Thoughts on the Political Economy of the New South since the Civil Rights Movement."* Describes how white supremacy continues to work against the class interests of black and white workers in the economically booming New South. Argues that only class politics can combat racism and poverty. JOANNA BORNAT, *"Home and Work: A New Context for Trade Union History."* An oral history of English textile workers from a Marxist-feminist orientation. Also SHERRY WEINGART on July's ERA demonstration in Washington; JAMES RUSSELL on a San Francisco rank-and-file union victory; and DAVID WIDGERY writing from London on an anti-racist punk rock demonstration. JW

RADICAL PHILOSOPHY, No. 19 (Spring 1978)

40 Langdon Park Road, London N6 5QG, England. $7.50 for 3 issues. CLAUDIA VON BRAUNMUHL, *"The Attack on Civil Rights in West Germany."* A study of the legal and juridical decisions and principles by which the Berufsverbote have been justified. PAUL

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PATTON, *"Althusser's Epistemology: The Limits of the Theory of Theoretical Practice."* Althusser's own judgments on his earlier work in *Essays in Self-Criticism* are seen as more of a statement of self-justification than self-criticism. Patton concludes that Althusser has failed to provide theoretical justification for the claim that historical materialism is a science. ROY EDGLEY, *"Education for Industry."* Doubts about the quality of education in England have been of two general kinds. Cites the commonplace that between education and industry there is a gap where there should be links, and examines the argument that students are not reaching high enough levels in the subjects they study—in particular, that they are falling short in both verbal and arithmetic skills. MARTIN BARKER, *"Kant as a Problem for Marxism."* Argues that within the rich texture of Kant's thought there are elements, and in particular a structure, which need preserving in the transformation from idealism to materialism. The conclusion is that a materialist critique of Kant should make it possible to reconstruct a theory of ideology that is already implicit in many of Kant's comments; a theory of science, resolving both logical and historical dimensions; a resolution of the apparent shifts within the theory and practice of Marxism between determinist and voluntarist orientations; and a powerful base for the critique of specific ideological views. PFM

RADICAL SCIENCE JOURNAL, No. 5 (1977)

9 Poland Street, London W1V 3DG, England. 3 Pounds for 3 issues. DAVID TRIESMAN, *"The Institute of Psychiatry Sackings."* Through a consideration of issues raised during a 1973-74 staff dispute in the drug addiction project at the London University Institute of Psychiatry, Triesman identifies matters of general importance for a radical exploration of science. The patriarchal structure of managed research insured that conflicting political attitudes would be reflected in clashes over differences in scientific theory and method. Psychiatry is seen in the light of its newly expanded and jealously guarded professional territory, based on treating deviance as illness. PATRICK PARRINDER, *"The Black Wave: Science and Social Consciousness in Modern Science Fiction."* The traditional view of science fiction as escapist or uncritically scientist is contrasted with more recent literary and ideological developments. "Soft" science fiction reveals a movement from the physical to the social sciences, and from applied to speculative theory, as well as an increasing concern with human relationships instead of merely scientific ideas. Although science fiction failed as social criticism in the 1950s, its incorporation of mythological fantasy, literary allusion and technological despair enriched its (liberal) ambiguity. GAVIN BROWNING, *"Comment: A Note from a Sci-Fi Freak."* Browning questions Parrinder's schematic presentation, and notes that science fiction has been and remains predominantly ideological, ambiguous even at its most critical moments. He implies that political position is often quite different from artistic ability: well-written stories can be enjoyed even though they contain reactionary or sexist attitudes. He lists seven novels that illustrate this point, with a brief exposition of the ambiguity of each one. BOB YOUNG, *"Science is Social Relations."* An uneven examination by a member of the *Radical Science Journal* collective of themes relating to the title. He calls for theoretical and practical improvement, outlines a counter-hegemonic worldview, and argues for the importance of everyday life in the prefigurative struggle for socialism. Followed by an extensive bibliography. RSJ COLLECTIVE, *"Directory of Fraternal Publications."* Extremely useful annotated list of journals relevant to radicals, with addresses and subscription information. GR

RADICAL SCIENCE JOURNAL, No. 6-7 (1978)

This issue consists of a series of critical reviews written by members of the RSJ collective. LES LEVIDOW, *"A Marxist Critique of the IQ Debate."* Two related reviewsd preceded by a common introduction that locates the resurgence of IQ interest in the role of the "Great Debate" in British capitalist reproduction and social control. The first review examines Steven Rose's "Scientific Racism and Ideology" (Chapter 7 of *The Political Economy of Science*) from a leftist, critical perspective, arguing that Rose shares the same scientism held by those scientific racists he is attacking. By uncritically maintaining the science-ideology distinction, Rose contains and deflates any radical implications his IQ critique has for the general capitalist manipulation of human nature. The second review examines Chapter 4 of Bowles and Gintis' *Schooling in Capitalist America* ("Inequality and the Meritocracy"), arguing that although Bowles and Gintis challenge some of the terms constraining existing IQ debates, their empirical-statistical approach leads them to rely on questionable concepts that reify capitalist social relations, separate cognition from personality and educational relations from economic ones, thus producing an economistic picture of social reproduction. Hence Bowles and Gintis' fusion of libertarian

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impulses with scientism makes their "socialism" abstract and utopian. These two reviews are excellent, creative applications of the *form* of Marx's analysisd to material other than political economy. MIKE BARNETT, *"Technology asnd the Labor Process."* Observations on Mike Cooley's "Contradictions of Science and Technology in the Productive Process" (in Rose and Rose, eds., *The Political Economy of Science*), which note the role that computer science plays in the Taylorization of advanced technological work. BOB YOUNG, *"Getting Started on Lysenkoism."* Young claims that Richard Lewontin and Richard Levins' "The Problem of Lysenkoism" (in Rose and Rose, eds., *The Radicalization of Science*) goes beyond cold war use-abuse polemics to present the first balanced analysis of Lysenkoism useful for radicals. Followed by an appendix and a bibliography. MARGOT WADDELL, BARRY RICHARDS, MAUREEN McNEIL, LES LEVIDOW, *"Psychoanalysis, Marxism and Feminism."* Review of Juliet Mitchell's *Psychoanalysis and Feminism* that criticizes her Althusserian notion of science and notes gaps in her approach stemming from structuralist theoreticism. Followed by an appendix on the importance of the British "object relations" school for feminists. LES LEVIDOW, *"Grunwick: Technology and Class Struggle."* Comments on the general issues related to a strike at a film processing plant in London. MICHAEL YOUNG, *"Althusser's Marxism and British Social Science."* A critical rejoinder to the following uncritical review, which notes taht the denial of the subject inherent in Althusser's scientism constitutes a fundamental barrier to the constructive appropriation of his work, since it sustains the elitism of bourgeois academic and politica life. GREG McLENNAN, *"Will the Real Louis Althusser Stand Up?"* Review of *Essays in Self-Criticism*. RSJ COLLECTIVE, *"Reading Lists on Marxism and Science, the Labor Process, Scientism and Psychoanalysis."* One of the many useful bibliographies the RSJ collective prints for the ongoing education of its readers. RSJ COLLECTIVE, *"Directory of Fraternal Publications."* Continued from last issue. GR

SIGNS: JOURNAL OF WOMEN IN CULTURE AND SOCIETY, 3:3 (Spring 1978)
University of Chicago Press, 5801 Ellis Avenue, Chicago, IL 60637. Subscriptions: $15 per year (4 issues). SALLY McCONNELL-GINET, *"Intonation in a Man's World."* A discussion of intonation as the chief sex-specific linguistic expression in American English. MARIANNE SHAPIRO, *"The Provençal* Trobairitz *and the Limits of Courtly Love."* JOANNE FEIT DIEHL, *" 'Come Slowly—Eden': An Exploration of Women Poets and Their Muse."* Women poets' perceptions of poetic influence in the 19th century. Emily Dickinson is portrayed as a central figure in the creation of a tradition of post-romantic women poets as they seek independence from powerful male precursors. PAUL J. ANDRISANI, *"Job Satisfaction among Working Women."* An examination over a 5-year period of the causes of job satisfaction or dissatisfaction among working women in their 30s and 40s. BARBARA STOLER MILLER, NABANEETA DEV SEN, AGUEDA PIZARRO DE RAYO, *"Splitting the Mother Tongue: Bengali and Spanish Poems in English Translations."* Two poets and their English translator discuss the translation experience. CATHY STEIN GREENBLAT, JOAN GASKILL BAILY, *"Sex Role Games."* An examination of games currently on the market that deal with such questions as women's rights, affirmative action, decision-making by couples, and the meaning of the women's liberation movement. Games are evaluated with a veiw to their effectiveness as tools for college students. CHERIS KRAMER, BARRIE THORNE, NANCY HENLEY, *"Perspectives on Language and Communication."* A review essay of work in language and communication as it relates to sexual differentiation: sex differences and similarities in language use; sexism in language; relations between language structure and language use; and prospects for change. HILDA KAHNE, *"Economic Research on Women and Families."* A review of studies of women's productive activities and their roles in the market and in the American family, focusing on new directions in non-market and family-related research and on contributions to the study of productive activities and work discontinuities over time. Reviews, comments, letters and archives. SW

STUDIES IN MARXISM, No. 1 (1977)
Marxist Educational Press, Dept. of Anthropology, University of Minnesota, 224 Church Street SE, Minneapolis, MN 55455. $2.85 per copy. Issue theme: Marxism and New Left Ideology. These papers from the First Midwestern Marxist Scholars Conference attempt a creative renaissance, but in effect they defend outmoded and problematic categories in a rigid manner all too common in leftist circles. ILEANA RODRIGUEZ, *"Eduard Batalov and the Philosophy of Revolt: The New Left through Soviet Eyes."* A review of Batalov's book on New Left ideology, fairly interesting on the official Soviet line regarding Marcuse, but uncritically presented.

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WILLIAM SIMBOLOV, *"The Rise of the New Left."* Terrible reduction of a social movement to its theoretical "sources." TERENCE BALL, *"Marxism, Revisionism and the State."* Brief and totally unoriginal exercise in Marxology. ERWIN MARQUIT, *"Science as a Science."* A well-argued critique of Darko Suvin's article on Engels in *Minnesota Review* No. 6. ROBERT HOLUB, WIGAND LANGE, SARA MARKHAM PIETSCH, STEPHEN PIETSCH, CHARLES SPENCER, RONALD YOUNG, *"Public Sphere, Labor, and Interaction: A Methodological Critique of Jürgen Habermas' Social Theory."* Brief but good discussion of Habermas' relation to Marxist theory, which notes the similarity between Habermas and the developmental modes popular in mainstream U.S. sociology in the 1950s and 1960s. DOMENICO SINDICO, *"New Left Theories on the Mode of Production."* GR

STUDIES IN MARXISM, No. 2

Issue theme: Social Class in the Contemporary United States. Again, a fairly significant topic is sacrificed to partisan polemics. The real nature of the changes in contemporary American capitalism is not the issue here so much as it is the "dangers" posed by erroneous New Left thinkers. Consequently, the real theoretical issues that need to be debated—such as the usefulness of many of the categories of mechanistic Marxism, the traditional crisis theory of social change, or the Leninist model of political activity—are uncritically upheld rather than creatively re-examined. These papers from the Second Midwest Marxist Scholars Conference demonstrate how a powerful theory of social change can, under certain conditions, sacrifice truth value to sectarian squabble. GIL GREEN, *"The False Promises of Stanley Aronowitz."* Aronowitz is subjective and spontaneist; the class struggle is alive and well. WILLIAM SIMBOLOV, *"Commentary: Gil Green and Aronowitz's False Promises."* EDWARD GREER, *"Racial Employment Discrimination in the Gary Works, 1906-1974."* JOHN PAPPADEMOS, *"Intellectuals and the Working Class."* Leninist nonsense. ERWIN MARQUIT, *"The Technical Intelligentsia and the Technological Relations of Production."* GABRIELLE BERSIER, NADIA DONCHENKO, VIKTORIA HARWIG, STEPHEN PIETSCH, CHARLES SPENCE, CHRISTA STUTUIS, *"Sex Now, Class Later? Comments on Sheila Rowbotham's 'Woman's Consciousness, Man's World'."* GR

STUDIES IN MARXISM, No. 3

$4.85 per copy. Entire issue consists of a book by ERWIN MARQUIT, *"The Socialist Countries: General Features of Political, Economic and Cultural Life."* Includes chapters on the following topics: communist parties, socialist goals, economic planning, the nature of work, standard of living, governmental systems, women, and international integration of socialist economies. Informative propaganda. GR

THEORY AND SOCIETY, 5:3 (May 1978)

Elsevier Scientific Publishing Co., P.O. Box 330, Amsterdam, The Netherlands. $18 per year. ELLEN BRUN, JACQUES HERSH, *"Paradoxes in the Political Economy of Detente."* An examination of the historical transformation in East-West relations from the standpoint of the world market. The U.S. is losing its influence while the Soviet Union is gaining influence, with the key to the future being Europe. The authors believe complementarity of economies is an illusion, promising greater difficulties, even war. WILLIAM P. NYE, *"The Emergent Idea of Race and Racism in the United States."* Nye attempts to isolate and elucidate some culturally significant ideas that aid in perpetuating the American racial (caste) system. He specifically examines the taken-for-granted logic of everyday racial typifications in America. JOHN LAW, PETER LODGE, *"Structure as Process and Environmental Constraint: A Note on Ethnomethodology."* The authors adopt a reformist view that both ethnomethodology and conventional sociology make implicit interpretive assumptions and use knowledge about social structure, yet these perspectives are unaware of their own limitations. Y. MICHAEL BODEMAN, *"A Problem of Sociological Praxis: The Case for Interventive Observation in Field Work."* This is a review and critique of current approaches to field work. Bodeman suggests all field work is intrinsically political. He advocates field methodology with a primary concern to end the misery that it observes. Book reviews: ELI ZARETSKY reviews *Capitalism, the Family and Personal Life* by Louise A. Tilly, and *The Making of the Modern Family* by Edward Shorter; JAMES FARGANIS reviews *The Critique of Domination* by Trent Schroyer. RER

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WORKING PAPERS COLLECTION

Feral Publications, Box 83 Wentworth Building, 174 City Road, Darlington, Australia 2008. Issue on *Language, Sexuality and Subversion.* This is the first in a projected series of books, collected articles, monographs and translations called the "Working Papers" collection. This publishing project is an expansion of the activities of the journal *Working Papers: Studies in the Discourses of Sex, Subjectivity and Power,* which has now abandoned its journal format, though the publishers do not preclude the launching of other journals in the future once the "Working Papers" collection itself has been established. This first volume is a collection of articles and translations around the general theme of "the importance of languages and discourses in inventing political strategies." GEORGE ALEXANDER, *"Introduction: On Editorial Strategies."* A discussion of the representative function of discourse. On the one hand, this involves an evaluation of the politics of "editorial strategies" in radical theoretical journals on the basis of recent critiques of the theory of representation inspired particularly by Jacques Derrida: on the other hand, it provides a set of conceptual coordinates for the first section of the book, *Politics of Transmission.* This section contains a lengthy treatment of certain recent political developments in Italy. MEAGHAN MORRIS, *"Eurocommunism versus Semiological Delinquency."* A historical account of the conflicts in 1977 between the PCI and various forms of left-wing opposition, especially the armed terrorist groups, the militant workers' *autonomia* movement and the movement around the free radios, of which the most spectacular was Radio Alice. The role of the PCI is analyzed in terms of the functioning of assertive and representative discourses. UMBERTO ECO, *"Silence is L(e)aden."* A consideration of the place of the media in the diffusion of terrorism. JEAN BAUDRILLARD, *"Requiem for the Media."* McLuhan, Marxist theories of the media (Brecht, Benjamin, Enzensberger) and Jakobson's communication schema are all criticized in this article, which challenges the idea that attempts either to subvert the media from within or to take them over from without can lead to any radical change in the structure of communication in the broadest sense. Part 2, Power and Psychoanalysis, presents two different views on the discursive strategies of psychoanalysis. The first paper, MIA CAMPIONI and ELIZABETH GROSS, *"Little Hans: the Production of Oedipus,"* is an attempt from within the framework of Marxist-feminist theory of patriarchal ideology to underscore the phallocentric assumptions in Freud's interpretation of one of his most famous cases. As well as giving their own account of the discursive practices of psychoanalysis from a perspective that rejects the Freudo-Marxist position and stresses the *institutional* dimension of analysis, Deleuze and Guattari in the papers called *The Interpretation of Utterances* expose the ways in which psychoanalysis and psychotherapy both actively work to crush desire and take away from people any real possibility of speech. In Part 3, Language of Sexes, other points of reference relating to the question of patriarchy and psychoanalysis are outlined in LUCE IRIGARAY, *"That Sex Which Is Not One."* An example of the unique work of a French feminist who has divorced herself from the established analyses of women's oppression, this paper argues that there is a reciprocal relation between the occultation of women's bodies by phallocentric categories and a repression in feminist theory itself of female sexual specificity. PAUL FOSS, *"Inspection and the Disciplinary Society."* Takes up a number of points from Irigaray's text and draws together some of the major themes of the collection for the purposes of a specific application to the recent history of Australian radical sexual movements. One of the frequent objections to much contemporary French thought is that of its style: the paper assumes this problem of the strategies of interpretation, and, by way of an opposition between spectacle and inspection, links the repression of style imposed by the dominant codes of reading with the repression of delinqent bodies. This opposition leads to a consideration of the working of "inspecting" institutions of pedagogy and the problem of radical incorporation into these bodies through the institutionalization of radical research and teaching programs. MPM

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LETTER FROM TRIVO INDJICH

In the summer issue of *Telos*, Sharon Zukin writes, in introducing the "Belgrade Manifesto" written by members of the Belgrade *Praxis* group, that "one of the original eight is not among the signers of this statement; coincidentally or not, his articles have reappeared in one of the major sociological journals in Yugoslavia." I am the "one of the original eight" referred to, and I consider this interpretation not only unfair, but also not duly accounted for and obscure as to its motives. Not subscribing to the principle of "democratic centralism," I did not feel obliged to add my signature to any single statement proposed by any of my colleagues. If Zukin deems it right and opportune to resort to such an unqualified and arbitrary differentiation as to the "original eight" on the basis of the supposed "privilege" of being allowed to publish, she was surely duty-bound to inform the readers of *Telos* of the facts. Namely, that almost all the "original eight" have had the following contributions republished in the "major" Yugoslav scholarly journals:

—Stojanovich, "How to Approach Marx's Determinism," *Theoria*, 1-2 (1976).

—Stojanovich, "Stalinism and the Historical Action," *Sociology*, 1 (1978).

—Tadich, "Right, Nature and Order," *Philosophical Studies* (1975).

—Tadich, "Revolution and Order," *Sociology*, 2-3 (1978).

—Golubovich, "Changes in the Family Structure in Serbia," *Sociology*, 3-4 (1977).

—Golubovich, "Trends in 'New Sociology'," *Sociology*, 1-2 (1978).

—Golubovich, "Socio-cultural and Human Conditions for the Realization of Self-Government," *Sociological Review*, XI(1978).

—Zivotich, "Futurology and Utopia," *Culture*, 36 (1977).

—Zivotich, "On Heidegger," *Delo*, 12 (1977).

—Popov, "Structure, Movement and Order," *Man and System*, V (1977).

Of course there are more, but the point has been made. I do not think that Zukin's statement, confronted with this, deserves any further serious comment.

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